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ABSTRACT
Malaysia is primarily an agricultural country where the smallholder 
sector is predominant. An integral part of the government strategy 
in agriculture is the heavy subsidisation of the smallholder sector. 
However, recently, the Malaysian government declared that the 
extensive system of subsidies in agriculture would be thoroughly 
reviewed with the ultimate objective of cutting back on subsidies 
which were deemed to be wasteful and unproductive. The government 
has taken the official stand that farmers and smallholders should 
not rely excessively on subsidies and that they must be more self- 
reliant and do away with the so-called " subsidy mentality The 
thesis attempts to investigate the claim of the government whether 
there is such a thing as a.” subsidy mentality " among Malaysian 
farmers and if there is one the reasons for its existence. In order 
to establish this claim, it is necessary first to prove whether, or 
not subsidies contribute towards improving the productivity and 
welfare of farmers. This is done by analysing the allocative and 
redistributive effects of agricultural subsidies in smallholder 
agriculture. In addition, the thesis also attempts to go further by 
investigating how farmers perceive and respond to subsidies by 
studying their attitudes towards specific subsidies. This is done by 
undertaking empirical investigation of two main smallholders’ 
activities in Malaysia, namely smallholder rubber cultivation and 
rice farming through the technique of sample survey. The study found 
that the effect of subsidies differs between different crops, types 
of subsidies and between farm and regional level. Hence the effect 
of subsidies is not conclusive. Generally, farmers had a positive 
attitude towards subsidies and most of them had to rely on subsidies 
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1.0 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Malaysia is essentially an agricultural country where about 
41 % of its work force was employed in this sector in 1980. Since 
the country gained independence in 1957, rural development has been 
given top priority and agricultural development constituted the core 
thrust of developmental focus of the government. This is clearly 
seen in the huge budgetary allocations that were set aside for 
agriculture in the five year development plans. Most of the money 
allocated for agriculture in fact went to various subsidy programmes 
that were subsequently instituted. However, while the government was 
deeply involved in its efforts to develop the backward agriculture 
sector, at the same time it was concerned that its liberal subsidy 
policies might have an adverse effect on its limited financial 
resources and of the likelihood of negative impact that these 
policies might have on the farmers themselves who tend to rely 
excessively on government subsidies. This over-reliance of farmers 
on the government - which may be termed as the '* subsidy mentality " 
- is a cause of deep concern for policy-makers in Malaysia. In fact 
this is a dilemma faced by almost all developing countries which is 
to what extent should farmers be subsidised and how much subsidies 
is considered adequate to help farmers stand on their own feet.
There is a general fear among the policy makers in Malaysia 
that excessive subsidisation of the smallholder farming sector is
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wasteful to the economy and detrimental to national objectives of 
creating a class of progressive farmers. This is because the 
government perceives that agricultural subsidies do not seem to 
contribute much to enhance productivity while at the same time, 
farmers do not seem to be adequately motivated to work harder when 
they receive subsidies. It is widely thought that farmers seem to 
take the subsidies given to them for granted. In Malaysia, this 
attitude is frowned upon and the small farmer who manifests all the 
above symptoms is said to have a ” subsidy mentality M. Here the 
government seems to perceive that its aid and incentive policies, 
particularly in the granting of input and output subsidies have only 
managed to transform the farmer into a mere passive recipient of aid 
while their level of effective utilisation of the subsidies remained 
relatively low and marginal. The net effect of all this, it is 
argued has been a decline in the general productivity levels of 
farmers which have not improved significantly. In addition, it is 
alleged that farmers underutilise and even waste subsidies that were 
granted to them. This view of the government is further reinforced 
by the fact that the poverty levels of subsidy-receivers ( assumed 
to be small farmers ) have not improved and that output levels have 
remained stagnant. ( It is important to note here that the 
government assumes that its subsidy programmes would be adequate to 
uplift fanners above poverty levels ). From this it is clear that 
the government does not consider the granting of all agricultural 
subsidies as merely income transfers but rather subsidies as 
valuable resource inputs meant to act an incentive for improving 
resource allocation and the productivity of the farmer and hence his
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income level. However, in practice there are some types of subsidies 
which are more redistributive in nature rather than allocative. For 
example, the padi price subsidy launched in 1980 is meant mainly as 
a redistributive mechanism to increase the income position of the 
farmers. Therefore, in assessing the impact of subsidies, 
consideration must be given to the nature of subsidies involved.
In 1984 the government commissioned the Economic Planning Unit 
with the assistance of the World Bank to undertake an extensive 
reappraisal of the agricultural subsidy policies in Malaysia with a 
view of rationalising the whole system and with the aim of either 
reducing, retaining or even removing certain kinds of subsidies. The 
study recommended that the system of agricultural subsidies should 
be reviewed and rationalised. It is postulated that the attitude of 
the government towards the agricultural sector in general and 
subsidies in particular have changed dramatically in the 1980s due 
to the following factors
i) attitude of new leadership on role of agriculture viv a vis the 
manufacturing sector
ii) the need for a full commercialisation of the agriculture sector
iii) dismal failure of present government strategies on subsidies
iv) financial constraints facing the country due to the recession.
In the light of the above situation, policy-makers in Malaysia 
believe that it would be in the best interest of the country if the 
government were to trim and reduce the amount of subsidies given to 
farmers. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the Mid-Term 
Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan published in 1984 which stated 
that,
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" .... Agricultural subsidies have claimed a substantial amount of
the financial resources of the government. The role of agricultural 
subsidies in agricultural development will need to be reviewed, not 
only because of the tightening of the financial resources of the 
government but also because of the long-term effect of subsidies on 
the farming community. An important task in the years ahead will be 
the need to progressively reduce the dependence of farmers on 
subsidies, i.e. to eliminate the subsidy mentality which has been 
part of the agricultural system in the country. The continuation of 
an extensive system of subsidy is eroding the will of farmers to be 
more independent, self-reliant and to raise their productivity and’ 
income by utilising their own resources, rather than relying 
excessively on the support of the government. "
In connection with this, we are interested to investigate 
whether what the government says about the farmers vis a vis 
subsidies is true or justifiable in the light of empirical data. Our 
intuition asserts that that the government has not been fair in 
blaming farmers for the failure of subsidy programmes without first 
of all providing a solid empirical basis for its allegation. In 
official documents we have not seen any but general and vague 
statements about farmers being too dependent on the government. It 
is our belief that subsidies are just one aspect of assistance to 
farmers and their impact therefore cannot be analysed in isolation. 
Other problems of a structural-institutional nature should not be 
ignored when assessing farmers’ performance. In fact before arriving 
at any conclusions regarding farmers* response to subsidies, it is 
necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of each subsidy programme
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objectively and not merely to make empty statements about farmers 
attitude and labelling them as having a " subsidy mentality " which 
is perjorative and demoralising to farmers. If farmers were to have 
a high ” subsidy mentality " by implication it means that farmers 
are not productive, not diligent, not self-reliant, have no 
initiative or just plain lazy. Although the government may have good 
intentions by coining and popularising this terminology in order to 
make the farmers stand on their toes, we believe that it must have 
an empirical basis. To do this it is necessary to study the impact 
and evaluate the effectivenes of subsidies on all crops that are 
currently subsidised by the government. In addition, it is necessary 
to find out farmers’ attitude and perception towards subsidies. It 
is therefore our intention in this study to make a small 
contribution to the continuing debate on farmers* response to 
subsidies and whether subsidies have contributed positively or 
negatively in achieving the developmental goals of the government. 
The specific objective of our study is a modest attempt to evaluate 
the effectiveness of subsidies and to find out how farmers perceive 
subsidies and factors determining their behaviour. It is hoped that 
some useful lessons may be drawn from the study which might be used 
as important input in formulating future policies pertaining to 
subsidies in Malaysia. We believe that an assessment of subsidy 
programmes based only on economic consideration is inadequate and 
that there is a need to further assess subsidies from farmers’ 
perception and point of view.
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2.0 OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
The objective of the study is to investigate whether the 
proposition of the government as summarised above is valid and 
justified. For this purpose, we propose to confine our investigation 
to the level of small farmers for the following reasons
i) it is the contention of the government that the majority of small 
fanners do not respond adequately and positively to government 
subsidies
ii) the small farming sector constitute the majority of the whole 
work force in Malaysia
iii) the small farming sector is the poorest category of workers in 
the country
iv) most of the small farmers belong to one racial group, namely 
Malays in a multi-ethnic society
The focus of the research is to study the effectiveness of 
subsidy programmes. Among the issues that we expect to cover in the 
study include the following
i) effect of subsidies on the resource allocation behaviour of small 
farmers
ii) effect of subsidies on productivity and income levels of small 
farmers
iii) perception and attitude of farmers towards subsidies
In this study we will confine our investigation to small 
farmers in the ri ce and rubber sector. The more specific objectives 
of the study are as follows
i) to determine the effect of agricultural subsidies on the income 
of farmers by looking at changes in production level, cost of
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production and form of usage of these subsidies
ii) to determine the effect of agricultural subsidies towards 
overall padi and rubber production
iii) to determine to what extent the implementation of agricultural 
subsidies have benefited the target groups
iv) to get an overall picture of the socio-economic status of small 
farmers before and after subsidy schemes have been implemented
v) to determine whether redistributive goals of subsidies have been 
achieved.
3.0 WORKING HYPOTHESIS
To assist us in the research, it was necessary for us to 
formulate a few working hypotheses as follows
i) Subsidy policies are favoured because they tend to stimulate the 
use of new production inputs which were previously not accessible to 
farmers either because they were too expensive or they were not 
known to farmers. However, we are postulating that these subsidies 
have failed to stimulate the use of these new inputs either because 
these subsidies did not benefit the small farmer or because they 
never reach them.
ii) Subsidies are also widely used because they tend to increase 
output of farmers. However, in the Malaysian case we are postulating 
that subsidies do not enhance the productivity of farmers due to the
presence of intervening variables between the administration of
subsidies and the final outcome.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 therefore states that the allocative effect
of subsidies to stimulate input use and output increase in
7
production in Malaysian agriculture is negative,
iii) It is also hypothesised that excessive, unselective and 
indiscriminate granting of subsidies to small farmers is not 
conducive to their work attitudes and motivation and hence 
productivity due to the phenomenon of M subsidy mentality ". It is 
postulated that small farmers in Malaysia are too dependent upon 
government subsidies and that they exhibit the " subsidy mentality ” 
which in turn affects their productivity.
4.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH OF STUDY
The thesis will attempt to test all the above issues 
highlighted by these hypothesis by studying the padi and rubber 
sector at the smallholder level in Malaysia. Four chapters will be 
devoted to the empirical section using primary data from a survey 
and secondary data from published sources. Regression analysis 
supplemented by extensive tabulation analysis will be widely used.
Methodology of Data Collection
To generate primary data two sample surveys were undertaken in 
the state of Perak in Peninsular Malaysia. The field survey 
technique was used to generate primary data. The stratified random 
sampling method was employed to choose respondents in which the 
population was divided into a number of groups or strata. These 
strata consist of administrative units or districts and sub­
districts. Within each stratum a random sample of farms were 
selected. This meant that every farm had an equal chance of being 
selected. The data collection instrument employed was the
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questionnaire which was administered by interviewing farmers 
personally. The questionnaires were designed to extract information 
on the broad socio-economic structure of farmers and on the input, 
output, income and expenditures before and after subsidy situation. 
Questions related to farmers’ attitude to subsidies also form an 
important part of the questionnaire. They were mainly qualitative in 
nature soliciting open-ended and also closed-ended answers.
On the other hand, secondary data was obtained from published 
official documents plus published and unpublished work from various 
government departments and statutory bodies.
Steps in Field Survey
In attempting to generate data from the survey, the following 
steps were thought to be critical :
i) Identify sector to study
ii) Identification of region
iii) Questionnaire design
iv) Identification of sample through stratified sampling
v) Identification of village and household to survey
vi) Administration of pilot survey
vii) Administration of actual survey
viii) Collation of data
ix) Analysis of data
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Limitations of Data
Despite taking all the precautions necessary to ensure that 
data generated would be good and unbiased, certain procedural 
matters tend to undermine the quality of data. Some of these include 
the following
i) The interview was done personally by the author on a once for all 
basis where the head of household was interviewed for an average 
time period of one hour. There was no time to check data 
inconsistencies.
ii) Farmers who agreed to be interviewed either in their homes or 
fields had to rely mainly on their memory.
iii) Farmers were chosen at random and were not given advanced 
notice of the intention to interview them.
iv) Field staff of LPP and RISDA accompanied the author on all 
interviews in order to facilitate the survey - how far responses 
were biased cannot be determined.
v) An average of 8 households were interviewed per day. This meant 
that interviews schedules were intensive and exhausting to the 
author.
In summary, the limitations of data were mainly due to limited time 
available to the author and resource constraints.
For padi areas, the survey was conducted during the new 
planting season while for rubber areas, survey was only conducted on 
smallholders who had replanted at least once. Data was collated and 
analysed manually because the number of respondents was relatively 
small. ( padi, n = 75; rubber, n = 87 ) RATS ( Regression Analysis 
for Time Series Programme ) was used to run regressions.
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5.0 OUTLINE OF THESIS
The body of the thesis is presented in three sections. Part I 
comprise a review of the literature on agricultural subsidies, both 
theoretical and empirical and the small farmer, the target group of 
subsidy policies. Chapter 2 discusses the rationale and theoretical 
justification for subsidies in general and agricultural subsidies 
specifically. Chapter 3 discusses on the impact of subsidies on 
resource allocation and on welfare and income distribution. The 
economic literature is explored for its contribution to the study of 
the consequences of subsidies. Chapter 4 focusses the discussion on 
the small farmers as recipients of subsidies and discusses their 
motivations, values and work orientation and their attitudes to 
work. Part II of the thesis is on the analysis of data. Chapter 5 
introduces the section by giving an overview of agricultural 
development in Malaysia and a general survey on the extent of 
agricultural subsidies in Malaysia. Chapter 6 and 7 discuss the 
padi and rice sector. Chapter 6 is a macro or economy wide analysis 
of input and output subsidies while Chapter 7 discusses the survey 
data. Chapter 7 also focuses the discussion on the attitude of rice 
farmers to subsidies. Chapter 8 and 9 deals with the rubber sector 
with the former taking the macro perspective and latter the micro 
perspective. Chapter 10 synthesises and compares the findings 
between padi and rubber sector and gives the findings and policy 
implications of the whole study.
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6.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study is an attempt to analyse the impact of subsidies on
productivity and income levels of farmers. It also analyses how
farmers respond to subsidies. Therefore, besides dealing with the
allocative and redistributive aspects of subsidies, the study also
analyses farmers* attitude to subsidies. In conventional economic
analysis, it is sufficient to deal only with the economic aspects
while the attitudinal aspects are barely touched upon. Farmers*
attitude and motivations to economic incentives are always assumed
to be constant. Hence, this study has attempted to integrate both
kinds of analysis together in order to give it a wider perspective
and hopefully it will enable us to understand better how farmers
behave and react to economic incentives. However, since this kind of
integrated analysis is not common and the methodology used not
vigorously applied and tested, the findings and conclusions are only
tentative and exploratory in nature. It is hoped that more research
would be done in future using this integrated approach where
economics could combine with other disciplines in order to produce a
more balanced and realistic analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL DESIRABILITY AND ECONOMIC 
JUSTIFICATION FOR AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The issue of subsidies in general and agricultural subsidies in 
particular is highly controversial. There are many proponents for 
and against subsidies and there seems to be no general agreement as 
to which view is correct or acceptable. Subsidies, as a matter of 
public policy have been widely adopted in almost every country, both 
developed and developing for different reasons. Agricultural 
subsidies in particular stand out as one of the most controversial 
areas where subsidization policies have been employed.
Objective of Chapter
The object of this chapter is to survey and analyse the 
justification and rationale of the various types of agricultural 
subsidies and the criticisms against them. More specifically, this 
chapter will discuss the following
a) the need for government intervention in agriculture
b)-distortions in agriculture and agricultural pricing policies
c) the definition and interpretation of subsidies
d) the rationale and justification of subsidies
e) the criticisms against subsidies
f) summary
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2.0 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE
The widespread interest and involvement of the state in 
agriculture is a universal phenomenon. The form and extent of state 
intervention varies from that of being highly supportive to that of 
being highly repressive against agriculture. The latter is visibly 
apparent in many LDCs while the former is common in the DCs.
However, of late many LDCs have changed their policies in favour of 
agriculture and resorted to a policy of widespread subsidisation of 
their agricultural sector. This change in attitude may be attributed 
partly to the conviction of the state that it has a moral obligation 
to assist the poor and small farmers who happen to constitute the 
majority of the farm population of these countries, and particularly 
to the political pressure of the farm lobby. An additional 
explanation is that LDCs may be genuinely concerned about the state 
of their agriculture and that it should and could be the leading 
sector in their path toward the development of their countries, as 
was the case in Japan and many present developed countries. [ 1 ]
On the other hand, for the DCs, notably the EEC, USA and Japan, 
government intervention in agriculture has been mainly undertaken to 
support the strong agriculture lobby in order to stabilise farm 
incomes and to correct and rectify the perceived unfavourable terms 
of trade between agriculture and the non-agriculture sector. More 
often than not, through the policies adopted, the marginal and 
smaller farmers benefit relatively little or nothing at all while 
the bigger and richer farmers reap all the advantages and benefits. 
At the same time, these policies also cause havoc and disruptions to 
the economies of the LDCs, mainly through dumping and stiff tariff
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against importation of agricultural products of the LDCs. [ 2 ]
But, whatever the outcome or implication of farm policies may 
be, it is a common attribute of the agricultural sector that it is 
of great importance to the state and hence inevitably highly 
politicised. A second common feature of the agricultural sector is 
that it faces a host of basic and fundamental problems that is not 
present in other sectors. These problems mainly revolves around the 
issues of demand, supply and resource allocation which interact in a 
dynamic setting to produce a sector which is highly volatile and 
unstable. [ 3 ]. This unique feature of agriculture reinforces the 
government’s conviction that by intervening in it, it would 
hopefully be able to serve the best interest of the farming 
community and the economic stability of the nation, especially when 
agriculture is the main preoccupation of the majority of the people.
However, although the case for agricultural support and state 
intervention is well established, numerous criticisms have been 
formulated and advanced against this policy. This will be discussed 
more thoroughly in the final part of the chapter. The above 
introductory remarks have only served to give a backdrop towards our 
understanding and discussion of the controversial issues of 
agricultural subsidies.
3.0 AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICIES
According to Hallet, the three most common intervention 
policies of the government in agriculture can be classified as 
pricing policy, structural policy and marketing policy. [ 4 ] We 
shall take up only the case of pricing policy which is an integral
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part of the total development policy of a country and focus on 
agriculture. Agricultural pricing policy basically involves the 
taxation or subsidisation of agricultural commodities, for example 
through the granting of subsidies through price support or input 
subsidy. The effect of these measures would either favour or 
disfavour the production or consumption of specific commodities. And 
since commodities under government control or command is significant 
in the composition of a country’s income, consumption and trade, the 
effect of these policies on the economy would certainly be great as 
it affects government revenue, welfare, the Balance of Payment, 
National Income and the rate of economic growth. [ 5 ]
In this regard, Tolley, et. al. [ 6 ] mentioned that among the 
most important objectives of agricultural pricing policies would 
include the following
a) to bring about certain income distribution deemed desirable by 
policy-makers
b) to provide incentives to fanners to increase production
c) to act as an instrument of stabilisation
d) to generate government revenue
e) as an instrument to speed up the process of economic development.
However, it should be noted that the above objectives need not 
necessarily be consistent with one another. For example, a policy of 
low domestic prices would benefit consumers and reduce cost of 
living but would lead to lower farm income. This would then have an 
undesirable effect upon farmers* incentive to produce which would 
then necessitate greater importation and heavier reliance on foreign 
sources. But, on the other hand, if farm prices are to increase and
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at the same time consumer prices are to he kept low, then the whole 
programme cost would tremendously increase. Therefore, in the 
process of policy formulation, it is necessary to determine that the 
various policy objectives are consistent with one another and 
according to the priorities set by the state. If not, policy-makers 
would be faced with a difficult task to balance among objectives.
As a rule, LDCs’ agricultural pricing policies have generally 
been used negatively because policies have been designed to lower 
the prices of food and other agricultural products while prices of 
manufactured goods have been increased. [ 7 ] Brown rightly pointed 
out that low food and other agricultural prices are politically 
popular because they increase the real income and employment of the 
urban poor. [ 8 ] A negative pricing policy imply that the terms of 
trade against agriculture is deliberately depressed and agriculture 
is discriminated. In fact evidence for this point is plentiful 
worldwide. Schultz, et. al. [ 9 ] have taken great pains to stress 
the damaging effects of the policies of distorting agriculture 
prices against the small farmers of the LDCs. This is not to imply 
that policies to lower food prices for consumers are bad but that 
measures taken to protect notably the poor urban consumers should 
not be at the expense of the peasant and their incentives to 
produce. Brown reiterated that there is a high cost attached to such 
low prices because their effect is to retard cost-reducing 
investment and innovation in agriculture. [ 10 ] In this 
connection, it would be informative to understand the justification 
for discriminating against agriculture. The argument is based upon 
the following assumptions about agriculture :- [ 11 ]
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a) that aggregate agricultural production is price inelastic, i.e. 
production is not very responsive to price changes
b) that the chief beneficiaries of higher prices of agricultural 
products accrue mainly to the larger and richer farmers
c) that higher food and other agricultural-related prices such as 
clothing would affect low-income consumers badly, and
d) that manufacturing provides a more rapid means of growth and that 
achieving that growth is dependent upon large transfers of surplus 
in the form of income / profits and foreign exchange from 
agriculture to manufacturing.
Thus, the rationale goes that policies that deliberately 
depress agricultural prices and increase manufacturing prices will 
result both in more rapid economic growth and in more equitable 
distribution of income. However, low agricultural prices have, inter 
alia, affected farmers* incentives to produce and in the attempts to 
achieve self-sufficiency in food production, the above policy 
measures would have an unfavourable and counter-productive effect. 
Hence,to overcome this defect, many countries have switched to more 
positive pricing policies by increasing the relative prices of 
agriculture against non-agriculture prices. One very popular and 
widespreadly used method is through the use of agricultural 
subsidies. Hence, a positive agricultural pricing policy implies 
that agriculture is being subsidised.
Krishna outlined three benefits of having a positive 
agricultural pricing policy. [ 12 ] Firstly, it would be able to 
accelerate and encourage agricultural production. Secondly, it would 
be able to either encourage or discourage the production of specific
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crops or to achieve the desirable crop-mix pattern. Thirdly, a 
positive pricing policy would enable the country to achieve an 
an adequate increase in food production and supply.
As a matter of fact, there have been a tendency for LDCs in the 
last 30 years to resort to policy measures to support agriculture 
through positive pricing policies which include the institution of a 
system of price guarantees and generous subsidisation of important 
agricultural inputs.
In this regard, it would be of interest to note the effects of 
a specific pricing policy on the agriculture sector. Basically, 
there are four effects. [ 13 ] Firstly, there is the production 
effect. For example, if farmers are responsive to price changes, 
then greater production is induced. Secondly, since agricultural 
pricing policy involves either taxation or subsidisation of 
commodities, the government either receives revenues or suffers 
losses in operating costs and since the commodities under government 
intervention is of great importance to the economy, the effect on 
government revenue or programme cost is great. Thirdly, it may 
affect income distribution through changing farm price, consumer 
price or farm income. For example, a high farm price policy will 
redistribute income to farmers while government release of food at 
low prices would lead to an increase in consumers’ real income, or 
alternatively, an export tax depresses domestic price level and 
lowers farm income but raises the real income of consumers. Tolley, 
et. al. mentioned that whether pricing policy is regressive in its 
effect on income distribution would depend mainly on whether farmers 
or consumers who benefit from the policy represent the poorer sector.
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of the economy. [ 14 ] Finally, there is the effect on resource 
allocation where pricing policies can distort relative price 
structure among inputs which could lead to an increase or decrease 
in the production and consumption of a certain commodity.
In summary, we have established that LDCs have reverted their 
discriminatory policies against agriculture in favour of a positive 
pricing policy. Also in many LDCs, subsistence farming is less 
susceptible to influence of price incentives due to the ” lower 
efficacy of the market mechanism ". Because of this, attempts to 
influence the pattern of investment and production through price 
incentives have often met with failures. In such cases a policy of 
direct government intervention through subsidies is thought more 
likely to succeed. [ 15 ] This kind of reasoning have been 
responsible for the existence of a plethora of subsidies in the 
agriculture sector of most LDCs.
4.0 DEFINITION AND INTERPRETATION OF SUBSIDIES
Introduction
Subsidies have come to be recognised and accepted as the most 
important and commonest fiscal instrument at the disposal of the 
government to achieve its multifold policy objectives. Its 
application is endemic and widespread in all areas of economic 
activities. Its scope is so wide-ranging and extensive and easy to 
implement that it is tempting for governments to resort to subsidies 
since the burden of the programme is borne fully by the state. The 
convenience and ease of applying this instrument has led to a 
plethora of subsidisation programmes in many countries and
20
established what some would call the phenomenon of the M subsidy 
morass However, subsidy tends to conjure a perjorative and 
negative connotation implying that the recipients, whether a state, 
firm or an individual, is dependent on the government for its 
operation and survival and thus considered inefficient and weak.
This is especially so if recipients have been continuously dependent 
on it for a long time. However, the rationale of granting subsidies 
as argued below is formidable enough to justify its widespread 
application by the state.
Infant-Industry Argument For Subsidies
Subsidies constitute a form of protective policies. The case 
for protective policies such as subsidies as development strategy is 
not new or unique in the history of development planning. It has a 
long history in the economic literature and has a powerful 
theoretical basis called the Infant Industry Argument. ( TIA ) The 
IIA is the guiding principle of post-war industrialisation policy of 
LDCs. This idea of IIA was originally developed by a German 
economist called List. [ 16 ] List’s theory was directly opposed 
to that of Ricardo who advocated free trade. List’s theory was 
designed to justify the application of protective tariffs and 
subsidies to domestic industries which, in the early stages of 
development, could not compete with the more established foreign 
producers. In the course of time, local industries could become 
efficient and competitive enough, at which time the need for 
protection would be discarded. However, it is well known that the 
IIA has inherent weaknesses. Firstly, that the ” infant may never
21
grow up " and secondly, that it may skew income and wealth 
distribution in favour of non-competing groups who derive quasi­
rents and other forms of reward from their influential and 
privileged status. However, despite these weaknesses, subsidies 
continue to be popular among governments.
Definition of Subsidies
In this section we will survey some of the definitions that 
have been given about subsidies and then propose our own definition. 
Naturally, there is no single and comprehensive definition of 
subsidies. Bannock, et. al. defined subsidy as a payment made by the 
government to producers which is intended to make prices lower than 
they otherwise would be. This payment will, in general, have the 
effect of raising the income of recipients above the level it would 
otherwise have reached and at the same time increasing the real 
incomes of the buyers of the subsidised products. [ 17 ] What 
Bannock is referring to is actually output or producer subsidies.
For example the padi price subsidy in Malaysia has the effect of 
increasing the incomes of padi farmers while maintaining consumer 
prices at the old level. Here, both consumers and producers benefit 
from this measure at the expense of the Treasury. This definition is 
however not complete. The World Bank gives a more comprehensive 
definition. It defines a subsidy expenditure as one which provides 
goods or services which could reasonably be expected to be provided 
by the private sector ( including the recipients themselves ) or 
which raises output prices or reduces input prices for private 
sector goods and services from their free market levels. From these
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two definitions, it is clear that subsidies may be for inputs or 
output. As to the objective of a subsidy, the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica states that its purpose is to alter the results created 
by the free markets in a direction considered within the objective 
of public policy. Its effect is to encourage the growth of the 
subsidised industries at the expense of others by redirecting the 
use of public resources. [ IB ] Hence through subsidies, numerous 
distortions are generated in the economy.
Goals of Subsidies
Subsidies vary in their form and goals and understanding this 
is useful in order for us to appreciate how it works. A useful 
framework to use to achieve this understanding is to use Musgrave's 
categories of allocation, distribution and stabilisation. Musgrave’s 
category of allocation can further be broken down into a production 
and employment goal. [ 19 ] In relation to subsidies, production 
goal is concerned with output while employment goal is related with 
input.
In addition, the policy of extending subsidies is closely 
related to politics, notably to answer questions of who gets 
what,when and how. Invariably, this has to do with the question of 
dis'tribution. In fact, subsidies are also dictated largely by 
distributional issues besides allocative issues as highlighted 
above. Hence, subsidy policies, like economic policies in general, 
would be better understood if the goal of ” vote maximisation *’ and 
M politics of subsidisation " are also considered. [ 20 ] Vote 
maximisation varies from case to case, but from observation it can
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be noticed that it varies in relation to the time of the next 
general elections. The dominance of this goal is particularly 
apparent when decision-makers are faced with the choice of 
allocation and distribution of limited public resources. Hence, from 
this broad goal of subsidy policies, it could be discerned that 
subsidies are used mainly for allocative and redistributive 
purposes.
Summary
Based on the above discussion, we can distinguish the following 
main features associated with subsidies
i) subsidies have both an allocative and redistributive function
ii) there are both input and output subsidies
iii) subsidies affect relative prices
iv) subsidies tend to distort the free market
Hence, in theory, subsidies can be manipulated by the 
government to achieve whatever objectives it deems suitable.
Normally, subsidies are dispensed through various means. Among the 
more common means include direct cash transfers, tax concessions, 
cheap credit, governmental provision of goods and services at prices 
below normal market prices or governmental purchase of goods and 
services at prices above the market price. A simple typology of 
subsidies could therefore include product-price raising, input-cost 
reducing and direct income support.
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5.0 PRINCIPLES OF SUBSIDISATION
Studies on subsidies benefit much from the literature on tax 
policies. Just as there are rules for efficient taxation principles, 
there also exist rules for efficient subsidisation. Andel mentioned 
four rules in order for efficient subsidisation to occur. [ 21 ]
a) principle of equal treatment of equal circumstance
This principle retorts that the government should act in a fair 
and just manner in its dealings with its citizens. It restricts the 
government from exercising its powers arbitrarily over its citizens. 
However, the realization of this principle depends upon two 
conditions. Firstly, that circumstances should also be equal. 
Unfortunately, in reality it is difficult to say when circumstances 
are similar or dissimilar. Secondly, although everybody agrees with 
this principle, yet certain groups in society would not hesitate to 
ask for favours to achieve some beneficial objective. In fact, one 
of the widespread criticisms of subsidies is due to the violation of 
this principle, especially between the rich and poor.
b) principle of differential treatment of different circumstances
This is related to the first principle and is another difficult 
one to realise in practice because a precise specification of 
circumstances is often difficult in individual cases, just as the 
determination of the " correct ” progressivity of an income tax is 
difficult. To what degree for example must farmers* income in a 
particular region deviate from the national average to justify
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granting it subsidies ? These are issues which are best handled by 
the decision-makers who are elected into power.
c) principle of avoiding excess burden
Public policies use and allocate resources of society. 
Allocation policies which are inefficient might result in welfare 
losses to society. Hence, the principle of avoiding excess burden or 
resource wastage demands that the subsidisation policies be achieved 
at least cost. Here M cost " is to be defined broadly including the 
amount of subsidy and any unwanted dislocation of consumption and 
production pattern induced by the subsidy.
d) principle of transparency
This principle requires that the subsidy programme, the 
conditions for receipt of subsidies and the effect of subsidies 
should be known. Only if the effects of a subsidy programme is known 
or estimable then the adequacy of a subsidy programme relative to 
given goals can be evaluated.
From this brief exposition, we are able to understand how 
subsidies ought to be administered in practice. If these principles 
could be followed strictly, then these programmes could be said to 
be administered efficiently and if not they are badly administered. 
The success or failure of a subsidy programme depends therefore on 
the extent to which these principles are violated.
26
Choice of Optimal Subsidy Form
Under normal circumstances, different kinds of subsidies are 
necessary to achieve different objectives. This is the premise which 
Andel used in ascertaining the choice of optimal subsidy form.
[ 22 ] Andel mentioned that in order for a subsidy to be optimal it
must have the following goals
a) preference for an explicit type of subsidy
The principle of transparency requires that subsidies should be 
of the explicit type rather than an implicit kind.
b) if the policy objective is to increase income
If the aim of a subsidy is to increase the income of a certain 
group of individual, then direct transfers would be better than 
subsidies. This is because in the case of subsidies, one cannot 
differentiate between the effects of an increase in factor prices, 
increase in profit, increase in real inputs and reduction in price 
of output. For example, a reduction in the price of output would 
benefit both the rich and poor buyers equally. In contrast, direct 
transfers to individuals can be given according to the personal 
circumstances of each recipient. Hence, such transfers would be more 
accurate in the distribution of benefits. Furthermore, the cost of 
attaining a given increase in income is much greater in the case of 
subsidies because it involve excess burden. However, if the goal of 
a subsidy is to increase profit through agricultural subsidies, then 
fixed subsidies ( lump-sum subsidies ) is preferable.
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c) if the goal is to increase employment opportunities
Subsidies are often given to avoid or reduce unemployment in a 
specific region. According to Andel, a correct basis to use in 
granting subsidies should be towards labour cost. However, in most 
cases subsidies are given based on capital rather than labour cost. 
In this case it is possible that capital subsidies can cause a 
reduction in employment because they tend to utilise more capital.
In addition, there would tend to be a simultaneous factor 
substitution against labour which is directly contrary to the 
original goal of employment creation.
d) if the goal is to increase production
If the goal of the subsidy is to increase production, then the 
correct basis for the subsidy would be the quantity of output, i.e. 
the more the quality produced the more subsidy one gets.
e) if the goal is to reduce dependence on foreign countries
This can be done by imposing tariffs on imports. However, 
whether tariffs are optimal instrument for accomplishing this is 
dubious because this might lead either to reduction in imports, 
reduction in domestic consumption, subsidisation of domestic 
production on the basis of the turnover and the subsidy is paid for 
by the users of the subsidised product. In fact, tariffs are more 
appropriate as an instrument for reducing the dependence on foreign 
countries on the grounds of national security. But from the point of 
view of distribution, it may have undesirable consequences. Hence, 
subsidies remain a preferable alternative.
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However, the choice of an optimal subsidy form must be 
considered with respect to all goals and not one goal at a time. 
[ 23 ] Also the choice of optimal policy instrument is also 
affected to a large extent by policy costs, i.e. by costs of 
administration, collection and policy change. [ 24 ]
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6.0 RATIONALE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SUBSIDIES 
Justification of Subsidies [ 25 ]
The conventional argument for a subsidy is the temporary 
" learning by doing M effects. The subsidised individual uses a 
subsidised input more intensively than he otherwise would, and this 
makes possible the adoption of modern inputs which would not 
otherwise be used. Once they have been adopted and costs are 
lowered, there is however no case for continuing the subsidy. As
Sambrani aptly stated : " ..... subsidies are a created,
administered device, intended for use only until such time as the 
basic robustness of the sector or activity can take up its own 
protection through its competitiveness; if this does not happen, the 
society at large cannot for all times protect it. To bring out the 
long-term competitiveness, certain structural changes in the economy
may be essential. Subsidies .... are meant primarily to provide the
policy makers sufficient time to effect these institutional and 
structural transformations " [ 26 ] Hence, it is important to 
mention at the outset that subsidies can only be justified as a 
temporary measure.
Agricultural Subsidies
- Agricultural subsidies can be broadly categorised into two 
kinds, viz. input and output subsidies. Under this generic term, a 
diverse and wide ranging type of subsidy exist. A typical but by no 
means exhaustive sub-division can be of the following form
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Input/Factor Subsidy Output/Product Price Subsidy
Fertiliser Price Support
Seed Floor Prices
Pest icide Guaranteed Minimum Price
Credit Deficiency Payment
Irrigation Rate Parity Prices
Transport Forced Procurement
Loans Price Subsi dy
Basically, the objective of an agricultural subsidy is to 
increase the rate of return or compensation to agricultural factors 
above those that they would receive under conditions of free trade. 
Under these circumstances, agricultural subsidies would operate 
exactly as any other type of subsidy by changing the relative price 
of factors. [ 27 ] The most common arguments given in favour of 
agricultural subsidies are as follows
i) it is needed Lo maintain the income of the small farmer
ii) that the output of subsidised products will fall if the 
subsidies are removed
iii) to prevent a decline in the number of farmers and hence 
preventing the governmment from losing important rural votes
iv) to redress the imbalance between agriculture and the non­
agriculture sector
In connection with this, Davidson [ 28 ] gave three major 
reasons why government initiates agricultural subsidies based on 
welfare, production, promotion of capital works and parity 
considerations.
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As for welfare considerations, if farmers are a depressed 
section of the community, then their incomes must be below those of 
the rest of the community and it is the responsibility of the state 
to redress this imbalance. On reasons of production, most who argue 
that agricultural output is likely to decline unless farmers are 
given subsidies base their arguments on the low returns to capital 
received by farmers and hence this situation need to be rectified.
On the other hand, subsidies in the form of capital invested in 
irrigation schemes have been justified because of their contribution 
in sustaining agricultural production and their stabilising 
influence during perods of drought. On parity grounds, it is argued 
that since the manufacturing sector always receive a lot of favoured 
treatment like tax incentives and protection, the agricultural lobby 
argue that they should also be given the same privileges. In 
addition to the above rationale, subsidies are also given as 
inducements for farmers to undertake risk, especially in the case of 
subsidies on " new inputs ".
In the section below, we shall deliberate more specifically on 
input and output subsidies and their relative merits and demerits.
7.0 INPUT SUBSIDIES
It is the quest of most LDCs to achieve as much food production 
as possible within the available resource-technology constraint that 
they possess in the agriculture sector. One influential school of 
thought believes that this could only be realised through the 
transformation of the rural and traditional mode of production. [29] 
According to Idachaba, [ 30 ] there are two main types of
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transformation that need to be undertaken to achieve the above 
objective. Firstly, increased agricultural production could be 
achieved through the reallocation of existing agricultural inputs. 
For example, new virgin land can be cleared using traditional inputs 
or cultural and management practices can be improved upon. Secondly 
structural transformation can be achieved through the introduction 
of new superior inputs that will have the potential to dramatically 
raise yields or prevent huge losses in yields.
Justification for Input Subsidies
It can be observed that both types of approaches have been used 
in many LDCs with varying success. The usage of traditional inputs 
have continued side by side with newer and better inputs. As 
regards to the use of new inputs, it is normal practice in many LDCs 
to subsidise the usage of these new inputs in agriculture. In his 
study of African agriculture, Idachaba hypothesised six reasons why 
input subsidies is widely subsidised in LDCs. [ 31 ]
Firstly, it is to help farmers bear a part of the adjustment 
cost of switching from traditional input package to a new input 
package. In the attempt to switch from using traditional to modern 
inputs, farmers go through a learning process and only they will 
only gradually approach the equilibrium values of production cost.
In this process, it is widely feared among extension specialists 
that the learning process and the associated adjustment costs may 
dissuade farmers from actively adopting the new innovation. It is in 
this context that subsidies on new inputs attempt to minimise these 
learning and adjustment costs and thereby eventually persuading the
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farmers to use these new inputs.
Secondly, there is a need to reduce the negative effects of 
uncertainties associated with an innovation. Farmers who have been 
using traditional inputs for years know the probability 
distribution of production coefficients of these inputs and are 
confident with its use. However, farmers who are at the margin of 
accepting new inputs are confronted with many types of risks and 
uncertainties and this lead them to discount prospective returns 
from these new inputs cautiously, a procedure which leads to smaller 
adoption of new inputs than would have been the case in the absence 
of risk and uncertainty.
Thirdly, input subsidies can be used to achieve a desired 
allocation pattern in agricultural production. This is possible 
because input subsidies are resource-specfic and can be purposefully 
used to achieve pre-determined factor proportions, substitutions and 
complementarities.
Fourthly, the economies of most LDCs is ridden with 
institutionally induced distortions that impose implicit and / or 
explicit taxes on farmers, e.g. import duties on agricultural 
inputs, artificially inflated costs of farm production, etc. These 
measures are usually undertaken because of many factors, e.g. to 
please the urban sector, existence of imperfect marketing and 
distribution system, etc. These distortions alter the equilibrium 
and marginality conditions otherwise attainable in a distortion-free 
world. Hence, farmers are granted input subsidies to compensate them 
for these taxes, especially when most of these distortions are taken 
as institutional realities.
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Fifthly, there is the need to subsidise inputs because of the 
limited price competitiveness among major multinationals who are the 
main suppliers of inputs, e.g. fertilisers, pesticides, etc. If this 
is not done, then most of these inputs would be beyond the means of 
most farmers in LDCs because of the high price.
Finally, the subsidisation of inputs has to do with the 
irreversible relations in production. For example, in perennial crop 
cultivation, a government interested in building a long-run 
productive capacity would provide the initial incentives in the form 
of input subsidies ( replanting grants, loans, etc. ) to induce 
farmers to commit resources to what is essentially a long-term 
investment.
Hence, the presence of subsidised inputs will lower marginal 
cost of production and hence tend to shift the supply curve to the 
right. However, the extent to which marginal cost can be lowered by 
a subsidy depends upon the significance of this input in total cost 
of production. Further, the extent to which the usage of subsidised 
inputs will increase will depend on the price elasticity of demand 
for the input; where the lower the elasticity, the lower will be the 
increased usage of the input. And finally, the impact on production 
by the use of the subsidised input will depend on the elasticity of 
production with respect to the use of these inputs.
Hence, for all these reasons, input subsidies have been 
universally used in many LDCs. The successful transformation of the 
traditional mode of production through the adoption of new inputs by 
farmers have necessitated the liberal use of input subsidies. 
However, whether input subsidies have achieved the desired objective
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or not has to be considered at the empirical level. This is one of 
the objective of the present study.
Fertiliser Subsidy
We shall now consider the classic case of the fertiliser 
subsidy. Fertiliser is an essential and important component in the 
input content of all crops. In fact, there is a high degree of 
correlation between the application of fertiliser and crop yields, 
the greater the application, the greater the yield and vice versa, 
assuming all other factors remain the same. Because of this it is 
not surprising that fertiliser has been one of the most heavily 
subsidised input items in agriculture. According to Dalrymple [ 32 ] 
the purpose of a fertiliser subsidy is
i) to encourage farmers to use fertilisers and therefore expand 
their total production
ii) to help farmers maintain fertiliser use in cases where product 
prices have not been raised or raised correspondingly,
iii) to help expand total domestic market for fertilisers and make 
the establishment of fertiliser manufacturing and distribution 
facilities economical
iv) to help increase food production.
Therefore since the use of chemical fertiliser as a 
complementary input in the package recommended under the Green 
Revolution is important, it is necessary for governments to initiate 
fertiliser subsidies. However, the use of fertiliser does not 
necessarily imply an automatic increase in output. Besides questions 
of correct application and other matters relating to the technical
36
aspects of fertiliser usage, it also depends on the economics of 
fertiliser application. According to Tolley, et. al. [ 33 ] the 
extent of response of output to fertiliser subsidy depends on the 
following factors
i) it relies on farmers’ incremental demand for fertiliser induced 
by the subsidy
ii) it depends on the contribution to output of fertiliser and 
substitutability of fertiliser for other inputs
iii) it depends critically on timely availability of fertiliser and 
other inputs, especially water.
Among the main advantages of a fertiliser subsidy are the 
positive effect on crop production, export, production and income.
In addition, it prevents the raising of food and raw material prices 
which would have adverse consequences for the industrial sector. 
Another strong point for fertiliser subsidy is that it is less 
costly to the government than product price subsidies and more 
easily reduced than price supports. However, there are also some 
shortcomings of fertiliser subsidies :- [ 34 ]
i) where improved inputs are unfamiliar to peasants, their price may 
be less important than the product price.
ii) it covers only part of the total cost of production and do not 
pro'vide an insurance against downward fluctuations in price
iii) it covers only part of the cost of several purchased inputs
iv) input price manipulation cannot discriminate between products or 
income groups of users
v) it is potentially a high budget cost to the government, 
especially if the subsidies are carried beyond the initial adoption
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period
vi) if the subsidy is applied to imports, it may discourage the 
development of the local fertiliser industry
vii) it may encourage the uneconomic use of fertilisers. For 
example, they may be used at the wrongtirae, in the wrong amounts or 
on the wrong crops. Hence, it may lead to an inefficient choice of 
cropping patterns.
viii) the subsidy may never reach the farmers, or at least the small 
farmers. Therefore, if the subsidy is designed mainly as an income 
transfer, it is both inefficient and inequitable because it also 
benefits the richer farmers.
Having discussed the significance of fertiliser subsidy and its 
drawbacks, it would be worthwhile to analyse the obverse situation 
without fertiliser subsidy, that is to analyse the effect of an 
increase in fertiliser price to the farmers ( either through the 
removal of the subsidy or a reduction in the amount of subsidy). 
Dalrymple noted that some undesirable effects would follow if 
fertiliser subsidy were to be abolished. [ 35 ] Firstly, the 
amount of fertiliser applied might fall. This is true for small 
farmers with limited financial resources because they have great 
difficulty in securing credit to buy fertilisers and other inputs as 
compared to the richer and bigger farmers. A second possible outcome 
is a change in the pattern of crop utilisation because there is a 
great tendency for fertilisers to attach to crops which give higher 
returns rather than crops which give lower returns, for example 
cheap staples like rice. An undesirable effect arising from this 
would be a rise in the price of food to consumers reflecting both a
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higher input cost and lower yield due to lower level of fertiliser
usage.
Summary
Fertiliser subsidies have been instituted in order for farmers 
to increase their level of fertiliser utilisation in order to 
enhance their production. This is important because most of the HYV 
are dependent upon chemical fertilisers. However, despite various 
advantages associated with fertiliser subsidies, there are also some 
negative forces at work against fertiliser subsidies.
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8.0 OUTPUT SUBSIDIES 
Introduction
Product price subsidy or more commonly known as price support 
is another important form of agricultural subsidy utilised in LDCs. 
It refers to the provision of a price to farmers which on average is 
higher than that in the market. In LDCs, it is more accurate to use 
the term price subsidy rather than price support since it involves 
the acquisition of crops by the government at farm-gate prices at 
harvesting time at a price which is above minimum incentive levels. 
This price level is usually set administratively. Price support is 
usually intended to complement the policy of input subsidies.
Johnson believes that just like the advanced countries, LDCs 
could face many difficulties in operating price subsidies. This is 
especially true if the support price which is set too high would 
lead to great production response from producers and would lead to 
storage and management problems beyond the control of the bureacracy 
to handle. However, he believes that if the policy is moderately 
implemented, the situation of greater price certainty thus created 
would be able to induce farmers to produce mainly for the market 
rather than remaining a subsistence producer. [ 36 ]
Price Support in Developed Countries
Almost all DCs use price support measures to protect and 
stabilise income of producers in the presence of surplus production. 
For example, in the United States, farm support programmes are 
• designed to maintain prices of farm products like wheat, corn and 
cotton at levels sufficient to maintain a parity relationship
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between farm prices in the economy. If the market price for these 
products is below the official support price, then the government 
lends the farmer an amount equal to the difference of the two 
prices. If the market price rises above the support price, farmers 
will retain the crops and sells it arid repays the loan. But when the
market price is below the support price, the government buys the
produce of the farmers. Here storage and disposal of the surplus 
production becomes a costly undertaking to the government. Since 
price support programmes encourage surplus production, it is usually 
supplemented by production controls and quotas and other devices to 
off-set the above undesirable effects. Price support policies are 
preferable if output is to be restricted because it provides a way 
to police strict observance of restriction measure. Under price 
support programme, the market price can be lower than the support 
price as long as government accumulates stocks, or is reselling at a 
loss. The government may both accumulate stocks and sell enough on 
the market to assure that market price stays well below the support
price. The difference in price induces farmers to enter the support
programme, selling their produce to government rather than on the 
market.
Price Subsidies in LDCs
In LDCs, output subsidies are more straight forward and less 
complicated than price support system as practiced in the DCs. In 
addition, price subsidies are instituted to stimulate production 
rather than to prevent surpluses. In fact price subsidies in LDCs 
are formulated on the basis that farmers are responsive to prices.
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Tolley et. al. observed that three factors can account for the 
effectiveness of a price support programme in LDCs. [ 37 ] Firstly, 
the output response would depend on whether the support price is set 
at a level that would provide farmers incentives to invest in modern 
inputs. Secondly, that the price is announced well ahead of the 
season and that all farmers are aware of it and that the government 
buys all that is offered at the minimum price offered. Thirdly, the 
output response would depend on the price elasticity of supply which 
in turn depends on the timely availability of farm inputs. The 
elasticity is likely to be larger if the time under consideration is 
longer.
In LDCs, relative product prices vary sharply between different 
countries. In some countries product prices are held below world 
market levels in order to keep consumer prices at artificially low 
levels while in other cases prices are supported above world market 
levels. For example, Malaysia belonged to the latter category 
because it is a high cost producer of rice and the government 
controls rice import and set producer prices at a level higher than 
world prices.
According to Dalrymple, price subsidies have certain advantages 
over input subsidies as follows. [ 38 ] Firstly, it is widely 
recognised and familiar to all farmers except for self-sufficient 
and non-market farms. Secondly, a rise in price, due to the cushion 
it provides, reduces danger from a downward price fluctuations. 
Thirdly, a price rise rewards the increased usage of an array of 
inputs and fourthly, an adjustment can be easily applied to a 
specific type. Because of these inherent advantages, many LDCs
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resort to price subsidies in addition to input subsidies.
However, price subsidies also suffer from many operational 
difficulties. [ 39 ] One main defect relates to the beneficiary . 
For example, an increase in product price may benefit a farmer who 
produces a consistently higher yield more than a farmer with lower 
yields. The latter are usually the richer and bigger farmers. This 
would therefore encourage the richer fanners to increase their yield 
by applying more fertilisers while the poorer fanners may not have 
this capacity. Hence, richer farmers tend to benefit more from 
this policy. In addition, there is a lack of linkage to specific 
inputs, i.e. all fanners will benefit from this policy irrespective 
of whether he is an innovator or not. Furthermore there is no 
guarantee that the desired increase in output will be attainable. 
There is also the practical and political limits as to how far 
product prices could be adjusted to offset an increase in fertiliser 
prices if price subsidies were the only policy implemented. But the 
most problematic is the fact that it is politically difficult to 
reduce price support once it has been started and hence government 
cost would be enormous.
9.0 COMBINED INPUT AND OUTPUT SUBSIDIES
In most LDCs, it is common for both input and output subsidies 
to be implemented together rather than using one at the expense of 
the other. In fact the practicality of a joint policy far outweigh 
that of an exclusive policy although in terms of resource cost it 
‘ would be considerable. Both policies are needed as complementary 
instruments for different reasons. In fact, there has been concrete
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suggestions for a joint price policy programme as mentioned by 
Dalrymple. [ 40 ]
We illustrate below the effect of input and output subsidies 
using simple demand and supply diagrams. [ 41 ]
Here, the following assumptions are made :-
i) that there are no imports
ii) that all government purchases and sales occur in the same period
iii) that demand price measures the value of the commodity to 
consumers and supply price measures cost to suppliers.
Fig. 2.1 shows the effect of input and output subsidies. Fig.
2.1Ci) shows a price support policy designed to raise production. SS 
is short-run supply curve and DD is demand curve for farm output. 
Supply curve slopes upwards reflecting increased costs faced by 
farmers when he increased his production in the short-run. With no 
government intervention and no imports, OPm is the market price and 
OQm is the quantity produced.
In order to increase output by 0Q1 ( ie. by the amount QmQl ), price 
need to be supported at 0P1. However, it can only be sold at price 
OPo at unit subsidy PoPl. The total cost of this subsidy programme 
to the government is PoPlCB. In order to calculate the resource cost 
of the above policy, we can do so by deducting changes in the 
producer and consumer surplus from government cost, where,
Producer surplus = PmPlCR 
Consumer surplus - PmPoBR 
Government cost = PoPlCB.
Netting both the consumer and producer surplus from government cost
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gives RCB as the deadweight loss. Note that further increase in the 
support price to 0P2 will raise programme cost to P3P2GF, i.e. any 
further increase in price imply higher governmental cost and vice 
versa, other things being equal. Hence, the resource cost will 
increase by BCGF. From this it is clear that resource cost of price 
support policy to the government is high.
Fig. 2.1(ii) illustrates a fertiliser subsidy, where,
Df = farmers’ demand curve for fertiliser 
Pf ~ world price of fertiliser 
Pf = subsidised price of fertiliser
Sf = supply of fertilisers assumed perfectly elastic at PF
PfPf = per unit subsidy - encourages additional fertiliser demand of
FoFl from free market level of OFo.
Government cost from subsidy rate PfPf = PfPfCB. An increase in
x *unit subsidy by PfPf would increase cost by PfPfFECB. Hence, the
the higher the existing level of subsidy, the higher is the
incremental cost to the government, other things remaining the
same. At the subsidised price of Pf, PfPfAC is transfered to the
producers. The government cost is PfPfBC. Netting this transfer from
the government cost gives ABC as the deadweight loss. A further
x
reduction in fertiliser price to OPf will raise the resource cost 
by-FEGB. Therefore, the effectiveness of a fertiliser subsidy 
depends, among other things, on the elasticity of output supply with 








(i) A PRICE SUPPORT POLICY
QUANTITY
(ii) A FERTILISER SUBSIDY POLICY
Fig. 2.1: EFFECT OF INPUT AND OUTPUT SUBSIDIES
Price Support versus Input Subsidy : Which is Better ?
From the above discussion, it is obvious that both input and 
output subsidies are important in that they complement each other. 
However, in terms of resource cost both measures would be a drain on 
the government budget. Hence the question to pose is, which one is 
more efficient ? Many studies have been done to provide the 
empirical answer to this and it would be worthwhile to review the 
findings of some studies on this matter.
Barker and Hayami [ 42 ] developed a simple demand-supply 
model to compare in a limited context the benefits and costs 
associated with alternative rice support and fertiliser-subsidy 
programme to achieve self-sufficiency in the Philippines. Their 
results show that a fertiliser subsidy to the rice sector requires 
less cost to the government for achieving self-sufficiency and that 
it is more efficient than price support in terms of cost-benefit 
ratio.
Ahmed [ 43 ] did a similar study for Bangladesh using the 
above methodology to determine the relative efficiency of price 
support versus fertiliser subsidy policies to increase rice 
production. He came to the same conclusion as Hayami of the relative 
superiority of fertiliser subsidy over price support. His result 
showed that although total social benefit is substantially large 
under both programmes but the net social benefit is negative for 
price support. Further, price support seemed to be more expensive to 
the government than fertiliser subsidy. In addition, fertiliser 
subsidy tends to be more egalitarian than price support policy. 
According to Tolley, et. al. [ 1982, p. 158 ], the reason for the
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positive net social benefit for fertiliser subsidy is due to the 
presence of suboptimality in the fertiliser ( factor ) market when 
the subsidy was introduced.
Tolley et. al. [ 44 ] also considered the question which 
of the two policies is more effective according to the criteria of 
national welfare and government cost and applied a model to 
calculate the effects. Using data for Bangladesh in 1970-79, they 
discovered that there was a tendency for a lower incremental 
resource cost under price support. However, they were careful to 
caution that different conclusions regarding the relative merits of 
changing the support price or the input subsidy could be arrived at. 
Hence, the results were inconclusive.
Rai [ 45 ] attempted to analyse the programmes of price 
support and fertiliser subsidy for achieving self-sufficiency in 
wheat production in India. The criteria used to evaluate these two 
policies were
i) government cost to the programme
ii) the efficiency of the programme
iii) the distribution of benefits, and
iv) foreign exchange savings
The study found that fertiliser subsidies were more effective 
in achieving food self-sufficiency than price support.
Parish and Mclaren [ 46 ] said that according to conventional
wisdom, an output subsidy would be more efficient than an input
subsidy as a means of encouraging the production of an output. In 
their paper, they claimed that there is a possibility of an input 
subsidy being more efficient than an output subsidy. In fact the
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principal question that they addressed in their paper concerns the 
circumstances under an input subsidy would cost less than an output 
subsidy to achieve a given expansion in output. This implied that 
they favour input subsidy over output subsidy as a policy 
i nstrument.
Krishna [ 47 ] believed that input subsidy is preferable to 
price support if the objective is to increase agricultural output.
He gave the following reasons to support his contention
i) if product prices are raised, farmers may or may not improve 
their cultivation techniques but instead they may spend the extra 
income on consumption and hence government expenditure would be 
wasted.
ii) if inputs are subsidised, the benefit of government investment 
can be derived by farmers only in proportion to their use of the 
improved inputs.
iii) input subsidies avoids the raising food and raw material prices 
against the growing industrial sector.
However, Krishna said that there are many practical reasons why 
price support is needed in addition to input subsidies, although the 
latter may be preferable a priori. [ 48 ] Firstly, if the improved 
inputs are unfamiliar to the farmers, they are not likely to be very 
sensitive to changes in their prices. And even when they are 
familiar, its absorption depends on whether the cost of employing 
them ( in addition to the cost of traditional inputs ) is covered by 
the product prices. Secondly, the assurance that farmers need 
urgently is insurance against downward fluctuations in product 
prices rather than upward fluctuations in the cost of purchased
49
inputs which form only a small part of the total cost. Thirdly, 
product price guarantees induce the better use of traditional as 
well as new inputs, whereas input price subsidies can cover only the 
purchased new inputs. Fourthly, price support encourages more 
production because the more the farmer sells the more they earn. 
Fifthly, input price manipulation cannot discriminate between 
products while product price guarantees can be used to induce 
changes in output of specific crops.
However, Krishna warned that although it is true that input 
subsidy avoids an immediate increase in food and raw material 
prices, this will not prevent a long-run steep increase in their 
prices if input subsidisation does not succeed in increasing 
agricultural output at the same rate as price support would be. What 
it means is that input subsidisation may seem cheaper than product 
price support in the short run, but price support may prove to be 
cheaper in the long run.
Summary
We have seen that input and output subsidies are common policy 
instruments of many LDCs. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages associated with either input or output subsidy. The 
question for LDCs which have limited resources is which of the two 
subsidies is more efficient in achieving the objective of increasing 
food production. Although there have been many studies done on this 
area, the results have still been inconclusive and hence LDCs have 
attempted to use both to achieve different goals.
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10.0 CRITIQUES OF FARM SUBSIDIES
Introduction
There have been a great many criticisms from economists of the 
negative aspect of farm subsidies. It is indeed felt that farm 
subsidies have been carried too far and bear a heavy burden on the 
budget of the affected countries. This state of affairs is most 
serious to LDCs because the agriculture sector is burdening the 
economy through inefficient subsidies rather than playing a leading 
role. Hence, there is a need for a review and a rethink of the 
system of agricultural subsidies. We shall highlight some of the 
strong arguments advocated against farm subsidies.
Wilson [ 49 ] mentioned three standard arguments against farm 
subsidies. Firstly, that subsidies, like any other forms of 
protection, is against the laws of comparative advantage and hence 
misuses alloaction. For example, when a country subsidises the 
production of a crop which it can import more cheaply from abroad, 
it is in fact misusing resources which could be better utilised 
elsewhere in the economy. This argument applies both within a 
country and across boundaries. It therefore argues for a system of 
free trade which is thought to be the best way to optimise resource 
allocation. Secondly, that subsidies tend to distort production 
pattern within agriculture. The huge grain mountain of the EEC and 
overflowing surplus of wheat production in the United States are 
classic examples of distortions in production practices which is a 
direct result of farm subsidy policies. In this paradoxical 
situation, farmers are paid subsidies to discourage production. 
Thirdly, since agriculture is a low profit-making industry, there is
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a prima facie case of discouraging further Investments in it since 
unprofitable industries do not make good investments. But most 
governments in practice act otherwise by giving generous assistance 
to agriculture. One explanation for the widespread occurrence of 
this phenomenon in the DCs is the presence of strong agricultural 
lobbies while in the LDCs the government is trying to win the votes 
of the rural people who form the majority of the population.
Another common argument forwarded against farm subsidies has 
strong emotive appeal. It simply states that once subsidies are 
introduced they tend to perpetuate themselves and any attempt made 
to reduce, phase, terminate or even review them would be opposed by 
the subsidy lobbies. As we have analysed that subsidies are only 
justified when they are temporary and once they have achieved their 
objectives there is no more case for subsidisation. What policy­
makers fear is that the subsidies which are originally intended as a 
temporary interim measure has now assumed a permanent form. Prest
[ 50 ] echoed the same sentiment when he said: " ..... A well
known danger is the likelihood that subsidies become irremovable
.... Another is that subsidies may be self-perpetuating .... Yet
another is that civil servants and their departments may themselves 
come to have a strong element of self-interest in perpetuating such 
payments ". In fact Prest believed that the reasons for ” bad ” 
subsidies can be attributed to two possible explanations, viz. to an 
incomplete economic analysis and secondly to the subordination of 
subsidies to alleged higher ends, whether political (vote-catching) 
or economic ( stabilise prices whatever the cost ). For this reason, 
many people have cautioned against the introduction of new
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subsidies. In fact the United States and other developed countries 
like those of the EEC are taking halting steps to reduce subsidies 
to their fanners. [ 51 ]
Another criticism which is widely quoted is that farm subsidies 
are inefficient and waste resources and that some of the resources 
that is used for subsidies could be better utilised elsewhere in the 
economy. As Self and Storing [ 52 ] said that although state aid to 
agriculture would lead to improvement of farm efficiency and income,
”.... it may still be open to the objection that it is absorbing
resources .... which could be better utilised in other sectors of
the economy ”. In fact, Body [ 53 ] argued that the effect of
massive support and subsidies to agriculture in Britain after the 
Second World War has been to divert resources away from other 
industries and services M into the production of unwanted quantities 
of expensive food on land that is often unsuitable for growing it”.
McCrone [ 54 ] in his classic study on agricultural subsidies in
Britain declared that there is no good economic reason for
paying costly subsidies to British agriculture either to maintain 
output at a high level or to encourage further expansion
However, the most critical attack on farm subsidies is the fact 
that it benefits mainly larger and richer farmers more than the 
smaller and marginal farmers. A considerable amount of evidence has 
been accumulated to support this contention. Brown [ 55 ] in his 
studies of input subsidies and its effect on income distribution in 
LDCs discovered that farm subsidies benefited mainly middle and 
upper-income farmers since large scale farmers were the ones who can 
afford to buy most subsidised input and poorer farmers cannot get
53
access to inputs since they lack the financial means to do so. 
Davidson [ 58 ] argued that in Australia it is large farmers who 
receive the largest share while the small farmer with the lowest 
production received the least subsidy. Boulding [ 57 ] in a 
particularly critical statement said that " .... political pressure 
has produced subsidies toward agriculture in all societies, but 
where these subsidies tend to have gone to the rich farmers and have 
tended, if anything, to drive the poorer farmers out of agriculture 
altogether. This is particularly noticeable in the United States 
where agriculture subsidies takes the form of price supports, which 
inevitably subsidise the richer farmers, as it is the richer farmer
who has more to sell .". Self and Storing [ 58 ] focussing on
the United Kingdom said that since price guarantees ignore the 
circumstances of individual farms and farmers, the largest amount of 
aid went to successful farmers, while the poorest farmers got the 
least. They further stated that irrespective of what the state did, 
the larger farmers will continue to increase both their output and 
efficiency but that smaller fanners need help to overcome their 
intrinsic disadvantages ". Islam [ 59 ] in his study on Bangladsh 
agriculture discovered that larger farmers did have easier access to 
irrigation which is heavily subsidised by the government. He 
concluded that the richer farmers are likely to get a 
disproportionate share of the benefits from the subsidy on 
irrigation. Thus, he said, ” .... it is clear that the subsidy on 
foodgrains and agricultural inputs does not have any positive 
distribution implications .... the subsidy on inputs is possibly 
benefiting the richer farmers disproportionately ". On the other
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hand, Wilson [ 60 ] a political scientist noted that in the United 
States and Britain, farm subsidies tend to benefit the rich. To 
quote him : ".... The tragedy is that while rural poverty has often 
been used to justify the enormously expensive farm subsidy policies 
of Britain and the United States, very little of this had benefited 
the rural poor or farmers with low incomes in both countries and 
have gone primarily to farmers who enjoy incomes above the national 
average ". This point is supported by Schultze who argued that the 
main effect of farm subsidies has been to raise the price of farm 
land, again benefiting mainly the rich while the poorest have 
benefited little. [ 61 ]
11.0 SUMMARY
It is therefore clear from the argument and evidence presented 
above that farm subsidies, despite being a very popular policy has 
come under heavy criticisms from many quarters for not bringing 
about the equitable effect it is supposed to have. Most people urge 
that farm subsidies should be constantly reviewed and that subsidies 
should be used selectively and not indiscriminately as is being done 
in many countries today. Some have even suggested that there is a 
dire need to set up appraisal criteria to decide which methods of 
subsidisation makes most sense. It is therefore up to the policy­
makers to decide on the most appropriate course of action to take 
after considering all alternative courses of action.
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Press, p. 32
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CHAPTER THREE
IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES ON AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, we have already analysed and discussed 
the rationale and economic justification of subsidies in general and 
agricultural subsidies in particular. We found that there were 
indeed some very sound economic grounds for the granting of 
subsidies. In this chapter, we shall probe the issue of subsidies 
further with a focus on an analysis of its impact.
A survey of the studies done on the impact of subsidies in the 
literature reveals that much attention has been concentrated in the 
field of agricultural pricing policies. [ 1 ] Our objective in this 
chapter is to highlight what the literature reveals about the impact 
of input and output subsidies and to outline some of the significant 
findings from these studies. We shall then attempt to investigate 
certain aspects of the implication of agricultural subsidies in the 
LDCs. This will form the basis of our empirical chapters where we 
will formulate certain hypothesis which will then be investigated in 
the field work.
We will discuss the issue of the impact of subsidies as 
follows. Realizing that a generalisation of the effect of subsidy 
policies would have less practical utility from a micro-policy 
perspective we will attempt to analyse the impact of subsidies under 
the following categories
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i) its impact on resource allocation
ii) its impact on the distribution of benefits
iii) its impact on labour supply and the supply response of farmers
2.0 SUBSIDIES AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Subsidies form a significant proportion of total government 
budgetary outlays and hence its influence on resource allocation is 
substantial. The problem of resource allocation is important because 
of its implications to public policy. George and Shorey [ 2 ] 
observed that : " .... the problem arises because resources are 
scarce which makes it essential that they be both fully and 
efficiently employed. If they are not, the potential of the economic 
system to generate welfare cannot be fully realised. ” And since 
governmental outlays and its total resources are limited, the amount 
that the government is willing to allocate towards subsidies would 
also be limited and subject to very strict considerations or 
qualifying criteria. It is in this regard that policy-makers are 
faced with the difficult and sensitive question of choosing among 
alternative uses of subsidies, for example, whether subsidies should 
go to agriculture or non-agriculture activities and in what 
proportion. Hence, it is crucial to have a clear and objective set 
of criteria on which to base policy decisions. It is in this context 
that resource allocation is one of the most important, though by no 
means the only criterion. It involves the satisfaction of the 
condition of optimality and maximisation of utility through 
efficient resource use and secondly the question of individual 
benefits and community welfare. [ 3 ] To quote George and Shorey :
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M The analysis of resource allocation is thus concerned with 
identifying the most efficient production and distribution pattern 
and with establishing the kinds of decisions that lead to the 
achievement of maximum efficiency .... " . Therefore, in considering 
the effects of reallocation of resources, both equity and efficiency
considerations must be taken into account since, "..... efficiency
consideration alone cannot indicate the nature of a welfare optimum
nor justify a change in the allocation of resources .... ”. [ 4 ]
Allocative Effect of Subsidies
We shall now look at the theoretical considerations of the 
impact of subsidies on resource allocation and its effect on 
welfare. In this section, we are concerned with efficiency issues 
while equity considerations will be analysed in the next section.
Much of the literature on the welfare effect of subsidies seem 
to suggest that subsidy policies often lead to welfare losses. These 
are mainly attributed to distortions that are generated in the 
economy which result in extensive deadweight losses. Many 
explanations and proof of this proposition use the concept of 
” economic surplus ” to prove their case. [ 5 ]
The concept of ” economic surplus ,f is a simple and
straightforward notion in that every consumer or producer gets out 
of- any transaction something extra and additional to that what he 
has paid. This situation is likely to be true because he enters into 
a transaction on his own free will rather than being forced to do 
so. Since all economic transactions involve exchange, consumers and 
producers will attempt to maximise the sum of their net gains from
62
the transaction, i.e. the ’’surplus'* from consumption and production. 
These net gains are measurable in monetary terms through the concept 
of consumer and producer surplus. In Fig. 3.1, in the demand and 
supply schedule, consumer surplus is measured as the area between 
the demand curve and the price line, i.e. the horizontal line 
indicating the price paid for the good at a given quantity. The 
reason is that since consumer equilibrium requires the consumer to 
equate price with marginal utility ( measured in monetary terms ), 
the demand curve, as a measure of willingness to pay, is also the 
marginal utility curve of that good. Similarly, producer surplus is 
the difference between total revenue from his output minus the area 
under his supply curve, which is also his marginal cost curve.
This basic framework of producer and consumer surplus can be 
used to examine effects on resource allocation and national welfare 
of changing levels of agricultural prices and government 
intervention in the factor and product market via subsidies. 
According to Harberger [ 6 ] consumer and producer surplus analysis 
of the welfare effects of price policy is based on the following 
assumptions
a) that demand price for a good measures its value to the consumer
b) that supply price of a commodity measures its value to the 
supplier
c)- that consumer and producer surplus may be aggregated.
We will now analyse whether society would gain or lose from 
the imposition of a factor subsidy, e.g. fertiliser subsidy by 











Fig. 3.1: PRODUCER AND CONSUMER SURPLUS
Price
X S  demand before subsidy 
XS  demand after subsidy
m
q4 Quantity OO C Import quantityi
(«) (*>
Fig. 3.2 : EFFECT OF AN INPUT SUBSIDY
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Figure 3.2 and its analysis will show some of the important 
implications of a fertiliser subsidy policy. To Fig. 3.2 (a), the 
following are defined
nS = domestic agricultural supply curve ( no subsidy )
DD = domestic demand curve
Pw ~ world supply price represented by horizontal line 
At price Pe, domestic supply = domestic demand and imports are zero. 
This is plotted as point m in the figure. At world price Pw, 
domestic supply ( no subsidy ) = qs, domestic demand = qd. Hence, 
imports = qd - qs = i. This import is plotted as point n in the 
figure. Both m and n lie on the import demand or excess demand curve 
represented by curve mnrs in Fig. 3.2 (b).
Now assume a fertiliser subsidy is introduced. [ 8 ] It will 
reduce the marginal cost of production of farmers and cause the 
supply curve to shift to the right from aS to aS. What the analysis 
would be able to show is the cost of the subsidy policy to the 
economy or put in another way whether the increase or benefit in 
output from the subsidy policy is greater or smaller compared to its 
costs. Note that the subsidy doesn’t change the market price of the 
product which remain at Pw. Hence, demand would remain the same at 
qd but domestic supply of the product would increase to qs.
From Fig. 3.2 (a), it can be seen that the cost of the subsidy 
to* taxpayers is the value equivalent to the shaded areas A + B + C. 
As a result of the subsidy, producer surplus increased by A + B. A 
is an addition to the surplus because it represents a subsidy for 
resource costs needed to produce qs before the subsidy was 
introduced. B is also an addition to surplus because it represents
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resource cost used to increase output from qs to qs. If we were to 
net the cost of the subsidy against the increase in producer 
surplus, we will get C, which is the welfare loss or deadweight
economic loss resulting from the subsidy. C then may be seen ......
" as the value of resources overcommitted to producing the commodity 
and represent a loss of production efficiency or misallocation of 
resources. " [ 9 ]
An alternative way to calculate the deadweight loss from 
subsidy policy is by looking at the resource cost. In Fig. 3.2(a), 
as a result of the subsidy policy, resource cost equal to the shaded 
areas B + C + D are drawn into production. As a result output 
expands, imports decline by the same amount and hence, there is a 
foreign exchange savings of area B + D ( which is equal to shaded 
areas F + E in Fig. 3.2(b). ) Therefore, additional resources worth 
B + C + D when valued at world price Pw have been used to achieve 
the foreign exchange savings of imports worth only B + D. This again 
shows that there is misallocation of resources equal to shaded area 
C.
The result of this partial equilibrium analaysis can thus be 
summarised as follows in terms of the shaded areas of Fig. 3.2 
Subsidy Cost to Taxpayers = A + B + C
Producer Surplus Gain =■ A + B
Deadweight Economic Loss = C
Resource Cost = B + D + C
Foreign Exchange Gain = B + D
Net Effect = Misallocation of Resources.
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Hence, as a policy instrument, an input subsidy like fertiliser 
subsidy could result in efficiency losses or lead to misallocation 
of resources.
Indifference Curve Analysis
An alternative method to analyse the impact of subsidies on 
resource allocation and hence welfare would be to analyse consumer 
preference, production relationships and prices by using 
indifference curve analysis. [ 10 ] In this kind of analysis,the 
following assumptions are made:- [ 11 ]
a) that there are only two commodities
b) that resources are given
c) that technology is given and fixed
d) that there is full employment of resources
e) that there is a set pattern of consumer preference ( indicated by 
indifference curves )
f) that there is mobility of factors
g) that the objective function is the maximixation of want- 
satisfaction
In Fig. 3.3, XI and X2 are two coinmodities. ABC is the 
production possibility curve while DBE is the community indifference 
curve which is tangent to ABC at point B. This indifference curve 
represents the maximum possible want-satisfaction and thus welfare 
of the community. Equilibrium between production and consumption 
will occur when the marginal rate of substitution ( MRS ), which is 
given by the slope of the indifference curve is equal for 







between the two products in terms of money, i.e. their prices will 
be such that the ratio of prices between these two products will be 






Fig. 3.3: CONSUMER OPTIMISATION IN INDIFFERENCE CURVE ANALYSIS
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3.0 WELFARE EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES
Now, we shall use the above analytical framework to analyse the 
welfare effects of subsidies. Owing to the effects on inter-industry 
allocation of resources under conditions of full employment, 
economic intervention in the form of subsidies will cause different 
patterns of consumption and production to emerge as compared to the 
situation under non-subsidy. Here we shall show the discrepancy in 
the optimum conditions under subsidy and non-subsidy conditions 
using Figure 3.4.
Assume a two commodity model. AFBC is the production 
possibility curve. QS, GFI and DBE are the community indifference 
curves. Here welfare is maximised at B, where ON of XI and OP of X2 
is produced and consumed by the community. However, when a subsidy 
is introduced a reallocation of resources and production will occur,
i.e. 01 of XI and OM of X2 produced. Now suppose that the community 
will consume the total production of XI and X2 thus produced, it 
will bring about a lower level of want-satisafaction by the 
community than would be the case in the absence of the subsidy. In 
Fig. 3.4, such a pattern of consumption will place the community on 
a lower indifferent curve, GFI. In fact, consumers may not remove 
the whole production of OL of XI and OM of X2 from the market and 
consume it. The result of this will be a still lower level of total 
consumption and hence want-satisfaction than that shown by the curve 
GFI. Such a level of want-satisfaction - hence welfare - is given by 
the curve QS. The above analysis, hence, suggests strongly that 
interference in the pricing mechanism through a subsidy will have an 
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Fig. 3.4: WELFARE EFFECT OF SUBSIDY USING INDIFFERENCE CURVE ANALYSIS
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Marginal Analysis
We can also illustrate the effect of subsidies on welfare and 
resource allocation by using marginal analysis. [ 12 ] If a subsidy 
is introduced, prices of resources and products are altered. This 
will tend to shift the equilibrium between inputs and production as 
shown in Figure 2.5.
In the diagram, when MCI = MP1, OB amount of resources will be 
used. When the price of output is raised through a subsidy, the MP 
curve will shift to the right as MP2. Hence, a new equilibrium will 
be reached where the industry will use OC resources. An input 
subsidy will cause factor prices to be lower and the MC curve will 
decline. This is represented by a shift from MCI to MC2. Here OD 
resources will be used at the new equilibrium instead of OB. If the 
subsidy causes prices for inputs to be lower, equilibrium will be 
determined by the intersection of MP2 and MC2. Here the industry 
will use OE resources. Therefore, if an industry or sector is 
favoured through the granting of input and output subsidies, it will 
result in increased resource use and hence production will be 
increased. However, under full employment of resources, the above 
can only happen by bidding away resources from other uses.
Therefore, any price intervention in favour of one sector of the 
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Fig. 3.S: WELFARE EFFECT OF SUBSIDY USING MARGINAL ANALYSIS
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In addition, it should be noted that an output subsidy tends to 
lead to a maladjustment between production and consumption. This 
occurs because a rational producer will respond to a higher product 
price by producing more of the crop being supported. However, the 
reverse is true for consumers. They would prefer to buy a smaller 
amount at this higher price. Therefore, for the market to clear, 
there are three ways:-
a) consumers will have to be subsidised at this new higher price
b) exports will have to be subsidised to make it competitive 
( dumping )
c) surpluses could be disposed off physically through destruction as 
storage costs could be expensive.
Therefore, it would be clear that an output subsidy through a 
price support will have to be accompanied by other measures if 
surpluses are to be avoided through for e.g. acreage control, output 
restrictions or quotas or restriction on imports.
Effect of Subsidy on Input Use
A good indication of an effective subsidy is that it would act 
as an incentive for farmers to use more factor inputs such as 
fertilisers or better seeds. Hence a related issue to be resolved is 
whether farmers buy and use more improved inputs ( assuming supply 
is readily available ) with subsidies. In this regard, it would be
relevant to ask what are the determinants of a factor input demand.
Nieuwoudt found that of all the factors considered in determining 
the usage of fertiliser, its price is the most important. [ 13 ]
This seems to agree with the findings of other studies. [ 14 ]
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Other factors that also have an important bearing on the demand for 
fertiliser are the prices of crops, net farm income, capital assets 
of farmers and land prices. Nieuwoudt further contended that the 
withdrawal of the fertiliser subsidy need not necessarily reduce the 
total consumption or demand for fertiliser because improvements in 
the farmers* financial position would still stimulate its 
consumption. However, although this scenario may be true for the 
richer and bigger farmers, it is not necessarily so for the smaller 
and poorer farmers in LDCs because of their greater dependence on 
input subsidies for sustaining or improving their productivity. In 
addition, in the long run, an increase in the consumption of 
fertiliser may also lead to an increase in the demand for labour 
especially to cater for greater productivity which therefore 
requires more labour for harvesting. Therefore, factor subsidies 
such as fertiliser could affect not only the use of resources within 
the agriculture sector but also the allocation of resources to the 
other sectors such as the labour market.
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Empirical Evidence of Welfare Effect of Subsidies
After discussing the theoretical question of the welfare 
effects of subsidies, we will discuss some empirical studies related 
to this. Among the? economists who have conducted empirical 
investigation on the welfare effects of agricultural policies 
include Wallace, Nerlove, Groenewald, Floyd, Tolley, etc. [ 15 ]
Wallace [ 1G ] compared social costs and social benefits of 
price support programmes in United States. He used the premise that 
total area under the demand curve to the left of a given quantity 
represent total utility to the community and the supply curve 
reflects alternative costs to the community of resources to produce 
each quantity. He showed that a high support price which led to a 
greater quantity of crops produced but which cannot be disposed or 
consumed at that price would add more to social costs of the 
community than to total utility. Hence, according to Wallace, such 
programme have a dampening effect on the welfare of the community.
Bale and Greenshield [ 17 ] presented calculations on social 
cost of achieving two levels of Japanese agricultural production by 
government intervention. They calculated welfare costs of Japanese 
agriculture trade and production policies for 8 major cereals and 
livestock commodities produced and imported in Japan in 1975/76.
They estimated that net social loss in consumption and production 
was substantial ( e.g. consumption loss was US$276 billion and 
production loss was US$111 billion ). They further projected that 
net social welfare loss for 1985/86 Plan would constitute about 2 % 
of Japan’s GNP.
Bale and Lutz [ 18 ] analysed government intervention in
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agricultural price determination in several DCs and LDCs. They 
discovered that agricultural policies pursued by LDCs produce 
effects which are diametrically opposite to those produced by the 
policies of many DCs and that policies of both are costly in terms 
of global welfare.
Harling and Thompson [ 19 ] in analysing the economic effects 
of intervention in Canadian agriculture found that the calculated 
deadweight welfare losses associated with distortions in prices and 
the resulting changes in quantities to be relatively small. They 
estimated that annual total deadweight loss or social cost from 
inefficiencies associated with government intervention was only 
$27.89 million. Nevertheless, the distributional impacts on 
consumers and producers were quite large.
In another study undertaken by Nieuwoudt [ 20 ] on input 
subsidy in South Africa, he estimated that welfare gains created by 
fertiliser subsidies exceeded social costs.
Numerous other studies undertaken by the World Bank [ 21 ] in 
the LDCs have contributed much to the understanding of the effect of 
subsidies and other government pricing policies on resource 
allocation. In view of the importance of the agriculture sector in 
the LDCs and agricultural pricing policies on economic development, 
it is anticipated that more of such country studies by the World 
Bank would be undertaken in the near future.
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4.0 SUBSIDIES AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
We have mentioned that equity considerations also feature 
prominently in the discussion of resource allocation. In this 
section, we shall try to answer the question of who benefits from a 
subsidy and by how much. We shall take the case of a fertiliser 
subsidy but the analysis is applicable to other agriculture 
subsidies as well.
First, we shall analyse theoretically the impact of subsidies 
on income distribution by using Fig. 3.6. AB is demand while S1S1 is 
supply of fertiliser before the introduction of subsidy. At the 
equilibrium price PI, farmers buy XI quantity of fertilisers. Then 
the government subsidises fertiliser and supply shifts to S2S2. The 
amount of the fertiliser subsidy is P2 - P3. Assuming that the 
supply of fertiliser is not perfectly elastic, the farmer is now 
paying a lower price P3 than previously at PI and is using more 
fertiliser than before, i.e. X2 rather than XI. The farmer’s share 
of the subsidy EF and share of the supplier DE depends on the 
elasticity of demand and supply of fertiliser. The more elastic the 
supply, the bigger the farmer's share and the more elastic the 
demand, the bigger the fertiliser manufacturer's share. Nieuwoudt, 
after allowing for a lag in price adjustment calculated that the 
short and long-term price elasticities of demand for fertilisers in 
South Africa are estimated as 0.75 and 2.50 respectively. [ 22 ]
The figures for other countries in the LDCs can be seen from a study 






Fig. 3.C: EFFECT OF SUBSIDY ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION
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Who Benefits From Subsidies ?
However, the more critical question to ask is which farmers 
benefit from subsidies? A lot of research on this matter has been 
conducted and it is generally found that the bigger farmers gain 
more from government subsidies than the smaller farmers. We shall 
see what are the findings of the various studies on this matter.
Brown [ 24 ] in his studies of input subsidies and its effect 
on income distribution in LDCs discovered that farm subsidies 
benefited mainly middle and upper-income farmers since large scale 
farmers are the ones who can afford to buy most of the subsidised 
inputs and poorer farmers cannot get access to important inputs 
since they lack the financial means to do so.
Davidson [ 25 ] argued that in Australia, it is the large 
farmers who need or deserve the subsidy the least are the ones who 
receive the largest share while the small farmer with the lowest 
production receive the least subsidy.
Sherrill [ 26 ] in a critique of the agricultural price 
support system of the U.S. said that the bigger farmers tend to reap 
more benefits than the smaller farmers from agricultural subsidies.
Boulding [ 27 ] echoed the sentiment of Sherrill and in a
particularly critical statement said : ”..... political pressure
has produced subsidies towards agriculture in all societies, but 
where these subsidies tend to have gone to the rich farmers and have 
tended, if anything, to drive the poorer farmers out of agriculture 
altogether. This is particularly noticeable in the United States, 
where agriculture subsidies take the form of price supports, which 
inevitably subsidise the richer farmer, as it is the richer farmer
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who has more to sell ..... ".
Self and Storing [ 28 ] focussing on the United Kingdom said 
that since agricultural price guarantees ignore the circumstances of 
individual farms and farmers, the largest amounts of aid go to 
successful farmers, while the poorest farmers get the least. They 
further stated that irrespective of what the state does, the larger 
farmers will continue to increase both their output and efficiency 
but that smaller farmers need help to overcome their intrinsic 
disadvantages.
Islam [ 29 ] in his study on Bangladesh agriculture discovered 
that larger farmers have easier access to irrigation which is 
heavily subsidised by the government. He concluded that the richer 
farmers are likely to get a disproportionate share of the benefits
from the subsidy on irrigation. Thus he said, M  it is clear
that the subsidy on foodgrains and agricultural inputs does not have
any positive distribution implications ...... subsidy on inputs is
possibly benefiting the richer farmers disproportionately.”
However, Meerman [ 30 ] in a comprehensive study of Malaysia 
found that in agriculture and rural development, those who benefited 
from land development schemes are the poor while those who benefited 
from subsidised inputs, extension activity and so forth, is 
extremely complicated to determine precisely. Nevertheless, Meerman 
be-lieved that poor farmers have as much access to and consume as 
much of the various agricultural services and inputs as do wealthy 
farmers.
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On the other hand, Wilson, [ 31 ] a political scientist noted 
that in U.S. and Britain, farm subsidies tend to benefit the rich.
Quoting him : "..... The tragedy is that while rural poverty has
often been used to justify the enormously expensive farm subsidy 
policies of Britain and the U.S., very little of this had benefited
the rural poor or farmers with low incomes .... , in both countries
subsidies have gone primarily to farmers who enjoy incomes well 
above the national average". Wilson quoted Schultze [ 32 ] who 
argued that the main effect of farm subsidies has been to raise the 
price of farm land, again benefiting mainly the rich while the 
poorest farmers have benefited relatively little.
Myrdal [ 33 ] in his voluminous and detailed study of the 
South Asian sub-continent also expressed the view that the rich 
farmers benefited more than the poorer ones. He attributed this to 
the way farmers respond to economic incentives. He said :
" .... the disproportionate distribution of benefits of
governmental intervention in agriculture to the better-off groups is 
not solely related to the superior power position of these groups. 
The intensification of inequalities is also a product of normal 
economic responses. Peasant landlords and privileged tenants have 
displayed more aptitude for using opportunities offered by the 
increased availability of state aid and technological advances. 
Naturally they have obtained more benefits than other members of the 
agrarian structure who are apathetic and who have neither the means 
nor the incentives to avail themselves of the advantages offered. "
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Summary
Hence, we can deduce from the above discussion that subsidies 
do create distortions in the economy and that empirical studies have 
attested to the fact that welfare losses are indeed significant.
This is also in line with our belief that too much subsidy would be 
detrimental to the welfare of the nation and that a more selective 
and discriminate use of subsidies would be the best policy to adopt. 
As regards to equity and income distribution effect of subsidies, 
there is wide agreement among writers that subsidies do indeed 
benefit the farmers but that they do so disproportionately and that 
the richer and well to do farmers gain relatively more them the 
poorer farmers which is indeed contrary to the declared objectives 
of the government. This phenomenon seems to cause some concern and 
alarm to policy-makers in LDCs. In fact, many writers believe that 
the disparity in the benefits of government assistance is one of the 
attributory causes for the persistence of rural poverty in these 
countries. Hence, the question of access of the poor to governmental 
programmes is also one of the key means in alleviating rural poverty 
in most LDCs. [ 34 ] Hence, the mere existence of subsidy 
programmes per se does not guarantee that it would reach the target 
group that it was originally intended for. Deliberate and conscious 
attempts on the part of development workers must be made to ensure 
that the intended beneficiaries do get their share.
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5.0 SUBSIDIES AND SUPPLY RESPONSE OF FARMERS
Understanding rural labour market behaviour and its 
characteristics is important to planners and policy-makers in LDCs 
in planning for the deployment of " surplus ” labour force in the 
rural areas. [ 35 ] However, there have been voices of concern 
regarding the applicability of the standard neoclassical framework 
in measuring and estimating labour supply elasticities in LDCs. 
Besides the problem of data constraints and its reliability, it is 
believed that many of the assumptions of the neoclassical model 
( examples the homogeneity of labour ) do not apply. However, 
studies done by Bardhan, Rosenzweig, Binswinger, Barker, Hart, etc. 
have refuted the above claims. A more important conclusion to be 
derived from these studies is that the small farmer and landless 
peasant do indeed act rationally and respond to economic incentives 
and that pricing policies such as subsidies do generate an important 
and significant effect on the labour supply function and therefore 
affect productivity.
In this section, we shall attempt to analyse the impact of 
subsidies on labour supply behaviour of rural households in LDCs. An 
appropriate place to start would be by utilising the basic income- 
leisure choice model in the theory of individual labour supply.
[ 36 ] The model basically states that an individual can divide his 
time between work and leisure ( non-work ). Here both work and 
leisure are considered to be consumption goods. Consumer theory 
suggests that an individual receives utility from the goods that he 
consumes. But a person can only increase his earned income by 
spending more time ( hours ) at work and less time in non-work
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pursuits. This interdependence between income and leisure is 
captured in the following utility function assumed for the 
individual :
u = u ( y, 1 ) 
where y = income 
1 = leisure 
u = utility
The assumptions made regarding this function are as follows :-
a) individual has got choice between income and leisure
b) individual endowed with non-employment income y
c) individual operates at a given wage rate
In Fig. 3.7, the following features are described
i) Consumption possibilities open to the individual is represented 
by the budget constraint ABC
ii) Initial endowment of time is OA
iii) Slope of segment BC determined by extra net income that can be 
exchanged by giving up an hour of leisure, which is the wage rate w
iv) Individuals assumed to have a given set of preference between 
income and leisure which is represented by -a set of well-behaved 
indifference curves.
Here the individual is in equilibrium when his budget 
constraint is tangent to the highest attainable indifference curve 
at- point E. Here he consumes OH leisure and AH hours of work. Now 
what happens if there is a change in y which is the wage rate ? 
Normally if the wage rate increases, the individual would respond by 






Fig. 3.7: MODEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL LABOUR SUPPLY
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In a major study done on the effect of taxation on incentives, 
Brown [ 37 ] concluded thus: M A proportionate income tax thus 
causes an individual both to wish to work more ( income effect ) and 
simultaneously to work ]ess ( price or substitutiton effect ). 
Because our theory is indeterminate, that taxes may make people work 
either less or more, the question can only be resolved through 
empirical research ".
Indeed, subsidies which is the obverse of taxation may indeed 
portray directly opposite effects as taxation does. At first sight, 
it would appear to be apparent that subsidies, which intend to 
reduce cost of inputs to farmers or increase returns to their 
output, would stimulate production and hence income of farmers. 
Another argument might take the position that since subsidies tend 
to increase the incomes of farmers, they might now work less than 
before because their demand for leisure would be now greater. 
However, to resolve this problem satisfactorily, empirical 
investigation needs to be done. For our present purpose, we take the 
stand that subsidies may or may not increase the supply of labour or 
greater man-hours to work. In other words, the proposition is that 
whether there is substitutiton of labour for income or leisure or 
vice versa when faced with subsidies is indeterminate.
In fact using the leisure-work framework, we can establish a 
whether there is a theoretical justification for subsidies.
Fig. 3.8 is an example. Here the initial equilibrium at point A. 
Subsidy of £1 per hour will increase the maximum wage of labour to 
£72 per day. This may then reduce labour input as it is now possible 













example by a movement to point C. But this move would not 
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Fig. 3-$ JUSTIFICATION OF A SUBSIDY
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Empirical Studies on Effect of Subsidies on Labour Supply
There has not been any studies done known to the writer on the 
effects of subsidy, per se, on labour supply in the LDCs. However, 
we can draw useful lessons on the studies done by Brown on the 
effects of taxation on the incentive to work. Nevertheless, there 
are a number of farm household and labour supply studies in the LDCs 
which could be a useful basis for our discussion. We shall extract 
some of the important findings from these studies.
Ahmed [ 38 ] in his study of Bangladesh agriculture commented: 
" Even if the supply of labour is abundant, hours of work per worker 
may not change significantly with a change in real wages ( for 
example through subsidies ) because the work day is already long. 
This rigidity limits the effect of price change ( or subsidies ) on 
production. In this case, higher income and more leisure may be 
equally appealing to workers. Each increment in production is 
achieved through harder work reflects in the real cost of labour the 
choice each worker must make between a reduction of time spent 
working and an increase in his income, enabling him to purchase more 
goods and services ” . In fact, in many LDCs the poor farmer is 
persisting on subsistence standards over and above the normal time 
of working. This is because the return he gets can meagrely support 
him to subsist. Hence, he will take every opportunity to add his 
income through whatever means is available.
With respect to policy measures to induce workers and farmers 
to work harder for income, Mellor [ 39 ] has suggested certain 
measures to influence the choice of labour over leisure by 
increasing the availability of attractive consumer goods over a wide
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range of prices and removing various cultural restraints on 
increasing consumption.
Schultz [ 40 ] agreed with the views of Mellor and pointed out
that: M In a developing country, ..... the minor role of the market
sector in satisfying the final demands of consumers. In this case, 
if more market investment is allocated to the production of consumer 
goods, consumers might work longer hours in the market to be able to 
purchase the wider array of market produced consumer goods if these 
are effective substitutes for home produced products. If consumer 
goods, on the other hand, are neglected and governmental savings are 
channeled into increasing the production of heavy industrial goods, 
the per worker supply of labour to the market may diminish ” .
In addition, the status of farmers may also affect their supply 
of labour in the light of the incentives given. This is especially 
true between large, medium and small farmers. [ 41 ]
To get a further insight into the question of labour supply 
response of farmers in LDCs, it would be instructive to analyse the 
labour supply behaviour and its characteristics. [ 42 ] It has been 
established that farmers in LDCs are rational and respond to 
economic incentives. The myth of the lazy native workers who like to 
idle and laze more than working after having acquired a minimum 
income, and thus exhibiting the backward-sloping supply curve of 
labour, has been widely refuted. [ 43 ] In fact it would not be 
irrelevant to mention that the phenomenon of perverse supply 
response of labour is not inconsistent with economic behaviour. For 
example, even in developed countries, most people after having 
attained a certain level of income would not want to work for more
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hours since the net addition to income would be heavily taxed. This 
attitude to avoid additional work due to the effect of taxation is 
termed by Lewis as the ” tax mentality ". [ 44 ] Hence, it would be 
more worthwhile and rational for a person not to work for the extra 
hours despite being offered an extra income and instead enjoy the 
leisure.
According to Rosenzweig [ 45 ] the development literature 
assumes the following about the rural labour markets in LDCs
a) that they are non-competitive with a rigid, institutionally set 
exogenous wages,
b) the presence of significant underemployment or unemployment ,
c) " special ” models of rural households differentiated by size of 
landholdings and /or access to labour are inappropriate, and
d) that rural labour is homogeneous.
One factor in determining the effect of subsidies on labour 
supply and employment is the shape of the supply curve of labour.
[ 46 ] The shape of labour supply curve is in turn affected by the 
preference of farmers for leisure or work / income. Relatively 
little empirical evidence exists on labour supply behaviour in rural 
areas of LDCs. However, we shall extract and highlight the findings 
of the few noteworthy studies that have been done.
Rosenzweig [ 47 ] who worked on data of rural India concluded 
-in his study that the annual number of days of wage employment by 
individuals is determined mainly by supply rather than demand ( as 
neoclassical model implies ). Therefore, because of positive 
preference for leisure, the supply curve for individual labour is 
backward bending. Also he observed that geographical immobility is
90
characteristic of the rural labour market.
Bardhan [ 48 ] estimated labour supply functions using a large 
set of cross-sectional data for agricultural workers in rural West 
Bengal. He found that for the casual farm workers and small 
cultivators, wage response to hiring out labour is positive but 
small, i.e. elasticity varies between 0.20 to 0.29. But wage 
response is not significant for total labour supply of all size 
groups combined together. This indicate the existence of backward- 
bending supply curve for medium to large farmers. He concluded that 
labour supply is primarily determined by social and demographic 
conditions of labour-supplying households and their assets.
Hart [ 49 ] from a systematic survey in Indonesia demonstrated 
that even landless labourers remain employed ( including self- 
employed ) almost all year in work of low productivity. Changes in 
wage rate would hardly influence their total hours of work. On the 
other hand, only a large change in wage rate ( or return to labour ) 
would induce relatively well-to-do people to work harder. This 
pattern of behaviour indicates inelastic labour supply ( preference 
for leisure ) in rural Indonesia. In her study, Hart also found 
that the villages worked hard and are fully employed, often working 
more than 40 hours per week and that the poorer members of the 
village tend to work longer hours
. In Bangladesh, studies on rural employment indicate that even 
though there is apparent labour surplus, voluntary unemployment and 
underemployment is quite large. This indicates a preference for 
leisure and the inelastic supply curve for labour. Ahmed [ 50 ] 
found that the aggregate rate of unemployment in one area in the
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Commilla district in 1975 / 76 was about 12 %, in which about 8 % 
were involuntarily unemployed, 26 % voluntarily underemployed and 
8 % voluntarily unemployed.
In another study, Ahmed [ 51 ] analysed the relationship 
between wage rate and unemployment of hired agricultural workers and 
discovered that the method supports the conclusion from the previous 
studies that the supply curve of agricultural labour is relatively 
inelastic. The above discussion indicates that in LDCs the supply of 
labour from large and medium farm households for manual work in 
agriculture is much more inelastic than that from the landless and 
small farm households.
Summary
In summary, it is therefore clear that before we can attempt to 
analyse the effects of subsidies on labour supply in LDCs, it would 
be meaningful first to establish and to get a clear idea of the 
behaviour and characteristics of labour supply in the LDCs and their 
supply response to price incentives. From the evidence adduced 
above, it is obvious that farmers in LDCs do indeed portray rational 
and normal economic behaviour. The studies that have been done on 
labour supply functions in the LDCs suggest, however, that the 
supply of labour is quite inelastic and the implication is that to 
persuade the farmers to offer more of their labour, a greater 
measure of incentives need to be offered. However, whether subsidies 
would be able to induce them to work harder is difficult to predict 
since there are many other variables that have to be considered.
This would include the following
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a) number of hours fanners already committed to work
b) the status of farmers
c) relative preference for leisure or greater income which in turn 
is determined by personal characteristics, level of education, etc.
d) the availability of attractive consumer goods with which to spend 
their extra income
e) the net benefit that they could get from the subsidy
f) the amount of subsidy.
6.0 CONCLUSION
We have surveyed the literature and analysed the impact of 
subsidies on resource allocation and on redistributional aspects 
using conventional neo-classical arguments. However, since most of 
the analysis is done in the static framework, it is not fully 
satisfactory. Hence, the weakness of the approach. But it has to be 
borne that in order for the analysis to be more realistic, time has 
to be taken into consideration and a dynamic approach has to be 
taken. In addition, the chapter has also surveyed and supplemented 
the theoretical part of the analysis by giving empirical evidence 
from various studies conducted in the relevant fields.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SMALL FARMER IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the previous two chapters, we have focussed our discussion 
and analysis on the issue of agricultural subsidies and examined 
their role and contribution towards stimulating and improving 
agricultural productivity. We came to the conclusion that although 
subsidies are critical components of agricultural development 
strategy, they have, by and large, benefited mainly the bigger and 
relatively well-off farmers. The smaller and especially landless 
farmers have either benefited relatively little or virtually nothing 
at all due to either inaccessibility or because the subsidies were 
too insignificant to be of much value to them. The potential, 
therefore, of increasing and enhancing the productivity of small 
farmers through greater accessibility and actual usage of realistic 
amounts of subsidy would therefore be of interest to the farmers and 
planners in LDCs.
In this chapter, we shall focus on the small farmer who we 
assume is the target group and intended beneficiary of subsidy 
programmes. Our objective here is to analyse who he is, his economic 
and social characteristics and disposition, his attitudes, 
motivations, values and hence his socio-economic behaviour.
More specifically, we will discuss the following
i) Definition of the small farmer and his general characteristics
ii) Motivations, values and attitudes of the small farmer
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iii) Objectives of the small farmer and factors affecting his 
behaviour pattern
iv) How farmers allocate scarce resources
v) Responsiveness of farmers to economic stimuli
2.0 DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FARMERS IN LDCs [ 1 ]
It is generally assumed in any discussion of the peasantry or 
subsistence farmers in the LDCs that the focus is on the small 
farmer. However, since there are many different interpretations and 
notions of what is and who constitutes the small farmer, it would be 
quite proper to attempt a definition of the small farmer for the 
purpose of this chapter. A particularly interesting approach was 
that taken by Wharton ( 1970 ) in his synthesis of the meaning of 
the subsistence farmer. He did that by establishing five economic 
and five socio-cultural criteria associated with the subsistence 
farmer. [ 2 ]
On the basis of economic criteria, the small farmer consumes 
most of his production while giving relatively little emphasis for 
the market. He uses mainly his own family labour and hence the ratio 
of hired wage labour to total labour force used in production is 
very small. Similarly, the ratio of purchased factor inputs to all 
inputs used in production is also very small. Normally, all inputs 
come from the farm household itself while those purchased outside 
are very insignificant or virtually nothing at all. Therefore, it is 
not at all surprising that the farmer utilises very simple tools 
which are relatively backward and this partially explains the reason 
for his low output and productivity. In almost all the cases, the
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fanners earn very low income and hence the ability to generate 
further capital and savings is denied. Finally, the subsistence 
farmer is depicted as one who has very limited choices due to the 
inherent constraints and bottlenecks present in the subsistence 
economy.
As regards to the second set of criteria related to the small 
farmer the premise is that of a M strong influence .... of socio­
cultural considerations in the process of production and labour use 
and in the distribution or exchange of agricultural output". [ 3 ]
In this case, among the variables linked to the sociocultural 
category would include non-economic factors like cultural and social
obligations as well as institutional factors. In addition, the small
farmer have relatively less external contacts with the outside world
and hence tend to have a " localite ” focus. Furthermore, the small
farmer tend to have a stronger interpersonal relationship than 
modern commercial farmers. It is also contended that the peasant 
farmer’s psychological make-up is characterised by a lack of 
achievement-oriented motives and more towards " subsist.ence- 
mindedness Finally, peasant farmers are also said to be 
tradition-bound and tend to resist change in their production mode.
However, we would prefer a definition adopted by Ellis [ 4 ] 
whereby he defined peasants or small farmers to be household 
agricultural producers characterised by partial engagement in 
incomplete markets. This definition is more comprehensive and serves 
a number of purposes as follows :-
a) it recognises that peasants are part of a larger economic system, 
and therefore that their economic behaviour as agricultural
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producers depends on how the larger system works for them;
b) it allows peasants some limited capacity for survival independent 
of the larger system, and this may sometimes be important for 
explaning peasant economic behaviour-;
c) it emphasises that peasant production takes place in a context of 
factor and product markets which are not fully formed, and depending 
on which markets are incomplete, this has an important impact both 
on their relative autonomy as agricultural producers and on the kind 
of economic decisions they make;
d) it serves to distinguish peasants both from the capitalist farm 
enterprises ( hiring wage labour ) and from commercial family 
farmers operating in the context of fully formed factor and output 
markets;
e) it lends a strategic perspective to agricultural policies which 
are often concerned with accelerating the transition of peasants 
into commercial family farmers by improving the working of 
markets,increasing the use of purchased inputs, and removing the 
social and economic constraints which distinguish peasants from 
other economic actors in the market economy. "
Hence, from Ellis’s perspective, small farmers in LDCs are a 
unique category of economic actors who operate and respond 
differently to economic stimuli because of different resource 
endowments and situations facing them. And hence the approach to 
take to help overcome the socio-economic problems of small farmers 
are also different. However, it has been universally acknowledged 
that small farmers in LDCs are indeed an unfortunate lot and much 
need to be done to assist them to get out of the " poverty trap
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In fact, poor farmers have been the focus of countless measures by 
both national and international developmental agencies to assist 
them to improve their living standards. But ironically the fate of 
the majority of poor farmers seem to remain stagnant and backward.
[ 5 ] Whether it has been the fault of the government for 
prescribing the wrong strategies or for formulating poor plans or 
for poor implementation despite impressive and feasible plans or 
whether the ** developmental environment M is not conducive enough 
and hence need to be restructured and reformed or whether the 
farmers themselves are not responding and participating sufficiently 
in government programmes is a subject of great controversy and 
interest. [ 6 ]
3.0 MOTIVATIONS, VALUES AND ATTITUDES OF SMALL FARMERS [ 7 ]
Before we embark on a discussion of farmers* behaviour and 
analysing their decision-making modes, it would be instructive to 
discuss briefly their attitudes, values and motivation because 
eventually these variables shape the behaviour pattern of farmers.
In fact according to Clayton ( 1983 ), many agricultural development 
plans, policies and projects failed or were unsuccessful because of 
the inability of government programmes to address the right problem 
and give the right solution. This implies that policy-makers and 
planners do not understand their target-group well enough, 
especially relating to the following matters :-
i) farmers* physical and economic endowment
ii) farmers* objectives and priorities
iii) farmers* environment and their constraints, and
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iv) fanners’ attitudes, values and motivations.
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that most of the 
studies done on attitudes, values and motivations of farmers were 
mainly undertaken by sociologists, anthropologist or psychologists 
while the economist is contented to assume these as ” the given 
since they are considered as non-quantifiable and involve random 
behaviour. Some economists believed that human motivation is 
incapable of being explained. [ 8 ]
According to Lewin [ 9 ] human behaviour is a function of the 
person in his environment which implies that behaviour depends on 
the interaction of the person who has certain goals, aspirations and 
objectives and his environment where he gets his resources and 
materials. This mode of thinking is in direct conflict with that of 
conventional economic theory which treats behaviour as a parameter. 
By assuming behaviour to be a constant, the economist would be in a 
position to proceed smoothly with his models to get the desired 
results more easily.
However, Gasson [ 10 ] observed that ”.....  orthodox
economic theory treats the goal of behaviour as a parameter since 
production, exchange, investment and so on are assumed to be 
undertaken to maximise monetary gains. Therefore, with one class of 
variables treated as a constant, the economist’s task is simplified 
considerably and he is able to manipulate resource variables and 
construct elegant and complex models to explain and predict 
behaviour. The sophistication of these models may divert attention 
from the fact that they are built on heroic assumption about human
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motivation and to this extent are removed from reality . ........
beyond postulating that his goal is profit maximisation and that he 
is rational, which implies that when confronted with alternative he 
selects that course of action yielding highest profit, economic 
theory assumes nothing about the personality of economic man ". In 
fact a body of literature has now emerged which is concerned with 
the above matter and is questioning basic assumptions made of the 
motive of economic actors. Also new areas of studies like Islamic 
Economics, Economic Pshychology, etc. is fast gaining popularity 
because it gives an alternative and wider perspective of economic 
issues dominated by traditional neo-classical models.
For example, the proposition of profit motive in economics has 
been challenged and subjected to much criticism and objections.
[ 11 ] For example, Gasson, a sociologist classified four 
categories of objective ( other than profit maximisation ) that a 
farmer is likely to pursue. [ 12 ] She concluded her analysis of 
how economics treat the farmer with a dismal note saying that for 
the purpose of explaining farmers* behaviour, economic theory is 
" intellectually satisficing but not particularly convincing. "
According to Tweeten [ 13 ], the abundance of natural resources 
by itself is inadequate to explain economic growth. He postulated 
that attitudes of people and the characteristics of institutions 
that, regulate and coordinate activities is as important. On the 
other hand, Alam [ 14 ] postulated that having the proper work 
ethos may determine how fast a nation can develop. Arnon [ 15 ] 
emphasised that agricultural development is not purely a function of 
technological and economic factors but its success also crucially
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depend on three factors:-
i) understanding of the society where development takes place
ii) socio-cultural knowledge about farmers* responsiveness to 
technological changes and
iii) ability to get willing cooperation of people involved 
Arnon [ 16 ] said that in this connection, there were two
schools of thought about motivations, attitudes and values of 
traditional subsistence agriculture. The first school deems that 
only economic factors determine peasant behaviour and that peasants 
will respond to economic incentives quickly and normally ( Schultz: 
1964; Mellor:1966 ). Here sociocultural factors only play a marginal 
role in determining farmers* behaviour. The second group feels that 
non-economic factors outweigh economic ones and hence would lead to 
behaviour not within bounds of economic rationality. (Balogh :1966) 
However, we agree with the contention that both extremes as 
discussed above do not reflect the real situation. Individual 
farmers and groups fall between the two extremes. For example, 
certain groups of farmers do not require much persuasion to adopt 
new techniques and methods of production while others resist change 
strongly.
In view of the above, the study of values, attitudes and
motivation is important in economic theory because social values are
sometimes perceived as obstacles to development and modernisation.
[ 17 ] This is especially important in the agricultural sector of
LDCs because the farmer is the root of all development.
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Sub-Culture of the Peasantry
In this connection it would be useful to quote Rogers [ 18 ], 
who studied the subsistence farmer. He listed ten elements which he 
believed exists in the so called ” sub-culture of the peasantry ". 
These ten elements in fact summarises the motivations, attitudes and 
values of subsistence farmers and include lack of innovation, 
fatalism, low aspiration, lack of deferred gratification, limited 
time perspective, farailisra, dependent on the government, 
localiteness, mutual distrust in interpersonal relations and lack of 
empathy.
Unfortunately, all ten elements seem to be biased against the 
farmer and seem to connote negativities. However, Castillo [ 19 ] 
took Rogers to task for such characterisation of the subsistence 
farmer and brought evidence from the Philippines that negated many 
of the negative attributes discussed by Rogers. This serves to show 
the misperception that Western writers had of the subsistence 
farmers in LDCs. The contention of many studies is that subsistence 
farmers in LDCs are rational and economic in their outlook. As
Todaro [ 20 ] stated, " ...... peasant farmers do act rationally and
are responsive to economic incentives and opportunities. Where 
innovation and change fail to occur, we should not assume that 
peasants are stupid, irrational or conservative: instead we should 
examine carefully the environment in which the small farmer operates 
to search for the institutional and commercial obstacles that may be 
blocking change
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4.0 OBJECTIVE OF SMALL FARMERS AND FACTORS AFFECTING BEHAVIOUR
The production process in subsistence agriculture is quite 
distinct from that of modern commercial farming. Whereas capital and 
hired labour are two major components of commercial fanning, 
traditional agriculture uses mainly two basic inputs, family labour 
and land. However, labour tends to play a relatively more important 
role than land in susbsistence agriculture. According to Clayton 
[ 21 ], fanners’ production decision and behaviour depends upon two 
sets of factors, namely constraints imposed upon the farmer and the 
objective function of the farmer.
Constraints of Fanners
With respect to the first factor, Clayton [ 22 ] listed six 
factors which he considered to be major constraints in the farm 
environment. They include the land-population ratio, the farm 
household economy, the hand-labour economy, socio-cultural factors, 
poverty and rainfall. The cumulative effects of all these 
constraints affects the productivity and efficiency of small 
farmers. For example, reliance on rainfall make farmers vulnerable 
to the elements.
Objective Function of Fanners
We have seen above that contrary to orthodox economic theory,
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the small farmer in LDCs does not aspire solely to maximise profit 
or make monetary gains. In fact, the prority and emphasis given to 
this goal is relatively small. The farmer is more concerned with 
day-to-day survival. For example, Clayton [ 23 ] listed the 
following objectives and goals of a typical small farmer in LDCs :-
a) to have an adequate and guaranteed supply of food,
b) to have a minimum income for buying basic consumer goods,
c) to have security ( physical and psychological ),
d) to fulfill traditional obligations and
e) to have an adequate amount of leisure.
This view is shared by Sen [ 24 ] who says that the objective 
function and goals of peasant farmers may not be to maximise profit 
at all but he may want to pursue wider goals which is less self- 
centred and more towards the community benefit. This incorporation 
of non-profit elements into the model would therefore tend to create 
problems with conventional neo-classical economic models in an 
attempt to analyse the economic behaviour of peasant farmers. For 
example, farmers may want to maximise family welfare instead of 
maximising profit.
Mellor [ 25 ] on the other hand, considers that the trade-off 
between the following objectives listed below tend to have a great 
influence in determining farmers* behaviour and his decision-making 
mode.: -
a) work versus leisure
b) security versus change
c) present income versus future income
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According to Mellor, farmers* values, interests and objectives 
do not seem to coincide with that of government. In other words, 
there seems to exist a kind of *’ divergence of interest and 
objective " between government and farmers. For example the 
government always seem to assume that farmers would give high weight 
to maximising output and hence income or that farmers dislike to 
waste time and idle around or that farmers give high regard to 
consumer goods and would therefore work extra hard to earn money to 
buy them. In assuming so, the government expects that the farmer 
would respond appropriately and positively to its programmes. 
Unfortunately, this is mostly wishful thinking on the part of the 
government since there is, firstly the presence of the divergence of 
objective and interest between farmers and the government, and 
secondly the government always takes the farmers for granted. 
Virtually very little consideration is given as to how to assist the 
farmer to overcome his basic constraints and defects, as for example 
on the issue of risk and uncertainty.
In the following section, we will elaborate further on the 
three issues mentioned by Mellor above since all of them constitute 
potential problems leading to a divergence of objective and interest 
between the farmer and government.
Work-Versus Leisure
We have already mentioned that in a subsistence economy, land 
and family labour constitute the two main components of the factors 
of production but that family labour is a relatively more critical 
component. labour in turn either opts for work or leisure. Farmers
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are also concerned with their ability and efficacy of transforming 
their labour into material goods. [ 26 ] In this regard, much work 
have been done using the work-leisure framework and understanding 
the reasons behind choices made either for work or leisure is 
important to understand the means to increase productivity. For 
example, Mellor [ 27 ] gave the following factors which he 
considers farmers may use in deciding whether to work or not :-
a) unwilling to work extra hours for extremely low marginal returns 
( except when under extreme pressure of poverty ) [ 28 ]
b) unwilling to work if there is a narrow range and relatively fewer 
availability of attractive and cheap consumer goods ( which would 
lower the utility of money earned from increased production or work 
effort )
c) traditional attitudes towards consumption ( which may further 
lower the utility of new forms of consumer goods )
d) backward technology ( which lowers the productivity of labour and 
hence lowers the quantity of consumer goods and services which may 
be had for giving up a given quantity of leisure ).
Hence, a complex set of factors will determine whether farmers 
will supply his labour in response to opportunities and incentives 
offered. However, inter-personal relationship among small farmers 
will determine the pattern of labour use. Small farmers tend to rely 
more-on other farmers them bigger farmers are. They tend to 
establish a network of inter-personal connections for purposes of 
support while larger farmers only buy labour and not rely on 
personal obligations. This is one of the methods or " survival 
algorithm " of the small farmers. This therefore implies that
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incentives per se is not likely to have the desired effect of 
getting fanners to supply his labour. We need also to look into the 
complex relationship as outlined above before we are able to 
understand fully how fanners respond to incentives.
Security Versus Technical Change
Development in agriculture usually implies change and change 
which is often related to technical change which alters input-output 
relationships. However, the problem with technical change in 
subsistence agriculture is that planners and policy-makers, by their 
actions, always assume that although small farmers face numerous 
problems and constraints they have little difficulty in adopting an 
innovation. However, the greatest constraint facing the farmer when 
trying to innovate is the presence of risk and uncertainty. He is 
uncertain whether he would benefit from the new technology 
introduced. Whereas bigger and richer farmers may not be constrained 
by risk or fear, to the smaller farmers this fear is very real.
( However, this does not mean that the larger and bigger farmers 
operate more efficiently than the small farmer ). [ 29 ] Therefore, 
in making decisions about change affecting the small farmer, 
planners should not consider only the technical and financial 
probabilities associated with absolute gains or losses but should 
also- consider the costs, anxieties and problems caused to small 
farmers in their attempt to modernise their farming practice and 
find out ways and means to lessen their burden.
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Present Income Versus Future Income
The preference for either present or future income is an 
intertemporal problem faced by the small farmer just like any other 
investor. Most farmers who are poor have a greater preference for 
the consumption of present income rather than the saving for the 
future. This is because the immediate satisfaction of their wants 
and needs overide other considerations. However, the concern for the 
future is also important because it implies the replenishment of 
outmoded capital stocks and an addition to a nation’s investible 
resources. The same rationale applies to the agricultural sector.
But the problem is that future income and investment implies that 
there are adequate income and savings in the economy. Hence there is 
a need to strike a balance between the needs of the present and the 
desirability of investing for the future. But the prerequisite for 
this is the ability to procure greater productivity in the
agricultural sector which would create the necessary surplus to
finance economic development in general.
According to Mellor [ 30 ], in subsistence agriculture, the 
following factors are important in determining whether future or 
present income is preferred
a) attitude towards consumption
b) attitude towards security
c) sense of fatalism
d) present income levels
e) the existence of a capital market
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Summary
From the above discussion, it is quite clear that there is a 
close relationship between farmers* values, objectives, his 
behavioural mode and his production decision. In the next section, 
we will examine more closely the Small farmer’s mode of behaviour 
and rationality in four main areas
a) how he allocates his scarce resources
b) how he behaves when controlling additional resources
c) his response to price changes, and
d) his response to technological changes.
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5.0 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES BY SMALL FARMERS
Economists are interested to find out exactly how the small 
fanner allocates his scarce resources. An understanding of this 
behaviour has important ramifications as far as policy prescription 
is concerned. For example, the policy prescription would differ if 
it were believed that farmers allocate their resources efficiently 
or otherwise. If farmers were seen to be efficient and tend to be 
maximisers ( as neo-classical economic theory postulates ) then 
measures taken to increase their productivity would be through 
research and technological innovations or through better usage of 
new inputs rather than through changing the farm environment. This 
would then enable the farmers to operate on a higher production 
function. However, if farmers are not maximisers but are instead 
optimisers and by implication operate inefficiently, then the 
measures that would need to be taken to increase production would be 
through actions like education, extension or other measures to 
improve the decision-making capacity of the farmers.
Schultz*s Hypothesis
In fact, there is a great deal of controversy over the extent 
to which small farmers allocate their resources. For example,
Schultz [ 31 ] and others are often associated with the " poor but 
efficient ” hypothesis which states that subsistence farmers are 
poor not due to inefficiencies on their part ( in the use of 
resources ) but rather because of constraints in the kinds and 
quantities of resources that they have. Schultz says that 
traditional agriculture has attained a long-run equilibrium with
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respect to the allocation of factors of production at the fanner’s 
disposal. In this static condition, all opportunities to increase 
agricultural production has been exhausted. The result of studies 
done by Tax (1955), Hopper (1965) and others using the production 
function approach supported his hypothesis. Since all the 
opportunities within traditional agriculture have been exploited, 
the only means then to increase productivity would be through the 
usage of new technologies or new inputs. Schultz singled out 
investment in agricultural research and education and the use of a 
positive agricultural pricing policy to be important policy measures 
to transform traditional agriculture.
It is worth repeating here that this hypothesis rules out the 
possibility of increasing productivity through the reallocation of 
existing farm resources. This has important repercussions as far as 
policy measures to improve subsistence agriculture in the LDCs.
However, the Schultz hypothesis has been subjected to much 
criticism although it played a significant role in influencing the 
direction and content of agricultural research and training 
especially in the United States. The defect of this kind of 
hypothesis is that by advocating that agricultural production cannot 
be increased through the reallocation of existing resources, it led 
research efforts away from this direction and this tend to have bad 
consequences. Among the more vocal critics of the Schultz hypothesis 
was Lipton [ 32 ]. His criticism of Schultz may be summarised as 
follows
a) the high degree of risk and uncertainty facing the small farmer 
makes optimal resource allocation difficult
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b) the theorem of economic optimality is static and only relate to 
the long-run
c) it is questionable whether Schultz concept of traditional 
agriculture have any operational relevance
d) it showed the limitations of production function analysis
Shapiro [ 33 ] also contended that the criteria of optimal 
allocative efficiency requires that the ratio of MVP to MFC 
( marginal factor cost ) should equal to one, but he showed that 
approximately one-third of the ratios given by Schultz differed 
significantly from one and therefore contradicted the efficiency 
hypothesis. In addition, Clayton [ 34 ] mentioned that the 
empirical studies used to support the hypothesis was based on data 
derived from small and isolated samples of peasant farmers and many 
were not randomly selected. He concluded that it was thus quite 
incorrect to generalise on the basis of the above observations about 
fanner’s behaviour.
According to Mellor [ 35 ] empirical studies of efficiency are 
subject to considerable hidden errors as follows
a) error in assumption about farmer’s objectives, factor 
productivity and factor cost ( which is reflected in the findings of 
inefficiency )
b) incorrect criteria and assumptions tend to show farmers acting 
inefficiently but in actual fact they may be efficient or vice versa
c) farmers may be efficient on average while all are individually 
inefficient.
In this regard, Mellor contended that the question therefore to 
ask is the extent to which variability in decisions and allocation
by fanners arise from inefficient allocation by many farmers and to 
what extent it reflect efficient allocation by individuals within 
context of different conditions.
Ghatak and Ingersent [ 36 ] argued that the Schultz hypothesis 
is weak since the choice of a neo-classical model to represent 
farmers* behaviour is inappropriate and also because Schultz did not 
distinguish between allocative and technical efficiency. However, we 
cannot say that a theory is weak because of its assumptions ( in 
this case of the neo-classical model ). The proper way to judge a 
theory is not by looking at assumptions but on its ability to 
predict.
Lipton*s Hypothesis
An alternative to the Schultz’s hypothesis was that postulated 
by Lipton [ 37 ] in which he hypothesised that peasant farmers are 
not maximisers but instead are optimisers. Hence, if this is true 
then their main concern is not with maximising profit ( or 
minimising cost ) but instead on maximising their utility. Lipton’s 
main argument is that the allocative inefficiency of small farmers 
is a result of risk aversion or what he termed as a " quest of 
security M on the part of the farmers. He said that the variability 
and hence risk confronting the farmer is so high that a strategy of 
maximising profit would lead to disaster and that the farmers and 
their family could even starve. Hence to survive, farmers must 
pursue a lower variance strategy which considerably increase their 
security. Therefore, farmers must pay a high risk premium to insure 
against disaster which takes the form of a trade-off between
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expected profit and an assured minimum yield. Lipton called this 
optimal strategy the *' survival algorithm ** by which farmers 
maximise utility and in pursuing this strategy, they tend to 
allocate their resources in such a way that there is a balance 
between profit, security and status.
Like Schultz, Lipton*s hypothesis also made a great impact on 
agricultural research and thinking in LDCs although it was not as 
influential. Academicians and researchers took up the issue of risk 
and uncertainty in determining how farmers behave as if all the 
other factors were not important. According to Clayton [ 38 ] risk 
is by no means the sole factor in determining farmers* behaviour and 
that by assuming that risk is the prime determining variable, it 
tend to create a false impression that economic sub-optimality, 
allocation of resources and the choice of technique or product is a 
result of risk aversion alone on the part of farmers. Although yield 
variability ( due to variable rainfall, pest, diseases, etc ) may 
lead to risk-averse behaviour on the part of the farmers, their 
efects may differ considerably between different farmers.
As far as policy implications were concerned, both approaches 
had different policy prescriptions as widely practiced in LDCs. For 
example, the most basic policy implications which follows from the 
theory of profit maximisation farmer of Schultz is that small farm 
households make predictable adjustments to changes in the prices of 
farm inputs and outputs. Hence, the widespread use of policies of 
raising farm output prices or by lowering the cost of variable 
inputs are used. As for the latter Liptonian approach, the theory of 
the risk-averse farmer is associated with government interventions
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designed to remedy the adverse impact of risk aversion on 
agricultural productivity and growth. For example policies 
prescribed include the provision of irrigation, crop insurance, 
price stabilisation schemes, etc. We believe that the approach to 
solve farmers problems should not rely exclusively in any particular 
school of thought. Both of the above approaches have their own 
advantages and we should work on the positive aspects of each. 
However, despite the predominance of policies in LDCs geared to 
solving the problems of poverty in LDCs using the above approches, 
the degree of success is not enough. Poverty is still widespread in 
the rural areas and the gap between the haves and haves-not seem to 
increase. This implies that other approaches to help solve the 
problem of rural poverty in LDCs need to be used. [ 39 ]
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6.0 RESPONSIVENESS OF SMALL FARMERS TO ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Response to Price
The issue of rationality of response fanners in LDCs to 
economic stimuli and incentives has been well documented in the 
literature. [ 10 ] A brief review here would be in order.
It was initially believed that fanners in LDCs were 
unresponsive to economic incentives and they instead demonstrated 
highly irrational and unorthodox economic behaviour, for example by 
working for less time when confronted by higher wages. In the light 
of these manifestations, traditional farmers were thus accused of 
being irrational, backward, conservative or even plain lazy and that 
they resist change and are against modernisation.
However, the early work of Ida Greaves [ 11 ] had already 
discounted the notion that smallholders reacted negatively to 
economic incentives. She claimed that the evidence showed positive 
response when account was taken of other productive activities open 
to the smallholders, e.g. off-farm income and non-monetaray aspects 
of alternative employment. Later studies done by Bauer ( 1918 ) and 
Bauer and Yamey [ 12 ] also rejected the notion of zero or negative 
response of farmers. For example, Bauer gave instances where farmers 
reacted positively to economic incentives, for example, by 
cultivating new crops, evading regulations which restricted their 
economic activities, etc. Jones [ 13 ] also tried to explain the 
unorthodox economic behaviour of African producers and concluded 
that ” most explanations of unorthodox economic response in Tropical 
Africa rest upon notions about personality - individual economic 
aspirations and rationality - and about the structure of African
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societies and the extent of trible ties and of economic ties ”.
Ingersent and Ghatak [ 44 ] after reviewing a vast literature 
on supply response of farmers in LDCs concluded that on the basis of 
evidence available, farmers in LDCs tend to behave rationally in 
general, though there are a few exceptions, particularly in highly 
subsistence economies. In fact what has long been considered to be 
irrational behaviour on the part of farmers in LDCs is actually 
rational and perfectly sound decisions. For example, recommended 
fertiliser usage by extension workers were rejected by farmers not 
because they were not receptive to new ideas but merely because they 
were not appropriate of the circumstances of the small farmers. The 
recommended levels of fertilisers were only suitable for farmers 
operating under the most favourable physical and economic 
conditions. In other words, fertiliser recommendation rates were 
based on an ” idealised " production functions. In summary, there is 
ample evidence that farmers in LDCs are price responsive ( or 
exhibit high price elasticities ) and act in a rational manner.
According to Mellor [ 45 ], in traditional agriculture, the 
aggregate response of agricultural labour force ( rather than land ) 
to price is more important. The response of labour to price change 
is a choice between work and leisure. However, the effect of price 
change is broken down into two effects, namely income effect and 
substitution effect. Note that income effect has the same effect as 
that of decreasing production ( production-decreasing ) and 
substitution effect has the effect of increasing production 
( production-increasing ). Therefore, the less the income effect and 
the greater the substitution effect, the greater will be the
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positive effect of price on production. However, the price response 
may not have the desired effect due to two factors. Firstly, the 
marginal utility of added consumer goods may be declining. ( This 
is likely to happen if consumption pattern is traditional or new 
consumer gooods are not available. In fact, at the extreme this may 
lead to the phenomenon of the backward-bending supply curve of 
labour ). Secondly, if the marginal physical product ( MPP ) of the 
additional labour is low or declining. ( at the extreme, if labour 
has zero MPP, then price increase cannot lead to an increase in 
supply of labour ). [ 46 ]
In most LDCs, the MPP of labour is usually very low. Hence, 
labour may only be supplied if the utility of consumer goods is very 
great or the disutility of sacrificing labour is very low. Hence, 
by implication, pricing policy will be more effective to effect 
change in agricultural productivity if the MPP of labour is high.
It has been argued that the low price responsiveness small 
farmers is because they are concerned with production for self 
consumption rather than for the market. Mellor referred this to the 
” subsistence-mindedness " of the fanners. Here two factors 
determine the relative emphasis that small farmers will give to non­
subsistence production, namely price relationship and risk and 
uncertainty. In the first case, the price relationship is between 
that of the sale price of his crop and the retail price at which he 
procures his purchases. If there is a significant difference against 
his interest, then at a certain determined price, he will not 
respond at the price change by increasing production. In the second 
case, farmers tend to give priority for producing for their own
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sustenance. In the face of price uncertainty, they will tend to 
favour production for subsistence rather than for the market.
Response to Technological Change and Innovation
The issue of farmer’s acceptance of technical innovation has 
been the subject of much discussion in the literature. [ 47 ] Under 
normal circumstances, an innovation is taken up by a small farmer if 
the following conditions are fulfilled
a) it is cheap
b) it is technically feasible
c) it is reliable, and
d) it is economically feasible
e) farmers get ancilliary benefits from government agencies if they 
innovate, e.g. credit
f) non-economic factor, i.e. undertaking innovation is linked with 
prestige of being pioneers
Mellor [ 48 ] on the other hand, laid down three conditions 
for an innovation to be accepted. Firstly, is their desire for 
increased material benefit, secondly, their expectation that the 
innovation will increase their income and wealth and thirdly, the 
expectation that they will participate in an increase in wealth from 
the innovation.
. However, in any discussion of technical innovation, the issue 
of risk and uncertainty will always come to the forefront. [ 49 ] 
Since the element of risk and uncertainty is very real, farmers are 
naturally very cautious in approaching it. Clayton emphasised that 















normally measurable ( objective risk ) but instead reflect farmers’ 
personal judgement of the likely outcomes ( subjective risk ) or 
where probabilities cannot be assigned. [ 50 ] This is clearly 
seen, for example, in the case of fertiliser recommendation rates by 
extension agents. In this case, farmers tend to discount expected 
returns to factor inputs in terms of their own subjective risk 
assessment and hence adjust their factor intensity usage 
accordingly. Fig. 4.1 below describes the situation.
OBJECTIVE MVP
FARMERS EXPECTED MVP 
(discounted for risk )
0 NN1
QUANTITY OF INPUT(S)
Fig. 4.1: A FACTOR-PRODUCT DECISION WITH RISK
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Therefore what appears to be economic sub-optimality is in fact 
a rational response to the uncertainty of outcome. In addition, in 
the face of price uncertainty, small farmers tend to adopt a 
diversified farming system in order to spread the risk as widely as
possible.To quote Clayton : ” Farmers .....  devise farming systems
which produce a lesser but more certain average expected income 
rather than a large but less sure average expected income ". [ 51 ]
Wharton [ 52 ] in his study of Philippines agriculture 
concluded that in order for small farmers to adopt new high yielding 
varieties of rice, two conditions were required. Firstly, the high 
yielding variety of rice should be more productive than the 
traditional variety. Secondly, and a sufficient condition is that 
the yield of the MV in poor season is higher than that of the TV. 
This is because the small farmer need to be assured that in bad 
seasons his position will not be worse off with the MV. 
Statistically, it means that not only must the mean yield of MV must 
be higher than that of the TV but also the negative standard 
deviation of the MV must be higher than the mean yield of TV in the 
poorer season.
7.0 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have defined what is a small farmer in the 
context of LDCs and analysed their motivations, values and 
attitudes. We also discussed how the small farmer allocates his 
resources and his responsiveness to economic stimuli. From the 
analysis, it is clear that the constraints and resources that 
farmers face are very important factors in determining their
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production decision-making. However, of greater importance is the 
fact that fanners* motivations, values, attitudes and objectives do 
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CHAPTER FIVE
AN OVERVIEW OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE AND THE ROLE OF 
SUBSIDIES IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF MALAYSIA [1]
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Agriculture has always been the basic industry of Malaysia 
and is of very great economic, political and social significance. 
Taken together with forestry, fishing and animal husbandry, 
agriculture still dominates the economic scene of Malaysia in the 
1900s. Although its relative importance has gradually declined in 
recent years because of structural changes in the economy, namely by 
the rapid growth of manufacturing sector, services and the 
development of a large oil industry, agriculture is still very 
important as a source of livelihood of many Malaysians. The critical 
role played by agriculture in the Malaysian economy is reflected by 
its contribution to GDP, employment, and the relatively high 
proportion of government expenditure devoted to it. Agriculture, 
especially the foodcrop sector is also important because of its 
supportive role in the industrialisation efforts of the country 
especially through the provision of labour and subsidised food to 
the urban sector.
In analysing agricultural development in Malaysia, it is often 
convenient to divide it into two categories, namely, the plantation 
and the smallholder sub-sector. [ 2 ] This dichotomy is essential 
because they are two highly contrasting modes of agriculture with 
the former being highly capitalised, greater productivity,
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extensive usage of wage labour and relatively large size of holdings 
with widespread utilisation of modern management practices. [ 3 ]
On the other hand, the smallholding sector, which is the traditional 
mode of farming is characterised by small size of holdings, low 
productivity, the low usage of capital and modern inputs and 
widespread use of out-dated and traditional means of production. The 
features associated with the smallholder sector outlined have been 
responsible for the stagnation and high incidence of poverty.
Objective of Chapter
The object of this chapter is to highlight the role of the 
smallholder sector and agricultural subsidies in the context of 
Malaysian agriculture development. This chapter will attempt to 
analyse the following related issues
a) the characteristic features of Malaysian agriculture,
b) the role and contribution of smallholders in Malaysian 
agriculture,
c) typology of government intervention in Malaysian agriculture
d) institutional support towards the smallholder sector, and
e) the role of agricultural subsidies in the smallholder sector.
2.0 CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE
Agriculture has been practised in Malaysia for a long time.
[ 4 ] Before the advent of the British colonialist in the 1870s, 
the mode of agriculture was mainly of the traditional-subsistence 
type where the cultivation of foodcrops was geared mainly for home 
^consumption. It was the British who introduced cash-cropping on a
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large scale basis and established the plantation system which is a 
highly capitalised form of agriculture into the country. [ 5 ] The 
British initially experimented with various cash crops like coffee, 
pepper, etc. for the export market. However, most of them failed due 
to diseases. After this initial fiasco, rubber was introduced and it 
was destined to become the prime foreign-exchange earner for 
Malaysia. Gradually, through its diversification policy, other crops 
like oil palm, cocoa, pepper were introduced and today Malaysia is a 
major world producer for these crops.
Table 5.1 shows the contribution of agriculture in terms of GDP 
from 1955 to 1985.
TABLE 5.1: Malaysia:Industrial Origin of GDP For Selected Years (%)
Economic Sector 1955 1965 1975 1980 1983 1985
Agric.,Forest,Fishing 40.2 31.5 27.6 22.0 22.3 21.5
Mining & Quarrying 6.3 9.0 4.0 5.0 4.4 4.7
Manufacturing 8.2 10.4 16.4 21.0 18.9 19.7
Construction 3.0 4.5 3.8 5.0 5.5 5.8
Services 42.3 44.6 47.6 47.0 48.9 49.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Bank Negara ( 1979 ), Govt. of Malaysia ( 1981 ), P- 11;
Govt, of Malaysia ( 1984 ), pp. 39 & 58.
Table 5.1 shows that agriculture plays a significant role in 
the Malaysian economy. For example, in 1955 the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP was 40.2 %t only to be outperformed by the 
services industry. However, as structural changes occurred in the
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economy, the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been eroded and 
by 1980s its share declined to almost one-half of the 1955 rate. For 
example, in 1980 and 1985 it dropped to about 22 %. The
consequences of this structural transformation is expected to have 
serious implications for the economy. For example, surplus labour 
from the agriculture sector is expected to be released to the 
industrial and service sectors. However, even though the relative 
share of agriculture to GDP has dropped, it is envisaged that it 
will continue to remain an important force for the next few decades.
Economic Sector 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 1990
Agriculture 52.1 53.5 47.6 43.9 40.6 31.8
Mining & Quarrying 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.7 1.3
Manuf acturing 8.4 11.1 13.1 15.8 15.8 19.0
Construction 8.0 7.8 9.1 9.6 10.0 10.0
Commerce 11.1 12.2 13.0 13.4 13.7 15.4
Services 17.9 15.7 17.0 18.0 18.2 21.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: E.K. Fisk, et. al. ( 1984 ), p. 136
Further evidence of the importance of agriculture in the 
Malaysian economy can be seen from its employment generating 
capacity. Table 5.2 shows the changing pattern of employment and 
indicates that a significant proportion of the work force is 
supported by agriculture. Although the proportion has dropped 
•through the years, in absolute terms, the number of people employed
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in agriculture is still large. For example, in 1965 about 1.4 
million people which constituted about 52 % of the work force were 
employed in agriculture. Although the comparable figure for 1980 was 
reduced to 32 % it still involved about 2.1 million workers. This 
made agriculture the largest provider of jobs in the country.
Sector 1980 1983
M C I Total M C I Total
, % . .
Primary 68 18 13 1,432,000 67 19 14 1,435,000
Secondary 40 51 6 1,167,000 40 50 9 1,292,000
Tertiary 49 40 11 1,423,000 50 39 10 1,636,000
Total 53 35 11 4.023,000 53 35 11 4.363,800
Source: Govt, of Malaysia ( 1984 ), Table 3.9, p. 96 
Note: M = Malays; C = Chinese; I = Indians
Another reason why agriculture is so important in Malaysia is 
because of its ethnic polarisation. The majority of farmers in 
Malaysia are the politically dominant Malays who are the most 
deprived category of workers in the country. Table 5.3 shows the 
distribution of employment in agriculture by ethnicity. Malays, 
Chfnese and Indians constitute the three main ethnic groups in 
multi-racial Malaysia with a sprinkling of other races. [ 6 ] The 
majority are the Malays who are rural based depending mainly on 
smallholding agriculture. The Chinese are mostly urban based and are 
concentrated in commerce and industry and estate agriculture. They
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are also dominant in money lending, merchandising and marketing 
activities of rural smallholder agriculture. Indians, on the other 
hand, are mostly found either as estate labourers or in the service 
sectors of the urban areas. This concentration of races into the 
different sectors with differential levels of productivity has 
resulted in uneven distribution of income among the races. [ 7 ]
For example, the mean monthly income of Malay households in 1970 was 
M$179 while that of Chineses and Indian households was M$387 and 
M$310 respectively. In the low income range of below M$100 per 
month, Malay households constitute 85 % while the Chinese and 
Indian households constitute 9.6 % and 4.9 % respectively. [ 8 j 
Another indicator of the primacy of agriculture in Malaysia is 
the proportion of public development expenditure devoted to it as 
Table 5.4 shows. In this regard it is important to note that all 
development policies in Malaysia is based on the New Economic 
Policy ( NEP ) as outlined in the Second and Third Malaysia Plans.
[ 9 ] The overiding objective of the NEP is the promotion of 
national unity through a two-pronged strategy of the eradication of 
poverty by raising income levels and giving employment opportunities 
to all Malaysians irrespective of race and is to restructure 
Malaysian society through social engineering in order that the 
identification of race with economic function is eventually 
eliminated. Since a great proportion of the population live in 
rural areas and more than half of are dependent on low yielding 
agriculture, the government’s priority has been to assist this 
sector to overcome poverty.
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TABLE 5.4:Malaysia: Public Dev. Exp. By Sector,*76-80 & *81-85
Sector TMP (1976-80)
(M$mil) %
FMP ( 1981-85) 
(M$mil) %
(A)ECONOMIC 18,481 59 29,608 61
a)Agric. & Rural Dev. 6,464 21 7,986 16
b)Minerai Resource Dev. 21 0.1 28 0.1
c)Commerce & Industry 4,256 14 7,043 14
d)Transport 4,463 14 6,713 14
e)Communication 1,253 4 3,002 6
f)Energy & Public Util. 1,932 6 4,762 10
g)Feasibility Studies 92 0.3 73 0.2
(B)SOCIAL 5,495 18 10,614 22
(C)SECURITY 6,309 20 7.744 16
(D)ADMINISTRATION 862 3 894 2
TOTAL 31.147 100 48.860 100
Source: Govt, of Malaysia(1981), Table 13.1, pp. 240-43; Govt, of 
Malaysia (1984), Table 7.2, pp. 208-211
Note: TMP - Third Malaysia Plan; FMP = Fourth Malaysia Plan
Hence, agriculture and rural development have accordingly been 
accorded top priority in Malaysian development planning. For example 
in the Third Plan, agriculture was allocated M$6.5 billion which was 
21 % of total development expenditure. This was the greatest single 
allocation to a sector. In the Fourth Plan although the allocation 
went down to 16 % and the amount allocated was M$8.0 billion. In 
addition, most of the international loans floated by Malaysia 
.overseas were devoted towards the development of this sector. [ 10 ]
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However, despite the apparently lavish and generous allocation 
to the agriculture sector since independence, agriculture continues 
to be the least developed and characterised with a high incidence of 
poverty. [ 11 ] This proves that financial committment alone is 
insufficient to develop the agriculture sector and guarantee that 
farmers livelihood would improve. The problem of poverty in Malaysia 
is a rural-agriculture phenomenon and widespread and concentrated 
among the landless farmers and those with uneconomic land holdings, 
the majority being Malays. Table 5.5 shows the incidence of poverty 
in Malaysia Peninsular Malaysia by rural-urban strata.
In Malaysia, the government uses the absolute poverty approach 
in planning and formulation of development policies. [ 12 ] In 
counting the numbers of poor households and measuring the incidence 
of poverty, the approach taken is by using the poverty line income 
concept. The poverty line income takes into account the minimum 
requirements of a household for three major components, namely food, 
clothing and other non-food components such as rent, fuel, power, 
and transport. All households which have an income below the poverty 
line income are considered as poor households while those with 
income above the poverty line are classified as non-poor households. 
The number of poor households expressed as a proportion of the total 
number of households then gives the incidence of poverty.
- Table 5.5 shows that rural poverty increased from 37 % in 1980
to 42 % in 1983. The high incidence of rural poverty is shown by
the fact that as much as 86 % of total poor come from rural 
households.
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TABLE 5 5 pWlMSUlA* KAXArSIA: incidence of poverty by ru ra l-u rb an  s t r a ta ,
1970, 1980, 1983 AND 1985
1970 1980 1983 1985
2 & B T
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Rural 706 59 89 543 38 K5 620 42 86 502 33 83
A g ric u ltu re 582 68 74 423 46 67 498 55 69 380 43 63
Rubber sm allholders 227 65 29 169 41 27 246 61 35 156 39 26
O il pa la  sm allholders 2 30 • 2 8 • 2 7 • 1 6 •
Coconut sm allholders 17 53 2 13 39 2 10 33 1 9 31 2
Padi farmers 123 88 16 76 53 12 75 54 11 78 58 13
Other a g ric u ltu re 126 92 16 106 64 17 87 54 12 76 48 13
Fishermen 28 73 4 19 45 3 18 45 3 17 44 3
Estate workers 59 40 7 38 35 6 58 55 8 40 39 7
Other In d u s tries 124 35 16 120 23 19 122 21 17 122 20 20
Urban 86 21 11 94 13 15 98 11 14 100 10 17
Mining 2 33 • 2 33 • 2 41 • 2 42 •
Manufacturing 20 24 3 24 13 4 28 13 4 30 12 5
C onstruction 6 30 1 6 17 1 5 14 1 5 12 1
Transport and U t i l i t i e s 13 31 2 16 19 2 14 16 2 14 14 2
Trade and services 45 19 6 47 11 7 48 9 7 49 9 8
To ta l 792 49 100 636 29 100 718 30 100 602 24 100
Total number o f 
household
1,606 2,193 2,371 2,497
Note: ‘ Value less than 0 .5  percent
Source: Fourth M alaysia P lan ; 1981-1985
Mid-Tern Revision o f the Fourth M alaysia P lan , 1981-1985
In addition, poverty incidence has also increased for certain 
groups, namely rubber smallholders and padi farmers. For example, in 
1983, rubber smallholders accounted for slightly more than a third 
( 34. % ) of total poor households.
Many people criticised the government’s approach to eradicate 
poverty in Malaysia. [ 13 ] Most of them believe that the measures
taken were inadequate and were prone to fail because they were not
radical enough. These critics preferred that the government should 
take more fundamental measures in order to benefit the poor in the 
development process. Land reform have been mentioned as one way 
because most farmers operate uneconomic size of land. For example, 
Peacock [ 14 ] observed that rural development in Malaysia had 
failed to solve rural poverty. He observed that the Third Malaysia 
Plan ( the first Development Plan to identify poverty groups in
Malaysia ) did not appear to have benefited the poor. He contended
that the failure of poverty groups to benefit from high growth rates 
can be explained by the concentration of growth in only certain 
limited sectors of the economy.
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Summary
We have seen that the agricultural sector in Malaysia is indeed 
a very significant and critical component of the Malaysian economy. 
This is by virtue of its contribution to GDP, employment and 
resources devoted to it. It is also of concern to policy makers and 
planners because a great and significant proportion of the poor 
depend upon it as a source of livelihood. And finally, it is 
important because the Malays, who constitute the majority of the 
population and also mainly rural based and who control political 
power are the poorest segments of society. The continued support of 
the rural populace is usually the determining factor in getting 
votes, hence the M politics of agriculture " and the rural 
agricultural lobby is a very important issue in Malaysia.
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3.0 ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE SMALLHOLDER SECTOR
Introduction
In Malaysia, the agricultural sector consists of three types of 
landholdings: plantations, state sponsored land development schemes, 
and individual smallholdings. [ 14 ] Table 5.6 shows the acreage 
planted in the principal crops by types of holding.
TABLE 5.6 : Acreage Planted in the Principal Crops by Types of
Holding, Peninsular Malaysia. Selected Years, 1960-1975 (’*000 ac)
Crop/Holding Type 1960 1965 1970 1975
Acres % Acres % Acres * Acres *
mRUBBER; 3.889 66 4.328 66 4,331 61 4.188 55
Estates 1,934 33 1,859 28 1,598 23 1,392 18
Indiv. S/H 1,955 33 2,469 38 2,290 32 2,796 37
FELDA & SLS n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. 443 6 n.a. ni.a.
(II)RICE S/H 929 16 950 15 992 14 944 13
(III)OIL PAIM 135 2 240 4 691 10 1.436 19
Estates 135 2 208 3 478 7 819 11
FELDA & SLS n.a. n.a. 32 1 213 3 617 8
(IV)COCONUT 520 8 507 8 527 7 567 8
Estates 80 1 68 1 55 1 44 1
Indiv. S/H 440 7 438 7 472 6 523 7
mMISCELL 452 8 479 7 515 7 405 5
TOTAL 5.925 100 6.504 100 7.056 100 7.540 100
Source: Adapted from Young, et. al. ( 1980 ), Table 8.5, p. 218 
Note: SLS = State Land Scheme
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The independent and unorganised smallholder sector which 
comprises about 68 % of agricultural landholding in Malaysia is the 
most important. The largest groups of smallholders are those in 
rubber, rice and coconut. On the other hand, private estates 
constitute about 30 % of the total acreage and concentrate on a few 
commercial crops like rubber, oil palm, coconut, cocoa, tea and 
pineapple. However, most rubber estates have switched to oil palm 
because rubber gave less profit. Since oil palm requires 
considerably less labour per acre than rubber and gives a better 
return, employment on estates has fallen on land formerly planted 
with rubber. Today estates account for less than a third of total 
employment in these two crops. Land development schemes, in which 
large numbers of individual settlers work under a common management, 
constitute about 10 % of the agricultural acreage in Malaysia in 
1975 and produce mainly rubber, palm oil and cocoa. About 1.8 
million acres have already been developed through land development 
schemes from 1960 to 1980. The Federal Land Development Authority 
( FELDA ) established in 1956, the most important land development 
agency was responsible for opening up more than 50 % of the land 
schemes in Malaysia. Rubber predominated on FELDA schemes in the
early years, but after 1965 oil palm became the most important crop.
By the end of 1975, FELDA had settled about 33,000 families. [ 15 ]
Other land development agencies include the Federal Lend
Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority ( FKLCRA ), the Rubber 
Industry Smallholders Development Authority ( RISDA ), State Land 
Development Boards and a number of private sector agencies.
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Agricultural Activities of the Smallholders
We have seen above that the rural sector is predominant and 
significant in Malaysia. In 1980, 66 X of households were rural 
while in 1983 the figure dropped slightly to 62.8 %. [ 16 ] This 
figure represents nearly three-quarters of the total households in 
Malaysia. In this section, we shall concentrate our discussion on 
two major activities of the smallholders, namely in rubberand rice.
TABLE 5.7; Productivity of Land and Smallholder Labour Producing the
Principal Crops, P. Malaysia. 1970
Crop & Land Type Value-Added Acre V-A / acre V-A / wkr.
fM$mil) f*000) M$ X of Ave. M$ X of Ave.
Rubber Smallholdings 628 2,733 230 76 1,194 66
Rubber Estates 655 1,598 410 135 3,325 185
Oil Palm Holdings(*) 269 691 389 128 6,114 339
Coconut Holdings(+) 103 528 195 64 2,512 139
Rice Farms 333 992 336 111 1,125 62
Total or Average 1.988 6.542 304 100 1,80 100
Source: Adapted from Young, et. al. ( 1980 ), Table 8.8.,p. 224 
Notes; (*) = includes FELDA and estates 
(+) - mainly smallholdings
Smallholders involved in rice and rubber are the largest 
agricultural groups in Malaysia. They are the also the least 
productive and manage to generate value-added respectively of 
M$l,125 and M$l,194 apiece in 1970, whereas the average value-added 
for all smallholders in the principal crops was M$1,801. Table 5.7
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gives the productivity of smallholders in 1970.
Rubber smallholders constituted about 21 % of total 
households in Malaysia in 1975. Between 1960 and 1975 the output of 
rubber smallholders grew at an average annual rate three times that 
of estates. In 1973 smallholders surpassed estates in total 
production because of the switch of estates from rubber to oil palm 
and the relative improvement of the yields of smallholders which 
grew at an average annual rate of 5.6 % during 1960 - 75, while the 
rate of growth on estates was only 2.9 X . The yield of smallholders 
are now about 85 X those of estates. The relative improvement in 
the yield of smallholders have largely been the result of new 
planting and replanting with high yielding clones. For example, in 
1965 about 50 X of the registered acreage of smallholders had been 
replanted but in 1976 it had risen to 67 X .
In 1979, the unorganised rubber smallholders accounted for
700.000 hectares or about 60 X of total rubber smallholders and 
supported about 270,000 families. Organised rubber holdings of 
FELDA, FELCRA and State land development agencies covered about
280.000 hectares and supported about 100,000 families. By racial 
distribution, Malays owned 63 X, Chinese 35 X and Indians 2 X in 
1977. [ 17 ]
The average monthly income of rubber smallholders in 1977 was 
M$240. This is a result of large scale replanting of high-yielding 
rubber clones, increased use of fertilisers and yield stimulant as 
well as favourable rubber prices which averaged M$3.00 per kg. in 
the late seventies. However, despite this about 35 X of rubber 
smallholders still earned less than M$200 per month mainly due to
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the small, size of their holdings. [ .18 ] Tn fact the number of poor 
rubber smallholders have increased by 8 % between 1980 and 1983.
( see Table 5.5 ) The exception in this case are the rubber 
smallholders in land development schemes who enjoyed a higher level 
of income due to the larger size of their holdings ( average of 10 
acres ) and the fact that they are more organised. For example, in 
1983, FELDA settlers earned an average net monthly income of M$451 
which was very high by smallholders’ standards. [ 19 ] In 1984, the 
smallholding sector is expected to contribute about 65 % of total 
national production while the estate sector the remaining 25 %.
[ 20 ]
Rice farmers, on the other hand, constitutes one of the poorest 
groups in the country and made up about 16 % of all agricultural 
households in Malaysia in 1975. In 1979, 8 % of all households in 
Malaysia depended upon rice farming as their primary source of 
income, but rice accounted for only 2 % of GDP. [ 21 ] However, 
the importance of padi and rice sector lies in the fact that rice is 
the staple food and basic wage good in the country. In addition, 
padi is a major user of the country’s land and labour resources 
while the majority of padi farmers, who are predominantly Malays, 
live in abject poverty. In fact, rice is grown more for subsistence 
than economic reasons which explains why the poverty rate among rice 
growers is so high.
The most important governmental activity in promoting rice 
farming has been the development of irrigation and drainage 
facilities. For example, the proportion of wet-rice fields that are 
double-cropped rose from 2 % in 1960 to 57 % in 1975. This
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contributed to an increase in production of the off-season crops 
from 2 X to 40 % of annual rice production. In addition, improved 
inputs, along with extension and credit services that encourage and 
facilitate the use of these inputs, contributed to an average annual 
increase in yields of 2.2 X between 1955 and 1970 and more than 3 % 
between 1970 and 3975. [ 22 ]
In 1983, the estimated 138,000 households involved in padi 
production satisfied about 76 % of the national rice requirements. 
Despite enormous efforts to raise the standard of living and to 
eradicate poverty among them, a large number of padi fanners are 
still very poor. For example, in 1984, 55 X of padi farmers are 
poor compared to 53 X in 1983. Among the reasons for this high 
incidence of poverty include uneconomic size of farms, low 
productivity, flood and pest hazards and low prices. It is estimated 
that 90 X of single-crop padi farmers own plots that are less than 
2.5 hectares in size which is the minimum size at which a fanner 
could earn a poverty line income. [ 23 ] In this regard, the 
government's effort to reduce the poverty level among padi farmers 
include the provision of drainage and irrigation facilities, 
fertiliser subsidies and price support schemes.
Summary
In the above account, we have identified and discussed two 
major categories of economic activities of the smallholders, namely 
in rubber and padi. We discussed briefly their features and 
contribution to Malaysian agriculture and found that most farmers 
and rubber smallholders live in poverty.
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4.0 INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT TOWARDS SMALLHOLDING AGRICULTURE
Introduction
The number of government agencies established to support 
smallholder agriculture in Malaysia is very large. [ 27 ] In 
relation to institutional support that the government gives to this 
sector, we can identify four main areas which stand out because of 
their financial size and overall effect on agriculture. These 
activities are mainly concerned with rubber and padi. The areas of 
concern are as follows
a) New planting or replanting of rubber
b) Regulating policies pertaining to rice
c) Land development and settlement
d) Drainage and irrigation
Rubber Replanting
In the rubber replanting programmes, the major thrust of the 
government’s efforts towards improving the lot of the smallholders 
lies in large scale replanting and newplanting. This enabled the 
smallholders to achieve an annual production growth rate of 4.4 X 
during the decade 1971-80. About 277,700 hectares of rubber were 
replanted with high yielding rubber clones while about 192,000 
hectares were newly planted with such clones during the same period. 
It is estimated that after replanting, a holding of 5 acres in size 
can generate an income of between M$348 - M$456 per month compared 
with M$104 - M$208 prior to replanting. The resultant increase in 
smallholders’ income has reduced the incidence of poverty among 
rubber smallholders from 65 % to 41 X in 1980. [ 28 J
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To support the government's replanting efforts, the Rubber 
Industry ( Replanting ) Fund was established in 1952 whose 
management was later transfered to the Rubber Industry Smallholders' 
Development Authority ( RISDA ) in 1973. The funds for replanting 
consist of as cess ( tax ) collected at the rate of 9.9 cents per 
kg. on rubber exported from the country and it is this source that 
provides the bulk of the grants for replanting. From an initial 
grant of M$400 per acre in 1952, the replanting grant was reviewed 
and increased many times to reach M$2,200 per acre in 1980. [ 29 ]
To provide additional incentives to smallholders to replant 
their rubber trees, in 1981 RISDA introduced a scheme under which 
families with holdings of less than 2 hectares are provided with an 
interest-free loan of M$100 per month as subsistence allowance while 
families with holdings of between 2-4 hectares are given credit 
amounting to M$60 per month until the replanted rubber trees mature 
in 6 years time. By 1982, a sum of about M$ll million was spent 
under the scheme.
In its efforts towards consolidation of uneconomic holdings, 
RISDA also introduced the Group Replanting Scheme in 1972 with a 
view to reaping the economies of large scale holdings especially for 
smallholders with holdings of less than 2 hectares. By the end of 
1982, 491 schemes covering 11,980 hectares and involving 7,883 
participants were established throughout the country. [ 30 ]
RISDA also introduced mini-estates in 1978 to overcome the 
problem of uneconomic holding sizes. Under the scheme, adjacent 
smallholder lots are grouped together, replanted and converted into 
mini-estates with adequate infrastructure as well as processing and
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marketing facilities. To encourage smallholders to participate in 
the scheme, living allowances are provided until the rubber trees 
mature.
In addition to the rubber replanting programmes, RISDA also 
provides a number of subsidies for the supply of fertilisers, 
weedieides, yield stimulants and credit for cover crops and other 
assistance under the SEPERDU scheme.
Padi Planting
For many decades, rice has been a crop of major political 
importance with self-sufficiency being a basic policy goal. 
Although complete self-sufficiency has never been reached over the 
years, nevertheless achievement levels have varied between 55-90 % 
between 1950 and 1986. For example, in 1956, Malaysia was 55 % 
self-sufficient but in 1974 it attained a 90 % self-sufficiency 
level. [ 31 ] The substantial increase in output over the 18 year 
period was largely due to the efforts of the government distribution 
and propagation of high yielding varieties and the development of 
irrigation which allowed double-cropping to be practiced. [ 32 ] In 
addition, the government also provided various inputs at subsidised 
prices, particularly of fertilisers and water for irrigation.
However, despite these measures, after 1974 output has dropped and 
the level of self-sufficiency has not been maintained at 90 %.
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Land Development
As for land development, FELDA has been financially the largest 
and most important public organisation in Malaysian agriculture.
More than half of the total expenditure for agriculture went into 
land development and most of it channeled to FELDA. ( Table 5.8 ).
Through repeated experience, the land development techniques of 
FELDA have become systematic. When a decision is taken to develop a 
new land scheme, usually in virgin forest, contractors will clear 
the land, plant the seedlings, build the settler houses, roads, 
water supply, clinics, schools and other amenities. Typically, when 
these works are nearing completion, the new settlers arrive. During 
the time before the trees begin to mature, which is 5 to 7 years in 
the case of rubber, the settlers receive subsistence allowances.
Each settler will have to repay FELDA eventually for the cost of the 
holdings which average about 14 acres per household and for the 
repayment of the allowances. Once production begins, FELDA is able 
to deduct part of the sales receipts of the individual settlers 
since they must sell all their output ( rubber, oil palm, cocoa ) to 
FELDA. Once all dues have been paid, the settler will be given the 
title to the holdings. With the exception of federal grants to cover 
administrative costs, FELDA receives much of its development funds 
in the form of loans from the Federal Government.
Settlers are chosen according to a point system and the 
criteria for awarding points are age, experience in agriculture, 
degree of landlessness and family size. Most points are given for 
those who are between 24 to 26 years old. There are usually more 
applicants than there are places and naturally there are long
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waiting lists.
Since 1956 FELDA has developed over a million acres of land 
which is about half of the total new land brought into production. 
Until 1979, 100,000 families were settled in land development 
schemes specialising in rubber production of which FELDA settlers 
accounted for more than three-quarters. [ 33 ] There is no doubt 
that the efforts of FELDA has brought a significant decrease in 
rural poverty.
One of the major criticisms against the FELDA model is on cost 
considerations. According to Thillainathan the cost of settling a 
family are twice as high as those incurred by the Kelantan State 
Land Development Authority. [ 34 ] The Mid-Term Review of the 
Fourth Malaysia Plan estimated that the average cost of settling a 
family in FELDA schemes increased from M$37,500 in 1980 to M$51,200 
in 1983. [ 35 ] Among the reasons for the high cost are the 
remoteness of the schemes, increased cost of labour and general cost 
increases. To reduce these cost elements, there have been 
suggestions that the settlers should participate more in the initial 
stages of preparatory work and hence much work presently done by 
contractors could be dispensed with.
Drainage and Irrigation
An area where the government has concentrated its resources is 
in drainage, irrigation and flood control where its involvement has 
been very extensive. As a result padi farmers have been able to 
double-crop their land and consequently led to big increases in padi 
production. Rice output has increased at an average rate of 4.1 %
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during 1960-75. [ 36 ] The major rice growing areas that were 
double cropped was negligible in 1960 but in 1975 about 57 X of 
total area were irrigated. [ 37 ] The acceleration in areas 
converted to double-cropping occurred due to the completion of two 
major irrigation works in Malaysia in the 1960s, namely the MUDA 
project in north-west Malaysia and KEMUBU project in north-east 
Malaysia. These two massive projects were partly financed by the 
World Bank and were the first applications of large-scale irrigation 
for double-cropping of rice in Malaysia. They managed to 
approximately doubled the incomes of nearly 75,000 padi farmers in 
three of the poorest states in Malaysia, namely Kedah, Perlis and 
Kelantan. These projects were also responsible for reducing the 
country’s reliance on rice imports from more than 40 % in 1967 to 
only 13 X in 1975. [ 38 ] The areas served by these two projects 
now account for nearly 60 X of rice production in Malaysia.
In addition to the two above mammoth projects, there are other 
smaller irrigation projects scattered throughout the padi growing 
regions of the country. The total area under drainage and irrigation 
facilities increased from 773,000 hectares in 1980 to 851,600 
hectares in 1983 and this increased the number of fanners who 
benefited from the project from 136,800 families in 1980 to 240,000 
families in 1983. [ 39 ] Table 5.8 summarises the public 
development expenditure for agricultural development in 
Malaysia. It is noticed that much of the allocation in the various 
programmes were subsidies. In addition, the number of institutions 
established by the government to help the fanners in the various 
programmes are multitudinal. Hence, the extent of governmental
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intervention in Malaysian agriculture is indeed very extensive. 
TABLE 5.8: M ’sia: Public Devt. Expenditure for Agriculture ^ l - ’SS
Programmes________________ (1971-75) (1976-80) (1981-85)
M$m % M$m M$m %
(A)AGRIC. - 5 - 8 7 -
-IADP - - 198 4 450
-Crop Diversify - - - - 43
-Exten. & others - - - - 74
(B)INPUT SUBSIDY - - 102 2 431 5
-KADA - - 7 27
-MADA 0.4 6 21
(C)REPLANTING 8 4 7
-Rubber 146 198 479
-Pineapple 4 12 13
-Coconut - - 54
(D)LAND DEV. 1072 59 2751 58 3554 44
(E)IRRIGATION 217 12 554 12 1472 18
(F)FORESTRY 9 26 33
(G)LIVESTOCK 57 127 3 138 2
(H)FISHERIES 32 151 3 320 4
(I)AGRIC. RES. 25 69 78
(J)AG. CREDIT.MKT 139 8 270 6 611 8
TOTAL 1794 100 4672 100 8014 100
Source: Govt, of Malaysia (1981), Table 6.2, p. 118;
Govt, of Malaysia (1984), Table 8.4, p. 246.
Item (D) includes regional development.
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5.0 TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE
We have seen that the government is actively involved in 
promoting the agriculture sector in Malaysia. Most of the 
intervention policies are in the form of of price incentive schemes 
including subsidies. According to a recent World Bank study [ 40 ] 
the intervention measures in Malaysian agriculture may be classified 
under five main headings
a) measures that affect net income from farming by changing farm 
revenue
b) measures that affect net income from farming by changing costs of 
production or marketing
c) measures to promote productivity, the adoption of new technology, 
or crop diversification
d) measures to stimulate agro-based non-farm activities; and
e) measures to affect the consumption of agricultural commodities.
We shall briefly discuss the above measures. Interventions that 
increase or reduce farm revenues operate mainly at the level of the 
Federal Government. The most important measures are the padi price 
supports operated by the National Padi and Rice Authority ( LPN ), 
which consist of a guaranteed minimum price ( currently at an 
average of M$466/ton ), coupled with an additional subsidy operating 
through the extension of a cashable coupon ( M$164/ton ). The other 
measures are export and import taxes. As for measures that affect 
farming costs, by far the major part of expenditures on subsidies is 
on programmes that directly reduce the cost of inputs. Hence, input 
subsidies are very widely used and cover all inputs in farming and 
are either directly administered through grants of cash or
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are either directly administered through grants of cash or 
materials, or implicitly administered through incomplete cost 
recovery or debt forgiveness. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture administers the padi fertiliser subsidy which consists 
of grants in kind of free fertiliser to padi farmers in the country. 
The third category of intervention measures are those that promote 
productivity, new technology adoption and crop diversification. 
Official intervention has greatly aided this process through for 
example the establishment of a large number of scahemes, e.g. the 
rubber replanting schemes. Also interventions can take the form of 
income maintenance grants or subsidised credits to smallholders for 
some tree crops with long maturation periods, during which time the 
level of farm income may drop quite sharply. For example, the 
Sepentas schemes organised by RISDA. The fourth measure include a 
number of schemes to encourage for example the development of agro- 
industries or the downstream processing of agricultural commodities, 
e.g. the tax exemption of palm oil refining. The major intervention 
policy of the last category is through the licensing and regulation 
of margins for millers, wholesalers and retailers in the rice trade.
We shall now confine our discussion on the padi and rubber 
sector because most of the government effort is concentrated on 
these two sectors. For example, out of five measures mentioned 
above, four are applicable to the rubber and rice sector. Table 5.9 
summarises all the intervention measures for rice and rubber sector.
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Table 5.9: Price Intervention Schemes in Padi and Rubber SectorIntervention Schemes Crop Measures Agency
Change Farm Revenue Padi Price Support/GMP LPN
Price Subsidy LPN
Padi Buffer Stock LPN
Rubber Income Support RISDA
Sepentas Scheme RISDA
Buffer Stock MOT I
Change Cost of Prod. Padi Fertiliser Subsidy DOA/LPP
Farm Cult. Subsidy LPP
Irrigation Water Charges DID
Rubber Credit Subsidy RISDA/BPM
Agric. Input Subsidy RISDA
Market/Process Subsidy MARDEC
Market Assist. Subsidy RISDA
Input Credit Subsidy B PM/LPP
Promote Productivity Padi Agric. Meehan. Assist. LPP
Adopt New Technology Padi Rehabilitation Grant DOA
Crop Diversification Padi Cult. For Fishermen DOA
Rubber Replanting Grant RISDA
Rehab. Assist. For S/H RISDA
Affect Consumption of Padi Storage & Milling Subsidy LPN
Agricultural Commodity Rice Transhipment to W. M ’sia LPN
Source : World Bank (1984), Vol. 3, Anndx 2
From the above account, it is thus very clear that governmment 
assistance to the padi and rubber sector is very extensive and 
widespread. In fact this is one of the reasons why we are focussing 
our study on these two crops.
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6.0 SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE
Introduction
Basically, the objective of a subsidy programme is either to 
stimulate production or to redistribute income or both. Subsidies, 
in theory, are supposed to offer temporarily at least a partial 
corrective measure to agriculture in the short run. They are 
essentially fiscal measures instituted by the government to assist 
the agricultural economy which consist of overwhelming numbers of 
subsistence farmers to overcome the bottlenecks of production and 
marketing. Subsidies can also be considered as an instrument of 
inter-personal transfer of resources from an advanced sector to a 
backwark sector. The acceptable social justification for such a 
transfer is that it would eventually lead to a more equitable 
distribution of income. As to the form that it might take, subsidies 
can be either reimbursements of part of the cost of an input or 
making available inputs at lower prices or at completely no cost. In 
addition, subsidies may be explicit or implicit. Explicit subsidies 
are those that can be readily identifiable and quantifiable like 
fertiliser subsidies, price subsidies, transport subsidies, etc. 
while implicit subsidies are more difficult to quantify, for example 
subsidies in agricultural research, irrigation rates, etc. From this 
it is clear that subsidies have got two critical functions, that of 
allocative and a redistributive one. In Malaysia, we can see that 
both of the above functions are well served by agricultural 
subsidies.
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Evolution of Agricultural Subsidies in Malaysia
Fertiliser was the first input item to be subsidised in 
Malaysia in the 1930s by the colonial agricultural administrators. 
This was done in order to popularise the use of non-organic 
fertiliser among padi farmers. Although the subsidy was withdrawn 
after a few years it was unprecendeted in the development history of 
the country. Replanting subsidies was started in the 1950s and have 
since been responsible for the massive replanting of rubber in 
Malaysia.
Afifuddin contended that the conventional agricultural 
development strategy of the government revolved around two 
significant components,namely the difussion of innovation and 
organisational development. [ 41 ] Various organisations, for 
example the Department of Agriculture, Rubber Research Institute of 
Malaysia and other agencies were responsible to diffuse modern 
agricultural technology among the farmers and this was expected to 
increase yield and productivity of farmers. However, the above 
efforts failed to produce the desired results and productivity was 
not improved. This was true for example of the padi sector. Among 
the reasons why the new technology was not widely practiced was 
because the farmers were constrained by the high costs of the new 
technology. [ 42 ] Hence, to facilitate the diffusion of these new 
technology, the government launched various subsidy schemes to 
enable farmers to utilise these new inputs. For example to encourage 
traditional farmers to use inorganic or chemical fertilisers, 
fertiliser subsidy was introduced in 1930s. The same rationale 
applied to the rubber sector where no replanting would be undertaken
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by the smallholders unless the government extended some form of 
assistance in the form of grants or subsidies to cover partly the 
cost of replanting and to cushion the effects of a temporary non­
production during the replanting stage. On the issue of price 
subsidies for rice, it was instituted essentially to give added 
incentives to farmers to sustain a reasonable level of output and to 
fulfil the requirements of self-sufficiency in food production.
Definition of Agricultural Subsidies in Malaysia
Agricultural subsidies in Malaysia can be defined as falling 
under the following categories : [ 43 ]
i) replanting grants
ii) input subsidies ( subsidised fertilisers, pesticides, planting 
materials, credit at low interest rates, etc )
iii) subsidies given through the provision of drainage and 
irrigation facilities to farmers at charges which do not cover the 
capital and operating / maintenance costs of the schemes
iv) price support policies by which farmers receive a guaranteed 
price for their output regardless of the prevailing market price
v) exemptions given to agricultural producers from payment of import 
duties, surtax, sales tax or excise taxes
vi) other subsidies given to agricultural producers through the 
activities of public sector agencies involved in production, 
marketing and land settlement, such as FAMA, FHLDA and FELCRA.
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TABLE 5.10: Subsidy Expenditure in Relation to Federal Government
Expenditure, 1973-83, Malaysia (M$million)
Year Sub. Exp.(1) RE/0EC2) TEC 3) %(4) *(5)
1973 247 3,341 4,447 7.3 5.5
1974 331 4,315 6,167 5.4 5.3
1975 402 4,900 7,013 6.9 5,7
1976 368 5,828 8,162 6.2 4.5
1977 469 7,398 10,536 6.3 4.5
1983* 1,428 n. a. n. a. _ 5.6
Note: (1) ~ Subsidy exp.; (2) = Recurrent/Operating exp.;
(3) Total exp.; (4) = Subsidies as percentage 
of recurrent exp.; (5) = Subsidies as percentage of 
total exp.;
* For 1983 - Subsidies as portion of total exp. - 5.6 %
- Subsidies as portion of federal exp. on 
agric., forestry & rural development = 63.3 %
- Subsidies as portion of estimated GNP = 2.1 %
Source: Kelim ( 1980 ), p. 70-73
World Bank ( 1984 ), Vol. 1, p. 39
Table 5.10 shows the extent and scope of agricultural subsidies 
in Malaysia. ( For details of agricultural subsidies in Malaysia see 
Statistical Appendix For Chapter 5 ) Total agricultural subsidies 
rose annually between 1973 and 1977, except for a temporary drop in 
1976. In 1977 they totalled an estimated M$469 million, twice as 
much ( in current prices ) as in 1972. The amount disbursed for
various types of subsidies amounted to more than M$1.4 billion in
163
1983. Total and recurrent Federal Government expenditure have risen 
every year and in 1977 were over twice the 1973 levels. As a result 
the trend seems to be for agricultural subsidies to represent a 
declining proportion of total Federal expenditure. Except for 1975 
and 1977, they amounted to 4.5 % ot total government expenditure and 
less than 6 % of recurrent expenditure.
Subsidy Mentality
In Malaysia, the concern for general attitude change among the 
Malays was voiced in the 1960s and 1970s by various quarters.
[ 44 ] At that time, the issue was not specifically referring to 
dependence on subsidies but more on self-reliance and the creation 
of an enterprising and innovative spirit among the Malay population 
who were relatively backwards when compared with the non-Malays. 
However, the government began to take a critical stand on the heavy 
reliance of farmers, who are mainly Malays, on government subsidies 
in the 1980s. By the decade of the 1980s, subsidisation policy was 
already an integral part of the agricultural development strategy in 
Malaysia as we have seen above. For example, in 1981, commenting on 
the ineffectiveness of subsidy schemes for fishermen, the Fisheries 
Development Authority quoted in a report that ” .... the
f
government cannot and should not continue to pour in millions of 
dollars to perpetuate the dependency syndrome among the fishermen. 
The days of subsidy must be balanced with productivity and self- 
reliance. The question of equality without progress must give way to 
efficiency and the enterprising few who could stimulate the 
fisheries economy to benefit the larger
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majority [ 45 ] The barrage of criticisms against over­
dependence of farmers on subsidy began to gain momentum. In 1982, 
the Cabinet Committee on the National Agricultural Policy 
[ 46 ] had already voiced its concern that ” in Malaysia, there has 
been an overt reliance on subsidies in the past and present and 
signs are that there are going to be little slackening off in the 
near future as indicated in the allocations for the Third Malaysia 
Plan ( 1976-80 )". The report added that from their humble 
beginnings as basic incentives for the adoption of new technologies 
and activities, subsidies have been increasingly proposed and used 
as a multiple objective policy instrument which included the 
following stated objexctives :- [ 47 ]
i) to increase productivity and income
ii) to stimulate production of selected crops
iii) to develop specific fanning areas or regions
iv) to eradicate poverty, and
v) to reduce income inequality
What was more alarming was that it has been fashionable to link 
the stated objectives of most subsidy schemes, somewhat arbitrarily, 
to those of the New Economic Policy. The report added that the 
impact of the various subsidy schemes were not evident. It confessed 
that the generous allocations for subsidies in the past with little 
apparent concern about their subsequent effectiveness was 
conditioned by the situation then ( and that the government could 
afford it ) where most of the farmers were operating at subsistence 
or semi-subsistence levels; ambitious and costly development 
programmes were few and there were less competition for development
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funds and the general public were less concerned. [ 48 ]. Hence, 
under such circumstances subsidies flourished and is looked upon as 
the quickest ( although not necessarily the most efficient ) means 
of internal transfer to the less well to do. But the situation has 
changed and farmers are now more commercialised and there is greater 
competition for development funds. Hence, there is a need to change 
the old ways. Hence, the report felt that there is a basic need to 
question whether the provision of subsidies is the most appropriate 
approach from amongst alternative policy instruments. In addition, 
proper coordination of the various agencies providing subsidies are 
imperative.
In line with the above concern, the government commissioned the 
World Bank to study the whole system of price incentives in 
Malaysian agriculture in 1984. [ 49 ] The study concurred with the 
general findings of the Cabinet Committee report and found that 
agricultural subsidy programmes in Malaysia is extensive and 
widespread and badly managed and called for a complete overhaul and 
rationalisation of the subsidy administration programme. In 
consonance with the findings of the World Bank Report, the Malaysian 
government declared in the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan as follows
" It is the rural sector that substantial adjustments need to 
be made to the current strategy for agricultural development if 
further progress is to be made in alleviating poverty and raising
the standard of living of the rural households ..... The role of
subsidies in agricultural development will be progressively reduced 
and this will assist in the eroding of the subsidy mentality among
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farmers. ” [ 50 ]
In fact this is the official stand of the government as far as 
agricultural subsidies is concerned. However, despite this stiff 
position against the too liberal use of subsidies in the 
agricultural sector, the government views that subsidies could still 
play a positive role in the agricultural development of Malaysia if 
it were applied efficiently to selective areas. Hence, not all 
subsidies would be reduced or phased out but only those that 
apparently have not benefited the intended target groups would be 
reviewed. However, some critics have expressed their doubts as to 
whether subsidy policies are the best ones under present 
circumstances. [ 51 ]
However, new policy directions of the Malaysian government 
towards the agricultural sector will influence to a large extent the 
continuation or dissolution of the subsidy system that is being 
practiced currently. In this regard, in 1984, the government 
announced the new National Agricultural Policy ( NAP ). The basic 
objective of the NAP is the maximisation of income from agriculture 
through the efficient utilisation of resources and hence make the 
revitalisation of agriculture possible and making its contribution 
to overall economic development of the country more pronunced. The 
focus for the maximisation of farm income lies through raising the 
productivity of traditional export crops, the development of new 
crops and the production of food and industrial crops.
In addition, the MTR of the Fourth Plan categorically stated 
that agricultural subsidies will be critically reviewed. In this 
regard the statement below is very pertinent :
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" Agricultural subsidies have cJaimed a substantia] amount of 
the financial resources of the government. The role of agricultural 
subsidies in agricultural development will need to be reviewed, not 
only because of the tightening of the financial resources of the 
government but also because of the long-term effect of subsidies on 
the fanning community. An important task in the years ahead will be 
the need to progressively reduce the dependence of fanners on 
subsidies, i.e. to eliminate the subsidy mentality which has been 
part of the agricultural system in the country. The continuation of 
an extensive system of subsidy is eroding the will of the farmers to 
be more independent, self-reliant and to raise their productivity 
and income by utilising their own resources, rather than relying 
excessively on the support of the government." [ 52 ] The Fifth 
Malaysia Plan launched in 1986 continued to emphasise on 
rationalising the extent of government involvement in subsidies by 
saying that " .... Efforts to reduce the heavy reliance on the 
government for assistance in promoting development and the 
predominance of direct involvement of public agencies in production 
and marketing will be stepped up. Where appropriate, subsidies will 
be gradually reduced and replaced by credit to meet financial1 cash­
flow constraints in agricultural activites. " [ 53 ]
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7.0 SUMMARY
In this chapter we have discussed the contribution of 
agriculture in the economic development of Malaysia. We have also 
analysed the role of the smallholder sector in two specific areas 
and found that although the contribution of smallholders is 
important, they are the poorest category of workers in the country. 
The institutional support of the government towards smallholder 
agriculture is tremendous. However, this apparently did not manage 
to uplift the majority of smallholders above poverty levels. We then 
briefly sketched the typology of government intervention in 
Malaysian agriculture. In the last section we surveyed the role of 
agricultural subsidies in Malaysia and found them to be extensive 
and cumbersome and inefficiently administered. In view of these 
defects, the government declared its position with regard to 
subsidies and hopes to rationalise the system to manageable 
proportions. Subsidies in the future are expected to be used on a 
selective basis. In the subsequent chapters, we will analyse the 
role of subsidies in the rubber and padi sector and its 
effectiveness in achieving the goals they were set for.
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NOTES
1. Malaysia is a federation of 13 states comprising 11 states in 
Peninsular Malaysia ( West Malaysia ) and the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak ( East Malaysia ). This chapter deals mainly with Peninsular 
Malaysia.
2. The officially defined division between estates and 
smallholdings has for many decades been fixed at a figure of 100 
acres ( 40 ha ), in which areas greater than 100 acrea are defined 
as estates and areas below 100 acres defined as smallholdings. 
Needless to say this definition is arbitrary and many smallholdings 
are less than 10 acres.
3. See P.P. Courtenay ( 1980 ), " Some Trends in the Peninsular 
Malaysia Plantation Sector: 1963-1973 M in J. C. Jackson 8c M. Rudner
( eds ), Issues in Malaysian Development , Heinemann Educatonal 
Books ( Asia ) Ltd., for a discussion on the usefulness of the 
plantation sector.
4. See A. Halim bin Ismail ( 1970 ), Some Economic Aspects of 
Peasant Agriculture in Malaya. Ph. D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 
Chapter 2, where he sketched the historical evolution of agriculture 
in Malaysia.
5. See M. Rudner ( 1980 ), ” Agricultural Policy and Peasant Social 
Transformation in Late Colonial Malaya ”, in J.C. Jackson 8c M. 
Rudner, ibid. for an account of British policy on agriculture in 
Colonial Malaya.
6. In the 1980 Population and Housing Census, Peninsular Malaysia 
had a total population of 11,426,600 people, of whom 55.3 % were 
Malays, 38.8 % were Chinese, 10.2 % Indians and 0.7 % others. See 
source Government of Malaysia ( 1984 ), Mid-Term Review of Fourth 
Malaysia Plan ( 1981-85 ). Government Printers, p.122
7. The distribution of population between rural and urban strata by 
ethnic group for 1980 was as follows:-
Race Rural Urban Total
f’000 ) ( * ) COOO ) ( % ) ( *000 ) ( % )
Malays 4,710 66 1,606 37 6,316 100
Chinese 1,699 24 2,166 51 3,865 100
Indians 686 10 485 11 1,171 100
Others 42 0.6 32 0.8 75 100
Total 7.138 100 4.289 . 100 11.427 100
Source: Adapted from Government of Malaysia ( 1984 ), Table 4.4, p.
123
8. Government of Malaysia ( 1973 ), Mid-Term Review of Second 
Malaysia Plan ( 1971-75 ). Government Printers, Kuala Lumpur.
9. The New Economic Policy ( NEP ) was launched after the 1969 race 
riots. It was incorporated into the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971-75 ) 
and forms the basis of all policy measures undertaken by the 
government in all its five year development plans. It seeks to
170
redress poverty and to restructure society through a time horizon of 
30 years ( 1970 - 90 ). For an account of its achievements in the 
various five year development plans, see the relevant chapters in 
the documents. For a critical assessment of the NEP, see David Lira, 
"The Political Economy of the New Economic Policy in Malaysia" in 
David Lim ( ed ) ( 1983 ),Further Readings on Malaysian Economic 
Development. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur.
10. Total loans approved to Malaysia by international lending 
agencies up to June 1984 was US$1,583.98 million for 56 projects.
The sectoral breakdown of the loans is as follows :-
Sector_____________No. of Projects______ Total Loans(US$m)______( % )
Agriculture 23 692.80 43.7
Transport/Com 8 217.75 13.7
Utilities 5 66.70 4.3
Energy 10 411.80 26.0
Industry 2 16.32 1.0
Education 6 156.74 9.9
Health 2 21.87 1.4
Total 56 1.583.98 100.0
Source: Ministry of Finance ( 1984 ), p. 45
11. Many studies on poverty have been done on Malaysia both by the 
government and non-governmental circles. Some of the important works 
are cited below :-
S. Anand ( 1978 ).Income Inequality and Poverty in Malaysia: 
Measurement and Decomposition. Oxford University Press; U.A. Aziz 
(1975), Footprints on the Sands of Time: The Malay Poverty Concept 
Over Fifty Years From Zaaba to Aziz. Penerbitan Universiti Malaya, 
Kuala Lumpur; L.C. Lean ( 1974 ), The Pattern of Income Distribution 
in West Malaysia. 1957-70. Geneva. I.L.O.; E.L.H. Lee, " Rural 
Poverty in West Malaysia: 1957-70 " in I.L.O. ( 1977 ), Poverty and 
Landlesaness in Rural Asia. Loussare, Impremeries Reunies, pp. 189- 
202.
12. For an elaboration and criticism of the concept of poverty line 
income see W. Bussink, " Employment and Income Distribution in 
Peninsular Malaysia ", in K. Young, et. al. ( eds ) ( 1980 ), 
Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multi-Racial Society. John Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore and London and Zainal Aznam Yusof ( 1986 ),
" Concept, Profile and Incidence of Poverty ", ISIS First National 
Conference on Poverty. Kuala Lumpur.
13. See for example the works cited below :-
S.A. Baharuddin ( 1976 ), " Second Malaysia Plan - Its Theoretical 
Orientations - An Evaluation and a Critique ", Paper Presented to 
Malaysian Economic Association Convention; S.A. Baharuddin ( 1979 ),
" The Development of the Underdevelopment of the Malaysian 
Peasantry ", in Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol. 9 ( 4 ) ;  L.
Corner ( 1983 ), " The Persistence of Poverty: Rural Development 
Policy in Malaysia ", Kajian Malaysia, Vol. 1 ( 1 ); F. Peacock 
( 1980 ), " The Failure of Rural Development in Malaysia ", in J.C. 
Jackson & M. Rudner ( 1980 ), o p .  cit.. Sukor Kassim ( 1984 ),
" Land Reform: Options and Realities ", in L.L. Lean & C.P. Lim 
( ed ), The Malaysian Economy at the Crossroads. Malaysian Economic
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Association; Syed Husin Ali ( 1986 ), ” Poverty; Social and 
Political Dimensions ” ISIS First National Conference on Poverty. 
Kuala Lumpur; Salleh bin Ismail ( 1986 ), ” Programme and Policies 
on Poverty Eradication in Peninsular Malaysia; An Assessment ”, ISIS 
First National Conference on Poverty. Kuala Lumpur.
14. New land development schemes are essentially smallholdings 
organised together under a central management and operates on an 
estate basis. This is in contrast to that practiced by traditional 
smallholders which are mainly operated on an individual basis and 
less organised. For an assessment of land development schemes in 
Malaysia, see N. Benjamin ( 1978 ), ” The Role of Land Settlement in 
the Economic Development of West Malaysia; 1957-70 ”, Development 
and Change. Vol. 9, pp. 581-598.
15. K. Young, et. al. ( eds ) ( 1980 ), ibid. pp. 217-218
16. Calculated from Table 3.2 of MTR of FMP, p. 80 
Stratum___________1980____________1983
  *000 .....
Rural 1,449.5 1,489.5
Urban 743.3 881.2
Total H/H_________ 2.193.0________ 2.370.7
17. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), Economic Report. 1983/84. Vol 12, 
National Government Printing, Kuala Lumpur, p. 167.
18. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), ibid. p. 168
19. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), ibid. p. 168
20. Ministry of Finance ( 1984 ), Economic Report. 1984/85. Vol. 13
National Printing Department, Kuala Lumpur, p. 117
21. K. Young, et. al. ( 1980 ), o p .  cit.. pp. 218-219
22. Ministry of Finance ( 1984 ), ibid. p. 175
23. Ministry of Finance ( 1984 ), ibid. p. 175.
24. Ministry of Finance ( 1984 ), ibid. p. 176
25. See article in Far Eastern Economc Review. June 21, 1984
26. Government of Malaysia ( 1984 ), op. cit. p. 15
27. See P. Thillainathan ( 1976 ), " Malaysia " in N. Truong ( ed )
( 1976 ), The Role of Public Enterprise in National Development in 
Southeast Asia. Regional Institute of Higher Education and 
Development, Singapore where Thillainathan examined the role of 
public enterprises in the implementation of the New Economic Policy 
end Bruce Gale ( 1983 ), Politics and Public Enterprise in Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur, Eastern Universities Press.
28. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), ibid. p. 168
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29. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), ibid, p. 168
30. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), ibid, p.168
31. Under the National Agricultural Policy, the government decided 
that the level of self-sufficiency in rice is to be kept at a level 
of 80-85 X . See Mid-Term Review of Fourth Malaysia Plan, pp. 244-45.
32. R.M. Goldman ( 1975 ), ” Stable Food Self-Sufficiency and the
Distributive Impact of Malaysian Rice Policy ” Food Research 
Institute Studies. Vol. 14 ( 3 ), pp. 251-293.
33. Ministry of Finance ( 1983 ), o p. cit.. p. 167
34. Quoted in J. Meerman ( 1979 ), ibid., p. 243
35. Government of Malaysia ( 1984 ), o p . cit., p.232
36. K. Young, et. al. ( 1980 ), o p. cit.. p.48
37. K. Young, et. al. ( 1980 ), op. cit.. p. 49
38. K. Youug, et. al. ( 1980 ), o p. cit.. p. 49
39. Government of Malaysia ( 1984 ), o p . cit.. p. 40
40. World Dank ( 1984 ), Sector Report Malaysia : Incentive 
Policies. Vol. 1, Main Report, pp. 18-21 & Vol. 3, Annex 2.
41. Afifuddin Omar ( 1984 ), " Prograur-Program Pembasmian 
Kemiskinan Diluar Bandar ”, Seminar Kemiskinan Luar Bandar, 23 April 
1983, Wisma Negeri, Alor Setar, Kedah
42. Nayan Ariffin (1975 ), Factors Associated With the Malay 
Peasant Farmers* Acceptance of the Agricultural Practices 
Recommended by Extension Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin.
43. Kelim & Economic Consultants Ltd. ( 1980 ), Review of 
Agricultural Prices. Taxes and Subsidies in Malaysia. Vol. 1, Main 
Report, p. 42.
44. Among the studies conducted in this area include :
Senu Abdul Rahman, et. al ( 1971 ), Revolusi Mental. Penerbitan 
Utusan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur; B.K. Parkinson ( 1975 ), ” Non- 
Economic Factors in the Economic Retardation of the Rural 
Malays ”, in D. Lim ( ed ), Readings on Malaysian Econmic 
Development. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur; Malaysian Centre 
for Development Studies ( 1976 ), Value Orientation of the Rural 
Population Towards Change in Peninsular Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur; S.H. 
Alatas ( 1977 ), The Myth of the Lazy Native. Frank Cass;
45. Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia ( 1981 ), Fisheries Financial 
Assistance Scheme, mimeo, Kuala Lumpur.
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Committee on National Agricultural Policy, Vol. 2, Part 2, 
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48. Government of Malaysia ( 1982 ), p. cit., p. 552 - 553
49. World Bank ( 1984 ), Sector Report on Malaysia : Incentive 
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CHAPTER SIX
IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE - 
EVIDENCE FROM RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS - A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The rubber industry has been and still is the mainstay of the 
Malaysian economy. Unlike mineral resources which are non- 
replenishable after they are exploited, rubber is replaceable 
provided the old rubber trees are replanted. Therefore, the 
continued exploitation of the industry is dependent upon regular 
replanting on a 25 years cycle. In this respect, replanting 
subsidies have been the most important fiscal policy instituted by 
the government since the 1950s to encourage regular and systematic 
replanting. This chapter is concerned with analysing the role and 
effect of replanting subsidies on the smallholder sector focussing 
specifically on the allocative and redistributive aspects.
Objective of Chapter
This chapter is a macro analysis of replanting and relies 
mainly on secondary data sources. To complement this, additional 
analysis utilising primary data obtained from a field survey will be 
attempted in the next chapter.
The specific objectives of this chapter will be to analyse the 
following
a) Historical development of rubber smallholders in Malaysia
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b) Necessity and justification of replanting rubber in smallholdings
c) Replanting grants - rationale, composition and financing
d) Empirical evidence of impact of replanting grants
e) Findings and conclusion
2.0 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS IN MALAYSIA 
Introduction
In Malaysia, the rubber industry was established in 1890 when 
H.N. Ridley introduced the first rubber seedlings from Brazil. [ 1 ) 
Initially the estate mode of production with overwhelming European 
interest was predominant. Rubber cultivation was a most profitable 
investment in 1920s because the development of the automobile 
industry in the United States had stimulated the demand for tyres. 
Realising the windfall that could be made, smallholders began to 
enter the industry in increasing numbers much to the envy of estate 
interests. In order to exclude smallholders from fully participating 
in the industry, the European interest persuaded the colonial 
government to take discriminatory action against them. [ 2 ] Hence, 
the smallholders had a very difficult time in the formative years of 
their development and had to face formidable resistance from many 
quarters. This situation remained unchanged until the 1950s which 
saw a radical shift in the colonial government position with respect 
to smallholders because of the imminent independence of the country. 
This culminated in the policy of granting replanting subsidies in 
order to encourage replacement of old rubber trees. [ 3 ] This 
policy in fact forms the bulwark of official government assistance 
towards the smallholder sector.
176
Historical Development of Smallholders in Malayaia
We have seen that although smallholders were already active in 
rubber cultivation in the 1920s and 1930s, it was only in the 1950s 
that they were officially recognised and a policy to develop the 
sector was formulated. Since that period, its progress had been 
phenomenal to the extent that it had overtaken the estate sector 
in its contribution to national output and total hectarage.
[ 4 ] We can distinguish three distinct phases in the progressive 
development of rubber smallholders in Malaysia
a) Initiation Stage in 1950s
b) Consolidation Stage in 1960s and 1970s
c) Expansion Stage in 1980s
The Initiation Stage
The 1950s can be considered as the first stage in the 
progressive development of smallholders in Malaysia. By the end of 
the decade, the foundation for its steady progress and development 
was firmly established. In the first decade of its development, the 
smallholders had benefited from three landmark studies commissioned 
by the government. [ 5 ] For example, based on the recommendations 
of the Enquiry Committee of 1948, the government in 1951 imposed a 
tax called the Schedule 2 Cess which made a levy on rubber exports. 
This levy formed the basis for the system of replanting grants and 
the Rubber Replanting Board was established to administer replanting 
programmes. [ 6 ] In addition, the Mudie and World Bank Missions 
of 1954 set the stage for the renewal of the industry by providing 
comprehensive evidence of the precarious state of the industry and
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made various recommendations pertaining to the role of the small­
holder sector. [ 7 ) Both the Missions in effect produced four main 
principles to government policy on rubber as follows :- [ 8 ]
a) recognition of the inadequacy of replanting cess and the need to 
provide additional finance
b) inducement for more extensive replanting on estates
c) special position of smallholdings and the need to induce 
replanting
d) financial assistance for new planting.
The Consolidation Stage
In the 1960s and 1970s, the government continued with the 
policies of the 1950s with rigorous replanting and new planting in 
estates and smallholdings and larger grants were given to the 
smallholders. In order to diversify the economic base of the 
country, cultivation of other crops like oil palm was also 
encouraged. In 1973, the government rationalised and restructured 
the Rubber Replanting Board and reconstituted a new organisation, 
the Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority ( RISDA ) to 
administer rubber replanting programmes.
The Expansion Stage
The 1980s was a watershed in the development of the rubber 
industry in Malaysia because the industry had to respond to new 
developments. A major fear was that Malaysia was losing its 
competitive advantage in the production of natural rubber. To 
overcome this, the government initiated the ” Dynamic Production
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Policy " which was incorporated into the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
( 1981-84 ). [ 9 ] This policy was formulated to enable Malaysia 
to sustain its lead as the world's largest natural rubber producer. 
To implement this policy, various programmes were instituted with 
special emphasis on increasing the productivity levels of small­
holders. Although the average yield of smallholders had increased 
from 400 kg. in 1960 to 1000 kg. per ha. in the 1980s, the small­
holder sector as a whole still lagged behind the estate sector which 
attained yields of around 1500 kg. per hectare in 1980. [ 10 ]
Three other related development in the 1980s which had a 
significant influence on policies affecting the smallholders were :-
a) Report of the Task Force of Experts on the Rubber Industry
b) Formulation of the National Agricultural Policy
c) Policy Paper on the Future of Rubber Smallholders in Malaysia
In 1983, the Expert Task Force [ 11 ] made a forecast on the 
future of the rubber industry in Malaysia up to the year 2000. It 
was optimistic and maintained that Malaysia could sustain itself as 
the leading producer of natural rubber in the world. However, the 
most significant part of the Report was its view that the declining 
role of the estate sector in sustaining national rubber production 
meant that the smallholder sector had to fill this vacuum and play 
the main lead. Table 6.1 shows the Task Force forecast for world 
demand for rubber and the share that Malaysia envisaged in world 
rubber output.
The government concurred with the recommendation of the Task 
Force and decided that this target should be met through accelerated 
replanting by smallholders. This recommendation put the smallholders
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into a dilemma. However, the National Agricultural Policy had a 
different view of the role of rubber smallholders. The NAP was aware 
of the problems facing smallholders and the rubber industry in 
particular and foresaw that the future of the industry would be 
determined by world market demand as well as the relative efficiency 
of the country. Its strategy for the industry was therefore to raise 
production efficiency in existing rubber areas and to increase the 
value-added of rubber in agro-based industries. Therefore, areas 
planted under smallholders* rubber was not expected to increase very 
much under this policy. [ 12 ] This was in marked contrast to the 
Expert Task Force recommendation which envisaged a big increase in 
land acreage under smallholdings. The reason for this change in 
priority was that rubber was now less profitable due to a fall in 
prices and hence at that stage no expansion in production should be 
encouraged.
Table 6.1; Forecasted World Demand For Rubber 
Year Total Rubber Natural Rubber Malaysian Prod. % of World
  ......million metric tons ......
1982 11.6 3.7 1.52
1990 15.0 5.0 1.80
2000 18.0  6^0___________________ 2.00
Source : Ministry of Land & Regional Development ( 1985 ), p. 2.
Thus, there was a clear difference of opinion within 
governmental circles as to which direction the smallholder sector 





Reports. Therefore, the role of the smallholder sector needed to be 
clarified. The opportunity came in 1985 when a policy proposal was 
presented to the Cabinet to seek the government’s clarification on 
the future role of rubber smallholders. [ 13 ] The paper argued 
that the burden on the smallholders to implement the targets set by 
the Task Force was too optimistic and unreasonable. Instead it 
recommended a few areas where the smallholder sector should focus.
[ 14 ] This policy paper formed the basis upon which the government 
formulated its policies with respect to the smallholder sector and 
RISDA and other related agencies like FELCRA are currently 
implementing most of its recommendations. It can be seen that from 
the above account it is quite certain that the government will 
continue to support the smallholder sector both for economic and 
political reasons in the foreseeable future.
Summary
We have discussed the important role of the unorganised 
smallholder sector in the rubber economy. This sector played a 
predominant role since the 1960s when it overtook the estate sector 
in terms of contribution to total production and hectarage. Hence, 
the future of the rubber industry in Malaysia will depend mainly 
on the performance of the smallholders. However, although the 
relative contribution of the estate sector has declined, it will 
continue to play an important role. Estates have instead 
concentrated their resources on oil palm. The main reason for the 
shift in emphasis by estates from rubber to oil palm was 
consideration of profit. [ 15 ] However, estates are not expected
to completely abandon rubber production because among other reasons 
some land is unsuitable for conversion. However, despite facing 
falling prices and accelerated increases in costs and hence reduced 
profitability for them, smallholders are not in a position to follow 
in the footsteps of the estates. This is mainly due to resource 
constraints. For example, although smallholders who cultivated other 
crops are also eligible to get replanting assistance, this is given 
only once. Further requests for replanting would only be approved 
for rubber. [ 16 ] This is an indirect way of discouraging 
smallholders from switching to other crops. Since estates are 
profit-making enterprises, they have to seek alternative investment 
opportunities to serve the interest of their shareholders once 
returns from rubber are less attractive. Smallholders do not have 
this choice because for most of them, rubber cultivation is the only 
means of livelihood known to them. However, the most important 
obstacle is the lack of resources and know-how to effect this 
transition. For example, about 70 % of smallholders preferred to 
replant rubber to other crops. [ 17 ] However, although positive 
discrimination towards tlie smallholders has its benefits, the wisdom 
of the policy of discouraging smallholders to switch crops is 
questionable since this would tend to retain the more enthusiastic 
producers in a declining industry. In addition, substantial 
subsidies have to be offered to maintain production. The only way 
therefore of sustaining the future viability of the industry and 
justifying the widespread use of subsidies would be to depend on the 
innovativeness and competitiveness of the smallholder sector.
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3. 0 FEATURES OF RITP.FR V:MA T.T.HOTJ}ERSJV MA} VYM A
T n( roduct I om
Tn this section we wi1 1 give 3ome relevant flat a on rubber 
smallholders in Malaysia. The most comprehensive information on 
rubber smallholders in Peninsular Malaysia is contained in the 1977 
Rubber Smallholders Census conducted by RISDA. About 338,137 
smallholders or about 68.9 X of known rubber smallholders 
population were interviewed on questions related to their income, 
holding size, age, productivity and other socio-economic variables.
[ 18 ] Although the Census was conducted in 1977, it was only 
published in 1983. Despite being dated, this Census is still useful 
for planners, policy makers and researchers in Malaysia because the 
results form an important source of data-base for the largest single 
group of primary producers as well as the largest single poverty 
group in the country. [ 19 ]
Characteristics of Smallholders in Malaysia
First, the basic features of rubber smallholders in Malaysia 
will be outlined. Relevant statistics on this are extracted from the 
1977 Census and produced in the Statistical Appendix.
Appendix Table 1 shows there were 490,460 rubber smallholders 
out of whom more than 4.0 X were organised smallholders in various 
land development schemes while the rest were unorganised. It is 
this latter group that concerns us in this study. Appendix Table 2 
shows that between 1961-77, the number of smallholders increased by
206,000 or about 50 X within 16 years. Appendix Table 3 shows that 
74.6 X of smallholders were Buraiputras or native-born Malays or
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literally meaning " sons of the soil ” and a significant minority 
were of Chinese and Indian origin. Appendix Table 4 shows that while 
Bumiputras were larger in numbers, they only owned about 63.0 % of 
rubber land while the Chinese who constituted less than one quarter 
of the population owned about 35.0 % of land. About 70 % of small­
holders were males who owned three-quarters of the land. Appendix 
Table 5 shows that the average age of smallholders was about 48.0 
years while about 21 % were above 60 years. This ageing phenomenon 
among smallholders is a serious problem in Malaysia because it will 
worsen the problem of labour supply. In addition, there will be an 
increase in the amount of land left idle by owners. Most youths 
prefer to migrate to the urban centres and not remain behind as 
rubber tappers. Appendix Table 6 shows that about 74 % of small­
holders were owner-operators while 24 % rented out their holdings. 
The latter category was more common among Chinese smallholders. 
Another feature of smallholders is that 39 % depended on rubber and 
other agriculture for their livelihood while 31 % had also to rely 
on off-farm job opportunities to supplement their income. As to 
holding sizes, on average they were very small at less than 2 
hectares per household. Appendix Tables 7, 8 and 9 give data on 
replanting. Appendix Table 7 shows that out of 490,000 small­
holders, 259,000 smallholders ( 52 % ) had participated in 
government replanting programmes. A majority of-89 % had replanted 
only once. Of the remaining 232,000 smallholders who did not 
replant, 107,000 smallholders did not do so despite having old 
trees. About 125,000 smallholders did not participate in RISDA*s 
programme because of three reasons :-
184
a) those who had financed replanting on their own
b) those who had newly planted rubber on their land
c) FELDA and FELCRA settlers whose trees were still young
Of the 366,000 smallholders who were eligible for replanting 
assistance, 29 % were yet to participate. Over 80 % of non­
participants were Bumiputras and about half of them had holdings of 
less than 2 ha. Appendix Table 8 shows that substantial replanting 
occurred after 1960 while there were no big increases after 1970s. 
Appendix Table 9 shows that the majority of non-replanters had 
holdings below 4 ha.
Major Problems Areas Facing the Smallholders
Many studies have clearly-identified that the smallholders face 
considerable constraints. [ 20 ] According to RISDA, [ 21 ] the 
majority of non-replanters were males ( 70 % ) . About 83 % were 
sole owners of land. This conflicts with Barlow’s findings that 
multiple ownership is an obstacle to replanting. About 61 % of non­
replanters were over 45 years old. But the most significant fact is 
that most of them had land holdings of less than 4 ha. Why is non­
participation rate in RISDA*s replanting programme so high, 
especially among the Bumiputra ( 84 % ) ? According to RISDA, 
there were three categories of problems which prevented replanting 
among smallholders. [ 22 ] Firstly, there were smallholders who 
were unaware or not convinced of the benefits of replanting. This 
shows that the extension efforts of RISDA failed and was not 
effective in conveying the message to smalholders. Secondly, there 
were smallholders who were aware of the benefits of replanting but
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wanted to give up rubber cultivation either by selling their land or 
converting it to other crops. Thirdly, there were smallholders who 
wanted to replant but were unable to do so because of the lack of 
information, capability and know-how. Some observers believed that 
although cultural and social forces played a part in explaining high 
non-participation rates of replanting among the Malays, the small 
and uneconomic size of land is the most important factor in 
determining profitability and viability of replanting. [ 23 ]
Summary
We have seen that the problems faced by smallholders are indeed 
formidable and one begins to understand why after nearly 40 years of 
concerted effort, rubber smallholders are still the poorest category 
of workers in the country. [ 24 ] The problems facing smallholders 
are in fact more deep-rooted. They are structural and institutional 
in nature whereas the solutions prescribed by the government have 
only touched the surface and not the root cause of the problem.
[ 25 ] The government is, however, aware of this but is reluctant 
to institute major agrarian reforms in the country which would 
attack vested interests. Hence, in designing a general developmental 
strategy to solve the problems of poverty, classical intervention 
measures revolving around pricing polices such as through the 
provision of credits and subsidies are the most commonly adopted 
because they are the least controversial. [ 26 ] It is an 
assessment of these fiscal policy measures that we shall attempt in 
this and the next chapter.
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4.0 RUBBER REPLANTING IN SMALLHOLDINGS [ 27 ]
The Replanting Process
Rubber trees have an economic life span of 30-35 years after 
which productivity will decline rapidly and eventually reach zero. 
Therefore, to maintain the industry on a sustained yield basis, the 
capital stock of trees must be renewed through replanting of 
approximately 3 per cent of total area under rubber each year.
[ 28 ] Hence, replanting is the life-line of the industry in 
Malaysia and has been responsible for increasing yields and reducing 
greatly the cost of production on estates and smallholdings.
Normally replanting takes place when the trees are over 25 years old 
but could occur earlier depending on the state of the trees and 
their output. The process of replanting involves cutting down the 
old trees and new high yielding clones are then planted.
After replanting work is completed, it takes about 6 to 7 years 
before the trees mature and produce latex which is produced through 
tapping. But the long gestation period before trees mature is the 
main reason hindering many smallholders from replanting because most 
smallholders are unable to forego their present rubber income. This 
is especially true for smallholders with holdings of less than 5.0 
hectares. However for those who manage to replant, their trees, once 
they mature will be productive for the next 30 years before 
undergoing a second cycle of replanting. Normally, if trees are 
replanted with high yielding clones 8nd properly maintained, yields 
will be relatively high.
Assistance is normally available to smallholders at all stages 
of replanting. Most is in the form of subsidies, credits or outright
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grants which are usually available on application. Basically, there 
are two methods of replanting which the smallholder can choose. The 
first which is replanting on an individual basis is the traditional 
form and the most popular. Under this method, it is common for 
smallholders to use family labour to save cost and contract out the 
more difficult jobs. However, a major drawback of this method is 
that its success depends entirely upon the personal efforts of the 
smallholder and his family who are under great constraints with 
respect to finance, material and expertise. Under these 
circumstances, the existence of RISDA should be encouraging but 
unfortunately, it is in the area of extension where RISDA is 
weakest. For example, the replanting phase is the stage where there 
is least supervision by RISDA. The only contact between RISDA and 
smallholders at this stage is the annual inspection of trees to 
determine whether holdings were properly maintained and whether 
grants were properly utilised. Decisions are then made whether 
instalment payments from the replanting grant could be approved for 
subsequent payment. Any technical or personal problems faced by 
smallholders at this stage are not given due consideration by RISDA 
mainly due to shortages of staff. Unless the management of RISDA can 
sort out this problem, it would be very difficult for smallholders 
to overcome their problems and realise their full potential without 
the full support of RISDA.
Partly as a reaction to this problem, in 1979 RISDA resorted to 
the second method which is the collective approach to replanting 
where it has been vigorously propagating the mini-estate concept.
[ 29 ] Under this approach, in addition to overcoming personnel
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constraints and easier management of replanting work, smallholders 
could be easily controlled. However, although collective replanting 
is favoured by RISDA it is still not popular with the majority of 
smallholders mainly to legal, administrative and attitudinal 
constraints. However, the emphasis by RISDA on the collective 
approach to replanting does not imply the abandonment of the 
traditional methods of replanting. For the present time at least it 
is anticipated that the area replanted on an individual basis will 
continue to be larger on an annual basis than mini-estates. For 
example, currently, about 20,000 hectares of individual holdings are 
being replanted compared to 5,000 hectares per year for mini­
estates.
The Use of High Yielding Varieties in Replanting 
Introduction
The Mudie and IBRD Reports have argued and justified 
persuasively the necessity for Malaysia to replant her stock of old 
rubber trees. It was feared that if the rate of replanting was 
inadequate or below the 3 % optimum level, then the country could 
not maintain its present levels of production.
In this section, we will analyse why there is a need for 
smallholders to replant. We shall illustrate the necessity of 
replanting in smallholdings under two different conditions; firstly, 
by comparing yield of old rubber trees with those of new rubber 
stand of high yielding variety, secondly, by comparing yield of 
estates with those of smallholdings and the income differentials.
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TABLE 6.2: Comp, of Yield of Old and Replanted Rubber Stand, 1980.
Old Rubber Stand Repl. Trees (RRIM 600) at Diff. % of










1 564 564 - - - - - -
2 564 1128 - - - - - -
3 564 1692 - - - - - -
4 564 2256 - - - - - -
5 564 2820 - - - - - -
6 564 3384 432 432 576 576 720 720
7 564 3948 726 1158 968 1544 1210 1930
8 564 4512 960 2118 1280 2824 1600 3530
9 564 5076 1116 3234 1488 4312 1860 5390
10 564 5640 1386 4620 1848 6160 2310 7700
11 564 6204 1392 6012 1856 8016 2320 10020
12 564 6768 1410 7422 1880 9896 2350 12370
13 564 7332 1482 8904 1976 11872 2470 14840
14 564 7896 1620 10524 2160 14032 2700 17540
15 564 8460 1416 11940 1888 15920 2360 19900
16 564 9024 1314 13254 1752 17672 2190 22090
17 564 9588 1224 14478 1632 19304 2040 24130
18 564 10152 1596 16074 2128 21432 2660 26790
19 564 10716 1764 17838 2352 23784 2940 29730
20 564 11280 1956 19794 2608 26392 3260 32990
Note: Ann. = Annual; Cum. = Cumulative; [1] = low yield rubber 
yield = 564 kg/ha. 1980. Source: A. Arope, et.al. (1983), p. 206.
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Comparision of Yield of Old Stand Versus New Stand
In order to show that yield levels are different between old 
unselected seedlings associated with trees planted in the 1950s with 
trees replanted with high yielding clones, we produce Table 6.2. 
which shows how replanting enhances the level of productivity.
To arrive at the above estimates, certain assumptions regarding 
output figures of existing old trees and field trial figures derived 
from RRIM 600 series clones were made. It is estimated that yields 
of unimproved rubber varieties of a typical low yielding small­
holding would produce about 564 kg. per ha. per year of dry rubber 
while a bud-grafted clone ( e.g. RRIM 600 series ) may produce 2000- 
2223 kg. per ha. But these latter figures from RRIM field trials are 
not replicable on smallholdings because of the poor standard of 
field maintainance and low level of fertiliser application. In 
addition, although the yield potential of RRIM 600 is substantial, 
maximum yields are not attainable until the fifth year of tapping.
The typical yield profile of RRIM 600 series is given in Table 6.3.
[ 30 ]
Although by undertaking replanting, production is lost for 6 
years the yield from the new clone is markedly higher than from the 
old unselected seedlings of the unreplanted holding. In the 
calculations presented in Table 6.2, we assumed the following :-
a) that the existing stand of rubber produced about 564 kg. per ha.
b) that one hectare of the unimproved rubber variety gave a constant 
average yield of 564 kg. per ha. compared to some possible yields 
from RRIM 600 based on 100 % t 80 X and 60 X of RRIM's field trial 
results.
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TABLE 6.3: RRIM 600 Series (Class 1 Clone) Mean Yield Profile 
















Source: Ani Arope, et. al. ( 1983 ), Chapter 6 , Tables 61 & 63
For example, at 60 % yield level, the cumulative yields of 
replanted stand exceeded yields of old trees after year 12, at 80 % 
after year 10 and at 100 % after year 9. The figures underlined in 
Table 6.2 indicate that yields of the new stand are more superior to 
yields of the old stand by a great margin. From this it is clear 
that in order to reap benefits of higher productivity, smallholders 
must replant their trees with high yielding varieties. For example, 
even at 60 % of optimum potential output, the cumulative yield of
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RRIM 600 after year 12 would be profitable and this would continue 
for another 16 years. Therefore, it can be concluded that old trees 
need to be replaced by better clones in order to increase yield and 
hence profitability for the smallholders.
Coinparisiop of Estate Yield With Smallholder Yield
The second method to justify the necessity for replanting by 
smallholders is by comparing the yields of estate with those of 
smallholdings and computing the monetary returns lost or foregone by 
smallholders for not replanting. The reason for comparing 
smallholdings with estates is that estates are models for the small­
holders in terras of managerial and organisational efficiency. In 
addition, almost all estates have replanted with high yielding 
clones. Hence, the yields attained by estates are more superior to 
smallholdings. According to Bailey [ 31 ] productivity on estates 
is superior when compared to smallholdings for two reasons. First, 
estates are in a better position to take advantage of research 
results by RRIM and secondly, due to the large size of holdings and 
capital resources available to it, estates are able to replace older 
and less productive trees by staggering their replanting schedule. 
Table 6.4 compares the yield of estates and smallholdings from 1947 
to 1986 and estimates were made of income foregone by smallholders 
by not attaining the estate level of production at various price 
levels.
Table 6.4 shows that estates were more productive than 
smallholders. The smallholders only managed to attain yield levels 
of between 58 % and 89 % of estate production levels between 1947
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and 1986. Although organisationul factors played a crucial pari in 
determining yields, it is very clear that replanting with high 
yielding materials was the main contribution to the high rise in 
yields. Based on this premise and using three price differentials of 
80 cents, 100 cents and 200 cents per kg. the additional income 
foregone by smallholders on a per hectare basis was very great. In 
fact, this situation has entailed great losses of income from the 
national perspective. Arope, et. al. [ 32 ] observed that total 
production is not the key variable in the assessment for the need of 
technology transfer but rather it is the yield per hectare variable 
which is crucial. Arope estimated that in 1973 there were 900,000 
ha. of smallholdings being tapped and with a price level of 100 
cents per kg. estimated that about M$5.8 million was lost within the 
smallholding sector. [ 33 ] In addition, even if smallholders were 
able to achieve only one-half of the estate yield, the income 
foregone would have still been high. Hence, there is no question 
about need for smallholders replanting with high yielding rubber 
so as to achieve a higher yield on a per hectare basis. It is 
therefore imperative that more smallholders should be urged to 
replant in order to benefit them personally and the nation from 
enhanced yield.
Summary
From the above analysis, it is clear that in order for 
smallholders to increase their productivity and achieve output 
levels near that of the estates, it is necessary for them to replant 
their old trees with high yielding clones.
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TABLE 0.4: Production and Yield in t jhe_ Estate and, jjma 11 l*oA(
— ^Sector and ~ Inc owe Pi fferonces Be tween llw Sec t QfgH Ty(Z6®_jL
Yf»ar Est S/H Additional Income(M$I__at---
----------  Diff. BO 100 200 c/k^
638 ~ 488 76.5 150 120 150 300
632 477 75.5 155 124 155 310
613 438 71.5 175 140 175 350
573 512 89.4 61 49 61 122
516 446 86.4 70 56 70 140
543 387 71.3 156 125 156 312
530 380 71.7 150 120 150 300
539 393 72.9 146 117 146 292
551 471 85.5 80 64 80 160
557 427 76.7 130 104 130 260
601 428 71.2 173 138 173 346
658 433 65.8 225 180 225 450
719 445 61.9 274 219 274 548
758 477 62.9 281 225 281 562
808 504 62.4 304 243 304 608






















917 550 60.0 367 294 367 734
953 577 60.5 376 301 376 752
1006 608 60.4 398 318 398 796
1032 599 58.0 433 346 433 866
AWO 1105 666 60.3 439 351 439 878
1969 1152 763 66.2 389 311 389 778
1970
1971
1190 718 60.3 472 378 472 944
—  1288 711 55'2 III ™  me1972 1323 680 51.4 643 514 643 1286
1973 1378 901 65.4 477 382 477 9541974 1380 1039 75.3 341 273 341 682
1975 1385 1068 77.1 317 254 317 508
1976 1400 1093 78.1 307 246 307 614
1977 1430 1102 77.1 328 262 328 525
1978 1448 1104 76.2 344 275 344
9^9 1449 1105 76.3 344 275 344 550
1980 1428 1104 77.3 324 259 324 518
1981 1450 1104 76.1 346 277 346 554
1982 1507 955 63.4 552 442 552 1104
1983 1423 948 66.6 475 380 475 950
1984 1373 978 71.2 395 316 395 790
1985
1986
1397 1009 72.2 388 310 388 776
id?n 1037 73.0 383 306____383---- 766
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 14.
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5.0 REPLANTING SUBSIDIES - RATIONALE, COMPOSITION AND FINANCING
Introduction
The Replanting Grant is the major form of governmental aid to 
rubber smallholders. These subsidies have been responsible for 
accelerating the rate of replanting in estates and smallholdings in 
Malaysia. The World Bank views replanting grants as the single most 
important governmental assistance scheme for the smallholder sector 
which had enabled it to upgrade its technological status. [ 34 ] 
Barlow observed that in the case of individual smallholders, the 
replanting grant may be seen as the only practicable means of 
financing replanting of old trees with high yielding materials in 
the absence of a functional long term capital market. [ 35 ] This 
is because most financial institutions are reluctant to lend to high 
risk but poor smallholders, rather they prefer to lend to big 
enterprises such as estates because of the low risk involved.
Without the subsidy, it is difficult if not impossible for 
smallholders to bear the high and risky cost of replanting.
Replanting grants are given in cash and kind. As for material 
assistance, seedlings and fertilisers are compulsory while other 
items are optional. The balance of the grant after deducting for 
these materials is then paid in cash to the smallholders. In 
general, cash balance to smallholders vary between 58 - 81 % of the 
grant while the rest is taken up by expenses on materials. [ 36 ] 
Grants are usually paid out in seven instalments. The rationale for 
this is to ensure that grants are not misused. However, there is 
still the problem of fungibility of funds where subsidies
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( especially the cash balances ) are not used solely for replanting 
but on consumption expenditures. Rates payable under the grant have 
been revised 7 times since 1952. The current rate is M$5434 per ha. 
for holdings less than 4 ha. and M$3705 per ha. for holdings more 
than 4 ha. for rubber. The rate for other crops is M$3707 and M$2965 
respectively. The grant system is so structured in order to assist 
tappers who have small land holdings to encourage rubber cultivation 
instead of other alternative crops. This subsidy scheme is financed 
partly through a tax on exported rubber and from direct government 
funds. In addition, for each hectare of rubber replanted, RISDA 
received M$741 direct from the Treasury as a reimbursement. [ 37 ] 
There are no restrictions on the size of holdings that can be 
replanted by smallholders at any one time. However, only those 
smallholders who own less than 6 ha. qualify for replanting grants 
of the entire area if it is replanted under a single programme. A 
smallholder who owns more than 6 ha. will be eligible for a maximum 
replanting grant of two-thirds of his land or 6 ha. whichever is 
smaller. The rest of the area will only qualify for the grant after 
a lapse of three years. Through this RISDA ensures that priority is 
given towards assisting the smalliest group of tappers. Table 6.5 
shows the current rate of subsidy while Table 6.6 shows the rates 
which were effective from 1952 till 1981. From Table 6.6 it can be 
seen that the amount of replanting grants have been revised upwards 
no less than seven times within 29 years. In 1952 the rate of 
subsidy was only M$400 per acre while in 1981 it increased five-fold 
to M$2200 per acre.
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TABLE 6.5; Payment of Replant.Grants to Land Size and Crop - 1980
Grant Instalment Rubber - . Other Crops
< 4 ha > 4 ha. < 4 ha. > 4 ha.
- -
1st instalment 1582 1236 1483 1236
2nd instalment 889 494 1112 864
3rd instalment 618 494 741 618
4th instalment 618 494 371 247
5th instalment 618 371 - -
6th instalment 618 371 - -
7th instalment 494 247 - -
Total 5437 3707 3707 2965
Source: RISDA
TABLE 6.6: Rubber Replanting Grant Schemes and Hates. 1952 - 1981
Scheme No________ Duration Grant ( M$ per acre )
1 1/1/52 - 31/12/52 400
2 1/1/53 - 31/12/59 500 ( from Nov. 1954 )
3 1/1/60 - 31/12/66 600 ( from Jan. 1960 )
(from Jan 1962 ) 750 + 50 bonus
4 1/1/67-31/12/70 750 + 50 bonus
5 1/1/71 - 31/12/75 900
5A 1/1/76 - 31/12/80 900 & 1200^from Jan. 1978
6 1/1/81 - present_________2200  -
Source: RISDA and Economic Reports, various issues
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From the smallholder’s point of view, replanting grants should 
cover the full cost of replanting. But this is not so. Since most 
smallholders are poor and earning income levels below the poverty 
line, the excess cost of replanting is likely to cause some 
difficulties for them since they have very little savings. In this 
connection, two issues are relevant. First, the extent of the 
finance gap ? Secondly, to what extent has this gap hindered 
smallholders participation in replanting programmes? To answer these 
questions, it is necessary to analyse replanting cost figures.













1st 295 590 310 900 741
2nd 205 410 100 510 272
3rd 105 210 50 260 259
4th 45 90 50 140 210
5th 35 70 45 115 -
6th 25 50 45 95 -
Total 710 1420 600 2020 1482
Source: A. Halim ( 1970 ), pp. 215
Note: - Wages for family imputed at M$2.00 per man-day
- Total costs include exp. M$200 for fencing in first year
- Weed growth need extra labour of 150 man-days in second 
year and 50 man-days in third year
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TABLE 6,8; Replanting Coat at Current Rates - 1981
A) For Individual Smallholder
Replanting Cos t......... M$6,420 per ha.
Replanting Grant........ M$5.434 per ha.
Excess Cost  M$1.014 per ha.
B) Mini-Estates ( Rubber )
< 4 ha. > 4 ha.
Estimated Cost M$6,511 M$6,511
Subsidy ( grant ) M$5.436_____________ MS3.707
Excess Cost____________ M$1.076_____________ M$2.804
Source: Robert B. Campbell et. al. ( 1985 ), p. 68
Tables 6.7 end 6.8 show the cost of replanting and amount of 
replanting grant given in 1960s and 1980s. From Table 6.7, it is 
estimated that the excess cost of replanting over replanting grants 
in smallholdings was about 36 X in 1960s while in 1980s it dropped 
to 19 X both for individual smallholders and mini-estates. Here it 
is important to note that it is not the policy of the government 
to subsidise the full cost of replanting. However, it is significant 
that rate increases have been quite dramatic and this has alleviated 
to some extent the problem of financing replanting by smallholders.
The existence of this problem has not apparently affected small­
holders achievement of replanting. The statistics on replanting in 
Statistical Appendix shows that smallholders do undertake capital 
replacement through replanting. As to the argument that the ” hard­
cores " do not replant because of financial problem, a study by 




an entirely different set of problems.
Among smallholders, family labour constitutes the main source 
of labour supply in replanting work although hired labour handle the 
more difficult jobs. This is due to the labour-intensive nature of 
rubber cultivation which involves a great amount of manual work like 
weeding, fertilising, planting, etc. Hence, in the early stages of 
replanting, the bulk of replanting costs tends to go to wages. In 
fact labour costs contributed about two-thirds of total cost in 
1960s. [ 39 ] Also the cost of replanting have been consistently 
high relative to the amount of grants available to the smallholders 
even in the 1960s till the present time.
Basis Used in Fixing Replanting Grant
As we have seen, the amount of subsidy under replanting grants 
have been revised seven times since 1952. The latest increase was in 
1981. Information obtained from the RISDA revealed that the 
principle used to determine the amount of replanting subsidy was 
based on two-thirds of a liberally estimated cost of replanting on 
estates while smallholders are expected to make up the balance. 
RISDA said that new rates must consider the development cost of 
FELDA and private estates. [ 40 ] Table 6.9 gives replanting costs 
for commercial estates which varied between M$1836 and M$2231 per 
acre. Note that prior to the latest subsidy increase in 1981, RISDA 
had suggested to the government a figure of M$1600 while the World 
Bank had suggested M$1800 per acre. However, the government approved 
M$2200 per acre payable according to Table 6.10 probably after 
yielding to strong pressures from the smallholders.
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TABLE 6.9: Rubber Replanting Costs For Comm. Estates ( 1980 Prices ) 
( various alternatives at M$ per acre )
OPTIONS
1 2 3 4 5
Preplanting Year 350 390 600 435 350
Year of Planting 450 615 500 480 450
2nd Year 310 285 267 257 300
3rd Year 240 230 267 223 250
4th Year 200 190 215 208 200
5th Year 200 155 186 233 200
6th Year 200 135 146 - 150
Total 1950 2000 2231 1836 1906
Source : RISDA ( 1987 ), Personal Communication, 17 April 1987.
TABLE 6.10: Rates of Replanting Grant for Rubber - 1960 - 80 
Instalment Comparable Rates In ( M$/acre )
_____________________ 1981 1978 1974 1960
1st 640 440 250 296
2nd 360 180 100 109
3rd 250 180 100 104
4th 250 150 70 84
5th 250 130 70 -
6th 250 120 60 -
7th 200 - - -
Total 2200 1200 750 593
Source: RISDA
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Table 6.10 also compares the replanting rates approved in 1960,
1974, 1978 and 1981. It is clear that the latest rate of increase in
1981 was the highest in the history of rubber replanting in
Malaysia. A probable reason for the substantial increase in
replanting grant was the government’s conviction that increases in 
replanting grants would be an incentive for smallholders to 
accelerate replanting. This is also related to the government’s 
effort of enhancing national production of rubber as envisaged in 
the ” Dynamic Production Policy ” discussed earlier. We shall 
discuss later whether there is any correlation between the rate of 
replanting and increases in replanting grants.
Summary
From the analysis above, it is clear that the amount of 
replanting grant was inadequate to cover fully the cost of 
replanting by between 10 % to 20 % in 1981. In the 1960s, since 
replanting grants were only one-half of the present rate, the cost 
exceeded subsidies by a greater percentage. However, this factor was 
not decisive in preventing most smallholders from replanting as data 
from RISDA revealed. Considering that the amount of subsidy received 
by smallholders was relatively small, their achievements in 
replanting is commendable. This leads us to conclude that it is not 
necessary for the government to pursue a policy of full 
subsidisation to achieve its objective provided farmers are able to 
perceive material benefits from their efforts.
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To pursue this objective, farmers are willing to work harder and 
extract additional resources to supplement governmental subsidies. 
Therefore, it is important to realise that farmers must make their 
own contribution in terms of material and non-material resources in 
order for their efforts to be successful.
Sources of Funds For Subsidies - Export Duty And Cesses
Replanting grants are financed partly from export tax on rubber 
and partly from government funds. RISDA in fact owes its existence 
to these sources. Since RISDA is responsible for administering 
replanting programmes exclusively for smallholders, it is important 
for us to study its budget. Table 6.11 shows the sources of RISDA’s 
income while Table 6.12 indicates RISDA’s expenditure.
TABLE 6.11: Main Income Sources of RISDA (1970-86) ( M$ million)
Item 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Cess 124 129 128 107 144 135 149 151 200 172 189 186 193 201 198 204
Asst 9 17 21 37 18 21 26 19 NA NA 67 47 38 28 40 29
Loan - - -  - _ _ _ _ _ _ _  42 39 59 61 64
Profit 3 5 6 8 11 12 13 14 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tot 136 148 155 152 173 168 188 184 200 172 256 275 270 288 299 297
Cess(%)91 87 83 70 83 80 79 82 100 100 74 68 71 70 66 69
Note: Asst. = Govt. Assistance; Loan = Govt. Loan; NA =Not Available 
Source: RISDA (1982), Table 2
RISDA (1987), Personal Communication, 17 April.
World Bank (1984), Vol. 1, Table 2, p. 36.
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Table 6.11 shows that the main sources of income for RISDA 
include cess, government assistance, loans and profits from its 
portfolio investment. Cess collection constitutes the bulk of its 
income. In the 1970s when rubber prices were high, this constituted 
about 80 - 90 % of total income. However, in 1980s, the 
contribution of cess to total income has dropped to about 70 %. 
However, in absolute terms its contribution is still significant.
For example, in 1970 cess collection was only M$124 million but in 
1986 this had increased to M$204 million ( in current prices ).
Since the cost of replanting has increased, in order to achieve the 
high targets of replanting smallholder acreage, from 1982 it was 
necessary to supplement the income of RISDA with government 
assistance and loans. For example, in 1980, 86 % of the replanting 
grant of M$5434 per hectare was provided by cess while the other 
proportion was provided by direct government grant. [ 41 ] On the 
other hand, government assistance constituted only about 13 % of 
total income in 1977 and 1986 which was M$19 million and M$29 
million respectively. The fall in revenue from falling rubber 
exports and low prices might have contributed to a fall in cess 
collection, [ 42 ]
From Table 6.12 we can see that the administrative expenditures 
of RISDA rose to more than double from 1975 to 1986, i.e. from M$41 
million to M$84 million. As for the development budget, in 1975-it 
was only M$192 million while in 1986 it increased to M$278 million, 
an increase of 45 %. (in current prices ).
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TABLE 6. i—1 ro RISDA’'s Annual Budget . 1975-86,, ( M$ million )
86Item 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Adm. Exp. 41 35 33 65 51 59 84 99 77 80 84 84
Est. Dev. 51 44 67 71 56 80 NA NA NA NA NA NA
S/H Dev. 138 127 110 123 101 137 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Marketing 4 4 11 7 2 5 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Dev Cost 192 175 187 200 159 222 67 326 296 288 300 278
AD Cost 234 220 265 221 280 150 424 373 369 384 363 362
Cess Ref 60 60 60 67 67 69 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Note: - Est. Dev. = RISDA mini-estate development
- S/H Dev. = include replanting, infrastructure, group 
processing centres, etc.
- Marketing = Smallholder Marketing Scheme
- Cess Refund ~ Estate Cess Refunds
- Dev. Cost = Est. Dev. + S/H Dev. + Marketing.
- AD Cost - Adm. + Dev. Costs
Source: Adapted from Statistical Appendix Chapter 6, Tables 11 & 12.
Having examined RISDA*s budget figures, the next important 
issue to discuss is how much subsidy is RISDA actually spending on 
rubber replanting activities ? This is a valid question to ask 
because RISDA has diversified its activities very greatly in the 
past few years. [ 43 ] To what extent has this diversification 
siphoned away funds from rubber replanting ? The answer can be found
if we scrutinise RISDA*s actual expenditure. However, RISDA’s
expenditure figures from original sources were not explicit as 
regards subsidies. We therefore have to estimate the actual amount
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of subsidy spent by RISDA on replanting. This is to distinguish 
between non-subsidy expenditures. In Table 6.13, we present a 
computation of the annual expenditure of RISDA from 1968 - 1986 
based on various sources in RISDA. Item 2 of Statistical Appendix 
Table 12 lumps all expenditure related to replanting grants, input 
subsidies and other smallholder development projects like 
infrastructure development, group processing centres, etc. However, 
it can be deduced that item 2 constitutes the bulk of the subsidy 
towards individual rubber replanting. Hence, this would exclude 
mini-estate development expenditures. Taking the criteria of the 
World Bank [ 44 ] that 50 per cent of the administrative 
expenditures of RISDA can be considered as replanting expenditures, 
we then add this figure to item 2 above. The result is Table 6.13 
which is an estimate of the total replanting expenditures of RISDA.
From Table 6.13, it can be seen that prior to 1974, replanting 
subsidy took up over 90 % of RISDA*s total expenditures. This 
figure has dropped greatly in the 1980s. For example, in 1986 it was 
only 46 %. This trend reinforces our observation that RISDA is now 
concentrating on other activities besides rubber replanting to 
improve the standard of living of smallholders.
Cess and Export Duty
There are at least 5 sources of funds for RISDA*s operations 
two of which are the export duty and cesses. In effect there are 
three types of taxes imposed upon rubber as follows
a) export tax - at rate of 22.125 cents per kilogramme
b) replanting cess - at rate of 4.5 cents per pound
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c) research cess - at rate of 3.85 cents per kilogramme
TABLE 6.13: Total Subsidy for Rubber Replanting, 1968-86, M$million




















Note: AD = Admin. & Development Cost
This tax is collected and spent by different agencies without 
any interference by the Treasury. However, it is believed that the
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burden of tax compared to the income of smallholders and estates is 
regressive. [ 45 ] In fact, tax discrimination was greater for the 
smallholders than the estates" because firstly, estates benefited 
more from research results than smallholders. [ 46 ] Secondly, 
estates were able to recoup all their replanting expenditures in one 
lump sum payment on producing proof of replanting whereas small­
holders only obtained advances of partial replanting expenditure in 
instalments over 7 years and the amount of subsidy receive will 
depend on the size of holding and type of crop replanted.
The various cesses which are imposed on exports of rubber 
are additions to the export duty. Based on the rates above, rubber 
replanting cess was imposed at M$99.20 per metric ton and research 
cess at M$38.50 per metric ton. All of these taxes were payable 
regardless of price until 1984. In this regard, the World Bank said 
that there were two problems with the rubber cess. Firstly, whether 
the net effect of replanting cess compared to the replanting grant 
ultimately represented a tax or a subsidy to the smallholders. 
Estimates made by the Bank suggested that the replanting grant 
represented a net tax, especially on the more productive rubber 
cultivators. [ 47 ] This meant that smallholders paid out more in 
cess payments than what they got in return from the replanting 
grant. Secondly, the accumulated funds constituted a large budgetary 
pool in one organisation, that is RISDA. The Bank believed that 
RISDA was badly managed and that it was inefficient, concerned with 
empire-building and hence has diverted RISDA from its prime mandate 
which is to offer technical and financial support to rubber small­
holders, especially in rubber replanting. [ 48 ] Although some of
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the observations of the World Bank are true, it has to be born in 
mind that RISDA*s operations are not solely motivated by economic 
considerations and hence could not be judged solely on economic 
criteria. In tackling major social issues facing the smallholders, 
RISDA has to make many non-economic decisions and take other 
measures which is in line with the government’s objective of 
eradicating poverty. For example, there are cases of smallholders 
without land title who have received replanting subsidies. Hence, 
RISDA has diversified its activities away from rubber replanting 
because it believes concentrating on rubber alone was inadequate to 
get smallholders out of poverty. [ 49 ] This stand is also in line 
with our earlier observation that if the government wanted to 
sustain rubber production in Malaysia, then rubber production will 
have to be highly subsidised.
Export Duty
On the issue of export duty, many people consider it as an 
extra burden on the smallholders. This situation, however, had been 
rectified by the government in enforcing the so-called threshold 
price at which rubber would be taxed. This occured in 1984 when the 
export duty was rationalised by the government and the threshold 
price is now M$1.80 / kg. By keeping the threshold price high, the 
government was effectively reducing the duty burden on rubber 
producers. According to a study commissioned by the Malaysian 
Government, at present market and threshold prices, the rubber 
export duty did not seem to represent a serious burden to the small­
holders. The duty of M$0.02125 / kg. is the equivalent of about
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1.5 % of current farm--gate price. ( See Table 6.14 below ). Under 
curren t rondi t ionn, Die removal of expoil duty on nibbar would not
lead to any .significant increases in production nor would there be 
much effect on poverty r<*dre;vrsn 1 . [ 50 J
TABLE 6.14: Derivation of 1983 Financial Farm Gate Price of Rubber
I tern Price ./ kg
MRELB Price, RSS 1 f.o.b. 
Less export dut y 
Research cess 
Replanting cess [1] 




Less Transport, field to factory 
Ex Farm Gate










Note [1]~ Estates are refunded replanting cess- hence its ex-factory 
price is M$2.02
Source: World Bank (1984), Table 5.13, p. 87
Summary
We have seen that replanting grants are mainly financed from
cess income and export duty. Although cess was the major contributor
to replanting grants in the 1960s, its contribution had declined
due mainly to the fall in rubber prices. Hence, RISDA had to rely
on direct government funding and on external loans to finance 
replanting and other activities.
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REGRESSION a n a l y s i s  o f  i m p a c t  o f  r e p l a n t i n g  g r a n t s
From our analysis so far we have found that
replanting is indeed crucial to the rubber economy of Malaysia. 
It is necessary now to find out the following:-
(a) whether there is a correlation between the increase in 
replanting grants and rate of replanting.
(b) whether replanting with high yielding clones has led to 
an increase in the productivity and yield levels of 
s m a l 1 h o l d e r s .
(c) whether income of smallholders have increased as a 
result of replanting.
However, due to limitations of time series 




iii) total production response
In the next chapter, we will be able to do more
extensive regression by using survey data of rubber smallholders. 
Hectare Response
First, we will investigate whether there is any 
correlation between rates of replanting and increases in 
replanting grants. Table 6.15 shows replanting grants and 
replanted hectares from 1952 until 1985 according to the
replanting schemes launched by the government. In 1952, about
7,084 acres were replanted when subsidies were first introduced.
In the second scheme a phonemenal increase was seen when more 
than 306,000 acreas were replanted. I Ills was a 4000 % Increase
over the previous scheme in which the annual rate of replanting 
was over 43,000 acres. Replanting grants had by this time only 
increased by 25%. In the third scheme, subsidies was raised by a 
further 20% and this led to an 82% increase in replanting. By the 
end of the third scheme, there was a definite pattern of
positive correlation between subsidy rate increase and hectares 
replanted. However, this trend changed in the fourth scheme. 
Although grants.increased by an additional 25%, replanted hectares 
.declined substantiablly. The same pattern recurred in 1978-80
when there was a 71% drop in the rate of replanting despite an
increase in grants. However the 1981 increase in grants was
accompanied by accelerated replanting.
TABLE 6*15i Replant Grants and Replanted Acreage in S/H* 1952^85
Scheme No. Year Replanting Grant ReplantingLevel
M$ / acre % Acres %
1 1952-52 400 - 7,084 -
2 1953-59 500 25 306,527 4227
3 1960-66 600 20 560,690 82.9
4 1967-70 750 25 209,209 -62.7
5 1971-77 900 20 363,584 73.8
6 1978-80 1200 33 105,716 -70.9
6 1981= 85 2200 83 341*848 223*4
Source: Calculated from Table 6.6 and Appendix Table 14.
In order to find out the actual trend, we shall employ
simple regression techniques using Ordinary Least Squares to find 
out the elasticity of hectares replanted with regard to subsidies. 
However, the time series data used is for 19 years from 1968 to 
1986. It is hypothesised that hectares replanted is a function of 
3 independent variables, namely replanting grants (REGRANT) 
(M$/ha.), the price of rubber (RUBBERP)(M$/kg) and total 
allocation for replanting of RISDA (TOTSUB) (M$ million). REGRANT 
and TOTSUB are in real terms after being deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index and RUBBERP is lagged for one year. The result of our 
analysis is produced in Table 6.16 below.









+ = significant at 5 X, * = significant at 10 X
Coefficients are in elasticities 














This simple model managed to explain about 40% of total 
variation in the dependent variable after considering the 
adjusted R2. All three independant variable are significant.
BEGRANI is significant at the 10 % significance level and have a 
positive sign as expected. This means that a 10 % increase in
replanting grants would lead to a 6 % increase in hectares
replanted. Hence, the policy of increasing replanting grants 
adopted by the government seems to have a positive effect. 
However, the other variable, RUBBERP although significant at the 5 
% significance level is negatively correlated with hectares 
replanted where a 10% increase in the price of rubber is expected 
to lead to a 7% decrease in acreage replanted. In the context of 
smallholding rubber, this result is not surprising. We have seen 
that most tappers who did not replant their rubber owned less than 
4 hectares. An increase in the price of rubber would be a
disincentive for smallholders to replant because they would prefer 
to reap the short term benefit of a price increase and hence will 
continue to tap their old trees because the opportunity cost of 
replanting would be very high for them. In fact, this is a problem 
for the government in its effort to encourage replanting. While 
an increase in the price of rubber would make the smallholders
better off in the short run, it is bad for the country in the 
long run if this were to prevent smallholders from replanting 
their old trees. However, this situation only applies if old 
trees are still producing latex.
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If trees do not produce any latex, a price increase would not have 
any effect on the smallholder because he has nothing to sell.
Another apparently strange result is the TOTSUB variable which is 
significant at the 5 X level but negatively correlated with 
hectares replanted. A 10 X increase in total allocation towards 
replanting in general tends to decrease hectares replanted by 4X. 
What this means is that either an increase in the total allocation 
for RISDA is not spent entirely on replanting or that some funds 
are diverted to other acitivities not directly related to 
replanting but for the welfare of smallholders. This is a 
feasible explanation in view of the current strategy of RISDA to 
adopt the multiple approach to assist smallholders. Notice that
the results obtained above is at variance with that at the farm
level as shown in the next chapter. What we can conclude from
this is that the trend at the national level and those at farm 
levels may not converge but rather give different results either 
because of a different data set or because of the realities of the 
situation.
Yield Response
The second regression we want to do is to find out the 
yield response of replanting grants. It ¥is hypothesised that
yield of smallholders is a function of 4 independent variables, 
namely REGRANT, TOTSUB, RUBBERP and total hectares replanted 
( REPHA ). The result of the regression is given in Table 6.17.
This model gives a better fit because it managed to 
explain about 53 X of total variation in the dependent variable
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after considering the adjusted R2. Although REGRANT is 
significant at the 5 % significance level, it it negatively 
correlated. A 10 % increase in REGRANT would lead to a 5 % fall 
in yield. Since in the first model REGRANT is positively 
correlated with hectares replanted, we would have thought that 
REGRANT would increase yield in this model.
TABLE 6^171 Regression Result of REGRANI on Y I E L D - (1968-86)














= significant at 1 %
+ = significant at 5 %
* = significant at 10 %
Coefficients are in elasticities
1 u l n l b l i e *  <iru in pwunthiisit* 
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However, the result does not show this. This means that although 
the rate of replanting is important and might influence yield to 
increase, it need not necessarily happen. This is an important
point to note. In this connection, it is relevant to quote the
findings of the Lower Trengganu Development Study ( 51 ) which
reports that while replanting has been successful in terms of
acreage replanted, there is no quantitative evidence that the 
programme has improved rubber production or income of 
smallholders. This is because of the following reasons:-
a) that smallholders undertook replanting in order to get and
use the subsidy for consumption purpose only.
b) the success rate of replanting is low because many young
rubber trees die before they reach maturity through a
variety of causes like fires, wild animals, etc.
c) trees were infected with diseases and hence affected their
productivity.
d) trees which were successfully replanted were left idle
because of labour shortage, and .
e) most smallholdings were poorly managed.
For example, in some areas of Trengganu, only about 50 % of rubber 
trees were tapped and up to 3096 of replanted rubber abandoned. 
Although there is no evidence that this condition is found among 




RUBBERP is positive and significant in explaning yield. 
A 10% increase in the price of rubber would lead to 5% increase 
in yield. This result is consistant with the result of the first 
model because a secular increase in price is an incentive for 
smallholders to produce more. In fact 'slaughter tapping ' is 
commonly practised during periods of high prices where 
smallholders try to extract the maximum yield from their trees 
even though it would spoil the trees in the long run. However, if 
trees were already old and due for replanting, then this practice 
is encouraged. Again TOTSUB variable although significant is 
negatively correlated with yield. The explanation given above may 
also apply in this case. REPHA is not meaningful at all in 
explaning yield.
Total Production Response
The third regression we want to estimate is the total 
production response. It is hypothesised that total production is 
a function of 4 variables, namely REGRANT, RUBBERP, REPHA, and 
yield per hectare (YIELDHA) ( kg /*ha). The result of the 
regression is given in Table 6.18.
This model managed to explain about 88 % of total
variation in the dependant variable after considering the 
adjusted R2. REGRANT is significant at 5 % significance level and 
is positive. A 10 % increase in REGRANT would lead to a 2 %
increase in total production. Although the increase is not big, 
it is nevertheless quite significant. Although there seems to be 
a contradiction between the result in the yield function, in the
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aggregate, REGRANT seems to have a positive effect of production. 
But the most significant variable as expected is YIELDHA which is 
significant at the 1 X significance level. A 10X increase in 
YIELDHA would lead to a 12 X increase in total production. 
RUBBERP is not significant while REPHA is quite significant at 5 
X. A 10 X increase in REPHA would lead to a 1 X increase in total 
production. This is of course an expected result and is a 
justification for replanting.
TABLE 6^181 Regression Result of REGRANJ on Total Production














= significant at 1 X
+ = significant at 5 X
Coefficients are in elasticities
I ' j lu l i i tUcs  qiu in puiuiithusls 
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Effect of Replanting on Income of Smallholders
Due to the limitation of data we are not able to regress 
the effect of replanting grants on income of smallholders. We 
will be able to do this in the next chapter. Here, we would like 
to produce some evidence from the RISDA Census which shows the 
effect of replanting on the income of both participants and non- 
participants.
TABLE 6_j.!9i Effect of Replanting on Income - 1977
Income/Cap. Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others TotalM $ 1_ _ _ _ ___%_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ %_ _ _ _ _ _ %_ _ _ _ _ _ X _ _ _ _ _ _ %
<20 P 14.7 9.5 13.8 13.2 13.1
N P_ _ _ _ _ 14i2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9 ^0_ _ _ _ 12^3_ _ _ _ _ 17^8__ 13^5
~20I 44~~P 4974 4171 4578 4871 4679
NP_ _ _ _ _ 53^2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 42_.2_ _ _ _ 53^.6_ _ _ _ _ 49 A __ 51^4
">45 P 3579 4974 4074 3877 4070
NP_ _ _ _ _ 32^6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 48 ^ 8 _ _ _ _ 34^1_ _ _ _ _ 3 3 A __ 3 S A
Total P 100 100 100 100~" 100~~
NP_ _ _ _ 100_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 100_ _ _ _ _ 100_ _ _ _ _ 100___ 100
Source : RISDA (1977), Table 4.25, p. 163
P = Participant: NP = Non-Participant
We noted that it was necessary for smallholders to 
replant in order to increase productivity and hence increase their 
income levels. To find out whether this is true, we will see 
R I S D A ’s data. For this purpose it is necessary for us to compare
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the per capita income distribution of participants with non ­
participants as shown in Table 6.19 which gives the following 
information :-
a) that slightly less participants (13.IX) were in the lowest
per capita income group category as compared with non ­
participants (13.5%).
b) that the middle per capita income category had more non­
participants (51.4%) than participants (46.9%).
c) that the highest per capita income category had higher
proportion of participants (40%) than non-participants
(35.1%).
The above pattern which shows that more participants
were located in the higher income category is true for all races. 
However, although income distribution of the two groups is in the 
expected direction, the differences are quite small and rather
less than expected. The question to pose is, why has replanting
had less impact on incomes of participants. According to RISDA, 
household size and size of holding are directly related to levels 
of living among smallholders. Although the size of smallholding
is more important in determining poverty, both factors tend to 
reinforce each other and hence produced poverty among the 
smallholders. Table 6.20 shows to what extent household size and
size of holding had an impact on per capita income of 




Income Cat. Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Average
lM$/mtl IHH1 ILS1 (HH) (.LS) ..1HH1 _.1LS1 __IHH1 .(.LS) 1HH1 1LS1 &
< 20 8.8 1.90 12.3 2.68 10.6 2.50 8.6 2.59 9.7 2.11
20 - 44 6.1 2.01 8.4 3.22 7.9 2.55 6.4 2.73 6.8 2.38
>45 3.8 2.14 4.9 3.70 4.8 3.55 3.7 3.05 4.2 2.80
A verage__ __ 3^7_ _ 2^04 _ _ 7 A _ 3j_40__ _ _ 7^0._ 2^95. __ 5^8 _ 2a 81_ _ _ 6 A _ _ 2^51
Source: RISDA (1983) Table 4.27, 4.29, pp 162 & 168
Note: HH = Household Size: LS = Land holding Size (in hectares)
Table 6.20 shows average household size of participants 
and holding size according to income category. It can be seen that 
poor participants, earning less than MS20.00 per month had an 
average household size of 9.7 members which is more than twice the 
average size of non-poor participants earning more than M$45.00 
per month which constitute only 4.2 members. This means that 
poorer participants have bigger household size than relatively 
better-off participants. Also the poor had the smallest average 
holding size of 2.1 hectares compared to 2.4 hectares for medium 
income category and 2.8 hectares for the highest income category.
From Table 6.20 it is clear that both holding size and 
household size are positively related to income differentials that 
exist among participant households. Poor participants have the 
largest household size but smallest holdings size while non-poor 
participants have the smallest household size and largest
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holding while medium income participants are in between. Is is
also clear that household size differentiation is more important 
than holding size differentiation in explaining poverty among 
smallholders.
Impact_of_Replanting_on_Prgductivity
In theory, replanting can make a substantial impact on 
productivity levels and hence income. According to Barlow, 
u ns e l e c t e d  seedlings and mixed stands yielded as little as 25% of 
high yielding varieties. Proof of the positive impact of 
replanting on productivity, as we have seen, can be found by
examining the yields of estates which have fully replanted. In 
general, smallholdings have lower average yields than estates. 
For example, smallhodings of less than 4.5 acres produced about 
948 kg. per mature hectare compared to 1,327 kg. per mature 
hectare of estate holding in 1973. This difference was mainly due
to the smaller proportion of high yielding material found in
smallholdings (75%) compared to estate (95%). (52).
Effect_of.Productivity_gn_Income
Productivity has an effect on income in two ways. 
Firstly, an increase in yield will also bring about higher returns 
per unit area. Secondly, an increase in yield will lead to a 
decline in costs of collection and tapping per unit area. For 
example, Barlow (1987, p. 271) estimated that for farms with 1.2 
to 2.4 ha. of planted rubber, the family return at the price
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of M$1.20 per kg. for RSS 1 rose dramatically from $280 per ha. to 
M$l,543 if yields obtainable are over 1893 kg. per ha. In 
addition, total costs also dropped from 90.9 cents per kg. per ha. 
for the low yields farm to 43.9 cents for the high yield farm.
Effect_of_Replanting_on_Income
According to RISDA, there is a weak but positive 
correlation between non-participation rate in replanting and the 
incidence-«of poverty. It also found that the failure of 
smallholders to participate in replanting may be due to poverty. 
However, in many cases even the poor have participatd in 
replanting. Smallholder participation in replanting does have an 
impact on their income especially because poor participants were 
much poorer to begin with. But a significant finding is that, 
although participation in replanting have provided benefits, it 
has not been sufficient to uplift smallholders above poverty 
l ev el s .
7.0 SymARY_AND_C0NCLUSI0N
The objective of undertaking the regression analysis 
above is mainly to find out whether REGRANT is important as a 
factor in influencing hectares replanted, yield and total 
production. It is found that REGRANT is indeed significant in all 
three models but only positive in the hectares equation and total 
production equations and negative in the yield equation. This 
result is however at variance with those of the next chapter. We 




From the above analysis, we have seen that the rubber 
economy is the mainstay of the Malaysian economy. In order fo 
sustain its lead as the w o r l d ’s largest producer of natural 
rubber, the government, since 1952 have introduced replanting 
grants in order to encourage smallholders to replant their old 
rubber trees. We analysed that in order to sustain high yields, 
it is necessary for smallholders to replant their trees with high 
yielding — clones. The system of replanting grants have ensured 
that replanting is undertaken at regular intervals. We also 
examined the sources of funds that goes towards this subsidy, 
namely cess collections and export duty. Touching on the impact 
of subsidies, the regression analysis shows that increase in 
subsidy rate does correlate with increases in hectarage replanted. 
This finding therefore justifies government raising the subsidy 
rate. The effect of an increase in the price of rubber had a 
negative correlation with replanting because smallholders 
preferred to earn present income rather than future income through 
replanting. We also used the findings of other studies to find 
out the effect of subsidies on production and income. It was 
found that the effect on income was relatively small and 
inadequate to lift smallholders above poverty levels. On 
production effects, it was found that output does increase 
substantially after replanting was undertaken. As to who benefit 
from this subsidy, it is established that smallholder does indeed 




1. For an account of the early history of rubber smallholders in 
Malaysia, see the following work
J. H. Drabble ( 1973 ), Rubber in Malaya : 1876 - 1922, The Genesis 
of the Industry. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur; J. H. 
Drabble, " Peasant Smallholders in the Malayan Economy : An 
Historical Study With Special Reference to the Rubber Industry ", in 
J. C. Jackson and M. Rudner ( eds ), ( 1980 ), Issues in Malaysian
Development, Heinemann Educational Books; See also T. R. McHale, " 
Rubber Smallholdings in Malaya; Their Changing Nature, Role and 
Prospects", Malayan Economic Review. Vol. 10, 1965, pp. 36 - 37 for 
the reasons why smallholders find rubber cultivation convenient.
2. P. T. Bauer ( 1948 ), The Rubber Industry : A Study in 
Competition and Monopoly. Longmans, London; Lira Teck Ghee ( 1977 ), 
Peasants and their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya. 1874 - 
1941. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur; S.A. Baharuddin
( 1986 ) From British to Bumiputra Rule. Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore and other economic historians have amply 
documented the colonial bias against rubber smallholders.
3. T.R. McHale, ibid. p. 46 notes that political independence for 
Malaya in 1957 shifted government goals from development per se 
toward development of Malayan interest which is manifested in direct 
intervention in smallholder sector subsidisation policies and this 
is justified on social and political grounds.
4. See Statistical Appendix Tables 17 8c 18
5. The citation for the three reports are as follows 
Federation of Malaya, Interim Report of the Rubber Smallholdings 
Enquiry Committee, in Federation of Malaya, Minutes and Council 
Papers of the Federal Legislative Council ( Third Session ),
February 1950 - January 1951 quoted in Lee Hock Lock ( 1978 ),
Public Policies and Economic Diversification in West Malaysia . 1950 
- 1970. University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, p. 196; Federation 
of Malaya ( 1954 ), Report of the Mission of Enquiry into the Rubber 
Industry of Malaya. Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur; International 
Bank for Reconstruction 8c Development ( 1955 ), The Economic 
Development of Malaya. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 2nd 
Printing, 1960, pp. 47-75.
6. The proceeds from this tax were earmarked solely for rubber 
replanting. The share of the smallholders was paid into a fund 
called Fund B while for estates it was called Fund A. From Fund B, 
grants were made to smallholders who wanted to replant at M$400 per 
acre. On the other hand, estates were allowed refunds of their 
replanting expenditure on providing proof of replanting to the 
authorities.
7. Among the important findings of the Mission of Enquiry into the 
Rubber Industry of Malaya ( more commonly known as the Mudie 
Mission )
a) More than 50 % of estate and smallholding areas were under
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ordinary seedlings and over 30 years old
b) 64 % of total planted acreage for estates and 90 % of
smallholdings were under low yielding trees
c) Proportion of immature rubber trees to total planted area was 
only 11 * in 1953 for estate sector
d) If there were no replanting, by 1973 there would be net loss of
140,000 tons in production
e) that natural rubber could not compete with synthetic rubber 
unless manage to reduce costs
8. Lee Hock Lock ( 1978 ), op. cit., p. 202
9. Ministry of Primary Industries ( 1981 ), Strategies and
Programmes-for Implementing a Dynamic Production Policy for 
Malaysian Natural Rubber. 8 July, ( in Malaysian ), mimeo. It was 
formulated with the following objectives :-
a) to accelerate the level of replanting
b) to use high yielding clones during replanting
c) to encourage good agricultural practices among smallholders
d) to encourage widespread use of the stimulant etherel among 
smallholders
10. Reasons for the low productivity of smallholders vis-a-vis the 
estates
a) significant proportion of smallholder acreage have not been 
replanted ( for example, 1980 - 313,725 ha. )
b) replanted areas not getting satisfactory yields because of the 
use of low yielding cultivars during the replanting stage
c) poor agronomic practices among the smallholders.
11. Malaysian Rubber Research & Development Board ( 1983 ), The 
Malaysian Natural Rubber Industry, 1983 - 2000 : Report of the Task 
force of Experts . Kuala Lumpur.
12. Ministry of Agriculture ( 1984 ), National Agriculture Policy.
12 January. The NAP was formulated to ensure a balanced and 
sustained growth rate in the agricultural sector vis-a-vis the other 
sectors of the economy. It set out the guidelines for agricultural 
development up to the year 2000. The NAP also indicated that the 
main thrust regarding rubber will be to expand production without 
appreciably increasing the number of hectares planted through the 
application of technical and research innovations. See pp. 10-11.
13. Ministry of Land and Regional Development ( 1985 ), The Future
of Smallholders* Rubber Production. ( in Malaysian ), mimeo
14. Ministry of Land and Regional Development ( 1985 ), ibid. Among
the recommendations of the policy paper include the following :-
i) that smallholders should be free to decide which crop they would 
like to cultivate
ii) that the government should reconsider the output target and 
total area that should be devoted to rubber based on the practical 
realities of market prices and rates of return
iii) that Malaysia should determine a ” core ” in the economy which 
will continue to produce rubber based on agro-climatic conditions
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iv) that if the government wants to maintain a national rubber 
output, rubber will then have to be a highly subsidised crop like 
padi
v) that the only way to increase rubber productivity would be to 
cultivate it on a collective or group basis on the lines of 
plantation
vi) that rubber land use should be intensified so as to gain maximum 
benefit
vii) that agro-based industries based on rubber should be 
established
15. Many studies discovered that rates of returns on rubber 
investment is very low compared to oil palm. For example see Robert 
B. Campbell, et. al. ( 1985 ), Study on the Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Smallholder Agriculture in Malaysia. Development 
Alternatives, Washington D.C., Appendix 1 calculated that the 
financial rates of return for RISDA mini-estates range from only 5-8 
per cent while for oil palm it was between 20-25 per cent. The 
analysis suggests that the rate of return on mini-estate rubber is 
likely to be below the opportunity cost of capital even under the 
most optimistic price and yield assumptions. This, however, does not 
suggest that the development of rubber should stop because there 
will continue to be positive social returns in many areas where crop 
conversion is either not feasible or desirable. But the analysis 
does suggest that new commercial investment in rubber is unlikely to 
occur unless there is a positive outlook in the future. To have an 
idea of declining output and rubber estate acreage versus 
smallholders performance see the Table below
Year Estate Smallholder
J__
Ha % Prod % Yield Ha. % Prod % Yield1930 308 61 - - - 197 39 - - -1950 793 53 - - - 700 47 - - -1960 889 45 438 56 758 1,076 55 339 44 4361965 789 39 515 56 952 1,256 61 409 44 5901970 677 33 631 50 1,189 1,382 67 638 50 7521975 583 29 592 41 1,272 1,408 71 867 59 9621980 511 26 595 39 1,428 1,494 75 935 61 9641983 469 24 565 36 1,485 1,527 77 997 64 1,031
Note: Ha = *000 ha ; Prod = ’000 tons; Yield = kg./ha. All figures 
refer to to the whole of Malaysia except 1930, 1950 & 1960 
Source: C. Findlay, J. Western & S. Chamala ( eds ) ( 1985 ), 
Smallholder Rubber Production and Policies. Australian Centre for 
Agricultural Research,pp. 73 & 96
16. Under rubber replanting regulations, smallholders are eligible 
to get replanting assistance to replant rubber or 18 other approved 
crops like oil palm, cocoa, fruits, etc. But the rate given for 
replanting rubber is higher compared to other crops. But this 
assistance is only given once whereas for rubber it is given on a 
continuous basis for every replanting cycle of 25 - 30 years. It is 
mainly for this reason that most smallholders still prefer to plant 
rubber to other crops. For example, between 1953-83, out of 484,744 
smallholders who applied for first and second round replanting
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involving 1.1 million hectares, 81 per cent applied to replant with 
rubber while only 6 per cent applied to replant with oil palm and 13 
per cent with other crops. See Robert B. Campbell ( 1986 ), et.al., 
ibid. Annex 6.
17. S/H Hectarage Replanted with Rubber & Other Crops - (1975-82)
Year Rubber % Ot. Crops % Total Ha. % All Crops
1975 20,709 62.4 12,470 37.6 33,179 100
1976 14,250 72.2 5,485 27.8 19,735 100
1977 12,789 70.2 5,419 29.8 18,208 100
1978 13,255 69.0 5,943 31.0 19,198 100
1979 14,186 63.3 8,205 36.7 22,391 100
1980 15,300 66.6 7,685 33.4 22,985 100
1981 22,624 76.8 6,827 23.2 29,451 100
1982 23.699 76.0 7.484 24.0 31.183 100
Source: C. Findlay, J. Western, S. Chamala ( eds ) ( 1985), ibid. 
p. 87
18. i) RISDA ( 1982 ), Interim Report of Rubber Smallholders 
Census, Peninsular Malaysia, 1977, November ( in Malaysian )
ii) RISDA ( 1983 ), Laporan Akhir: Banci Pekebun Kecil Getah 
Semenan.iong Malaysia. 1977: Analisa Profail Sosio-Ekonomi Kemiskinan 
and Penyertaan Dalam Rancangan RISDA, RISDA & Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, Ogos 1983.
19. RISDA ( 1983 ), ibid, p. 1
20. A. Ghafar Wahab, ( 1985 ), in C. Findlay, et. al., ibid, p. 97 
mentioned the following problems facing smallholders
a) remote and scattered nature of holdings
b) small and uneconomic size of holdings
c) lack of infrastructure facilities
d) low yields and income coupled with uncertain and unstable prices
e) low degree of replanting
f) low level of education and training
g) limited scope of on-farm activities and lack of employment 
opportunities
h) lack of marketing system for inputs and outputs
i) increasing population pressure on land and other resources 
j) lack of and backward nature of smallholder equipments
21. RISDA ( 1983 ), ibid.
22. RISDA ( 1980 ), Efforts to Accelerate Rubber Replanting in
Kedah. Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, in Malaysian, mimeo
23. Ozay Mehmet ( 1986 ), Development in Malaysia: Poverty, Wealth
and Trusteeship, Croom Helm, London, pp. 54 - 56.
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24. Poverty Households in Plantation Agriculture ( *000 ) 
Sector_______1970______________1980_______________1983
Poverty h/h % Poverty h/h % Poverty h/h %
Agriculture 582.4 73.6 443.7 66.7 497.6 69.3
Rubber S/H 226.4 28.6 175.9 26.4 247.9 34.5
Oil Palm 2.0 0.3 1.9 0.2 1.5 0.2
Coconut S/H 16.9 2.1 12.8 1.9 10.1 1.4
Estate Wkr 59.4 7.5 39.5 5.9 57.7 8.1
Plantation 304.7 38.5 230.1 34.4 317.2 44.2
Non-Agric. 209.4 26.4 222.4 33.3 220.0 30.7
Total 791.8 100.0 666.1 100.0 717.6 100.0
Source: Ozay Mehmet ( 1986 ), Development in Malaysia: Poverty. 
Wealth and Trusteeship. Croom Helm, London, Table 2.3, p. 20
25. Ozay Mehmet ( 1986 ), ibid. p. 30. And according to Robert
B. Campbell, et. al. ( 1985 ), op. cit., p. 69 and Table 4.1 that a 
7.5 ha. rubber smallholding could probably generate sufficient gross 
income to give a smallholder family of 5.4 persons a monthly income 
above the poverty income of M$367.50 at a rubber farm gate price of 
M$l.60/kg. and a per ha. yield of 1525 kg.
26. See Tan Siew Hoey (1986 ), M Padi Land Reform in Perspective ” 
Paper presented at Workshop on Usage and Ownership of Padi Land. 27 
February, Malaysian Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies, Kuala Lumpur.
27. For a comprehensive account of rubber replanting and the 
history ofi rubber replanting programmes in Malaysia from 1950s to 
1970s, see the following work:-
Gayl D. Ness ( 1967 ), Bureacracy and Rural Development in Malaysia. 
University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles; A. Halim 
Ismail ( 1970 ), Some Economic Aspects of Peasant Agriculture in 
Malaya. Ph. D. thesis, University of Oxford; C. T. Edwards 
( 1970 ), Public Finances in Malaysia and Singapore. Australian 
National University, Canberra; P. Radhakrishnan ( 1974 ), Role of 
Rubber in West Malaysian Economy. Ph. D. thesis, Stanford 
University; M. Rudner ( 1976 ), ” Malayan Rubber Policy : 
Development and Anti - Development During the 1950s ”, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies. Vol. 7; C. Barlow ( 1978 ), The Natural 
Rubber Industry.Its Development. Technology & Economy in Malaysia. 
Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur; Lee Hock Lock ( 1978 ), 
ibid; Mark Thomas ( 1982 ), Appraisal of Rubber Replanting in 
Malaysia, SPAS Development Seminar, Working Paper 451; Tan Tat Wai 
( 1982 ), Income Distribution and Determination in West Malaysia. 
Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur; C. Bailey ( 1983 ), The 
Sociology of Production in a Rural Malay Society. Oxford University 
Press, Kuala Lumpur; Ani Arope, et.al.( 1983 ), Rubber Owners* 
Manual: Economics and Management in Production and Marketing. Rubber 
Research Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.
In this chapter, we are mainly concerned with replanting by 
smallholders. Replanting in estate sector, however, is almost 
complete. See Table below and Appendix Table 13 for yearly figures. 
Estates rely on commercial banks and other financial institutions 
plus replanting grants for financing replanting expenditure whereas 
most smallholders only rely on government grant. But unlike small­
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holders, estates receive refunds of their replanting expenditure on 
proof of production quaterly. See Lee Hock Lock ( 1978 ) op. cit. 
















Source: S. Tugiman, et. al, M Approaches to Agricultural Extension 
and Development in the Rubber Smallholding Sector in Malaysia, ** 
Table 2, p. 87 in C. Findlay, et. al. ( 1985 ), op. cit.
28. C. Barlow ( 1978 ), op. cit. and Mudie Report ( 1954 ), o p .  cit 
According to R.B. Campbell, et. al. ( 1985 ), op. cit.. p. 68 by 
encouraging smallholders to replant and thus increasing yields at 
rates which might balance the declining estate production will 
require replanting 40,485 ha. per year ( which is 3 % each year for 
average life of 33 years ).
29. Given the fact that current rubber smallholding size averages 
about 2.4 ha. which is much below the recommended size of 7.5 ha., 
considerable consolidation of holdings is required in order to 
ensure viability of this sector. Such consolidation could be 
expected to have important financial and social implications.
Related to this, the mini-estate concept involves the the clearing 
of contiguous parcels of smallholders land with a minimum size of 
100 acres. RISDA takes over temporary ownership of the land and 
hires contractors to do the replanting work and supervises the whole 
operation until it reaches maturity. Normally, mini-estates give 
better results and cost lower compared to individual replanting due 
to economies of scale and better management. See RISDA ( 1979 ),
Mini - Estate Manual. Kuala Lumpur for full details of operation. As 
of June 1984, 273 mini-estates have been opened covering 31,580 ha. 
See R. B. Campbell ( 1985 ), op. cit.. Annex 6, Table 6.2. However, 
there are some quarters who are critical of the mini-estate concept 
of development. According to C. Barlow and S. Jayasuriya ( 1984 ),
” Problems of Investment for Technological Advance, M Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. Vol. 35 ( 1 ), mini-estates or government- 
sponsored management schemes tend to stifle individual initiative 
and entrepreneurship and may produce the " fossilisation ” of 
farmers* attitude.
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30. RRIM 600 series is a Class 1 clone. Class 1 clone refers to 
planting material suitable for large-scale planting. Hence, the 
performance of the clones are usually confirmed by records from . 
commercial areas. RRIM 600 series is also a widely recommended clone 
extensively used by smallholders.
31. C. Bailey ( 1983 ), ibid.. p. 141.
32. Ani Arope ( 1982 ), ” Increasing Agricultural Productivity 
Through Technology Transfer ”, Agricultural Institute of Malaysia 
Seminar. The State of Malaysian Agriculture - A Critical Review,
12 - 14 August, p. 33.
33. Ani Arope (1982 ), ibid. p. 7.
34. World Bank ( 1984 ), op. cit.. agrees that the replanting 
subsidy does in fact reach the smallholders for whom the subsidy is 
meant unlike the case of most subsidies where the benefit goes to 
the rich and big farmers.
35. C. Barlow 8c S. Jayasuriya ( 1984 ), ” Problems of Investment 
for Technological Advance: The Case of Indonesian Rubber 
Smallholders ”, Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 35 ( 1  ).
36. RISDA ( 1986 ), RISDA*s Extension Programme To Develop the 
Smallholder Sector. ( in Malaysian ), p. 67.
37. Australian Agricultural Consulting and Management Co. Pty. Ltd
( 1981 ), Lower Trengganu Development Study. Australian Development 
Assistance Bureau, Government of Malaysia and State Government of 
Trengganu, p. 159. In addition to government grants and cess 
payments, RISDA also derives its funds from other sources as 
stipulated in Section 2, Rubber Industry ( Replanting ). Fund 1952 
namely loans, proceeds from investment and monies derived from other 
sources. See Table 6.11 in the text.
38. RISDA ( undated ), Replanting in the Context of Development of
Smallholders. ( in Malaysian )
39. A. Halim ( 1970 ), Some Economic Aspects of Peasant Agriculture
in Malaya. Ph. D. Thesis, University of Oxford, pp. 215-222
40. RISDA ( 1980 ), Rational Basis in Calculating Increase in 
Replanting Grant Rate, in Malaysian, mimeo and RISDA ( 1980 ), 
Increase in Replanting Grant Rate, in Malaysian, mimeo, 20 
November.
41. Australian Agricultural Consulting and Management Co. Pty. Ltd. 
(1981), ibid. p. 158.
42. See New Straits Times. 13 November 1986 which captioned ” RISDA 
Hit By Fall In Cess Tax ”.
43. See Statistical Appendix on RISDA*s programmes.
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44. World Bank ( 1984 ), op. cit. Vol. 3, Annex 4, para 15, p. 14.
45. Many writers have discussed this issue of regressiveness of 
taxes against rubber smallholders. • See the following work: C. T. 
Edwards ( 1970 ), op. cit., p. 244; L. S. Ching & T.M. Tay
( 1977 ), " A  Note on the Restructured Export Duty on Rubber, 
Malaysia Rubber Review. Vol. L ( 2/3) Dec., pp. 27-28; Sundaram, 
J.K. & Shari, I. ( 1981 ), H Income Distribution and the Role of the 
State in Peninsula Malaysia: A Review ", in H. Osman-Rani, Jomo, 
K.S. & I. Shari ( eds ), Development in the Eighties. Jurnal Ekonomi 
Malaysia, No. 3/4, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, p. 242 which 
estimated that the average rubberysmallholder was actually paying a 
tax rate on his rubber income equal to the rate paid by households 
subject to an income tax with income of M$30,000 a year. The World 
Bank also says that measured as a proportion of income from rubber 
cultivation, export taxes are seen to reduce returns by almost 40 % 
World Bank ( 1984 ), op. cit.. Vol. 1, para 5.16, p. 72.
46. See the following works which discuss about the question of 
biasness of research against smallholders, C. Barlow & 0. S. Peries 
( 1977 ), M On Some Biases in the Generation of Technologies by 
Rubber Research Instituttes, w Journal of Rubber Research Institute 
of Sri Lanka. Vol. 54; C. Barlow & S. Jayasuriya ( 1984 ), " Bias 
Towards the Large Farm Sub-Sector in Agriculture Research: The Case 
of Malaysian Rubber, H Research and Development in Agriculture. Vol. 
1 (3); Y. L. Lee & J. W. Longworth ( 1985 ), " Bias in Research: The 
Case of Rubber Growing in Malaysia, ” Journal of Agriculture 
Economics. Vol. 36 (1). ^
47. World Bank ( 1984 ), op. cit.. Vol. 2, pp. 87 - 89.
48. We believe that the World Bank was influenced by rumours of 
allegations of corruption in RISDA in 1983. On allegations that 
RISDA had misappropriated M$130.00 million cess funds, in part to 
construct a luxury headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, see New Sunday 
Times. 28 August, 1983. In addition, an economist, Professor Mokhtar 
Tamin of the University of Malaya said in an interview with Business 
Times. 10 October, 1983 as follows :
" If the clones that are given to the farmers are good
clones it will appear in its output later on. But with a lot of 
RISDA*s replanting, the output has been very miserable. So what has
been happening ? The question is, have the clones that had to
be planted been those good clones ? The clones cost money and 
recommended clones are difficult to get and more expensive. All 
the cases of corruption now coming up against RISDA officers 
seem to validate my suspicion. M
49. In fact the issue of whether RISDA should diversify to other 
activities besides rubber have long been debated within RISDA and 
has been a contentious issue ever since. It culminated with the 
resignation of the former Director-General of RISDA who believed 
that RISDA should diversify. For example the following quotation has 
been credited with this person as quoted in Malaysian Business. 
November, 1977,
” Behind every tree there is a man. Behind the man there
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is a family. It is this family that forms the community - the 
backbone of Malaysia's economy. It is towards this community that 
RISDA's development strategy is directed ".
However, today it is accepted policy that RISDA be diversified*
50. See Robert B. Campbell, et. al. ( 1985 ). Study on the 
Restructuring and Modernization of Smallholder Agriculture in 
Malaysia. Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington D. C., Annex 2 
which mentioned that in 1984 the duty rates for rubber was derived 
from a system comprising threshold prices, gazetted prices and ad 
valorem prices. According to the report, the government is actively 
considering the abolition of rubber export duties and studies are 
on-going to assess the likely effect on prices received by 
smallholders.
51. Australian Agricultural Consulting and Management Co. Pty. Ltd 
( 1981 ), op. cit.. p. 159.
52. C. Barlow ( 1978 ), ibid. Table 6.1, p. 195.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE - 
EVIDENCE FROM RUBBER SECTOR : A MICRO PERSPECTIVE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 discussed and analysed rubber replanting activities 
of the smallholders using national data. In this chapter, we will 
use primary data from a survey conducted among rubber smallholders 
in Malaysia to analyse the allocative and redistributive effects of 
replanting subsidies on smallholders.
Objective of Chapter
The discussion of this chapter will be similar in approach to 
the previous one. The purpose is to supplement the findings of 
Chapter 6. Here we will cover the following aspects
a) Socio-economic profile of rubber smallholders in Perak
b) Analysis of rubber replanting subsidies in Perak
c) Analysis of farmers' attitude to replanting grants in Perak
d) Regression analysis of effect of replanting grants
e) Findings and conclusion
2.0 CHOICE OF AREA STUDIED
For the survey, we decided to select the rubber belt of the
state of Perak which is located in the north-western part of
Peninsular Malaysia. Since Perak is a big state, we decided to 
undertake a stratified random sample covering about 87 smallholders
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all over the rubber growing areas of Perak. Among the reasons why we 
chose Perak as the study area were as follows
a) It is the second most important rubber producing area in 
Malaysia,
b) It was convenient for the author to conduct the study in this 
area because it also covered Krian where the survey on padi fanners 
was carried out, and
c) the author is a native of the state and is familiar with it and 
this facilitated the conduct of the survey.
The location map of Perak vis a vis the whole Malaysian 
peninsular and areas where rubber smallholders were interviewed 
during the survey are marked in the map given below. Table 7.1 shows 
the distribution of respondents and the number of respondents
1
interviewed per location selected.
TABLE 7.1: Distribution of Respondents in Sample Survey of Rubber
Smallholders In Perak








FIG. 7.1 The Rubber Belt of Perak
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A stratified random sample method was used to choose 87 
respondents throughout the whole of Perak made up of rubber 
smallholders. ( see Upton for a more detailed description of this 
method ) Although the sample is thinly spread out, it is thought 
that this would not lead to biases in the responses of the 
respondents because of the homogeneity of the areas where 
smallholders live and worked and also the homogeneous features of 
the smallholders, as reflected for example in their low level of 
income, small size of landholdings, and all being racially Malays.
The local RISDA office assisted in the identification of 
villages and provided various facilities to the author in the course 
of the survey such as transportation, field assistants, office 
space, accommodation, etc. Although 100 respondents were initially 
chosen, due to time and resource constraint, only 87 were chosen to 
be interviewed. The author personally conducted the oral interviews 
from 12 August until 4 September 1986 using a standard questionnaire 
which was specially designed for the sample survey. ( see Appendix 
for sample of questionnaire ) The questionnaire is basically similar 
to the one used in the padi survey except for modifications to cater
t
for the peculiarities of the rubber sector. The following 
information was extracted from the questionnaire
a) socio-economic status of smallholders
b) details of inputs in rubber cultivation
c) details of output in rubber cultivation
d) attitudes of farmers towards replanting grunts
e) marketing behaviour of smallholders
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3.0 SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS IN PERAK
The survey was able to generate a wealth of information on the 
socio-economic conditions of smallholders in Perak. In this section, 
the basic features of rubber smallholders in Perak will be outlined. 
Relevant statistics on this is detailed out in the Statistical 
Appendix. Where available, data in the macro chapter will be 
compared with that of the survey data.
Appendix Table 1 shows that more than 89 % of smallholders were 
above 45 years while about 40 % were above 60 years old. The average 
age of smallholders was about 56 years. In contrast to the RISDA 
data, the smallholder population in Perak is therefore much older. 
For example, RISDA census shows that only 21 % of smallholders were 
above 60 years old. Appendix Table 2 shows that the majority of 
smallholders were literate and only about 9 % did not attend any 
form of schooling. Appendix Table 3 shows that household size is 
relatively small, averaging about 6.1 members. Appendix Table 4 
shows that mixed farming mode was common with about 63 % of 
smallholders cultivating rubber as a main job. Apendix Table 5 shows 
that other forms of economic activities pursued by smallholders were 
varied and comprise mainly of other agriculture, padi cultivation 
and orchards. Appendix Table 6 shows that the average number of 
working experience of smallholders was about 29 years. This 
reinforced the evidence that smallholders were generally older. 
Appendix Table 7 shows that more than 80 % of smallholders belonged 
to members of Smallholders Development Centres. Appendix Table 8 
shows that the percentage of smallholders who were owner-operators 
were larger in Perak than the national average ( 86 % compared with
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74 % ) while smallholders who were tenants were less at 14 % 
compared with 24 % at the national level. Appendix Tables 9 and 10 
shows that about 75 % of rubber holdings in Perak have been 
replanted and only about 25 * have yet to be replanted. The majority 
of holdings have been replanted after 1970s as compared with after 
1960s for the national level. However, most replanted holdings were 
less than 2.0 ha. which covered 77 % of areas and about 90 % of 
cases. Appendix Table 11 shows that smallholders tend to utilise 
family labour more frequently than hired labour for most of the 
replanting job and rubber cultivation in general.
From this brief account the following things should be noted. 
Rubber holdings were very small with labour being relatively old and 
most smallholders have relatively long working experience. The 
educational level was low although.basic^literacy was evident.
Family labour is predominant. Many smallholders practice mixed 
farming types. Owner-operation was the dominant type of tenure 
status. Most holdings have been replanted at least once but their 
size was very small. The purpose of this section has been to show 
that on the basis of the above features which are not very 
favourable to the smallholders as far as the potential of the area 
is concerned, the positive effect of subsidies as expected would not 
materialise because the institutional and structural basis of the 
area and smallholders concerned is not conducive. For example the 
problem of aged labour force, small size of holdings and low level 
of litreracy will affect the degree of effectiveness of subsidies. 
Hence, the question is not whether to give subsidies or not but 
whether the smallholders are able to utilise the subsidies
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effectively. This is of course assuming the subsidies are given on 
allocative grounds. However, if subsidies are given on 
redistributive grounds, there might be a case. Despite this 
observation, in the following sections, we shall analyse the 
allocative and redistributive effect of subsidies. We shall also 
have the opportunity to see whether or not socio-economic factors 
play a part in determining the effectiveness of subsidy policies.
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4.0 EFFECT OF REPLANTING GRANTS ON SMALLHOLDERS 
Introduction
In this section, based on the field survey, we shall discuss 
and analyse the following
a) the use of resource inputs in rubber cultivation and replanting, 
and
b) productivity, profitability and income from rubber cultivation 
and replanting
Use of Resource Inputs in Rubber Cultivation and Replanting
Rubber, unlike rice is not an annual but a perennial crop. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6 a  rubber tree has an economic life span of 
between 25 to 30 years. After 30 years, it is not economic to 
exploit it any further because yield would be diminishing or even 
nil. Hence, after every 30 years the tree must be replanted. We have 
established in Chapter 6 the estimated costs for replanting a 
typical average smallholding of size of less than 2.0 hectares. 
Statistical Appendix Table 12 shows the typical farm budget of a 
rubber smallholder practising mixed farming while Statistical 
Appendix Table 13 shows the revenue and cost profile and projected 
returns for a typical smallholder.
Production. Yield. Income and Profitability of Rubber.
In determining the yield profile and total output of the 
smallholders in the survey area,it is important to consider various 
factors which will have an effect on yield per unit area. Among them 
would include the following
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a) age of replanted trees
b) type of clone used
c) management and upkeeping of trees, e.g. fertiliser, weeding, etc
d) density of planting
e) soil condition
f) number of tapping days per month
g) others







From Table 7.4 it can be seen that about 52 % of total rubber 
holdings in the survey area were replanted in the 1970s. It has been 
established in Chapter 6 that rubber trees yield the maximum output 
at ages between 10 - 20 years of age. This would mean that trees 
replanted in the 1970s would yield the maximum output in the survey 
area, assuming that the holdings are well maintained. In addition, 
about 20 X of lend holdings have been replanted in the 1980s. 
However, most of the acreage replanted in 1980s are still immature.
It is also of interest to note that about 27 X of smallholders have 
trees which are over 20 years old and hence due for a second round 
of replanting. Hence, the time period when trees are replanted is
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important because this, among other things, will determine the 
productivity of rubber trees. Generally, trees which were planted in 
the 1970s tend to produce greater yields while trees planted in the 
1950s and 1960s have relatively lower yields. On the other hand, 
trees which were newly replanted especially in the 1980s would begin 
to produce latex only in the late 1980s. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 give 
further details on length of replanting and frequency of replanting.
TABLE 7.5: Length of Time Replanted Trees Have Been Tapped
Years Tapped Ha. %
0 35.0 19.6
1 - 5 63.6 35.7
6 - 1 0 41.6 23.3
11 - 15 23.9 13.4
16 - 20 12.9 7.2
Total 178.4 100.0
Note: 0 years - immature trees
Table 7.7 lists out the common clones used by smallholders in 
Malaysia. The RRIM have been successful in propagating and 
introducing new clones suitable for smallholders in Malaysia. For 
example, in the 1950s unselected seedlings ( US ) were commonly 
used, in the 1960s TJ and PB series were popular while in 1970s and 
1980s RRIM 600 series was popular. From an examination of Table 7.7, 
it is clear that RRIM 600 was the most popular Class I clone used by 
the smallholders in the survey area. This is in part due to the 
efforts of RISDA which recommended smallholders who received
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replanting grants to use this clone type when replanting their old 
trees. However, smallholders who replanted on their own initiative 
and using their own resources used clones which were not recommended 
by RRIM and hence they generally got lower yields. However, this 
only applied to a very small minority of smallholders in our sample.
TABLE 7.6: Frequency of Occurrence of Replanting
Frequency Ha. % No. of S/H *
Once 51.7 28.8 48 55.2
Twice 84.8 47.3 30 34.5
> Thrice 42.9 23.9 9 10.3
Total 179.4 100.0 87 100.0
Table 7.8 shows the density of planting, i.e. the number of 
trees planted on a per hectare basis. It can be seen that about 71 % 
of smallholders planted between 400 to 700 trees per hectare. This 
worked out at an average of 583 trees per hectare. RISDA / RRIM 
recommended rate is about 600 to 800 trees per hectare. Hence, it is 
obvious that in our sample the smallholders were underplanting.
This could have serious implications for the yield capacity per 
hectare of holdings. According to the RRIM, if the density of 
planting as recommended is not followed by smallholders, there is a 
great likelihood that the number of trees which manage to survive 
the immaturity stage on a per hectare basis would be smaller in 
numbers and consequently smallholders would only be able to get 
relatively lower yields on a per hectare basis.
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Clone Type Hectares Years Applied
US 1.6 1950s
TJ & PB551 47.9 1960s
RRIM 600 120.0 1970s & 1980s
RRIM 605 8.9 1970s & 1980s
Total 178.4 _
TABLE 7.8: Density of Planting of Smallholders
Trees/Ha No. of S/H %
< 400 7 8.1
401 - 500 23 26.4
501 - 600 22 25.2
601 - 700 23 26.4
701 - 800 4 4.6
801 - 900 8 9.2
Total 87 100.0
TABLE 7.9: Average Number of Tapping Days Per Month
No. of Days No. of S/H X
< 14 12 13.8
15 - 20 73 83.9
> 21 2 2.3
Total 87 100.0
In Table 7.9, about 84 X of smallholders tapped between 15 to 
20 days per month. The average number of tapping days was about
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14.8 days per month. This worked out to about once every other day 
which is the norm recommended by RISDA / RRIM according to the S2/D2 
system of tapping. Tapping on alternate days ensures that the life 
span of trees would be extended. Hence their productivity would not 
be affected due to excessive tapping as normally practiced in 
slaughter tapping. On the other hand, if trees were not chemically 
treated and undertapped, i.e. less than 14 days per month, their 
productivity might also be affected. This is especially so if trees 
were left for a long period of time without tapping. However, to 
solve the problem of labour shortages, the RRIM have recommended 
that tapping days could be shortened without affecting yield with 
the application of yield stimulants.
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 show the yield profile of smallholders in 
Perak before and after replanting. As a whole, yields before 
replanting were very much inferior to yields after replanting.
Average yields before replanting only reached up to 260 kg./ha/year 
while average yields after replanting were over 900 kg./ha/year. In 
Table 7.11, the pattern of yield profile is not marked in general 
although it tends to taper off after reaching yields of over 1800 
kg./ ha.. About 46 X of smallholders attained yields of between 360 
to 840 kg. per hectare per year and about 59 % have reasonably good 
yields of between 852 to 1320 kg./ha./year while about 20 % got 
very good yields of above 1300 kg./ha./year. However, about 20 X of 
smallholders achieved very low yield levels of below 840 kg/ha/year. 
These are smallholders replanted their holdings either in the 1950s 
or 1960s. In addition, about 3 t of smallholders achieved 
relatively high yields of above 1800 kg./ha. Note that the average
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yield of the survey area was about 946 kg./ha. which is quite low 
compared to the national average of 1400 kg./ha. ( RISDA: 1977 )
TABLE 7.10: Yield Profile of Smallholders Before Replanting
( kg. / ha. / year )
Yield Profile No. of S/H_________%_
< 131 13 14.9
132 - 180 22 25.3
181 - 240 9 10.3
241 - 300 10 11.5
301 - 360 14 16.1
361 - 420 10 11.5
421 - 480 9 10.3
Total 87 100.0
Table 7.12 shows yield per hectare and total productive 
capacity of the survey area before and after replanting. Before 
replanting average yield was about 260 kg./ha. which is considered 
very low. At this yield level and with a total land holding of 201.5 
ha. which was not replanted gave a total production capacity of 
about 52,390 kg./year. However, when replanting was undertaken, 
there was a dramatic increase in yield and total productivity. 
Average yields per year increased more than 260 % to about 946 
kg./ha. At this yield level, when multiplied to about 135 hectares 
of matured rubber holdings increased total production to about 
127,332 kg./year, an increase of over 143 X, Note that only about 
57 hectares or 25 X of the total area was still not replanted until
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1986. Although from the national point of view, this rate is 
considered small, from the analysis it is obvious that replanting 
has indeed increased yield on a per unit area dramatically and 
subsequently total production of the replanted area.
TABLE 7.11: Yield Profile of Smallholders After Replanting 
( kg. / ha. / year )
Yield Profile No. of S/H_______%
< 360 7 8.0
361 - 600 10 11.5
601 - 840 23 26.4
841 - 1080 15 17.2
1081 - 1320 13 14.9
1321 - 1560 13 14.9
1561 - 1800 3 3.4
> 1801 87 100.0
Note : Average yield - 946 kg. / ha. / year
Table 7.13 shows the price trend for different types of rubber 
produced by the smallholders during the survey period. Although 
yield on a per hectare basis was one of the important variables in 
determining income levels of smallholders, it is by no means the 
most important. Equally significant is the price of the commodity.
In 1986 the average price fetched by rubber ( all types ) was only 
M$1.25 which was very low compared to the early 1980s. Note that 
unsmoked sheet ( USS ) and dried latex fetched the highest prices as 
indicated by the smallholders.
250
TABLE 7.12: Rubber Prod, and Yield Before and After Replanting
( kg. / ha. / year )
Status Yield Tot. Ha. Tot. Prod. % increase
Before Replant 260.0 201.5* 52,390 -
After Replant 946.0 134.6** 127.332 143.0
Note: * - Total area ( 228.6 ) - idle ha. ( 27.1 ) - 201.5 ha.
** = Tot. area replanted (171.6)-Tot. immature(37) = 134.6 ha 
Derivation of yield before and after replanting:
- Before Replant=1.46 kg/ha/day x 14.8 days x 12 rat.= 259.5 kg/ha/yr
- After Replant- 5.33 kg/ha/day x 14.8 days x 12 int.- 946 kg/ha/yr.
TABLE 7.13: Profile of Average Price of Rubber. September 1986 
Type of Rubber Sold No. of S/H % Average Price($/kg)
Unsmoked Sheet(USS) 54 62.1 1.60
Cuplurap 21 24.1 0.94
Latex(Dried) 11 12.6 1.71
Scrap 1 1.1 0.75
Total 87 100.0 —
Average Price (all types)_________________________ 1.25
Income Position of Smallholders
After considering the factors affecting the yield of 
smallholders in the survey area, we will now analyse the income 
position of smallholders.
In determining the income levels of the smallholders in the 
survey area, it is pertinent to note that although rubber 
cultivation was the predominant occupation, it was not the only one.
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TABLE 7.14: Category of Occupation of Smallholders
Category_________________No. of S/H______%
Solely Rubber 21 24.1
Rubber Plus One Other Job 43 49.4
Rubber Plus Two Other Jobs 23 26.4
Total________________________ 87_______ 100.0
This is probably due to the fact that cultivating rubber on an 
individual and small basis is not viable to sustain the smallholders 
and hence they have to resort to other activities to supplement 
their income. This situation is similar to the padi areas of Krian. 
Table 7.14 shows that only about 24 % of respondents relied solely 
on rubber for their livelihood while the rest took up one or more 
additional jobs. Hence, these smallholders were essentially mixed 
farmers. However, while this is true, it is not just a question of 
whether they can earn enough from their rubber holdings. It is also 
a question of whether they have the time and opportunity to do other 
things.
Since all respondents have replanted some or all portions of 
their holdings, we can show the household distribution of income 
from rubber only so as to get an overall picture whether there was 
any appreciable increase in their income level. Table 7.15 shows 
that about 90 % of smallholders earned less than M$300 per month. A 
further breakdown indicated that more than 60 % earn less than M200 
per month.
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TABLE 7.15: Distribution of Household Income From Rubber (M$/Month)
Income Category No. of S/H__________%
< 50 10 11.5
51 - 100 18 20.7
101 - 150 20 23.0
151 - 200 19 21.8
201 - 250 7 8.0
251 - 300 4 4.5
301 - 350 2 2.3
351 - 400 5 5.7
> 401 2 2.3
Total 87 100.0
This means that even though yields from replanted rubber have 
increased more than two-fold, earnings from rubber were still very 
low and inadequate to push the smallholders above the threshold 
income of M$300 per month which is considered as the poverty income 
level. This is mainly due to the small size of land holdings where 
the average size of replanted holdings was only 1.74 hectares. 
Hence, it is not surprising that a great proportion of smallholders 
pursue other activites to boost their income levels.
Table 7.16 lists the others sources of income which accrue to 
the smallholders in the survey area. Between 5 % to 32 % of small­
holders received income from other sources. Replanted rubber only 
accounted for an average income per month of M$161.00 while for 
other agriculture it was M$230 and M$218 for government jobs and 
others accounted for M200.00 per month.
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TABLE 7.16: Profile of All Sources of Income of Smallholders
Sources____________No. of S/H______X______Ave. Incoige(M$/mt)
Replanted Rubber 87 100 161.00
Unreplanted Rubber 14 16.1 35.00
Children Remittance 28 32.2 60.71
Other Agriculture 23 26.4 230.43
Govt. Employee 4 4.6 218.75
Others_________________ 21_________24J________ 200.95
Table 7.17 shows the expenditure pattern of smallholders in 
purchasing durable goods and making other expensive social and 
religious expenditures before and after replanting. What emerges 
from the above analysis is that it is possible that smallholders 
income position might have improved after replanting in order for 
them to incur these expenditures. From Table 7.17 we can see that 
after replanting, a greater percentage of smallholders managed to 
purchase television sets ( 57.4 X ), motorcycle ( 42.5 X ) and 
renovate their houses ( 10.3 X ).
TABLE 7.17: Expenditures By S/H Before and After Replanting 
Item________Before Replant(*) After Replant(X) No. of S/H
T.V. 31.0 57.4 87
f
Radio 60.9 12.6 87
Motorcycle 24.1 42.5 87
Motorcar 3.4 3.4 87
Pilgrimage(Haj) 14.9 12.6 87
Renovate Home_____ 2.3______________ 10.3_____________ 87
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The average expenditure pattern of smallholders in the survey 
is shown in Table 7.18. Note that total expenditure exceeded the 
poverty income level of M$300 per month. Food took up the greatest 
proportion of the budget with schooling coming second. The above 
expenditure pattern could also imply that smallholders are indebted 
to the middlemen who also supply their daily food requirements. 
Hence, with such low income earning capacity and high expenditures 
there is hardly any opportunity for smallholders to have surpluses 
for savings and in fact there is a high degree of dissaving.
TABLE 7.19; Saving Habits Among S/H After Replanting




Despite the budget figures as laid out in Table 7.18, about 
63 % of smallholders claimed that they do keep some form of savings.
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However, we believe that if the smallholders did indeed save, the 
amount is negligible.





Table 7.20 shows that about 38 % of smallholders borrowed from 
RISDA and the Agricultural Bank to supplement the replanting grants. 
This shows that only one-quarter of smallholders bothered to make 
the extra effort to make end financing for replanting work. For the 
rest it is most likely that they are contented with whatever grant 
they have and to make the best use of it. We may perhaps deduce that 
this minority group are the more progressive ones. If this is true 
then the figure is surprisingly quite high.
Summary
From the above discussion, it is clear that most smallholders 
have replanted at least once while some have replanted more than 
once. However, there were still many hectares which have not 
undergone even a first round of replanting. Although replanting has 
been accepted by smallholders to be important in improving their 
yield, most of the replanted areas were still very small and hence, 
the income that smallholders received from replanted rubber was 
still low. We have analysed and tabulated additional information on
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income profile, savings, expenditure pattern, etc. to show that the 
income levels of smallholders were very low. This meant that the 
policy of replanting pursued by the government has not been 
successful in eradicating poverty among smallholders. Hence, this 
confirms the observation that replanting per se is inadequate to 
help eliminate poverty. On the other hand, if replanting were not 
undertaken, the income position of the smallholders might have been 
worse off. To overcome this problem, it has been necessary for 
smallholders to rely on off-farm income activities to boost their 
income level. In fact RISDA has acknowledged that based on present 
land holding pattern in the country, rubber alone is insufficient to 
guarantee smallholders a return commensurate with their effort.
257
5.0 ATTITUDE OF SMALLHOLDERS TOWARDS REPLANTING GRANTS
Introduction
After analysing the contribution of replanting grants to 
productivity, income and profitability of rubber production, we 
shall analyse the attitudes and perception of smallholders towards 
replanting grants. Attitudes and perceptions of smallholders 
determine the mode of action that is forthcoming from them. If 
smallholders perceived replanting grants as being able to assist 
them to improve their productivity and income position from rubber 
then this might have a great impact on success or failure of the 
replanting programme itself. However, if smallholders were to 
perceive replanting grants as a handout to be spent on consumption 
instead of concentrating on making the replanted acreage successful, 
then its effect on increasing output may bound to be affected. In 
this section, we shall tabulate and analyse the result of the survey 
on following aspects
a) perception of smallholder concerning replanting grant
b) perception on whether replanting grant is adequate
c) perception on administration of replanting scheme
d) perception on problems of replanting
e) factors which persuade smallholders to replant
f) whether abuses were present in the grant system
Table 7.21 shows that about 98 % of smallholders perceived 
replanting to be beneficial. On the form of benefit that they 
perceived, Table 7.22 shows that about 60 X believed that through 
replanting, they would be able to improve their income position 
while 28 % believed that their output would increase. Hence, the
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smallholders positively believed that if they replanted their old 
rubber they would be able to reap the benefits in the form of better 
yields and improved income. This is the psychological barrier which 
needs to be overcome before a smallholder would want to undertake 
replanting.
TABLE 7.21: Perception of S/H Whether Replanting Is Beneficial
%
Beneficial 86 98.1
Not beneficial 1 1.1
Total 87 100.0
2: Perception of S/H Why Replanting Is B
Perception No. of S/H %
Improve Yield 24 27.6
Improve Income 52 59.8
Others 11 12.6
Total 87 100.0
TABLE 7.23: Whe. Materials Issued to S/H Under Replant Scheme Good
Material________Satisfactory Unsatisfactory______Total
........... in percentage...........
Seedlings 77.0 23.0 100
Fertiliser__________90.8____________ 9.2____________ 100
Since replanting assistance came in the form of material and 
cash, smallholders were asked about the quality of the material
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assistance given by RISDA. Table 7.23 shows that more than 11 % of
smallholders were satisfied with the clones provided by RISDA while
about 91 % were happy with the quality of fertiliser supplied by 
RISDA. In the course of the survey, we discovered that some 
smallholders were not happy with clones provided by RISDA 
contractors because they were of not of the clone type as
recommended but other cheaper types.
TABLE 7.24: Whether S/H Would Replant if Grant Were Reduced
Decision By 50 X By 100 *
No. X No. X
Continue 63 72.4 7 8.0
Discontinue 24 27.6 80 91.9
Total 87 100.0 87 100
Smallholders were asked a hypothetical question as to what 
their reaction would be towards replanting if replanting grants were 
to be reduced by 50 X and 100 X of present rates. The reaction of 
smallholders is important in so far as we are able to know the shape 
of their response curve towards subsidies. The result is quite 
interesting. For example, in Table 7.24, about 72 % of smallholders 
said that they would continue to replant their holdings if 
replanting grants were reduced by 50 X while the rest would not 
replant. This means that most smallholders do not rely absolutely on 
subsidies in order to replant. Apparently, the smallholders who 
answered in the affirmative had relatively bigger holdings or had 
other alternative sources of income while those who answered in the
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negative were either those with very small holdings or relied mainly 
on rubber as the only source of income. However, if the replanting 
grant were to be reduced by 100 % of present rates, meaning that
there would not be any replanting assistance at all, only 9 % of 
smallholders would continue to replant on their own and the rest 
would not replant at all. Out of this number who would agree to 
continue replanting, most are relatively well-off smallholders and 
had the largest landholding. However, although this is so, only 
about 54 % of smallholders believe that they will live a hard life 
without replanting assistance from the government as Table 7.34 
shows. In fact the response to the question is informative because 
replanting grant is just an enabling factor for smallholders to 
undertake replanting. It is by no means the only factor because the 
relative size of holding and no loss of income are other factors 
that will influence smallholders to undertake replanting.
TABLE 7.25: Whether Current Rate of Replanting Grant Reasonable




Table 7.25 shows that about 93 % of smallholders said that the 
amount of replanting grant which they received at the time of 
replanting was adequate. Only about 7 % said that it was inadequate. 
Although replanting grants do not cover the full cost of replanting, 
smallholders were on the whole satisfied with the assistance given.
2 6 1




Not happy 4 4.6
Total____________ 87___________ 100.0
Table 7.26 shows that more than 95 % of smallholders were 
happy with the way RISDA administered the rubber replanting 
programme. Those who said that they were not happy were those whose 
grants were withdrawn or whose application for additional assistance 
were not approved.
TABLE 7.27: Whether Smallholders Faced Problems During Replanting
Response No. of S/H________%
Problem 32 36.8
No Problem 55 63.2
Total_____________87___________100.0
TABLE 7.28; Problems Faced By Smallholder During Replanting
Problem No. of S/H %
Wild Animals 13 40.6
No Own Capital 5 15.6
Late Inspection 3 9.4




Table 7,27 shows that about 63 X of smallholders did not face 
any major problem during replanting. About 37 % faced some major 
problems during the replanting stage. Table 7.28 lists some of these 
problems. For those who complained, about 41 % had their young 
trees destroyed by wild boars while about 22 X had their young 
trees eaten by domestic animals because there were no fencing around 
their land. Others faced problems like inadequate capital, late 
inspection by RISDA officials, etc.
TABLE 7.29: Reasons Smallholders Replanted Their Trees
Reasons_____________________No. of S/H_________X
Trees Old & Poor Yield 63 72.4
Friends Persuade 17 19.5
No loss of Income 7 8.0
Total__________________________ 87__________  100.0
Table 7.29 list some of the factors which persuaded small­
holders to replant their holdings. About 72 X said that they 
replanted because their trees were old and they were not getting 
good yields. About 20 X of smallholders said that persuasion of 
friends was important in influencing them to replant. About 8 X of 
smallholders said they undertook replanting because there was no 
immediate loss of earnings because they had other other plots of 
land to tap rubber or had alternative sources of income. It is 
important to note in this respect that the replanting grant is an 
important source of income, however temporary it might be. Most 
smallholders got cash balances of between 60 to 80 X of the total
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igrant as shown in Chapter 6.
"TABLE 7.30; Nature of Assistance S/Hs Received From RISDA ( in % )
Assistance Received Not Received Total
Replanting Grant 100 - 100
SEPENTAS 31.0 69.0 100
Fertiliser Subsidy 18.4 81.6 100
Ethrel Subsidy 45.0 55.0 100
Other Subsidies________ 40.0_________60.0________ 100
Table 7.30 shows that of all the forms of assistance that is 
available to smallholders from RISDA, the replanting grant is the 
most universal. All the 87 respondents received replanting grants. 
However, for the other forms of assistance, only a few smallholders 
either bothered to apply or were successful in their application. 
For example, only 18 % of smallholders received fertiliser subsidy 
for their mature trees. This also showed that smallholders in 
general did not apply any fertiliser to their mature holdings.
TABLE 7.31: Cases of Abuse In Administration of Replanting Grant 
Cases________________ No. of S/H________%
S/h Re-Sold Fertiliser 4 28.6
Corruption 7 50.0
Cheating By S/H 3 21.4
Total_____________________ 14_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 100.0
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Table 7.31 shows that about 16 % of smallholders believed that 
abuses did occur in the administration of the replanting programme 
while more than 50 % said that corruption was the main form of 
abuse. This referred to the unethical practices of RISDA officers in 
their dealings with smallholders, contractors and tenderers. Other 
instances of abuse alleged included the reselling of free 
fertilisers by the fanners or cheating by smallholders themselves.
But the fact that only 16 % of smallholders suspected of the 
occurrence of malpractice and abuse indicate that this is not a very 
common or serious matter.
Summary
On the issue of whether the smallholders thought that the 
government should continue to sponsor a programme of replanting, 
all smallholders interviewed unanimously agreed that it should 
continue. The reason given was that smallholders could not afford to 
replant without government assistance. All 87 respondents also 
unanimously agreed that the present format of assistance comprising 
of materials and cash assistance should be retained in order to 
ensure the success of the replanting effort.
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6.0 SUBSIDY MENTALITY OF RUBBER SMALLHOLDERS 
Introduction
The issue of ” subsidy mentality " is interesting in the 
context of Malaysian agriculture. It has become a sort of household 
word among smallholders and the farming community because of the 
constant exhortation and reminders from the community leaders and 
national leadership that smallholders should not have this kind of 
attitude. Therefore, in view of this fact, in this survey, we assume 
that smallholders were implicitly aware of the general meaning of 
the term " subsidy mentality " by virtue of its common usage. Hence, 
when the term is mentioned it connotes a state of affairs in which 
smallholders will not want to or be able to adopt a certain 
technology or innovation unless subsidies are given by the 
governmen t.
In this section, we will attempt to solicit the views of 
smallholders on " subsidy mentality " with the objective of the 
finding out the following
i) smallholders* general attitude on government assistance
ii) whether smallholders exhibit a " subsidy mentality M in the 
above sense
iii) if so the reasons for exhibiting this kind of attitude
iv) the reasons for the government downplaying this attitude, and
v) how smallholders could resolve the contradiction between having a 
” subsidy mentality " end being self-reliant or more specifically 
for how long they should rely on government subsidy.
Although smallholders generally welcomed any form of assistance 
that would reduce their burden, they believe that subsidies is not a
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limiting factor in affecting their work efforts. In this matter it 
is important to distinguish between the actual contribution of 
subsidies to farmers * income and their perception and attitudes 
towards subsidies. It is postulated that even though farmers in 
general would face economic hardships if subsidies were not 
available to them, they still believe that they could survive 
without it.
TABLE 7.32: Whether S/H Can Succeed With Minimal Govt. Assistance
Response_______No. of S/H_________%
Can Succeed 7 8.0
Cannot Succeed 80 92.0
Total_______________87_________ 100.0
TABLE 7.33: Whether Self-Reliant Spirit Affected By Subsidies
Response_______No. of_S/H_________%
Affected 2 2.3
Not Affected 85 97.7
Total_____________ 87___________ 100.0
Tables 7.32 and 7.33 probe smallholders* response towards 
subsidies. In Table 7.32, about 93 % of smallholders believed that 
they cannot succeed in their venture if there were only minimal 
government assistance in replanting efforts. Here government 
assistance is a generic term to include all monetary and non­
monetary assistance. From this it is clear that smallholders are 
dependent upon the government for subsidies, credit facilities,
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infrastructure, etc. However, although smallholders are generally 
dependent upon the government for help, Table 7.33 shows that about 
98 % of smallholders believed that their spirit of self-reliance 
would not be affected and that they would work as hard as before. In 
fact about 98 % indicated that the numerous government assistance 
programme that they have received tend to make them worked harder 
because these acted as incentives to them. In addition, smallholders 
believed that they were morally obliged to work hard because they 
were using public funds.
Table 7.34 listed a few statements on how " subsidy mentality ” 
could be conceptualised and viewed and smallholders were solicited 
for their responses. About 90 % agreed that the so-called " subsidy 
mentality " among smallholders did in fact exist. About 75 % 
confessed that this occured because of the poverty level of fanners.
TABLE 7.34: Smallholders Views On Subsidy Mentality(SM)(*)
Views___________________________________Agree_____Disagree Total
SM Does Exist 90.0 10.0 100
SM Exist Due To Poverty 74.7 25.3 100
Without Subsidy S/H Live Hard Life 54.0 46.0 100
SM Due To Govt. Patronage 59.7 40.2 100
Subsidies To Be Used To Help S/H 90.8 9.2 100
Subsidies No Guarantee S/H Good Life 79.3 20.7 100
Smallholders have no choice but to rely upon the government 
assistance entirely, and if this is termed as " having a subsidy 
mentality ”, then that is what it is. However, only a slight
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majority ( 54 % ) believed that smallholders would not be able to 
replant and hence would lead a hard life if there were no subsidy at 
all. As to another possible reason why smallholders have " subsidy 
mentality ", about 60 X agreed that it was the government’s fault 
because it initiated subsidy programmes and nurtured farmers to rely 
on a regime of subsidies. Although about 91 X wanted the government 
to use the instrument of subsidies as liberally as possible to help 
the smallholders, the government was urged to use it more 
discrirainately on deserving cases only so as to justify its use. 
Finally, more than 79 % believed that subsidies or replanting 
grants per se would not ensure the success or failure of the 
replanting programme, but rather the attitude and hard work and 
dedication of the farmers themselves. Subsidies are therefore only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of 
replanting efforts.
About 78 X of smallholders in Perak have heard government 
leaders applying the term towards fanners in general and felt that 
this description of the smallholders in general is both unfair and 
unwaranted. Smallholders gave a variety of responses why the 
government labelled them as having a " subsidy mentality Table 
7.35 shows that 64 * believed that the government was frustrated 
that its subsidy programmes in general was not producing the outcome 
as expected because many projects failed and subsidies were wasted. 
Other views ranged from the hope that smallholders should rely less 
upon government assistance, that the smallholders should realise 
that the government was facing a financial crisis and the fact that 
subsidies given were often abused.
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TABLE 7.35: S/H Perception Why Govt. Using Term Subsidy Mentality
Perception____________________________No. of S/H %
Govt. Wants S/H To Be Self-Reliant 17 19.5
Govt. Want To Phase Out Subsidy 3 3.4
Subsidy Given Widely Abused 7 8.0
Subsidy Have Not Improved S/H Output 56 64.4
Don1t Know 4 4.6
Total 87 100.0
Table 7.36 gives the various responses of smallholders to the 
question of how long replanting grants should continue. About 26 % 
insisted that they have a right to replanting grants and it must be 
given to all smallholders as long as they planted rubber. Only 8 % 
were more moderate in their answers by responding that grants should 
be given only if the government could afford to do so. However, a 
majority of about 54 X said that replanting grants are in fact 
contributed partly by the smallholders through the cess payments and 
hence, they claim that assistance should be extended to the fanners 
as long as they contributed to the cess payments.
TABLE 7.36: Situation Under Which Smallholders Should Continue
To Receive Replanting Grants
Situation_____________________No. of S/H_______%
As Long As Cess Imposed 47 54.0
Govt. Financially Stable 7 8.0
Assistance Given Perpetual 23 26.4
Total________________________ 87_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 100.0
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Summary
This section attempted to elaborate on the concept of " subsidy 
mentality *' in the context of rubber smallholders in Malaysia by 
analysing some of their responses to some qualitative questions on 
certain aspects of subsidies. Although we have not attempted to 
measure the extent of " subsidy mentality ” of smallholders, we have 
managed to get an overview of smallholders* reaction and perception 
related to this much abused but vague terminolgy. However, what is 
quite clear from this analysis is that smallholders in Perak do 
admit that most of them exhibit the so called M subsidy mentality " 
in the sense that is commonly understood in Malaysia. Most feel that 
poverty was the main factor which have forced them to rely upon 
government subsidy. However, some smallholders feel that in the case 
of replanting subsidies, it is not a pure subsidy because it also 
comes directly from the smallholders through the cess tax. Hence, 
they feel that as long as smallholders were contributing partly to 
the grant, they are entitled to enjoy its benefit. This reliance 
therefore could not be construed to mean that smallholders have the 
" subsidy mentality ” in the perjorative sense.
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7.0 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF REPLANTING SUBSIDIES
In this section, we will supplement the findings from the 
survey by estimating the output elasticities of replanting subsidies 
using multiple regression analysis o.n the following:-
(a) Hectarage replanted response
(b) Yield per hectare response
(c) Total production response
We will attempt to estimate the above by using two 
alternative models for each, namely the linear-additive model and the 
log-linear production function model. Cross section data with 87 
observations obtained from the survey of rubber smallholders will be 
used in the analysis. For each function, we shall run a series of 
regressions and will present the findings of the model which give the 
most reasonable and significant results. From the estimates, we will 
draw some policy conclusions with regards to the effectiveness of 
government subsidy policies in the rubber sector. Below we shall 
specify the models used and the estimating equations and discuss and 
•interpret the results.
Hectare Replanted Response
It is hypothesised that the hectares that would be replanted 
in any particular year by smallholders would depend on the following:-
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REPHA = F (AGESH, RUBBERP, YIELDHA, HHSIZE, REGRANT, TOTHA, DUMMY)
where
REPHA = Hectares replanted 
AGESH = Age of smallholders
RUBBERP = Price of rubber ( M$ / kg)
YIELDHA = Yield/ha. ( kg / ha )
HHSIZE = Household size
REGRANT = Replanting grant ( M$ / ha )
TOTHA = Total land holdings of smallholders. ( ha )
DUMMY *=■ Land title dummy ( where land with title = 1,
In this model, it is hypothesised that hectares replanted is 
a function of 7 independent variables as listed above.
Yield Response
In finding out yield response, we relate the output per 
hectare of rubber to some of the more important factors of production 
used within a single year. For this purpose, it is hypothesised as 
follows:-
YIELDHA = F (REGRANT, REPHA, AGETAP, TAPDAY, TASKSIZ, HHSIZE, REPYEAR, 
AGESH, WORKEXP, DUMMY1)
where
YIELDHA = Yield per ha ( kg. / ha.)
REGRANT = Replanting grant ( M$ / ha )
others =
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REPHA = Hectares replanted (ha)
AGETAP = Age of rubber tress tapped ( years )
TAPDAY = Number of trees per ha. ( number )
TASKSIZ . = Tapping days per year ( number )
REPYEAR = Years trees replanted ( actual years )
WORKEXP = Working experience of smallholders ( years )
DUMMY1 = Clone dummy ( where RRIM 600 clone = 1, others = 0 )
In this model, it is hypothesised that* yield per hectare 
depends upon 8 factors' as outline above. We have seen in Chapter 6 
that replanting grants have been responsible for encouraging 
smallholders to replant their old and unproductive rubber trees. We 
also know that trees which were replanted with high yielding clones 
tend to be more productive than the old trees. Here, what would be of 
prime interest to us is to see whether replanting grants (REGRANT) is 
an important variable in explaining yield and also which other factors 
affect yield. From this information, we would be able to know which 
variables are more important to manipulate as a policy instrument. 
For example, if the variable TAPDAY is significant; then we could 
suggest that the optimum number of trees as recommended by the RRIM or 
RISDA should be strictly adhered to when smallholders replant their 
trees.
Total Production Respose
For this function, it is hypothesised that,




GROSSYLD = Gross yield per year ( kg. / year )
REGRANT = Replanting grant ( M$ / ha )
REPHA = Hectares replanted ( ha )
RUBBERP = Price of rubber ( M$ / kg )
REPYEAR = Year trees replanted ( actual year )
AGESH = Age of smallholder ( years )
WORKEXP = Working experience of smallholders ( years )
HHSIZE = Household size ( number )
DUMMY1 = Clone dummy ( where RRIM 600 clone = 1, others = 0 )
In this model, it is hypothesised that total production of 
smallholders depend upon 8 variables, namely replanting grants, 
hectares replanted, price of rubber, year trees are replanted, age of 
smallholders, working experience of smallholders, household size and 
the clone dummy.
It is pertinent to clarify at this stage the reason why the 
variable REGRANT should vary cross-sectionally. At first sight it may 
seem logical for REGRANT to be same throughout the observations. If 
so then cross-section analysis of the regression exercise would not be 
possible because of the problem of multicollinearity. The reason why 
REGRANT vary cross-sectionally is because replanting rates are 
different at different period of time as shown in Table 6.10. For 
example the rates on a per acre basis have changed in 1960, 1974,
1978 and 1981. Since our sample of observation too varies which 
include smallholders who have replanted at different time periods,
hence the rates of REGRANT tend to vary cross-sectionally.
275
The estimating regression model for all three functions above 
is of the form specified below:-
1) Y = a + blxl + blx2 + b3x3 + ..............+ bnxn
2) logY = a + logblxl + logb2x2 + logb3x3 + ......... + logbnxn
The results of the regression analysis is given in the Tables 7.37 and 
7.38.
8.0 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Hectares Replanted Response
From Table 7.37, it is seen that this model managed to
explain about 71% of total variations in the dependent variable.
Althc>ugh 7 variables were regressed, only 3 were statistically 
significant because they have high T-statistics. The result is 
interesting when compared with that of Chapter 6. For example, 
REGRANT had a negative sign and shows that a 10% increase of
replanting grant would lead to 4% fall in the hectares replanted. 
This result contradicts that of Chapter 6 which found a positive
correlation between replanting grants and replanted hectares. How can 
we explain the contradiction? One possible explanation is that the 
data used in' Chapter 6 is of a time series form obtained from official 
publication. It therefore tends to show a more systematic trend 
rather than the cross-section data generated from the survey.
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TABLE 7.37 ^ Result of Regression Analysis on Hectares Replanted
Independent Estimated Coeff. Std. Error
Variable
Constant, (a) 4.1701 1.9209
(2.1708)
AGESH, (bl) -0.0779 0.1886
(-0.4131)
RUBBERP, (b2) *-0.0794 0.1487
(-0.5341)
YIELDHA, (b3) -0.0804 0.0821
(-0.9787)
HHSIZE, (b4) -0.0684 0.0783
(-0.8727)
REGRANT, (b5) -0.4135* 0.2010
(-2.0473)
TOTHA, (b6) 0.8950+ 0.0632
(14.1406)





Note : T-Statistics are in paranthesis
+ = significance at 1 %
* = significance at 5 %
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Another possible explanation is that other factors may be more 
important in influencing smallholders in the survey area to replant 
rather than the amount of replanting grants given. It may also mean 
that smallholders are less concerned about the actual amount of 
replanting grants that they receive. In fact, this might be a more 
plausible explanation. For example, TOTHA, i.e. the total amount of 
land holding is significant and shows a positive relationship. A 10%’
increase in TOTHA tend to increase hectarage replanted by 9 %. This
means that smallholders in the survey area who have larger holdings 
tend to replant more because they are able to tide over the transition 
period when their trees are immature and not productive. The dummy 
variable shows that it is not necessary that smalholders with land 
titles would replant more than those without titles. Note that 
RUBBERP is not significant as an explanatory variable. Hence, 
although REGRANT is an important variable in influencing smallholders 
to replant as indicated in Chapter 6 (using national data) the result 
in Perak shows that REGRANT has a negative effect on replanting.. On 
the other hand, in Perak land holding is a more important factor in 
influencing the level of replanting.
Yield Response Function
Table 7.38 gives the result of the regression analysis. 
This model managed to explain about 32% of total variation in the 
dependent variable after considering the adjusted R2. This means 
that there are many other explanatory variables not included in the 
model. For example factors like soil type, tapping system,
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7.38 : Result of Regression Analysis on Yield and Production 
Independent . Model 1 Model 2











WORKEXP, (blO) 0.0711 0.0757
(0.9393)




























































Total Production Response 
significance at 5%
Model 1 = Yield Response; Model 2 = 
T - statistics in paranthesis.
# = significance at 1%, * =
+ = significance at 10%
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topography, input expenditures, management cost and tapping labour 
input, among others were not included. Much of these information 
could not be extracted from the survey either due to oversight in . the 
formulation of the questionnaire or because the smallholders were not 
able to give the appropriate response because of absence of record 
keeping. However, based on whatever information was available, 6 out 
of 8 variables were significant in explaining the yield response of 
smallholders. Four variables which were significant at the 1%
significance level were RUBBERP, AGETAP, TAPDAY and REPYEAR. For 
example, a 10% increase in the tapping age of trees (AGETAP) would 
lead to a 4% in yield per hectare. This also means that there would 
be a greater yield if replanted trees are of tappable age. In Perak, 
there are about 25% of areas where trees are still immature. 
Therefore the scope for higher yield when these trees are replanted 
and reach maturity is high. This fact is reinforced by the
coefficient for (REPYEAR) which is also significant at the 1%
significance level. A 10% increase in REPYEAR, meaning the sooner 
trees are replanted after reaching "old age", would lead to a 38% 
increase in yield. This again strengthens the justification for 
replanting. It is also important to note that the TAPDAY variable,
i.e. number of trees planted per hectare is also significant in 
explaning yield response. A 10% increase in TAPDAY would lead to a 9% 
increase in yield. We have seen that for the survey area, the density 
of planting is still below the optimum level. An apparently strange 
result is the REPHA variable, i.e. the hectares replanted variable 
which has a negative sign and which is significant at the 5%
significance level. A 10% increase in hectares replanted would lead 
to a 1% decrease in yield per hectare. This seems to contradict with 
the established observation of the positive effect of replanting.
However, the AGETAP and REPYEAR variables described above proved 
otherwise. One explanation for this seemingly strange result is that 
initially, i.e. before trees reach maturity, an increase in hectares 
replanted do .indeed reduce yield but this is only a temporary 
phenomeneon. This means that an increase in hectares replanted would 
be offset once trees reach tappable age and yield would then rise to 
between 10% to 40% as shown by the AGETAP and TAPDAY variable. The 
clone dummy, however, is significant in explaining yield at the 10% 
significance level. But the correlation between yield and clone type 
is negative which is quite strange. It is tempting to explain this 
anomaly by saying that smallholders specified the wrong clone when 
they replanted. But there is no “other explanation. Other variables 
included in the regression model are not significant in explaining 
yield. For example, the number of tapping days per year (TASKSIZE) 
and WORKEXP or work experience variable are not significant variables. 
But the most significant result as far as we are concerned is the fact
that REGRANT variable seems not to have any effect at all on yield.
The coefficient for REGRANT besides being insignificant also shows the 
wrong sign, which is negative.
Total Production Response
This model managed to explain about 63% of total variation 
in the dependent variable after considering the adjusted R2. Hence,
it has a better fit than the previous model discussed above. Only 4
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variables out of 8 are highly significant in explaining the total
variation in the dependent variable. For example REPHA and RUBBERP is 
significant at the 1% significance level. A 10% increase in hectares
•
replanted (REPHA) would lead to a 9% increase in total production. 
This result confirms out observation in the first model on the effects 
of the REPHA variable. However, the price of rubber, RUBBERP, which 
is also significant at the 1% significance level again has a negative 
sign. A 10% increase in the price of rubber would lead to an 7%
decline in total production. At first sight this means that 
smallholders are not responsive to price incentives which seems also 
to contradict with other empirical studies on the price responsive 
behaviour of farmers in the underdeveloped countries. However, it 
should be remembered that rubber is a perennial crop and smallholders 
act differently. A price increase would enable smallholders to earn 
the same amount by working less hours while devoting the rest of his 
time to other more lucrative ventures. However, a more reasonable 
explanation is that a price increase may have adverse consequences on 
replanting efforts of smallholders. Because of their desire to
benefit from a price increase, smallholders are more likely to
postpone their replanting efforts in order to make short term gains in 
their income level. This finding is also confirmed in Chapter 6 which 
saw a negative relationship between hectares replanted and the price 
of rubber. This is in fact a dilemma facing the government in its 
effort to balance between increasing the welfare and income levels of 
farmers and increasing the stock of replanted trees in the country. ' 




negative. Unlike the yield function where REGRANT is not significant, 
in this model it is significant at the 10% level. However, there is a 
negative correlation between total production and .replanting grants. 
Eor example, 10% increase in replanting grants would lead to an 8%
decrease in production. One possible explanation is. that if the 
increase in grant is able to stimulate replanting (as seen in Chapter 
6) then there would be a temporary halt in current production because 
trees under replanting would be unproductive. Only after trees 
mature after 6-7 years would production be continued. This is one 
explantion for this negative correlation.
Summary
The main objective of the regression analysis has been to
find out whether replanting grants (REGRANT) has any effect at all on
hectares replanted, yield and total production of smallholders in
Perak. From the analysis it is clear that either REGRANT is not 
important at all or it has a negative effect. We can summarise the 
findings of the regression analysis below:-









Hence, replanting grant is not an important variable as far as all the 
above functions are concerned for Perak. This result is very 
interesting because almost all the claims relating to the positive 
effect of replanting grants on smallholders have.been proven to the 
contrary. We do not claim that this result is applicable throughout 
the country because if it does then it opens up the question of the 
justification of replanting subsidies.
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main conclusion of the regression analysis are negative 
ones. Empirically we cannot establish any statistically significant 
correlation between replanting grants and yield and that there are 
negative correlations between replanting subsidies and hectares
replanted and total production. The result of the regression analysis 
therefore fails to support the contention of smallholders in the
survey area that" replanting grants have been functional to their 
efforts in replanting. We are not saying that smallholders have not
benefited from replanting subsidies but that it has not had the
desired effects as far as government objective is concerned. We can
thus make the following-conclusion from this.
First, that subsidies cannot function well under under
conditions obtained in the survey area. This is reflected in the
socio-economic profile of the smallholders noted in the analysis.
Second, that attitudes and perception of smallholders
towards subsidies may have played some part in contributing to the
negative trends.
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Third, that the policy of giving replanting subsidies to 
smallholders have to be reviewed and its implementation made more 
efficient.
Fourth, the result of this analysis echoes the sentiment of
many writers and observers that the strategy to help smallholders
through subsidies is bound to fail because it cannot operate 
efficiently if the institutional and structutral basis under which 
they work is not changed. Hence, as we have noted in Chapter 6, it is 
no wonder that after nearly 4 decades, smallholders are generally 
still in poverty.
However, despite the above conclusions derived from the 
regression analysis we can also make the following observations based 
on the analysis in general:
(a) Rubber replanting is imperative in ensuring a
sustained, stable and increasing yield provided
holdings are well maintained.
(b) The size of land holdings is the most important .
variable in deciding whe.ther or not smallholders in the
survey area would want to replant.
(c) Although an increase in the price of rubber is
desirable and beneficial to smallholders in the short
term, its long term effect on hindering the rate of
replanting might be possible. Therefore, measures
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should be taken to balance the ill effects on both the 
rate of replanting and smallholders' income level.
(d) Although smallholders tend to display the 'subsidy 
mentality' upon the government, they claim that 
subsidies were not a limiting factor and that they 
would continue to replant even though replanting 
subsidies were not available.
(e) Although the allocative effects of replanting grants 
were negative or insignificant, its redistributive 
effect were positive, in the sense that all 
smallholders who applied for subsidies received the 
grant. Therefore, unlike padi price subsidies where 
non-farmers were the ones who benefited most, only 
smallholders benefited from rubber subsidies.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE - 
EVIDENCE FROM PADI SECTOR - A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The rice and padi sector in Malaysia is one of the most heavily 
subsidised sectors in Malaysian agriculture. A host of reasons have 
been given to justify this action on the part of the government.
[ 1 ] Our concern in this chapter is to analyse two specific 
subsidies prevalent in this sector, namely fertiliser subsidy and 
padi price subsidy. We have selected these two subsidies for 
analysis because both of them involve huge government expenditures.
TABLE 8.1: Govt. Expenditure On Padi Subsidies, (M$*000). 1979-85. 
Year Fertiliser Sub. Price Sub. Total Tot. Padi Exp.*
1979 51,062 — 51,062 342,000
1980 79,200 88,000 167,200 342,000
1981 122,300 177,000 299,300 342,000
1982 119,300 180,000 299,300 520,000
1983 97,800 175,000 272,800 520,000
1984 73,600 164,000 237,600 520,000
1985 87,100 201,000 288,100 520,000
1986 106,800 219,000 325,800 520,000
1987 80,400 205.000 285.400 NA
Source: World Bank ( 1988 ), Review of Rice Industry, p. 11.
* = Allocation for padi exp. estimated from 5 year plan allocation.
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padi arid rice sector in Malaysia. The analysis in this chapter will 
be complemented in the next chapter by a micro household level study 
based on farm survey data acquired from Kriari District in the state 
of Perak. Data and information for this chapter are based on 
secondary sources and ucquired from officiul documents, reports, 
censuses, published and unpublished studies. We will also give a 
descriptive analysis of both subsidies involved in this study.
The specific objectives of this chapter are as follows
a) an analysis of fertiliser subsidy in Malaysia
b) an analysis of padi price subsidy in Malaysia
c) regression analysis of effect of subsidies
d) policy implications of findings
Objective of Chapter
In the previous two chapters, we have analysed the impact of 
replanting subsidies in the rubber smallholding sector by assessing 
its impact on productivity, income and attitudes of smallholders. In 
this chapter, we will assess the impact of subsidies in the padi and 
rice sector. The reason why we chose fertiliser subsidy and padi 
price subsidy is because these two subsidies constitute a 
significant proportion of current annual recurrent expenditures of 
the government in the padi sector. In addition, although as many 
economists argue that subsidies can be justified and should be 
adopted only as a temporary measure, in practice it is not easy for 
the government to Withdraw it once they are adopted. Subsidies in 
the padi and rice sector of Malaysia belong to this category.
Therefore, since the amount of public funds spent on subsidies
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agriculture, there is a great need for planners, policy-makers 
and scholars to make an evaluation and independent assessment 
of the effectiveness of subsidy policies in the padi and rice 
sectors. As more information and knowledge are generated and 
made accessible to government from impact studies on subsidies, 
the easier it would be for the government to correctly assess 
its subsidisation policies. Although this analysis is not complete 
because of various limitations, it is hoped that it would be of 
some use to planners and policy-makers in Malaysia.
In this chapter we will attempt to analyse both the 
allocative and redistributive effects of subsidies using data 
at the national level. Specifically, we shall concern ourselves 
with the impact of these subsidies on production, yield and 
acreage response of farmers. The policy implications arising 
out of this analysis will then be highlighted.
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2.0 FERTILISER SUBSIDY IN MALAYSIA
Introduction
Fertiliser has been acclaimed universally to be one of the most 
critical inputs in rice cultivation. In Malaysia, fanners have been 
using organic fertilisers for many decades especially before the 
introduction of chemical fertilisers after the Second World War.
[ 2 ] Chemical fertiliser is significant as an input because of the 
greater yield response of modern high yielding varieties when 
applied to it. In fact it has been claimed that chemical fertilisers 
constitute an industrial input par excellence of the Green 
Revolution. [ 3 ]. This unique feature of fertiliser as a yield- 
increasing input is very important in Malaysia because increases in 
total output could no longer depend on acreage expansion due to the 
physical limitations of the land. [ 4 ] However, it should be 
remembered that fertiliser application by itself would not lead to 
any output increase. It needs other complementary inputs such as 
good irrigation facilities, high yielding varieties responsive to 
fertiliser and other inputs related to the so called M seed-water 
revolution " of the Green Revolution. However, the high costs 
related to acquiring these complementary inputs have caused many 
economists to remark that Green Revolution technology is very 
expensive for Third World countries and that returns from the huge 
investments made have not been justified on equity and efficiency 
grounds. [ 5,]
In this section, we shall attempt to do the following
a) to trace the evolution of fertiliser subsidy policies in the padi 
sector of Malaysia
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b) to analyse the economics of fertiliser utilisation in the padi 
sector and the justification of fertiliser subsidy policies
Evolution of Fertiliser Subsidy Policy in Malaysia
Halim has analysed and described fertiliser use pattern in 
Malaysia during the early years of this century. [ 6 ] He observed 
that fertiliser usage in padi was already in vogue among Malay 
farmers in the 1920s and 1930s when organic fertilisers were widely 
applied. However, after the Second World War, the government wanted 
to encourage fanners to use chemical fertilisers instead of organic 
fertilisers because of their alleged advantages. And once the 
government was convinced that chemical fertilisers were superior to 
organic fertilisers through the numerous fertiliser trials and tests 
conducted by the Department of Agriculture, it openly recommended 
fanners to switch to them completely. Hence, in 1951 the first 
official fertiliser subsidy scheme was introduced by the government 
in the state of Kelantan where successful tests had been conducted. 
About 300 tons of fertilisers were distributed free to the farmers. 
The main objectives of this fertiliser subsidy scheme were 
threefold. Firstly, it was to instil an attitude of " fertiliser- 
mindedness ” among padi fanners. Secondly, it was to assist farmers 
with low cash outlays to buy fertilisers and thirdly, it was to 
encourage the use of fertilisers by other farmers in Kelantan and 
other states
It was perceived that once the use of chemical fertiliser was 
familiar to the farmers, the government would withdraw the subsidy.
But the actual reason for the withdrawal of this subsidy was because
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of the failure of the scheme to achieve its stated objectives. This 
is in view of the fact that the government at this stage was 
unlikely to have any specific strategy with regard to agricultural 
policies and specifically on any long term plan for the use of 
agricultural pricing policies in colonial Malaysia.
The second stage in the evolution of fertiliser policy in 
Malaysia coincided with the Second Development Plan of 1961-65. All 
the states were covered by this policy except Kelantan. Initially 
the government allocated M$6.1 million for the scheme but reduced it 
to only M$3.1 million in 1963 due to lack of funds. The rate of 
subsidy was initially 50% of the market price and gradually reduced 
by 10% annually until the subsidy was exhausted in 1965. In this 
scheme, each fanner was given a coupon to buy fertiliser from 
Farmers* Cooperatives. The scheme was envisaged to cover 350,000 
acres at an annual rate of 70,000 acres but actual achievement was 
well below the original target.
The third stage of fertiliser policy in Malaysia was during 
1966-70, the period of the First Malaysia Plan. Fertiliser subsidies 
were continued to be given at the rate of 30 % of the market price. 
But this time it was restricted to fanners who worked on land below 
5 acres. It was planned that M$10 million would be allocated for 
the whole 5 years but only M$1.6 million was spent. This indicated 
that there were problems in the planning and implementation of 
fertiliser policy in Malaysia. One feasible explanation could be 
that the price of the fertiliser was too high for the fanners even 
with the subsidy. This factor could have been the stumbling block to 
fuller and wider use of fertilisers. Furthermore, by this time new
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high yielding varieties were only beginning to be introduced into 
the country and farmers were actually still planting the traditional 
rice varieties which do not need to use high dosages of chemical 
fertilisers and whose yields were not affected by not using them. 
Hence,in 1971, the fertiliser subsidy scheme was abolished and it 
affected farmers in double-cropped areas because the farmers 
apparently did not comply with the recommended rates.
This leads us to the fourth stage in the evolution of 
fertiliser policy in Malaysia. In the mid-1970s, following the OPEC 
oil crisis, the price of fertiliser in the international market 
increased by more than double the 1973 rate. This caused the farmers 
to face difficulties in procuring fertilisers easily. Hence, in 1974 
the government decided to reintroduce the subsidy but this time 
only urea was subsidised at the rate of 50 %, Farmers were charged a 
flat price of M$10 per 20 kg. bag ( recommended rate of application 
was 2 bags per acre ). However, this scheme only managed to serve 
40 % of the farmers’ population. The scheme was revoked in 1976 
when the price of urea in the international market dropped below 
M$226 per ton. [ 7 ]
The final stage of Malaysian fertiliser policy began in the 
second planting season of 1979 when the government introduced a 
100 % subsidy policy. A number of considerations led the government 
to introduce this subsidy. One was the high cost of fertiliser input 
in the total cost of padi production. [ 8 ] Secondly, the 
government was abandoning all new development of high cost 
irrigation projects and hoped to improve yield not by increasing 
acreage but through the existing planted acreage to be assisted by
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optimum application and utilisation of chemical fertilisers. Many 
studies gave ample evidence that fertiliser usage by farmers was 
still low and that much potential still existed through yield- 
increasing methods. [ 9 ] A third factor was the conscious and 
sincere attempt by the government to help farmers reduce their cost 
of inputs since most of the fanners were poor and lived below the 
official poverty line. Under the National Fertiliser Scheme, farmers 
who fulfilled three conditions are eligible to get free fertilisers. 
First, they must be tilling the land. Secondly, they must be working 
land below 2.4 ha. ( 6 acres ) and thirdly, the land worked must be 
a gazetted padi land. [ 10 ]
However, there were some fanners whose application for this 
subsidy was rejected. This matter should be considered to be a
serious problem because of the fact that there are needy and poor
fanners who are the intended target group of the scheme failing to 
get access to free fertiliser. Hence, there is a need to assess the 
extent of this problem. Among the reasons why farmers have been 
disqualified from getting free fertilisers and whose application 
have been rejected inlude one of the following
a) farmers whose land were not gazetted for padi or whose land were 
gazetted for planting padi but instead planted it with something 
else,
b) absentee landowners who registered an application ( instead of 
the tillers who may be tenants ),
c) those who worked land which exceeded 6 acres, and
d) farmers who belonged to the Opposition Party [ 11 ]
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Source : Mokhtar Tamin ( 1982 ); LPN ( 1986 )
Table 8.2 and Statistical Appendix summarise what we have 
discussed so far. Hence, what started as a policy restricted to a 
few states was later extended to the whole country. In addition, 
there were different subsidy rates between different locations of 
the country. Only in 1974 was the subsidy rate for the whole country 
standardised at M$10 per bag and in 1979 when fertiliser was 
provided free to any farmer who could prove that he tilled the land.
TABLE 8.3:Details of Fertiliser Subsidy - Costs & Composition-1979
Type/Qty._______________ Price / bag________Total Amount(M$)
Urea-2 bags/acre M$14.40/bag/20kg. 28.80
Compound:4 bags/acre M$14.60/bag/20kg. 58.40
Aramophos:l bag/acre M$6.52/bag/4kg. 6.52
Total cost/acre/ha. M$93.72(231.58)_____________-_______
Source; G.S. Suan ( 1984 ), Table 2.1, p. 28
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TABLE 8.4: Dist. of Fertiliser Under Subsidy Scheme,PM,*79-*85
Year No. of Area Type of Fertiliser______________Total
Farmers (ha) Ammophos Urea Compound (Qty) M£m
(*000) (’000) (Qty) M$m (Qty) M$in (Qty) M$m
* 79/80 219 259 3 3 46 26 78 47 127 75
*80/81 416 535 5 7 50 38 99 64 155 109
*81/82 305 378 4 5 51 38 102 57 158 100
2/82 285 365 0.02 2 24 11 47 19 73 31
*83 285 365 0.04 3 46 20 97 37 147 60
*84 283 362 0.02 2 49 19 93 42 146 114
*85 280 362 0.01 0.7 3 1 4 1 8 32
Source: Min. of Public Enterprise ( 1986 ), Personal Communication 
Note: Quantity in metric tons; M$ in millions
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 highlight the assistance offered by the 
fertiliser subsidy scheme of 1979. Table 8.3 details out the quantum 
of assistance given to padi fanners. Each fanner who is qualified 
and eligible to get assistance from the government acquires an 
average of 7 bags of free fertiliser of various composition 
amounting to M$93.72 per acre or M$231.58 per hectare. This is 
indeed a great saving to farmers in their input costs. On the other 
hand, Table 8.4 gives the details of the distribution of fertiliser 
under the free scheme with costing and quantity of fertiliser 
distributed. It is significant to note that between 1979 and 1985 
about M$522.9 million have been spent on this scheme.
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Economics of Fertiliser Use
In this section, we shall discuss and analyse the relevant 
aspects of fertiliser usage and focus on the economics of fertiliser 
use in padi production.
Taylor reiterated that for padi yield to show its full economic 
potential, farmers must apply the correct type and appropriate level 
of fertilisers. [ 12 ] The critical dimensions of fertiliser 
application include the amount and timing of nutrients applied, 
method of application, and the type of fertiliser applied.
In addition, the amount of fertiliser to be applied would depend, 
among other things, on the the level of nutrient requirement of the 
padi variety, the natural fertility level of the soil, the depth of 
water and the number and timing of cloud-free days during the 
growing stages of the padi plant.
The above gives in general the technical and botanical 
requirements of fertiliser application. Some economists believe that 
padi farmers in Malaysia use relatively substantial amount of 
fertilisers. For instance, Selvadurai believe that the majority of 
farmers in double-cropping areas use fertilisers. [ 13 ] On the 
other hand, Taylor is of the opinion that about 90 % of farmers in 
most double-cropped padi areas used fertiliser. The extent of 
fertiliser application is said to average about 90 kg. per hectare 
and this represents 80 % of official recommended rates. According to 
Taylor, two possible explanation for the relatively heavy fertiliser 
usage by Malaysian padi farmers compared to farmers in neighbouring 
countries include, firstly, the more favourable physical irrigation 
environment of Malaysia and secondly, the favourable fertiliser-padi
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price ratio. [ 14 ]
As a rule, fertilisers acquired in the open market are 
generally expensive input items for farmers in LDCs including 
Malaysia. This is because most kind of fertilisers are imported from 
abroad with handling, transport distribution and storage costs 
jacking up the costs. In Malaysia about 60 % of domestic requirement 
of fertilisers are imported while the rest are produced locally. In 
addition fertilisers produced locally are relatively more expensive 
to produce compared with imports. Hence, fertiliser subsidies are 
necessary to bring down the market price so that farmers can afford 
to use this vital input in the production process. In addition, 
fertiliser application is associated with the use of modern padi 
varieties and modern irrigation technology. Hence, fertiliser 
consumption is tied to the availability of these complementary 
inputs which are often very expensive because of the huge investment 
costs. In fact there is a high correlation between these three 
complimentary inputs of fertiliser imports, expenditure on 
irrigation and the adoption of high yielding varieties as Table 8.5 
shows.
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TABLE 8.5: Irrigation Development Expenditure, Fertiliser Imports &
Use of High Yielding Variety - Peninsular Malaysia, 1965-81
Year Irri.Exp.(M$m) Fert. Imports(m.t) HYVfS of
1965 1.3802 n. a. 11.3
1966 1.5418 n. a. 16.7
1967 2.2629 n. a. 15.2
1968 3.2195 n. a. 19.3
1969 3.609 26,000 23.6
1970 5.1925 41,500 46.8
1971 5.1046 36,000 60.2
1972 13.745 49,500 67.5
1973 17.573 62,000 59.7
1974 17.726 68,000 50.7
1975 18.407 74,000 44.1
1976 18.429 81,000 33.0
1977 18.823 89,000 32.1
1978 23.047 98,000 33.0
1979 22.017 n. a. 32.3
1980 17.290 118,000 43.8
1981 16.992 230,000 38.7
Source: Irrigation exp.= 1965-70 D.C. Taylor, 1971-81 Chamhuri 
HYV of Padi = 1965-69 Capule & Herdt, 1970-82 Chamhuri 
Fertiliser imports = A. Yunus ( 1984 ), p. 48 ( urea only )
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Fertiliser— Padi Price Ratio
Many economists believe that the fertiliser-product price ratio 
is important in determining whether farmers would use more or less 
fertilisers. Using more or less fertiliser as recoimnended by 
extension would invariably affect overall yield. A favourable ratio 
would encourage the consumption of more fertilisers. The ratio in 
effect defines the amount of rice or padi that would have to be 
exchanged for one kilogramme of fertiliser. If the product price is 
relatively more favourable than the fertiliser price, the ratio 
would be smaller and this would in general tend to encourage more 
use of fertiliser. This means that the price of fertiliser is 
relatively cheaper. In fact Taylor attributed the favourable 
fertiliser— padi price ratio of Malaysia to be one of the factors 
responsible for the high consumption of fertiliser in Malaysia.
[ 15 ] Prior to 1979 this ratio would have been less favourable as 
compared to post-1979 level. Generally, today the ratio is much in 
favour of fertiliser consumption because of the free fertilisers and 
also because the padi price is heavily subsidised. In Table 8.6 we 
derive the fertiliser— padi price ratio for Malaysia and correlate it 
with yield.
From Table 8.6 it is clear that as the fertiliser-product price 
ratio becomes more favourable, that is the ratio becomes smaller 
either due to an increase in padi price or due to a fall in price of 
fertiliser with padi price remaining constant, there should be a 
greater use of fertilisers. The enhanced use of fertiliser in the 
production process normally affects yield per hectare. This is 
especially true after the national fertiliser policy was introduced
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in 1979. The correlation between the fertiliser-product price ratio 
with yield may give us some clue as to their relationship. [ 16 ] 
Although price is a very important variable in explaining the 
demand for fertiliser, it is not the only one determining demand. 
Other factors of equal significance may include non-pricing factors 
like personal factors, institutional factors and technology. In this 
connection, it is important to know the price elasticity of demand 
of fertiliser in Malaysia. This is because it will give some 
indication whether subsidies policy is appropriate or not. If the 
demand for fertiliser is inelastic in the short run ( ie. a price 
increase will not lead to a proportionate decline in the amount 
demanded ), then it raises the question about the justification of 
subsidies.[ 17 ] Hence, the argument for subsidies in the short run 
would not be as strong as in the longer run since generally it will 
be more elastic. Secondly, if the demand for fertilisers on smaller 
and poorer farms is elastic even in the short run, the implication 
is that it could lead to less productive use of fertiliser 
resources. Hence, the only way to encourage farmers to continue 
using fertilisers would be to either give away free fertilisers 
( 100 % subsidy ) or give credit facilities to farmers to buy 
fertilisers. However, the usual classical remedy undertaken by most 
governments is to grant some sort of subsidy in the short run and 
remove it in the long run while the actual situation should have 
been the reverse where subsidies are more appropriate in the long 
run. According to Tamin, the price elasticity of fertiliser in 
Malaysia in the 1970s was 0.0535. [ 18 ]
3 0 1
TABLE 8.6; Derivation of Fertili3er-Padi Price Ratio
Year Fertiliser Price Padi Price F/P Ratio Yield 
........ cents / k g ........  (kg/ha)
1965 20.30 26.45 0.77 2500
1966 20.00 26.45 0.76 2400
1967 18.90 26.45 0.71 2300
1968 19.70 26.45 0.74 2500
1969 23.50 26.45 0.89 2600
1970 20.57 26.45 0.78
\
2600
1971 18.73 26.45 0.71 2800
1972 18.47 26.45 0.70 2700
1973 24.90 30.58 0.81 2900
1974 48.55 41.50 1.17 3000
1975 46.62 43.00 1.08 2800
1976 32.53 43.00 0.76 3000
1977 34.65 43.00 0.81 2800
1978 33.64 43.00 0.78 2700
1979 37.30 50.00 0.75 3100
1980 48.50 56.50 0.86 3300
1981 61.70 63.00 0.98 3300
1982 39.10 63.00 0.62 3200
1983 31.50 63.00 0.50 3200
1984 31.90 63.00 0.51 3200
Source: Figures from 1964-81 estimated from N. Kamil ( 1983 )
Figures from 1982-84 estimated from Economic Report ( 1982
302
This means that the short-run price elasticity of fertiliser in 
Malaysia was very small and inelastic. Therefore, according to the 
above argument, government policy of giving fertiliser subsidy in 
the short run is not efficient. However, since fertiliser policy in 
Malaysia has been instituted in various forms since the 1950s and is 
projected to continue in the foreseeable future, the policy is in
fact geared for the long run as well. If this is so, according to
the above argument, then fertiliser subsidy is efficient.
3.0 GUARANTEED MINIMUM PRICE
Introduction
The padi price subsidy evolved at about the same time as the 
fertiliser subsidies. However, the structure and mode of operation 
of price subsidies is more complicated than fertiliser subsidies.
The padi price subsidy originated as the support price which is 
otherwise known as the Guaranteed Minimum Price ( GMP ) and has
survived and maintained essentially its original features right to 
this day with a few modifications.
Malaysia has throughout its history been a net importer of rice 
because domestic supply could not cope with domestic demand. In 
normal times this situation is considered tolerable. However, during 
periods of emergencies and national calamities and world food 
shortages, the food security position of the country may be at 
stake. Hence, one of the earliest policy objectives of the 
government was to try to improve the food security position of the 
country by becoming self-sufficient. However, to implement this
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policy there was one major obstacle, namely the question of 
competition from efficient producers abroad who were able to sell 
cheap and quality rice. The government therefore had to protect 
local producers by restricting imports. In addition the government 
undertook to guarantee a floor price for padi sold by fanners to the 
government stockpile. [ 19 ] This led to the introduction of the 
GMP in 1949. Hence, the objective of the GMP when it was initially 
introduced was to protect local producers by ensuring a guaranteed 
price for their product. If there were no import restrictions, there 
was a likelihood that the local market would be flooded by cheap 
imported rice through dumping from abroad.
Technically, the GMP is a subsidy because it assures a price to 
the farmer which is higher than the world market price. Table 8.7 
outlines the historical trend of the GMP. Under the GMP, the 
government agreees to purchase padi from farmers at a guaranteed or 
a floor price which is above the world market price and to be 
delivered at the mill door. [ 20 ] Millers are also offered this 
price when they sell rice to the government provided that they buy 
padi from fanners at stipulated prices set by the government. Under 
the GMP, however, only padi that does not contain more than 13 % 
moisture content, free of dirt, empty grains, husk, straw or other 
foreign matter and the grains are fully matured will be entitled to 
get the full guaranteed price. [ 21 ] However, most farmers seldom 
qualify for the full floor price because they cannot fulfill this 
requirement.[ 22 J
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TABLE 8.7: Guaranteed Minimum Price, M$/picul (60.5 kg) of Padi 
Year___________Long Grain Medium Crain Short Grain_____Note
1949 15 - — GMP
1950/51 14 - - GMP
1951/52 15 - - GMP
1952/54 17 - - GMP
1954/55 12 - - GMP
1955/56 14 - - GMP
1956/57-1962/63 15 - - GMP
1963/64-1972/73 16 - - GMP
1973/74 23 21 19 MSP
1974/75 26 24 22 MSP
1975/76-1977/78 28 26 24 MSP
1978/79 30 28 26 MSP
10/1/80 30+(2) 28+(2) 26+(2) MSP+PPS
16/7/80-present 30+(10) 28+(10) 26+(10) MSP+PPS
Source : Chamhuri Siwar (1986); Soon-Chee Lee (1982), p. 154
This causes the floor price to be lowered through weight reductions 
as Table 8.8 shows. Notice that compared with that of Thailand, 
Malaysia adopts a relatively lenient criterion in allowing for 
deductions. One explanantion why the deduction rate is not so severe 
in the case of Malaysia is because of the strength and political 
leverage of the padi farmers. [ 23 ) Another explanation is that 
the LPN is the " buyer of last resort M and hence it is obliged to 
buy padi from the farmers even if they were of poor quality.
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TABLE 8.8: Comparision of Malaysian and Thailand Rate of Deduction
For Moisture Content
Moisture Content Malaysian Rate Thailand Rate
14 *
14.1* - 14.5* 
14.6* - 15.0* 
15.1* - 15.5* 
15.6* - 16.0* 
16.0* - 17.0* 
17.0* - 18.0* 
18.1* - 19.0* 
19.1* - 20.0* 
20.1* - 21.0* 
21.1* - 22.0* 
22.1* - 23.0* 
23.1* - 24.0* 
































Source: Auditor-General ( 1986 ), Appendix 4
The GMP is not static as Table 8.7 shows. The government in 
fact reviews it every year. In fixing the CMP, the government's main 
consideration is the cost of production and farmers' income 
position. [ 24 ] Since 1949, the GMP has increased by 100 * and is 
the highest in the world. [ 25 ] In 1974, the government decided to 
grant three categories of prices, namely for long grain, medium
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grain and short grain padi. In addition, in 1974 the GMP was 
slightly altered and is known as the Minimum Support Price ( MSP ).
A higher price was offered to farmers who planted long grain variety 
while a lower price was offered for the other varieties as seen from 
the table. Although the GMP / MSP may not change every year, the 
following factors may influence its rate
a) demand for rice in the local market
b) price of imported rice
c) price of padi compared to other crops like rubber, oil palm, etc.
For example, in 1954/55 due to a dramatic fall in the world 
price of rice because of a glut, the GMP was reduced to M$12 per 
picul ( 60.5 kg. ). On the other hand, in 1973/74 there was a sharp 
increase in the GMP ( M$19 - M$23 per picul ) due to a world 
shortage of rice. Hence, the GMP is always very sensitive to the 
world rice price.
How does the GMP mechanism work ? This may be illustrated with 
the help of simple demand and supply diagrams. In Figure 1(A), DDL 
and SSL is the demand and supply curve of locally produced rice.
Under perfect competition, price is determined at OP where supply
equals to demand. OQ quantity is demanded. Now assume that the
government introduces GMP above the free market price at 0P2. At 
this price, the quantity supplied is 0Q1. However, at this point 
consumers are willing to buy rice if the price is lowered to 0P1. 
Therefore, the rectangle represented by P2P1C1C2 represents a 











FIG. 1(A) LOCAL RICE
PI
P
0 Q I Q
FIG. 1(B) IMPORTED RICE QUANTITY
Fig. 8 A MODEL SHOWING HOW THE GUARANTEED M IN IM U M  P R IC E  WORKS
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In order to operate the GMP with least cost to the government and 
not increase staple food prices to consumers, it is important to 
know how to make up the deficit above. In Figure 1(B), DDI and SSI 
are the demand and supply curves for imported rice. Demand for 
imported higher quality rice is assumed to be inelastic ( because 
imported rice is a luxury item ). The supply price is the world 
price which is not affected by relatively small changes in demand 
from Malaysia. If there is no government intervention, OP is the 
market price and 0Q1 is the quantity supplied. With the introduction 
of GMP and import licensing, consumers now must pay higher price for 
the imported rice at 0P1. Consumers demand is 001 while the supply 
price remains unchanged at OP. Hence, the area covered by the 
rectangle P1C1C2P contributes to the difference between what 
consumers of imported rice pay and what producers get and represent 
a surplus needed to finance the deficit in Figure 1 (A). Hence, 
under the GMP there is an interpersonal income transfer from the 
relatively well-off consumers to the producers. This in fact 
represents a tax to the consumers.
The GMP has basically remained unchanged since its inception in 
1949. However, it has certain limitations as far as income 
distribution is concerned. Firstly, farmers rarely deliver padi to 
the LPN because they prefer to deal with the middlemen. This is 
because farmers have received credit from middlemen and hence they 
have to sell their crop to them at prices below the GMP. As a result 
farmers never receive the full GMP for their crop. Instead the 
middlemen are reaping some of the benefits themselves. The 
introduction of price subsidy plus GMP/MSP in 1979 will tend to
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worsen the problem of price received by the farmer as we have seen 
above. [ 26 ] In addition, although GMP augments income of farmers, 
there is a perverse redistributive effect through implicit taxation 
of rice which constitute major food staple item of population.
[ 27 ] It should be remembered that the system of GMP could only be 
self-financing as long as imports continue. This puts the government 
in a dilemma because its policy of complete self-sufficiency in rice 
production would mean reducing imports considerably. [ 28 ] In the 
light of .this and other considerations, e.g. Malaysia being a 
relatively high cost producer and who is able to buy cheaper and 
higher quality rice in the world market, the government made a 
decision to restrict self-sufficiency to about 50 - 55 % and 
letting the rest of the demand be met through imports. [ 29 ]
Hence, the viability of the policy of price subsidy could still be 
maintained cheaply.
4.0 PADI PRICE SUBSIDY / COUPON SUBSIDY
Introduction
In 1980 in addition to the prevailing GMP, the government 
introduced a padi price subsidy or the coupon subsidy. Hence, 
effectively the farmers got a higher price for their product. In 
addition to getting a GMP of M$466 per ton the farmers are getting 
an extra M$164 per ton as the price subsidy. One source suggested 
that the government undertook this policy measure because of an 
electoral pledge to improve the income position of the fanners.
[ 30 ] It was felt in many quarters that as the price of padi in 
the market had been relatively stagnant for many years, it was an
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appropriate time to raise the price of padi in 1980 when the 
financial position of the government was strong. However, the 
government was concerned that padi price increase would have a chain 
reaction in the economy and would lead to increase in the prices of 
other good3 and services. This would therefore nullify the padi 
price increase itself and farmers would not be better off than 
before. Bearing this in mind, the government decided to introduce a 
price subsidy which would come from the budget.
The specific objectives of this subsidy are as follows
a) to ensure that market price of rice is maintained at the present 
level for the benefit of the consumers
b) to ensure that fanners receive the full price for padi while at 
the same time encouraging them to save and invest their extra income
c) to ensure that farmers receive an income level that exceeded the 
poverty line income of M$300 per month.
Therefore, in January 1980 when the scheme was first announced 
a price subsidy of M$2.00 per picul ( 60.5 kg. ) was given. In July 
1980 it was increased to M$10.00 per picul. This made the effective 
producer price of padi M$40 - M$60 for every 100 kg. of rice sold.
( ie. GMP M$ 30 + M$ 16.54 for long grain )
We shall discuss the following aspects of the price subsidy:-
a) the administration of the subsidy and its problems
b) the extent it achieve its objectives
c) its effect on production
d) its effect on income distribution
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Administration of Subsidy Programme
We have noted that the padi price subsidy is the GMP plus a 
premium which is paid in the form of coupon. These coupons at the 
rate of M$16.54 per 100 kg. of padi sold can be cashed at stipulated 
financial institutions. To claim the coupon, farmers may either sell 
their padi directy to LPN or through their authorised agents. All 
that the farmers need to do to claim the coupon is to show LPN the 
official receipt of sales from the purchaser. The receipt normally 
contains the name and license number of the buyer, net weight of
moisture and the price paid. Note that all coupons worth less than
M$200 are paid in cash while those in excess of this amount are paid 
by cheque. However, coupons are not issued for the following:-
a) padi used by farmers for their own consumption
b) padi sold as seeds to Department of Agriculture
c) padi paid as zakat ( religious tithe )
d) padi sold to unlicensed traders
On paper the scheme looks tidy and neat. However, the main flaw 
of this scheme is its less than smooth implementation. We shall 
discuss some of the administrative problems of the scheme.
First, it is a cumbersome scheme to manage because there are 
many loopholes and abuses which may occur. For example, the 
procedures used to pay the subsidy is opened to abuse. Payments are 
based only on the production of a bill of purchase or a receipt. 
These receipts could be falsified by the private mills or even by 
the LPN subsidy clerks. Secondly, private mills could make double 
sales and claim the excess as subsidies. Thirdly, this system still 
' has to utilise the middlemen to buy padi from farmers who live in
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remote areas by granting licenses to them. Because of this they may 
not benefit fully from the subsidy because the middlemen make 
deductions for cost of transport, service charges, etc. Furthermore, 
there are many complaints from the farmers that payments of subsidy 
are often delayed. Although LPN have introduced the passbook system 
as a means to register only genuine farmers, this has not been 
foolproof to prevent abuses from the middlemen. [ 31 ] For example, 
according to the Auditor-General, fraud cases were committed by 
private millers, farmers and LPN staff. For example, between 1980- 
85, there were 190 cases involving more than M$2.4 million. Table 
8.9 below shows the number of fraud cases brought to court.
Among the control measures that have been suggested to overcome 
this problem include the investigation of farmers who receive 
excessive subsidy. As for the private millers, LPN must attempt to 
compare monthly padi purchased by private millers and coupons issued 
to them based on the coupon issue statement and to reconcile the 
difference.
TABLE 8.9: LPN - Summary of Fraud Cases - 1980-85 
Party Involved_______ Number_____Value(M$)
Private Millers 99 224,030
Licensed Buyers 13 91,825
Individual Farmers 78 131,554
Total 190 447,409
Source: Auditor-General (1986), Appendix 9
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Actually, the main difficulty of overcoming abuses in the present 
system is due to the difficulty of prosecution because of the 
absence of specific provisions in the LPN Act. But the most serious 
problem facing the government is the high cost of administering this 
scheme. In fact this has all along been the contention of the World 
Bank regarding the issue of subsidies, that it is generally 
inefficient and tends to waste resources. Therefore, it is very 
important to ensure that public money is well spent and that it 
achieve its objectives. In the next section, we shall try to assess 
to what extent padi price subsidy has achieved its objectives.
5.0 EFFECTIVENESS OF PADI PRICE SUBSIDY
If we were to scrutinise all the objectives of the subsidy 
scheme, it would be obvious that it was meant to safeguard the 
interests of both the consumers and the producers. We have seen that 
although the government appears to bear the burden of the price 
subsidy solely through its revenue, the subsidy is in fact financed 
indirectly through imports of rice and well-off consumers are in 
fact subsidising the poorer households. It is not actually true that 
the government bears the full burden of the subsidy. A point that is 
certainly emphasised by the government through this subsidy is its 
concern to improve the income and welfare of the producers. In this 
regard, we shall attempt to find out whether the following 
objectives have been achieved or not by this subsidy:-
a) whether all farmers did in fact receive the higher price (coupon 
subsidy) of padi ?
b) whether the intended increase in income through higher padi
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prices was able to uplift farmers from the poverty level of M$300 
per month ?
c) whether fanners were able to save and invest their perceived
extra income presupposing that (b) above was achieved ?
With regard to objective (a) only those fanners who were able 
to have a good harvest and a considerable market surplus would be 
able to benefit from the scheme. In this respect, not all farmers 
benefited equally. In fact there were non-fanners who also benefited 
greatly from the scheme. Therefore, those fanners who were 
consistently having good yields in previous years prior to the 
introduction of the subsidy would be able to benefit more this time 
round. Therefore, it would still not solve the problem of poor, 
small and landless fanners who continue to get low returns. It is 
in fact a case of " the rich getting richer and the poor getting 
poorer.” Some poor farmers do benefit marginally from the scheme as 
the next Chapter shows through selling the padi which they normally 
keep for own consumption. ( Normally, farmers would allocate a 
certain proportion of their harvest for own consumption ). But with 
the introduction of this scheme, the farmers perceived that it would 
be more profitable for them to sell all their padi and to buy rice 
instead from the open market. However, the disadvantage is that cash
income tend to be spent on non-food items. Hence, the increased *
commercialisation of subsistence farmers tend to make them worse-off 
than before. Therefore, it would be better for the welfare of the 
farmers if they were to resist the temptation to get the extra 
income from selling all their padi but instead to keep some padi for 
auto-consumption. [ 32 ]
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Table 8.10 clearly shows the beneficiary of the coupon subsidy 
from 1981 to 1984. In 1981 about 76 % of fanners received coupons 
valued at less than M$1000. This constituted about 25% of the value 
of coupons given out. About 40 % of fanners had received coupons 
valued at M$200 or less and about 21 % of farmers received coupons 
valued at between M$200-M$400. This means that fewer farmers receive 
the bulk of the coupon subsidy. It is commonly believed that bigger 
and richer farmers who have big surplus of padi to sell in the 
market are the main beneficiary of the scheme. In addition, 
middlemen and private millers who buy padi from the farmers and 
resell them to the LPN reap huge subsidies. In fact between 1st 
January and 15th July 1981, when the scheme was in its initial 
stages about 4,508 farmers received subsidy of more than M$2500 each 
while 43 fanners received subsidy of more than M$4500 each. [ 33 ] 
This cost the government about M$16.2 million. It is doubtful 
whether those who got the high subsidy payments were small fanners.
On the issue of the contribution of subsidies to eradicating 
poverty, from available evidence, it is quite clear that despite the 
presence of subsidies, most farmers are still living in poverty.
( see Chapter 5 for an elaboration on the concept of poverty in 
Malaysia ) However, it is true that in general subsidies have been 
able to improve the income position of the farmers. To prove this 
point we produce Tables 8.11 and 8.12 and 8.13.
For example, Shand, et. al. compared and contrasted two 
important rice growing regions in Malaysia, namely the MADA scheme 
in Kedah and KADA scheme in Kelantan. The former region is a high 
yielding irrigated area while the latter is a low yielding irrigated
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area. Table 8.11 summarises the findings of the study. In MADA, the 
contribution of subsidies to total household income was 42 % while 
for KADA it was 49 \. It is significant that although the average 
monthly income of household in MADA was M$441, which is above the 
poverty line income, ( estimated to be M$300 / month ) fanners in 
KADA earned an average monthly income of M$196, with subsidies 
contributing nearly half of this figure. Based on this, subsidies 
did contribute to increasing fanners earnings in KADA but not enough 
to push them above poverty levels. For MADA, many studies have found 
that the distribution of income in this region is very inequitable.
[ 34 ]
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TABLE 8.10: Number of Coupons Distributed & Their Values, *81-84* 
Value of No. of Coupon Distributed Value of Coupon(M$m)
Transaction 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984
<M$200 87000 81000 86000 83000 6.4 6.3 6.8 3.9
(40) (38) (38) (36) (4) (4) (4) (4)
200-400 46000 45000 51000 54000 15.1 14.7 16.8 17.8
(21) (21) (22) (24) (9) (9) (10) (11)
500-1000 34000 34000 38000 40000 24.6 24.1 27.4 28.7
(16) (16) (17) (18) (15) (14) (16) (18)
1000-2000 28000 28000 31000 31000 39.1 39.9 43.2 43.5
(13) (13) (13) (14) (23) (23) (25) (27)
2000-5000 27000 21000 21000 19000 62.3 64.4 61.5 54.7
(9) (10) (9) (8) (36) (37) (36) (34)
5000-10000 3200 3200 2300 1700 22.0 20.5 14.8 10.2
(2) (2) (1) (1) (13) (12) (9) (6)
>10,000 300 300 100 80 4.0 3.8 1.7 1.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.05) -CO. 1) (2.1) (2.1) (1.0) (0.6)
Source: Estimated from Economic Planning Unit ( 1985 ), Appendix 3 
Figure in paranthesis are percentages
Table 8.12 merely confirmed the findings of Shand, et. al. 
which found that both fertiliser and price subsidies contributed 
about 43 % of the annual income of farmers in KADA while padi 
income stood at about 43 % of farmers total net income. This 
finding tends to emphasise the significance of subsidies as an 
income redistribution mechanism. Therefore, if subsidies were to be 
withdrawn, the income position of farmers would be worse off.
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TABLE 8.11: Contribution of Subsidy Towards Income of Fanners
Items High Yield Irrig. Low Yield Irrig
   " --    RiceJ Farm(MADA) Rice Farm (KADA) r
Farm Land (hectares) 1.40 0.9
Yield (tons/ha.) 3.60 2.7
Receipt from Padi (M$466/ton) 4697 2283
Govt. Coupon Subsidy (M$164/ton) 1653 804
Gross Farm Income 6350 3087
Estimated Production Cost 1746 1045
Net Farm Income 4604 2042
Other Non-Farm Income 691 306
Total Household Income 5295 2348
H/H Income Per Month 441 196
H/H Income Per Capita Per Month 86 40
Tot. Sub. (Coupon + Fertiliser) 2213 1164
Tot. Sub. As % of Total H/H Income 42 49
Tot. Sub. As % of Net Farm Income______ 48_________________ 57
Source: R. T. Shand, M. A. Hussein & M. A. Rahman (1982), p. 472
Table 8.13 gives the official government statistics on the the 
poverty rate of farmers. It shows that poverty rate has fallen from 
88 % in 1970 to 54 % in 1983 and is forecast to fall to 30 % in 
1990. We can clearly see that the fall in poverty rates in the years 
mentioned above was accompanied by increasing subsidisation of 
farmers.
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TABLE 8.12: Comp, of Padi Farmers Net Annual Income in MADA. 1982
Source_____________________________Amount (M$) (%)
Net Value of Padi Sale
( sales less cost of production) 1,528 42.8
Padi Price Subsidy Received 1,036 29.0
Value of Fertiliser Subsidy Received 513 14.4
Miscellaneous Agricultural Income 85 2.4
Non-Agricultural Cash Income 405 12.4
Total 3.567 100.0
Source: MADA, Muda II Impact Evaluation Survey Series
TABLE 8.13: Poverty Rate Among Fanners, GMP and Price Subsidy 
Item/Year__________1970 1975 1980 1983_____1990 (forecast)
Total H/H('000) 140 149 151 139 133
Tot.Poor Padi H/H 123 114 83 75 40
% Poor Padi H/H 88 77 55 54 30
% of Poor H/H 16 14 13 11 8
GMP + Subsidy(^) 16 24-28 28-32 38-40 -
Source: Third Malaysia Plan, Fourth Malaysia Plan, Mid-Term Review 
of Fourth Malaysia Plan
For example, in 1970 subsidies constituted about 16 % of 
farmers* income while in 1983 it increased to 40 %. This shows that 
the fall in poverty was mainly due to subsidies. However, the number 
of padi households in poverty is still high despite the government’s 
effort to assist this sctor. This reflects the lack of success of 
strategies to fight poverty. For example, a study undertaken by the
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National University of Malaysia in 1986 of 1000 fanners in four 
areas of Malaysia found that the effect of subsidy on poverty was 
only marginal. The study concluded that subsidy alone cannot 
effectively reduce the poverty level so long as a large proportion 
of fanners* income come from the farm. [ 35 ] This means that 
farmers have to rely on off-farm income for a big proportion of 
their earnings in order to overcome the problem of poverty in padi 
farming. [ 36 ]
In fact there is a strong case for raising the price subsidy 
above the 1979 rate. Padi prices have actually been stagnant and 
lagged behind the general rise in consumer prices. Hence, granting 
of a price subsidy is simply one method of returning farmers to 
their earlier earning capacity. In this connection, it is worth 
mentioning that any transfer payments from the urban to the rural 
sector is justified provided that a substantial proportion of the 
payment goes to the target poor group. The problem with the existing 
subsidies is that unintended beneficiaries are reaping the subsidies 
and also bigger farmers benefit more than the smaller fanners 
leading to situation of inequitable income distribution.
Hence, the decline of farmers to a worse off situation is 
hindered by the provision of subsidies. [ 37 ] However, the 
implications of this are serious. Firstly, there are limits as to 
the use of subsidy as an instrument because at best it could only 
remain temporary. Secondly, it implies an ominous and dangerous 
position for the future welfare of the farmers. Thirdly as to the 
point whether farmers have been able to save and invest after price 
subsidies have been introduced, from the above discussion it is
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obvious that it would not be possible for this to happen. Table 8.16 
shows this.
TABLE 8.14: Price Subsidy - Coupons Issued & Cashed. P. Malaysia 
Year Issuance Cashed
_______No. Issued M$(*000) No. Cashed M$(*000) % Coupon Cashed
1980 958,317 88,071 863,932 83,335 94.6
1981 1,251,511 175,849 1,281,958 173,715 98.8
1982 1,157,238 167,199 1,165,917 173,308 103.7
1983 966,357 172,981 1,053,042 169,131 97.8
1984 901,008 155,958 910,972 170,684 109.4
1985 935.541 195.796 920.787 189.796 96.9
Source: Estimated from data provided by Ministry of Public 
Enterprise, (1986) Personal Communication. Figures in brackets are 
percentages.
From Table 8.14, it is clear that almost all the coupons that 
were claimed by the farmers ( or non-farmers ) were cashed and 
virtually nothing was saved or invested. For example, in 1980 about 
95 % of the coupons were cashed while in 1985 it rose to about 
97 %. In this regard, it is important to remark that the beneficiary 
of the coupon subsidy have a choice either to cash the coupon or 
saved it. Hence, we can conclude that padi price subsidies have not 
been successful in enabling farmers to increase their savings or 
investment. In reality farmers prefer cash rather than investing 
their money because they do not have any surplus. Therefore the 
objective to encourage farmers to save and invest from their " extra
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income " from the price subsidy was based on the assumption that 
the price subsidy was an adequate instrument to improve the income 
position of the farmers. This assumption is proved to be false and 
too simplistic.
Production Effect of Price Subsidy
Although the objectives of the padi price subsidy is not 
concerned primarily with allocative but rather with redistributive 
issues, it is still important to find out what the production 
response of farmers have been. This is important because although 
output increases has not been explicitly stated to be one of the 
objectives, we can consider it to be an implicit assumption of the 
government when it introduced this policy. This can be stated 
because by introducing this subsidy the government would expect the 
farmers to produce a greater market surplus for sales. A greater 
market surplus can only be derived from a greater output response 
from farmers. An empirical answer to this will be attempted in the 
next chapter but here we shall analyse some of the issues involved 
by looking at secondary information derived from official statistics 
and discussing the cost of this policy to the nation.
It is contended that losses incurred by LPN in managing the 
stockpile and purchasing surpluses from the farmers through the 
price subsidy programme is a great burden to the nation. The padi 
price subsidy encourages fanners to sell all their padi instead of 
retaining and processing some themselves for their own consumption. 
According to the Auditor-General the padi subsidy scheme encourage 
farmers to sell wet and dirty padi in view of the gains to be
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derived since the payment of subsidy is based on the weight of padi. 
Hence because of the willingness of LPN to buy all types of padi 
regardless of quality and payment of subsidy, farmers and middlemen 
do not bother to safeguard the quality of padi for sale. Hence, LPN 
buys all the low grade padi to produce low grade rice which is less 
in demand. Therefore LPN cannot sell this rice and make huge losses. 
Table 8.15 indicates the losses incurred by LPN in holding low 
quality rice stocks.
TABLE 8.15: Losses by LPN in Disposing Locally Purchased Rice-,81-84
Year_______Sales______Cost of Sale3______Frod./Mgnt Cost Loss
................  (M$ million) .....
1981 163.9 155.6 24.1
1982 130.4 141.2 43.4
1983 144.2 160.3 47.2
198 4_______ 121.0__________ 103.1_____________ 45.6
Source: Auditor-General (1986), p. 11
Another way to look at this problem is by comparing domestic 
production data with that of import data as Table 8.16 attempts to 
do. From Table 8.16, it is quite clear that despite the existence of 
the padi price subsidy introduced in 1980, domestic rice production 
has continued to drop while imports has increased quite rapidly.
This is despite the increase in yield as shown in Table 8.6. In fact 
yield increase could be attributed to the use of high yielding 
varieties and other technologies associated with the Green 






cultivation have dropped, total production has followed suit.
( This meant that total production was sustained in the past through 
acreage increase ). In fact the self-sufficiency level has dropped 
from a high of 90 % to less than 60 %. In fact according to the 
World Bank, padi production in Malaysia have been constant since 
1974 when the two massive irrigation projects of MADA and KADA were 
completed. [ 38 ] Although padi price subsidy is not the sole 
factor in determining output growth, its effect on output increase 
seems to be negligible. This strengthens its role therefore as a 
redistributive rather than allocative mechanism.
TABLE 8.16 : Rice Imports and Production - P. Malaysia. 1975-84 












Source: Tan Soo Hoey ( 1986 ), Appendix 2; EPU ( 1985 ), Table 4.
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6.0 REGRESSION ANALYSTS OF INPUT AND OUTPUT SUBSIDIES
In this section, we shall attempt, to estimate the 
contribution of both fertiliser subsidy and padi price subsidy 
using multiple regression analysis on :-
a) Total production function
b) Rice yield function.
We shall attempt to estimate the above functions by 
utilising two alternative models for each function, namely the 
linear-additive and the log-linear or the familiar Cobb-Douglas 
model. Time series data for- 22 observations, namely from 1.965 
till 1986 are obtained from official publications. We shall 
consider both linear and log-linear models in our estimation and 
see which of the two estimates is more significant in explaining 
variations in the dependent variable. From the estimates, we 
shall be able to make some observation as to the effectiveness of 
the government's subsidy policies. Below we shall discuss the 
specification of each model and description of its variables.
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Total Production Function
The model stipulated takes the form of the following
TP = f (TAC, FS, PRICE SUB, YPH, RAIND, IRREXP), where,
TP = Total production ('000 m.tons)
TAC = Total acreage ('000 hectares)
FS = Fertiliser Subsidy (M$/ha.)
PRICE SUB = Price Subsidy ($M/ton)
YPH = Yield per hectare (tons/ha)
RAIND = Rainfall Index (1969 = 100)
IRRIEXP = Total Operating Expenditure on Irrigation
(M$ Million)
We hypothesise that aggregate total output of padi 
depends on six independent variables. The choice of explanatory 
variables is dictated by the availability and access to data.
The independent variables included in the model are total acreage, 
price subsidy, average yield per ha, rainfall index, total 
operating and maintenance cost for irrigation facilities and the 
fertiliser subsidy. In this model, we shall attempt to find out 
specifically the contribution of price subsidy and fertiliser 
subsidy in total output. The estimating regression model is 
specified below
i) Y = A + blXl + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6
ii) logY = a + logblXl + logb2X2 + logb3X3 + logb4X4 + logb5X5 + logb6X6
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The total production of padi is hypothesised to be a 
function of aggregate acreage in all seasons. Hence, the greater 
the area under production the more will total output occur. 
Hence, the estimated coefficient is expected to have a positive 
sign. Another possible factor which is likely to influence 
aggregate output would be the yield variable. The greater the 
yield per unit area the greater would be overall production. 
Hence, the expected sign is again positive. However, we are also 
interested to find out the effect of padi price subsidy on total 
output. Theoretically, price subsidies may enhance production 
increase per farm unit but not necessarily in the aggregate. 
Hence, the expected result is that this variable would be 
significant in influencing total output. As for fertiliser 
subsidy, the effect is again expected to be similar to price 
subsidies. Hence, both these variable are expected to have 
positive signs. The total expenditure on irrigation should have 
positive effect on total output while the rainfall index would 
probably be neutral since this is a double cropped area.
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TABT.E 8.1.7 j_ Result of Regression Analysis on Total 
Production (bog-Iilnear Function)
Independent
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant, (a) 0.4338 0.6041
( 0.7181)
Acreage, (b) 0.9473 0.0714
(13.2669)
Fertiliser 0.0097 0.0248
Subsidy, (bl) ( 0.3908)
**
Price 0.0738
Subsidy, (b2) ( 1.9098) 0.0386
Yield, (b3) 0.9458 0.0970
( 9.7468)
Rainfall, (b4) -0.0678 0.0919
(-0.7380)
Irrigation, (b5) -0.0198 0.0122
(-1.6253)
* = Significant at 1%
* = Significant at 5%
(T - Statistics are in paranthesis) 
R - Squared = 0.98
Adjusted R - Squared = 0.97 
DW Stats = 2.64
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Table 8.17 gives the result of the regression analysis. This 
model managed to explain more than 90% of total variation in the 
dependent variable even after considering the adjusted R-squared. 
As anticipated, the acreage variable have the expected positive 
sign and effect on influencing total output. Tt has a positive 
sign and the coefficient is highly significant at 1%. A 1.0% 
increase in acreage tend to increase total production by 9%. The 
policy implication of increasing total production is clearly by 
opening of more land acreage for production. However, the policy 
option in this direction is definitely restricted since there is 
an overall constraint in the availability of suitable new areas 
for padi production. In fact the government has a clear policy of 
restricting padi production to the so-called granary areas. In 
addition to being a costly venture, the government has decided in 
the National Agriculture Policy that the target of rice self- 
sufficiency should be set around 50-60% only rather than 100%.
As a result of the above fact, additional burden would 




Yield or productivity-related strategies normally 
attention of planners in their zeal for greater
production. In this regard the yield coefficient is able to 
offer some insights because it has a positive sign at the 1% 
significance level. A .1.0% increase in yield tend to increase 
total production by 9%. In fact the emphasis of the government 
all along have been in adopting strategies especially through 
research in HYV.
As for subsidy effects, it is noteworthy to observe 
that price subsidy is quite significant in explaining production 
increases. A 10% increase in price subsidy would lead to a 1% 
increase in production. This is the expected incentive effect of 
the price subsidy in increasing production, although the original 
intention of the subsidy was for redistributive purposes. Hence, 
the price subsidy policy would be justified if it were to be 
sustained. The coefficient for fertiliser subsidy cannot but lead 
to the conclusion that this subsidy needs its implementation much 
to be improved so as to achieve its desired objective. But as it 
stands fertiliser subsidy has not been able to enhance total 
national production as its original intention warranted. The 
other variables like rainfall and irrigation have not been able to 
assist much in the interpretation. Hence, it is clear from this 
analysis that price subsidy have a positive effect while 
fertilizer subsidy does not seem to have any effect.
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Rice Yield Function
The purpose of this regression is to find out which 
variables are significant in affecting rice yield and specifically 
whether subsidies have any influence. The simple model used in 
the regression stipulates the following :-
YRAS = f (PRICESUB, FS, RAIN, IRR, DUMMY),
where,
YRAS = Rice yield ( ton/ha )
PRICESUB= Price subsidy (M $ /Kg)
FS = Fertiliser subsidy (M $ / ha)
RAIN = Rainfall Index (1975 = 100)
IRR = Irrigation Expenditure (M$ m)
DUMMY = Drought dummy where 1977 = 1, other years = 0
We hypothesise that rice yield depends on five
independent variables. The choice of explanatory variable is 
constrained by the availability and access to data. Hence, 
variables like soil fertility and proportion of high-yielding 
varieties used have to be excluded although they are important 
factors in influencing total output because information is not 
easily available. Moreover, this kind of data are more easily 
available for cross-section data analysis employed in micro
studies. The available time series data include price subsidy,
fertiliser subsidy, rainfall, irrigation and the drought dummy.
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TABT.E 8.1.8 j_ Result of Regression Analysis on Rice 
Yields(Dog-Linear Function)
Independent















Rainfall, (b2) - 0.0933
(- 0.4095)
0.2279
Irrigation, (b3) - 0.0377 
(-1.4220)
0.0265
Dummy, (b4) - 0.1926 
( - 2.5949)
0.0742
* = Significant at 1%
(T - Statistics are in paranthesis) 
R - Squared = 0.71
Adjusted R - Squared = 0.62 
DW =1.8
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Table 8.18 gives the result of the analysis. Out of five
variables, only two are significant in explaining yield. These 5
variables account for 62% of the total variation in the dependent 
variables. The first significant variable is price subsidy. A 
10% increase in price subsidy would lead to a 2% increase in
yield. This positive effect of price subsidy is quite consistent 
when compared to the production function analysis analysed
earlier. Another variable which is quite significant is the
drought dummy. A prolongation period of drought would lead to a 
reduction in yield. Fertiliser subsidy is again not able to
explain yield increases. Consistent with the earlier analysis on
production increase, fertiliser subsidy seems not to have any 
effect either on yield and hence production. The policy 
implication is therefore clearly to review the viability of this 
subsidy although the practical measure of removing or phasing out 
an existing subsidy would need a highly strong willed political 
decision. A more moderate and pragmatic effort would be to review 
the implementation of the fertiliser subsidy.
6.0. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have seen in the above discussion that farmers in 
Malaysia are very dependent upon government's assistance. This 
is especially true in terms of assistance in input and output
subsidies. We have attempted to analyse both subsidy types and 
have come to the following general findings:-
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1. The national fertiliser subsidy scheme was introduced in 1979 
whereby padi farmers obtained free fertilisers amounting to M$232 
per hectare. Each farmer is entitled to get a maximum subsidy 
equivalent to 2.4 hectares. The government have spent about M$523 
million on fertiliser subsidy between 1979 and 1985. It is 
envisaged that the level of fertiliser utilisation by farmers have 
increased greatly. However, the results, of the regression 
analysis showed that fertiliser subsidy did not seem to have any
positive effect on yield or production increases. Hence, there is
a need for the government to review the implementation of this
subsidy.
2. Padi price subsidy was introduced in Malaysia since 1946. 
The main objective of this subsidy is to improve the income 
position of the farmers without increasing the price of rice to 
the general population. However, the abuses inherent in the
• system plus its inequitable distribution tendencies tend to make it 
ineffective as an income redistribution mechanism. Hence, small 
farmers only tend to benefit marginally from this subsidy while 
non-farmers seem to benefit a great deal from it. [38] In
addition, although the income position of farmers have improved
due to the positive effect of padi price subsidy, the poverty 
level of farmers is still high. However, the results of the
regression analysis showed that padi price subsidy was 
responsible for effecting yield increases and total production 
expansion. Hence, the supply response of farmers to price subsidy 
have been positive.
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In the next chapter, we will be able to analyse the effect 
of both fertiliser subsidy and padi price subsidy more rigorously 
due to the availability of data obtained from the survey.
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CHAPTER NINE
IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES IN MALAYSIAN AGRICULTURE - 
EVIDENCE FROM PADI SECTOR : A MICRO PERSPECTIVE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is complementary to the last chapter. Here, we 
will use primary data from a survey conducted in a padi area in 
Malaysia to analyse the allocative and redistributive effects of 
subsidies. We will also analyse farmers' atttitude to subsidies.
Objective of Chapter
The analysis of this chapter will be on the same lines as 
Chapter 8, except the addition of a section on farmers' attitudes to 
subsidies which was not possible to do before due to the absence of 
data. Specifically, we will cover the following aspects
a) Socio-economic characteristics of Krian farmers
b) Analysis of padi fertiliser subsidy
c) Analysis of padi price subsidy
d) Analysis of farmers' attitude to subsidies
e) Findings-and; Conclusions
2.0 CHOICE OF AREA STUDIED
For the survey, we have chosen an area adjacent to the rubber 
belt of Perak called Krian located in north-west of Peninsular 
Malaysia. We have chosen this area for the following reasons
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a) It is one of the oldest and most important rice growing areas in 
Malaysia,
b) It is one of the seven officially designated rice bowl areas of 
Malaysia,
c) It was convenient for the author to choose this area because it
was in the vicinity where survey on rubber smallholders was held,
d) It is less intensively studied compared to the MUDA and KADA.
Figures 1 and 2 present the location map of the state of Perak 
and the Krian region. The Krian Irrigation Scheme was completed in 
1906 and is one of the oldest in the country. The scheme serves 
about 24,014 hectares of padi land comprising 22,024 hectares in 
Krian District and 1,496 hectares in Sg. Acheh in adjoining Province
Wellesley in the state of Penang. The original irrigation works were
designed for cultivation of a single crop but in 1960 the project 
was improved to cater for double cropping. However, due to serious 
technical problems which are yet to be resolved, farmers in Krian 
are only able to plant three crops in two years rather than than the 
two-crop per year norm.
In the sample survey, a questionnaire was designed and used 
to extract the following information :-
a) socio-economic status of farmers
b) details of inputs and output in padi farming
c) details of padi price subsidy
d) attitudes of farmers towards subsidies, and
e) marketing behaviour of farmers.
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A sample of the questionnaire can be seen in the Appendix. A 
stratified random sample method was used to choose 75 farmers as 
respondents. The distribution of respondent farmers can be seen in 
Table 9.1.
TABLE 9.1: Distribution of Respondents in the Sample Survey, Krian. 






The Area office of the Farmers* Organisation Authority or Pusat 
Pertubohan Peladang ( PPK ) located in Parit Buntar assisted in the 
locating of farmers and provided various facilities to the author in 
the course of the survey such as transportation, field assistants, 
office space, etc. Although 100 farmers were initially identified to 
be interviewed, only 75 respondents were chosen in four locations. 
The author personally interviewed all farmers from 8 September till 
23 September 1986.
As in the rubber survey, it needs to be stated at the outset 
that there are many limitations in the data and information 
generated from the survey. The most serious is the problem of 
questionnaire design and the reliability of responses given by 
respondents. Due to these problems, there is a possibility that some 
of the findings from the study may be inaccurate and give a
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distorted view of the actual situation. However, we have tried to 
minimise this problem by validating the data from other similar 
studies and getting feedbacks from agricultural officials in the 
field on fanners* responses. Through this method, we hope that the 
study would not be a futile activity and thus able to make a 
positive contribution to the continuing quest to understand how 
effective subsidy policies have been as well as how farmers behave.
3.0 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES OF KRIAN FARMERS
In this section, we shall briefly outline the features of Krian 
farmers while details could be referred from the Statistical 
Appendix. Appendix Table 1 shows that the age profile of farmers in 
Krian was middle-aged. For example, more than 72 % of farmers were 
above 45 years old while about 28 % were above 55 years old.
Appendix Table 2 shows that the educational level of farmers were 
very low. Appendix Table 3 shows that family size was big with 78 % 
of fanners having between 4 - 9  members. Appendix Table 4 shows that 
although padi cultivation was a full time job for the majority of 
farmers in Krian, they also resorted to other jobs to supplement 
their income. Appendix Table 5 shows that other agriculture and 
petty jobs constitute more than 60 % of supplementary activities of 
farmers. Appendix Table 6 shows that the average number of working 
experience of fanners was 29 years and about 60 % of farmers have 
cultivated padi between 21 to 40 years. Appendix Table 7 shows that 
about 96 % of farmers are members of the Area Fanners*
Organisation. Appendix Table 8 shows that owner-tenant category 
constituted about 51 % of landholding followed by pure-tenant and
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owner-operator. Appendix Table 9 and 10 shows that most of the land 
worked in Krian was small averaging about 2.0 ha. in 1986. Appendix 
Table 11 shows that in the absence of mechanisation, most activities 
were done manually by family labour.
From this brief account we can note that farmers in this region 
face many difficulties and constraints which are both physical and 
institutional in nature and which will affect their level of 
productivity. For example, although Krian has been a traditionally 
important granary area, the technical constraints of the region have 
prevented it from practising full double cropping. Family labour is 
still the main form of labour although hired labour played an 
important part during the harvesting period. Another major 
constraint of this region is the inability to practice 
mechanisation due to unfavourable soil conditions. Therefore, in 
view of these factors, we believe that Krian has a limited potential 
unless the region undergo radical changes in its physical setting 
and its institutional format. For example, it would be necessary to 
extensively improve the irrigation structure through major 
engineering works. In addition, it would be necessary to ensure a 
favourable land-labour ratio, the planting of two-crops a year 
instead of three crops in two years, the solution to the problem of 
aged labour and other structural changes which would attempt to 
transform this semi-subsistence region to a fully commercialised 
one. In the absence of these necessary changes, Krian would remain a 
peripheral and traditional semi-subsistence padi region and 
henceforth would only play a limited role as a major rice producer 
in the country.
4.0 EFFECT OF FERTILISER SUBSIDY 
Introduction
In the previous chapter we have discussed and analysed the 
origin of fertiliser policy in Malaysia up to the introduction of 
the National Fertiliser Scheme in 1979. In this section, we shall 
discuss and analyse the following
a) use of resource inputs in padi cultivation
b) production, yield and profitability of padi cultivation
Use of Resource Inputs in Padi Cultivation
In the production of padi, various inputs need to be utilised 
and combined to produce an output. Chemical fertilisers applied to 
padi are just one of many inputs although the natural fertility of 
the soil is sufficient to produce an output though a small one. 
However, the use of high yielding varieties and other Green 
Revolution type of technology plus irrigation facilities necessitate 
the use of great amounts of chemical fertilisers to enhance crop 
yield. Therefore, we cannot discuss the effect of fertiliser in 
isolation but rather the whole input package. However, in the last 
part of the chapter we will try to isolate the effect of fertiliser 
on yields through regression analysis.
In this part, we shall tabulate survey findings on resource use 
in padi cultivation in Krian district. This includes use of 
conventional but essential inputs like seedlings, fertilisers, 
insecticides and pesticides, machinery, and labour.
Table 9.2 shows that before 1978 most of the padi varieties 
used by farmers were of the traditional type where Mat Candu was the
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most popular. However, the high yielding variety produced by MARDI 
( MR series ) was the most popular variety used in 1986 (over 56 X ). 
The increased usage of the MR varieties may be attributed to the 
extension efforts of the Department of Agriculture. It is also 
interesting to note that some varieties of padi developed by the 
farmers are quite popular in 1986. For example the variety known as 
M Sha’ari " which is a product of farmers* own breeding from Kedah 
constituted about 32 X of usage in Krian. As to sources of supply of 
seeds, Table 9.3 shows that over 70 X of farmers’ seedlings came 
from their own stocks and purchases.
TABLE 9.2: Distribution of Type of Seedlings Planted. 1978 A 1986
Type of Seeds 1978 1986
No. X No, X
Mat Candu 61 81.3 - -
Mahsuri 6 8.0 - -
Seraup 4 5.3 - -
Sha’ari - 24 32.0
MR 77 - 30 40.0
MR 55 - 5 6.7
MR 52 - 4 5.3
Other MR series - 12 16.0
Others TV series 4 5.3 - -
Total 75 100.0 75 100.0
Tables 9.4 and 9.5 give information on fertiliser utilisation 
pattern and sources of supply. We have seen in Chapter 8 that padi
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fanners in Malaysia used relatively greater amount of fertilisers 
than their counterparts in other countries in Southeast Asia even 
before the introduction of the free fertiliser scheme in 1979.
Before 1979, fertiliser was only subsidised at 30 % of the market 
price and farmers had to acquire their supply from authorised 
retailers including LPP. As a result, more than 90 % of farmers used 
some proportion of fertiliser. Table 9.4 shows that the average 
amount spent per hectare on fertilisers before the National 
Fertiliser Scheme in 1979 was about M$65.00 per ha. but when free 
fertiliser was made available after 1979, all the farmers claimed 
to use fertilisers at the recommended rate valued at M$232.00 per 
ha. Assuming that all the fertilisers given to fanners were 
utilised, the application rate would be very high indeed and 
logically, there certainly should have been a marked increase in 
output. But certainly fertiliser subsidy enabled farmers to have a 
greater supply of fertiliser. Whether all the fertilisers were used 
or not is another question.
TABLE 9.3: Sources of Padi Seedlings. 1986
Sources No %
Agric. Dept. 4 5.3
Barter 10 13.3





Table 9.6 shows that tlie majority of farmers in Krian invested 
a considerable amount to purchase other inputs like pesticides and 
weedicides. Although the average expenditure on pesticides remained 
about the same for the two years at M$5.00, weedicide expenditure 
increased by 42 % t i.e. from M$24.00 in 1978 to M$34.00 in 1986.
This was possible because farmers are now able to use their capital 
to purchase these inputs instead of fertiliser.
TABLE 9.4: Whether Farmers Use Fertilisers & Amount Spent. *78 & *86
Response__________1978_________________________1986
______________Noj______ % Ave. M$_____No. % Ave M$
Use 73 97.3 65.00 75 100 232.00
Not use 2 2.7 - -
Total 75 100.0  75 100
TABLE 9.5: Source of Fertiliser Supply 1978 & 1986
Source_____________________1978________________1986
________________________Nor._______ %_______No.________ %
100 % subsidy - 75 100
Bought from retailer 75 100
Total__________________ 75_______100_______75_______ 100
TABLE 9.6: Average Expenditure on Inputs / Ha. 1978 & 1986 ( M$ )
Year_________Fertiliser Pesticide Weedicide
1978 65.00 5.00 24.00
1986__________ 232.00________5J)0_______ 34.00
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TABLE 9.7: Use of Insecticide and Pesticide, 1978 St 1986
Response_____________1978________________ 1986
No.________%________Nq,__________ \
68 90.7 71 94.7
7 9.3 4 5.3
75______100_________75_________100.0




Not use 75 100.0 75 100.0
Total_________75________ 100.0_____ 75________ 100.0
We have seen that heavy machinery cannot be used in Krian. 
Table 9.8 confirms this fact. This situation is related to the non- 
coinpletion of the irrigation scheme which would have enabled the 
fields to be irrigated all year round instead of being flooded and 
hence contributing to the deterioration of the land condition. 
Consequently, the low level of mechanisation of this region has been 
a detrimental factor to enabling it to become an important rice bowl 
region in the country vis a vis the other rice producing areas.
Table 9.9 shows the labour use pattern and distribution in 
Krian in terms of person-days. It can be clearly seen that 
harvesting took up the bulk of available person-days followed by 
maintenance work of the fields. Under maintenance work the 





Out of 150 person-days, family labour constituted about 56 % of 
person-days used followed by hired labour at 34 % and gotong-royong 
or cooperative labour at 10 %. In total, family labour took up about 
56 %, hired labour by 34 % and the rest by only 10 %.
Item Family Lab Hired Lab
i v
Coop Lab Person-Days
Land Preparation 20 10 - 30
Nursery Stage 5 - - 5
Transplanting 10 10 5 25
Fertilising,Weeding 
& Chemical Spray 30 5 _ 35
Harvest & Threshing 10 20 10 45
Winnowing,Cleaning 
Drying & Storing 10 5 15
Total Person-Davs 85(56%) 50(34%) 15(10%) 150(100%)
Amount paid / per person day M$8.44.
Note:
- % contribution of hired labour on an average farm size of 2.5 ha. 
or less is between 34 - 40 %, but percentage of hired labour 
increases if farm size also increases. Percentage increases is also 
marked if padi is not the main occupation of the farmer.
- Total person-days per season per hectare in Krian is comparatively 
higher than other padi areas, for example Kedah/Perlis due mainly to 
low level or virtual absence of mechanisation in this area.
- Imputed value of family labour is between M$6 - M$7 / person-day.
- Gotong royong labour ( cooperative labour ) is considered to have
353
a similar value, i.e. to cover cost of food and cigarette 
- Estimated cost of hired labour is as follows:-
a) for land preparation at M$25 / person-day / ha.
b) for transplanting ( for women ) at M$12.35 / person-day / ha. 
for fertilising and chemical spraying at M$25 / person-day / ha.
d) for weeding ( women ) at M12.35 / person-day / ha.
e) for harvesting using the the " pawah system " or crop sharing 
agreement in the ratio of 10 : 2
TABLE 9.10: Component of Labour Cost in Padi Cultivation. 1986





Fertilising 8t spraying 4.94
Weeding 5.58
Harvesting & Threshing 29.82
Winnowing, Cleaning,
Drying & Storing 5.55
Total____________________100.0
Table 9.10 shows the component of labour cost in padi 
cultivation in Krian. The purpose of tabulating this result is to 
arrive at an estimate of the labour costs in Krian by imputing the 
labour costs of family labour.
354
~ Since the level of labour usage in Krian was relatively higher and 
the use of machinery was negligible, the cost of labour in Krian was 
relatively higher than in other parts of the country. In addition, 
the Table also confirmed the trend of labour utilisation that land 
preparation and harvesting took up the bulk of labour costs which 
was about 60 % of the total labour costs.
Production. Yields and Profitability Analysis of Padi Cultivation 
In this section, we shall analyse the following
a) cost of padi production
b) returns from padi production based on productivity and 
profitability analysis and we shall estimate the following
- yield per hectare
- return from farm labour and management
- return from farm labour, management and land
- return to one man-day labour
- yield for each kg. of fertiliser applied
- return for each kg. of fertiliser applied
- return for each M$1.00 expenditure on fertiliser
Table 9.11 shows the budget expenditure figures on a per 
hectare basis for two time periods, 1978/79 and 1986/87 main 
planting seasons. For comparative purposes, figures for 1978/79 were 
derived from Fatiraah ( 1983 ) while figures for 1986/87 were 
calculated from the survey results. It is very clear from the Table
that although variable and fixed costs for 1986/87 season have
increased, net return was still higher at M$822.32 per season/ha 
mainly because output and price have increased.
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TABLE 9.11: Budget Expenditure Per Ha. of Padi Land Cultivated
1978/79 1986/87
Qty. M$ Otv. M$
(A) VARIABLE COST
Prepare land (tractor) - 123.25 - -
Seedlings (kg) 21.13 8.88 15.24
Fertiliser (kg)
- nursery stage 11.14 59.85 16.51 10.00
- growing stage 98.95 154.36
- mature stage 56.14 101.88
Pesticide - 19.11 29.84
Weedicide - 26.65 - 40.62
Combined Harvester - - - -
Labour
- Total man-days 154.35 150.00
- Wages 125.78 430.50*
(B) FIXED COST
Land Rental 322.17 315.00
Land tax & irri. rates - - - 10.00
TOTAL COST 685.69 851.20
VALUE OF OUTPUT(kg) 1932 908.04 2595 1673.52
( GROSS INCOME )
NET RETURN 222.35 822.32
(yield x price)-(A+B)
* - M$8.44 x 150 man-days x 34 % ( hired labour )
Note: 1978/79 figures quoted from Fatimah Arshad ( 1983 )
Note for costs in 1986
1) - There is no marked increase in rental charges on land because 
system of tenancy is based on kinship relations
- For owner-operated land, the net return or income from padi 
increase by 38.3 % (M$1673.52 - M$536.20 = M$1137.32 ), i.e. 
compared to overall net return of M$822.32
2) Cost of tractor service is nil because of physical character of 
farmland which is not suitable for tractors.
3) There is a marked increase in the cost of pesticide and weedicide 
because of the after effects of reliance upon chemical fertilisers. 
It has been established that fertiliser use have attracted pests.
4) As to labour cost, the number of man-days is almost constant due 
to lack of mechanisation farming technique in this area. Here the 
fanning technique is still manual and traditional. However, the 
increase in the cost of hired labour is very great. Greater resort 
is made by hiring labour on a commercial basis rather than relying 
on cooperative tfotontf royong labour.
Note also that fertiliser costs in 1986 have declined tremendously 
and remained at a token figure of only M$10 while its physical usage 
in kilogrammes have more than doubled. As to the contribution of 
fertiliser subsidy in the element of costs, if fertilisers were to 
be purchased in 1986, then the cost of production would increased by 
27 % (i.e. subsidy at M$231.00 per hectare)
TABLE 9.12: Productivity and Output Capability in Padi Prod.(M$)
Items 1978 1982 1986
Return to Farm Lab. & Mgnt. 222.35 939.97 822.32
Return to Farm Lab.,Mgnt & Land 544.42 1287.11 1137.32
Return to 1 Person-Day 2.26 6.98 8.35
Yield to 1 kg. of Fertiliser 11.62 9.72 9.51
Return to 1 kg. of Fertiliser 1.70 3.55 3.05
Return to M$1.00 Fertiliser exp. 4.71 35.13 83.23
Note: 1978 and 1982 figures are taken from F. Arshad (1983)
Productivity Analysis
In this section, we wil) attempt a productivity analysis to 
find out whether padi cultivation is profitable or not. Table 9.12 
gives the result of the calculation. Note that Table 9.12 is derived 
and calculated from Table 9.11 and we shall explain how the results 
have been derived and interpret its results. There are six measures 
of productivity that are being analysed. For the figures to be 
meaningful and comprehensible, we have included figures for 1978 and 
1982 taken from Fatimah ( 1983 ) to be compared with 1986 figures.
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Return to Farm Labour and Management
This is derived by deducting gross income from total cost. From 
the Table it is clear that 1982 had the highest return at M$939.97 
while in 1986 it was only M$822.32. Return to farm labour was lowest 
in 1978 at M$222.35 which meant that padi cultivation was more 
profitable in 1982 and 1986 compared to 1978.
Return to Farm Labour. Management and Land
This is derived by deducting gross income from total cost plus 
land rental cost. Here again 1986 figures of M$1137.32 was 
overridden by 1982 figures of M1287.ll while 1978 figure stood at 
M$544.
Return to One Person-Pay
This is derived by adding net return to wages and dividing by 
total person-days worked. It can be observed that return per person- 
day was highest for 1986 at M$8.35 compared with the two earlier 
periods.
Yield to One Kilogramme of Fertiliser
This is derived by dividing the value of output ( price 
multilplied by output ) by total kilogrammes of fertiliser used. 
Although the free fertiliser subsidy programme started in 1979, the 
yield for 1986 of M$9.51 was lowest compared to the two earlier 
periods. This may not be surprising due to the law of diminishing 
returns because although fertiliser application was at a high level, 
marginal returns were low.
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Return to One Ki logramnnne of Fertiliser
This is derived by adding net return to fertiliser expenditure 
and dividing by total amount of fertiliser used. For 1986 the figure 
derived was M$3.05 which was a bit lower than the 1982 figure of 
M$3.55
Return to M$1 Fertiliser Expenditure
This is derived by adding net return to fertiliser expenditure 
and divided by fertiliser expenditure. Here is where the return for 
1986 was highest compared to the earlier periods where the figure of 
M$83.23 was nearly three times the figure for 1982.
TABLE 9.13: Yield Per Hectare For Main Season. 1978 and 1986 ( kg )
Location__________ 1978_________ 1982______ 1986
Krian 1932 2650 2595
Malaysia(ave) 2332 2568
P. Malaysia(ave) 2393_________2617________-
Note: 1978 and 1982 figures are from Fatimah ( 1983 )
From Table 9.13, the average output on a per hectare basis in 
1986 in Krian was about 2595 kg. This is still much higher than the 
1978 rate although 1982 rate exceeded the 1986 rate. The year 1982 
registered a much higher output than 1986 probably because the 
effects of fertiliser and padi price subsidy introduced in 1979 and 
1980 was greatly felt.
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Summary
From this discussion we can make the following conclusion:-
a) as to resource use, it is evident that family labour was still 
the main form of labour used while hired labour was used only during 
peak times of planting and harvesting
b) padi varieties used were mainly of the HYV type
c) farmers used relatively much fertilisers, pesticides and 
weedicides
d) fertiliser subsidy was the main factor which enhanced the use of 
fertilisers among the farmers
e) since mechanisation was not practicable in Krian, this factor was 
an important constraint in promoting Krian as an important producer 
of rice in Malaysia in the future
f) despite the existence of subsidies, the returns from padi 
cultivation was very low. Fertiliser subsidies, however, contributed 
to a great reduction in input costs of farmers.
g) the various productivity tests suggest that returns to padi 
cultivation were more favourable compared to pre-subsidy period.
( see Table 9.12 )
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5.0 EFFECT OF PADI PRICE SUBSIDY 
Introduction
We have analysed padi price subsidy at the national level in 
Malaysia in the previous chapter. In this section, we shall attempt 
to tabulate and analyse the results of the survey in Krian and see 
what effects padi price subsidy had with regards to the following
a) its effect on farmers* income
b) its effect on market surplus
c) its effect on total output
Effect on Market Surplus
In this part we shall not attempt to cover everything related 
to marketing of padi but only those parts having a direct bearing 
upon price subsidy. The following information is pertinent to our 
discussion.





Private mills 8 10.7
Total____________ 75________ 100.0
Table 9.14 shows farmers* choice of marketing their padi. About 
68 % of the fanners prefered to sell most of their crop to private 
licensees, namely the private operators licensed by LPN to act as
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buying agents rather than to other buyers. The most often cited 
reason for this choice was the convenience that it entailed for 
farmers in terms of making relevant logistic arrangements with the 
buyers like transportation, advances, etc which were more flexible 
rather than for better prices. In general the prices offered by 
private buyers and those offered by the licensees were about the 
same.
TABLE 9.15: Ave. Price Received By Farmers/l00kg. ( Long Grain)
Price_________________ 1978_________1986
......M $ ......
Without subsidy 47.00 47.9
With subsidy_____________-___________65.00
Table 9.15 shows the price of padi in 1978 and 1986. Basically, 
it was about the same in both years at M$47.00 per 100 kg. However, 
when the the price subsidy at M$16.54 per 100 kg. was introduced in 
1979,it inflated the effective price of padi to about M$65.00 per 
100 kg. to the farmers although consumers were shielded from paying 
the extra amount. Hence, the price subsidy had effectively increased 
the receipt of farmers by about 37 % although the basic consumer 
price remained constant. Through this mechanism of price subsidy 
which was financed through the budget, the government managed to 
increase the return to farmers while protecting the poorer consumers 
from having to pay the extra cost. However, there was a great 
likelihood that richer consumers were subsidised by the government 
by pursuing this measure.
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TABLE 9.16:Effect Of Price Subsidy On Market Surplus. *78 & *86
Effect ____________1978/79____________ 1986/87
Qty. % Qty. %
Total Acreage (Ha) 133.27 - 158.3 -
Yield/Ha.(Kg) 1932 - 2595 -
Auto-Consumed (Kg) 52,800 17.7 36,924 9.3
- Zakat (Kg) 15,510 5.2 2,245 0.6
- Seeds (Kg) 1,610 0.5 700 0.2
- Market Surplus (Kg) 227,400 76.3 357,067 90.1
Total Output 297,960 100 396,096 100
Ave. Deduction/100 Kg 10 - 15 -
Table 9.16 compares the situation before and after subsidy 
( ie. 1978 versus 1986 ) with regard to market surplus and other 
uses of padi. Note that a market surplus could occur under the 
following circumstances:-
a) if total production were to increase but total consumption remain 
constant
b) if total production remained constant while total consumption 
declined, or
c) if total production were to increase but total consumption 
decline.
In addition, total production could increase either by a rise 
in yield per hectare or through an increase in planted acreage. In 
the case of Krian, the total output of padi after subsidy was 
introduced increased by about 98,136 kg. or by 32.9 %. Also, before 
subsidy was introduced in 1978, the amount of padi that was sold in
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the market was only 227,400 kg. or 76.3 X of total output. However, 
after subsidy was introduced for six years in 1986, the proportion 
sold was 90.1 X'of total output. In absolute terms market surplus 
had increased by 129,667 kg. or by 57 X. It is our contention th*^ 
the increase in market surplus was due to the incentive effect of 
the padi price subsidy. At the same time, the amount of padi 
consumed by farm households was considerably reduced in 1986 by 
15,876 kg. or by 30 X of the 1978 figures. One likely reason for 
this was probably to the greater incentive of farmers to sell as 
much of their output as possible in the market in order to benefit 
from price subsidies. In addition, fanners would find it more 
economical to buy rice in the market rather than keep some for their 
own consumption after price subsidy was introduced. In summary, if 
the objective of the price subsidy was to increase the quantity of 
padi marketed then this objective had been achieved to a certain 
extent when we examined the market surplus effect of subsidies.
Effect on Income
We have seen that the effect of price subsidy on market surplus 
was quite considerable in the case of Krian. We would now like to 
discover whether its effect on income was also significant as well 
since market surpluses and income accruing to farmers should be 
highly correlated. Here we are concerned to see whether all farmers 
have benefited equally from the price subsidy scheme or whether only 
a certain category of fanners have benefited.
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TABLE 9.17: Average Income From Padi Fanning Per Season, 1986
Item__________________ M$_____________ %
Padi income
(No Subsidy) 1945.84 74.4
Coupon Subsidy 669.32 25.6
Total Income___________ 2.615.16________ 100.0
TABLE 9.18; % Contribution of Coupon Subsidy to Total Padi Income
Percentage_________No.__________ %_
2 1 - 2 4  7 9.3
25 - 27 65 86.8
2 8 - 2 9  3 3.9
Total___________ 75________ 100.0
Table 9.17 shows on average, that the coupon subsidy 
contributed about 26 % of total farmers * income from padi. Table 
9.18 shows that all farmers have benefited from price subsidy since 
all of them have sold a portion of their crop in the market and 
subsequently claimed the coupon subsidies from LPN or its agents. A 
significant point to note is that about 87 % of farmers said that 
coupon subsidy contributed about 25 - 27 % of their total income 
from padi. This meant that if the government were to discontinue 
with the present system of subsidising farmers* income, then the 
income of fanners would be affected and the overall rate of poverty 
among padi farmers would increase.
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TABLE 9.19; Distribution of Coupon Subsidy, 1986
Coupon Subsidy(M$)  No._________%
100 - 200 8 10.7
201 - 400 17 22.7
401 - 600 17 22.7
601 - 800 15 20.0
801 - 1000 7 9.3
1001 - 2000 11 14.7
Total 75 100.0
As to the distribution of coupon subsidies, Table 9.19 
indicates that about 65 % of farmers have received coupon subsidies 
amounting to between M$201 to M$800 per season. Since farmers in 
Krian planted three crops in two years, then one season is equal to 
8 months. Hence, the majority of farmers received about M$25 to 
M$100 per month of coupon subsidy. On the other hand, about 10 % 
received less than M$400 per season while about 24 % received more 
than M$800 per season. Therefore, in the case of Krian there was an 
absence of great inequalities in the distribution of the benefits of 
price subsidies because there were no extreme distribution as 
compared to data at the national level which portrayed great 
inequalities.
Income Profile of Krian Farmers
As noted in Table 9.11, the average monthly net income of 
farmers in Krian from padi alone was M$102.79 or M$822.32 per 
season. Since income from padi was only seasonal, farmers had to
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find other supplementary jobs in order to earn additional income to 
finance their daily expenditures. For the poorest of farmers with no 
other sources of income, they were forced to seek odd jobs to 
sustain themselves while rice was consumed from their own stock for 
self-consumption. In addition, they managed to find supplementary 
food sources like fish, vegetables, etc. from the rivers or natural 
surroundings. Although these sources were by no means adequate, this 
ensured that the farmers did not starve when they faced hard times. 
In one sense this meant that the welfare of farmers were better off 
than their counterparts producing rubber because rubber cannot be 
consumed.
TABLE 9.20: Income From Other Sources ( M$ monthly )
Sources ____ ________ Ave. M$ Padi Income(M$) Tot Month Y(M$)
None 9.3 - 102.79 102.79
One Other 65.3 173.00 102.79 275.79
> Than One 25.4 317.52 102.79 420.31
Total 100.0_________________________________________________
Note:-for farmer with no other source of income, padi income = 100 % 
-for farmers with one other source of income, padi income = 37 % 
-for farmers with two or more sources of income, padi income = 24 %
Tables 9.20 and 9.21 indicate the other income sources of Krian 
farmers. Table 9.20 shows the amount of income earned by farmers 
from the various income sources. About 90 % of farmers who relied 
exclusively on padi cultivation had a monthly income of about M$103. 
On the other hand, about 65 % who cultivated padi plus one
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additional job earned a monthly income of M$276. Note that these 
income figures were still below the poverty line income of M$300 per 
month. Only about 25 X who cultivated padi plus 2 additional jobs 
managed to sustain an income above the poverty income,i.e. M$420 per 
month.
TABLE 9.21: Categories of Other Sources of Income. 1986
Source * Ave. M$
Hired Labour 4.5 83.75
Business 20.5 182.39
Pension 4.5 202.50
Govt. Employee 12.5 275.00
Remittances(child) 11.4 128.00
Other Agric. 8.0 104.29
Animal Husbandry 11.4 148.00
Rental Income 12.5 120.27
Others 14.7 166.92
Total 100.0 156.79
Table 9.21 shows the alternative job opportunities pursued by 
farmers in Krian. About 21 X had jobs in petty businesses like 
selling food, small contracting jobs, etc. Other agricultural 
activities and animal husbandry constituted another 20 X . However, 
off-farm income opportunities which gave the highest average returns 
were farmers working in government departments. Most of these part- 
time farmers usually worked in the afternoons when they were free 
while in the mornings their family tended the fields.
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Expenditure and Savings Pattern of Households
Another way to find out and cross-check whether subsidies had 
any effect on the income position of farmers is to look at the 
expenditure pattern and savings position of farmers. An ideal way 
would be to compare the position " with and without subsidy ". A 
likely proposition would be that if the farmers managed to save more 
or spent more today than say at a time when there were no such 
subsidies, and considering that subsidies constituted about 25 % of 
their total padi income, then it is possible this might have been 
the result of the subsidy policy. However, as we have seen above, 
that since there were other alternative sources of income for the 
farmers, the increased savings or expenditure might have been 
attributed to this source or alternatively due to both factors. 
Hence, in this respect, the effect of off-farm income and price 
subsidies should be considered together by the government in any 
consideration of policy measures affecting farmers income and 
welfare.










It would be quite instructive to look at the overall 
expenditure pattern of farmers in Krian in 1986 and 1978. 
Unfortunately, we have only data for 1986. From the above Table 
9.22, we notice that the bulk of expenditure, constituting about 45 
% of total expenditure was spent on food. Expenditure on schooling 
for children came next at 17 %. One interesting observation was the 
expenditure incurred on cigarette consumption at 12 %. This was 
quite significant because this unproductive expenditure could be 
used to finance other items or saved. We have to take note that this 
is the average expenditure pattern of all Krian farmers. Total 
expenditure at M$363 per month was slightly above the official 
poverty line but poverty is a prominent feature in Krian as we have 
seen above. ( see Table 9.20 ) showed that more than 74 % of farmers 
in Krian earned a monthly household income below the poverty income 
of M$300.
TABLE 9.23: Ownership Pattern of Farmers Of Following Items Before
And After Subsidy, 1978 and 1986
TotalItem 1978 1986
% * No. %
Television 44.0 49.3 75 100
Radio 72.0 4.0 75 100
Bicycle 74.7 12.0 75 100
Motorcycle 41.3 37.3 75 100
Motorcar 2.7 2.7 75 100
Pilgrimage to Mekah 17.3 6.7 75 100
Home improvement 4.0 2.7 75 100
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Table 9.23 lists the items normally owned by farm households 
which farmers normally purchased if they had surplus income. Items 
which were considered expensive and luxurious include television 
sets aind motorcars while motorcycles were considered semi-necessary. 
From the Table, there did not seem to be aiiy significant difference 
in ownership pattern before and after padi price subsidy was 
instituted. In fact cheaper items like radios and bicycles were 
already owned by farmers even before the subsidies were introduced. 
Hence, the effect of price subsidies is not obvious from the 
ownership pattern outlined above.
TABLE 9.24; Production Loans Among Farmers. 1986
Item_________No.________ %
Take Loan 57 76.0
Do Not Take 18 24.0
Total________ 75_______ 100.0
Table 9.24 shows that about 76 % of farmers borrowed some 
money to cater for their recurrent expenditures in padi cultivation. 
Most farmers said that they borrowed from the Agricultural Bank. We 
can infer from this that farmers were able and willing to borrow and 
that they were able to pay back the sum from their earnings in both 
padi and non-padi activities.
Tables 9.25 and 9.26 look at the position of savings of Krian 
farmers. Apparently, more than 77 % of respondents did save some of 
their income. However, when asked the amount of savings held, most 
farmers were either reluctant to answer or gave vague and misleading
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answers. Hence, it was not possible to know precisely the extent of 
savings of Krian fanners. However, we believe that the amount of 
savings held was very small. However, we should not discount the 
possibility that there might be instances where bigger and richer 
fanners did save or invested significant sums of money in the ASN 
scheme for example although it was not reflected in the findings. 
But in general, the poverty status of most of the farmers in this 
area precluded them from pursuing saving their income because there 
was little or nothing to save.
TABLE 9.25; Position of Savings Among Farmers, 1986
Position__________NOj._________ %
Save 58 77.3
Do Not Save 17 22.7
Total_____________75________ 100.0








What we have attempted to do in the above was to determine 
whether the increase in fanners* income through government subsidy
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policies could be measured and observed from their savings 
behaviour, expenditure pattern or credit behaviour. From the 
available data, it is apparent that this is not a wholly successful 
method because not all the results given managed to prove the point. 
In addition, there existed many data limitations, for example to 
compare before and after subsidy situation. This might be due to the 
weaknesses in the data collecting procedures in the survey. 
Notwithstanding the above points, it could be seen that about 77 % 
farmers did save and 76 % did take loans in 1986.
Summary
We have analysed padi price subsidy at the farm level and can 
make the following conclusions:-
a) its effect on farmers* income have indeed been positive.
b) its effect on market surplus was also positive and
c) its effect on total output have also been positve.
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6.0 ATTITUDE AND PERCEPTION OF FARMERS TOWARDS FERTILISER SUBSIDY
Introduction
Another important aspect that needs to be studied with regards 
to subsidies in this chapter is how fanners perceived and reacted to 
them. We believed that this is an important area to probe because 
the ultimate effect of whether subsidies would have an influence on 
increasing output or not would initially depend on how farmers 
perceived them and secondly, whether the farmers were responding 
positively or negatively to the subsidies and their reasons for 
undertaking alternative courses of action. In this section, we shall 
tabulate the result of the survey and analyse the following
a) attitude and response of farmers to fertiliser subsidy
b) attitude and response of farmers to padi price subsidy
c) an analysis of subsidy mentality of fanners
Fertiliser Supply. Its Quality and Administration
It has been established in Chapter 8 that farmers would be 
responsive to a reduction in cost of inputs by utilising them in 
greater quantities. In fact, that fanners in developing countries 
are responsive to price incentives has been universally acclaimed by 
many studies as mentioned in Chapter 4. In this part, we shall 
attempt to observe and analyse from the survey findings whether the 
data tends to confirm or deny this observation.
Table 9.27 shows that all the respondents received free 
fertilisers under the National Fertiliser Scheme irrespective of 
whether they were members of Farmers Association or not. The
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important qualifying criterion for procurement of free fertilisers 
was only to show proof of tillage. This meant that all farmers 
benefited from fertiliser subsidy without exception.
TABLE 9.27: Whether Fanners Receive Free Fertiliser. 1986
Response________ No._________ %
Receive 75 100
Do Not Receive - -
Total___________ 75_________ 100










On the other hand, Table 9.28 shows that about 53 % of farmers 
believed that the quality of fertiliser distributed by the 
government was good while about 47 % believed that the quality was 
not satisfactory. Following from this, we would therefore expect 
most farmers who claimed that the fertilisers were of good quality
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to get a fairly good yield. Of course, this situation assumed that 
the standard maintenance services were performed by these farmers. 
Most of the farmers who complained about the poor quality of 
fertilisers said that the fertilisers were adulterated. Although the 
LPP insisted that the quality of fertilisers was generally good and 
verified by their officials who undertook constant spot checks, it 
is possible that some unscrupulous manufacturers might have managed 
to dispose of their bad stocks to the Consortium responsible for 
distribution of fertiliser and ultimately reaching the farmers in 
this area.
TABLE 9.30: Whether Farmers Face Problems To Get Fertiliser 
Response__________No_____________%
No Problem 68 90.7
Face Problem 7 9.3
Total 75 100.0
TABLE 9.31; Kinds of Problems Faced By Farmers
Problem No. %
Physical Distance 4 57.1
Transport Charges 3 42.9
Total 7 100.0
Table 9.30 shows that about 91 % of farmers in Krian 
apparently did not face any problem in securing fertiliser supplies 
from the LPP. In fact when the LPP announced that farmers could 
collect the free fertilisers at the beginning of the planting season
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at the LPP complex, it was the f armers’ responsibility to collect 
them. Nine of the farmers who claimed that they had problems in 
securing fertiliser supplies were the ones who lived at the fringes 
of the area and very far from the fertiliser distribution centres 
and subsequently they had to incur additional transport costs to 
collect the fertilisers. ( Table 9.31 ) Note that fanners who were 
not members of the AFA/PPPK had to pay the full charges for 
transportation while members had to pay only a flat rate of 50 cents 
per bag delivered.
TABLE 9.32: Response of Farmers to Statements On Fertiliser Supply
Statement Agree Disagree Total
Dist. point of supply far from field 13.3 86.7 100
Inadequate supply of fertiliser 5.3 94.7 100
Delay to get supply at stipulated time 2.7 97.3 100
Fertiliser undersupplied to fanners 1.3 98.7 100
On the issue of fertiliser supply, we attempted to solicit the 
opinion of farmers on the efficiency of supply by asking farmers’ 
views on four different situations. From the responses given in 
Table 9.32, it is quite clear that farmers were generally satisfied 
with the way fertiliser distribution was administered. From this it 
is apparent that the LPP and the Consortium responsible for 
fertiliser supply were able to overcome problems of supply and 
logistics which were quite serious in the early years of the 
implementation of the scheme. We can see that the majority of 
farmers interviewed expressed their satisfaction over the actions
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tuken so far. For example, distribution points have been 
centralised, supplies have been adequate, no delays in supplies and 
that fanners have been getting the right amount of assistance. In 
short, the administration of the fertiliser subsidy scheme was 
efficient. In contrast, many fanners said that when the scheme 
started in 1979 it was chaotic due to the presence of many 
irregularities.
Beneficiary of Subsidy and Mode of Utilisation
In this part, we shall analyse farmers* response on whether 
fertiliser subsidies have benefited them and mode of fertiliser 
utilisation by the fanners.
TABLE 9.33: Whether Fertiliser Subsidy Benefit Fanners. 1986
Response_______ No.________ %
Benefit 75 100.0
Not Benefit 0 0
Total___________ 75_______ 100.0
Table 9.33 shows that all farmers interviewed genuinely felt 
that they had benefited from the scheme. About 77 % of fanners said 
that fertiliser subsidy had enabled them to lessen their expenditure 
and instead they were able to purchase other critical inputs like 
pesticides and weedicides. On the other hand, about 23 % of fanners 
said that fertiliser subsidy had enabled them to increase their crop
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yield. ( Table 9.34 ) In view of the above responses, it was not 
surprising that all the farmers interviewed insisted that the scheme 
should be continued. ( Table 9.35 )
TABLE 9.34: How Fertiliser Subsidy Benefit Fanners. 1986
Benefit No. %
Forgo Fertiliser Expenditure 58 77.3
Increase Padi Yield 17 22.7
Total 75 100.0





TABLE 9.36: Form Fertiliser Subsidy Should Take if Continued
Form______________________No._________ %




On the mode of assistance that they preferred, Table 9.36 shows 
that about 92 % of farmers said they prefer to receive fertiliser 
subsidy in kind rather than in cash as the practice at present. This 
finding is very interesting because nearly always people would
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prefer cash which is more liquid than material assistance. This 
finding is also unusual because it contradicts everything known 
about subsidy. Unfortunately, we did not ask the farmers the 
reasons for showing this preference but it would be interesting to 
speculate the probable reasons. The following reasons may make this 
choice likely. First, that farmers tend to get material assistance 
more quickly than cash. Second, that the value of the material is 
greater than the value of the subsidy. Third, that it probably shows 
that farmers in Krian understand the value of fertiliser inputs in 
improving their yield and hence they prefer it to cash.
TABLE 9.37: Response of Farmers if Fertiliser Subsidy Abolished
Response_________________No.________ %
Continue Planting Padi 75 100
Discontinue Planting
Total____________________ 75________ 100
The findings of Table 9.37 is also very interesting. It shows 
the response of farmers if fertiliser subsidy were cut by 100 %, All 
the respondents unequivocably replied that they would continue to 
plant padi even if there were no fertiliser subsidy. This shows that 
the impact of subsidy is not that tremendous as commonly known. The 
next question that would be interesting to ask would be by how much 
would output fall if fertiliser subsidy were abolished. Judging from 
the above response, we would probably get a similar answer as above.
In this regard, it would be relevant to put together the responses
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given by the rubber smallholders in Chapter 7 ( Tables 7.38, 7.41 
and 7.33 ) with that of Table 9.37. Therefore what is important in 
this context is that farmers' reliance upon subsidy is not absolute. 
In one sense, the response given was quite rational and expected in 
the context of padi farming in Malaysia because farmers have to 
continue to plant padi, with or without fertiliser subsidy, as they 
had always done in the past in order to survive. In this regard, 
subsidies are therefore not indispensable and can be thought to 
function only as a catalyst rather than a prerequisite for fanning. 
Therefore, in this sense farmers are not displaying the ” subsidy 
mentality " as claimed.
It is important to realise that the amount of fertiliser 
distributed to fanners need not necessarily be equal to the amount 
applied to the crop. This gap could be attributed to abuses 
committed by farmers which ultimately lead to waste. For example, 
Table 9.38 shows that one-third ( about 64 % ) of fanners felt that 
fertiliser subsidies were not properly used. This implies that there 
is wastage. The question to ask is if farmers get fertilisers for 
free to whom can they sell it and why is there a market for it. It 
should be understood that fertiliser is only distributed freely to 
padi farmers planting padi. However, since these fertilisers are 
universally applicable to other crops as well, naturally there is a 
demand for them. In addition, farmers can find ready market from 
Chinese commercial farmers who plant vegetables, fruits, etc. 
Therefore, the most common abuse was the unauthorised re-sale of 
fertilisers to a third party at great discounts. Another abuse was 
the non-application of part of the fertiliser to the padi crop as
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ahown in Table 9.39. Many reasons could be given to explain the 
presence of these abuses. One was the fact that many farmers were so 
poor that they had no choice but to sell part of their fertiliser
supplied under the subsidy scheme in order to get cash to buy other
more essential goods. Another possible reason was that since the
soil condition was not uniform among different locations in Krian
( where some areas were more water-logged than others ) some fanners 
in the water-logged areas saw no logic in applying fertilisers 
because it would not be effective in influencing output. So they 
would rather apply the fertiliser to other crops that they planted. 
However, it should be noted that the above responses were only 
farmers* perception as to how their colleagues were reacting to 
fertiliser subsidy. It is possible that the farmers who perceived 
the presence of these abuses may be committing them himself. The 
only way in which we can say with certainty of the presence of 
abuses would be the successful prosecution of offenders in the law 
courts. However, as many farmers agreed ( Table 9.40 ), this action 
was rarely resorted to because there were no provisions in the 
existing regulations for the authorities to act in cases of misuse.
Although some form of abuse in fertiliser usage was perceived 
to have occurred it could safely be said that it was not widespread.
In one study it was found that the difference between fertiliser 
supplied and fertiliser applied was only 5 %. ( see Fatiraah, p.373 )
If the difference was very marked, then the level of output and 
profitability would be very marked also but as we have seen this was 
not so. ( see profitability analysis )
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TABLE 9.38: Opinion Whether Fertiliser Subsidy Properly Utilised
Opinion No. %
Properly Used 27 36
Not Properly Used 48 64
Total 75 100
TABLE 9.39: Reasons Think Fertiliser Subsidy Not Utilised Properly
Reason No. %
Re-Sold Fertiliser 41 85.4
Used In Other Crop 7 14.6
Total 48 100.0
TABLE 9.40: Way to Overcome Abuse in Fertiliser Subsidy Scheme
Method No.
LPP Show Correct Way To Use 6 12.5
LPP Monitor Fertiliser Use 7 14.6
Prosecute Offender In Court 35 72.9
Total 48 100.0
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7.0 ATTITUDE AND PERCEPTION OF FARMERS TO PADI PRICE SUBSIDY
We have discussed in detail some aspects of padi price subsidy 
in the previous chapter. In this part, we shall rely upon survey 
data to analyse further the effects of price subsidy on fanners.
Similar to fertiliser subsidy, all the farmers interviewed 
collectively agreed that padi price subsidy have benefited them 
through an increase in their income level because this subsidy was 
given in the form of coupons and redeemable for cash at selected 
government financial institutions.
TABLE 9.41; Waiting Time Before Fanners Able to Cash Coupons
Time__________No.___________%
1 - 2  days 2 2.7
3 - 5  days 5 6.7
6 - 7  days 21 28.0
> 7 days 47 62.7
Total________ 75_________ 100.0
Table 9.41 shows that the about 63 % of farmers had to wait 
for more than seven days before they could cash their coupons. 
According to the farmers, this time period was considered tolerable 
and did not seem to inconvenience them. However, we believe that 
this is not the true position of the fanners because being poor 
means that the utility of immediate cash income would be great. In 
addition, fanners response to questions related to what form of 
subsidy they would have preferred contradicts with their response 
above.
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TABLE 9.42: Fanners* Response About Coupon Subsidy ( % )
Statement________________________Satisfied Not Satisfied Total
Coupon issued by buyers of padi 76.0 24.0 100
Moisture deductions by buyers 20.0 80.0 100
Details stated in receipts____________93.3__________ 6.7_______ 100





Tables 9.42 and 9.43 considered farmers* reaction on the 
administration of the subsidy scheme. Table 9.42 shows that about 57 
% of farmers were quite satisfied with the overall administration of 
the scheme while 43 % were not very happy. Most of the farmers who 
were unhappy with the scheme complained about the high deduction 
rates. This was clearly shown in Table 9.42 where about 80 % of 
farmers voiced their dissatisfaction with the percentages deducted 
which they claimed were too high and adversely affected their gross 
income from padi. Note that the average amount of deductions 
amounted to about 15 kg. per 100 kg. of padi bought. As we have 
noted in the previous chapter that the LPN claimed that deduction 
rates had to be high because farmers were in general selling wet and 
poor quality padi.
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TABLE 9.44: Whether Farmers Heard Abuses in Admin, of Price Subsidy
Response________Nik_______ %
Heard 39 52.0
Not heard 36 48.0
Total_______ 75 100.0
TABLE 9.45: Form of Abuses that Occurred
Form______________________________No.________ %
Farmers Collaborate With Buyers 8 20.5
Buyers Collaborate With Millers 3 7.7
Millers Collaborate With LPN Staff 20 51.3
Others 8 20.5
Total__________________________________39________100.0
Similar to other forms of government assistance programmes 
including subsidies, a common phenomenon is the high occurence of 
abuses. For example, abuses occurred when unintended beneficiaries 
enjoyed the benefits of the subsidy more than the intended group. 
Table 9.44 indicates that about 52 % of farmers thought that they 
have heard of abuses in the implementation of the scheme. Table 9.45 
list the forms of abuses. About 59 % seemed to blame the millers 
and buyers while only about 21 % blamed their fellow farmers for 
committing the abuses. On the whole, what we could say for certain 
is that abuses did happen in the scheme but we could not say for 
sure the extent of abuse in Krian. If data on number of prosecutions 
were present then we could be sure.
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TABLE 9.46: Response of Farmers if Price Subsidy Vary( in % terms )
Response________________Subsidy Decline 50% Subsidy Increase 100*
Increase Padi Area 18.7 60.0
Decrease Padi Area 1.3 4.0
No Change From Present 76.0 36.0
Others 4.0
Total_____________________ 100.0__________________ 100.0
In addition, fanners were also asked questions with regard to 
what their responses to production and market surplus would be if 
price subsidy were to vary from the present rate. In Table 9.46, 
fanners indicated that if there was a positive change in price 
subsidy, they would increase acreage devoted to padi in order to get 
a greater output and subsequently to increase the amount of padi 
sold in the market. On the other hand, if there was a negative 
change in the rate of price subsidy, it would not matter much to the 
farmers and would not affect their status quo in terms of area 
devoted to padi and their committment to padi production.
TABLE 9.47: Whether Increase Market Surplus If Subsidy Increase
Response___________No.________ %
Increase 23 30.7
No change 52 69.3
Total________  75_______100.0
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As regards to market surplus, Table 9.47 shows that only about 
31 % of farmers said that they would increase their sales if the 
price subsidy was increased. Here there seems to be a contradiction 
because from Table 9.16 the amount of padi offered for sale in 1986 
as compared to 1978 increased by 57 %. One possible explanation for 
this apparent inconsistency might be that the 31 % of farmers who 
indicated that they might increase sales might account for the bulk 
of market surplus indicated in Table 9.16.
TABLE 9.48: Response of Farmers if Subsidy Were to be Withdrawn 
Response _______________________________No. %
Find Alternative Job 2 2.7
Continue Plant Padi(at diff. acre) 24 32.0
Continue Plant Padi(no change in acre) 28 37.3
Plant Padi For Own Consumption 14 18.7
Others 7 9.3
Total ______________________________75________100.0
Table 9.48 shows that even if the price subsidy were to be 
withdrawn more than 60 % of fanners would continue to cultivate 
padi. As the case with fertiliser subsidy, this showed that farmers* 
attitude to price subsidy was not one of absolute reliance but 
rather as an incentive for farmers to work harder. Here farmers* 
attitude is simply to make the best use of whatever aid there is 
while aid is around.
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In addition, fanners were asked to indicate their choice of the 
form of price subsidy that they favoured and reasons for their 
choice. This is to see whether the present form of price subsidy 
which was given in the form of redeemable coupons was thought 
suitable and convenient by the farmers. From Table 9.49 it can be 
seen that more than 93 % of respondents said that they would prefer 
if the price subsidy were given based on actual output of padi 
produced by farmers rather than based on sale of padi as practiced 
at present. The reasons quoted by farmers for prefering this method 
is given in Table 9.50 below. Most farmers indicated that they 
prefered the alternative form because they would be able to get more 
subsidies.
However, when it came to the question of choice between 
increase in price subsidy or an increase in market price of padi, 
there was a split decision as Table 9.51 shows. About 49 % of 
farmers preferred an increase in the price of padi while 37 % 
preferred an increase in price subsidy. Among the reasons for a 
preference of a price increase, more than 75 % of farmers felt that 
the coupon system was cumbersome while 16 % of farmers said that the 
acquisition of immediate cash was important. Of the 37 % of farmers
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who still preferred coupon subsidy, most said that a padi price 
increase would burden the consumers and would eventually affect the 
farmers themselves if they purchased rice in the market.
TABLE 9.50: Reasons Farmers Prefer Subsidy Based On Output
______Reasons__________________________________No_._________ %_______
Fanners Able To Get More Subsidy 9 12.9
Fanners Get Subsidy For Padi Not Sold 59 84.3
Government Able To Avoid Cheating By M/M 2 2.9
Total_____________ :____________________________ 70_________ 100.0
TABLE 9.51: Chioce Between Price Increase & Subsidy Increase
Choice_____________________No.____________ %
Increase Padi Price 37 49.3
Increase Price Subsidy 28 37.3
Indifferent 10 13.3
Total______________________75___________100.0
Table 9.52 shows that on the question of whether present rates of 
price subsidy were reasonable ( M$16.54 / 100kg ) about 59 % of 
fanners said that it was so. Of those fanners who thought the 
present rate was not reasonable, about 45 % said that M$20.00 / 100 
kg. was more realistic while the others wanted a subsidy increase of 
between M$25 - M$50.00 / 100 kg.
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From the above analysis, it is clear that farmers did consider 
both types of subsidies as useful and assisted in enhancing their 
production and income, but the farmers feel they benefited more from 
price subsidies than from fertiliser subsidies. Although subsidies 
were seen as only a privilege rather than as an absolute right to 
farmers, our calculations showed that it managed to boost farmers * 
net income. Consequently, the absence or reduction of subsidies 
would affect greatly the level of poverty among farmers. Despite 
this fact, subsidies were by no means a limiting factor in affecting 
the work attitudes and effort of the farmer. This Implies that even 
if the government were to phase out subsidies, fanners in Krian felt 
that they have no choice but to carry on farming although its 
implications on the poverty situation for the fanners would be 
serious indeed. For one thing farmers here had experienced fanning 
for more than 30 years and there were times in the past when they 
had virtually no assistance from the government. Yet despite their 
difficulties they had managed to survive. But from the point of view 
of efficiency and productivity of the region as a whole, subsidies 
will still be the key to higher productivity and a mechanism for
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redistribution of income. Hence, as we have noted in Chapter 8 that 
Malaysia is a relatively high cost producer of rice in Southeast 
Asia and the government feels that the only way for the country to 
sustain rice production is through an expensive subsidy policy. 
However, this assumption can be questioned because rice subsidy 
policy in Malaysia is basically an instrument of a welfare state 
where income is redistributed not in the form of cash to poor 
households in general but in the form of input and price subsidies. 
Therefore, the purpose of subsidy is to redistribute income rather 
than to stimulate production. This point can be clearly seen for 
example in Table 9.48 where three-quarters of farmers replied that 
even if price subsidy were to be reduced by 50 % % fanners would not 
change their production pattern. Hence, the impact of price subsidy 
on production is relatively small while its impact on income is big. 
Therefore, it seems that padi price subsidy is in large part an 
instrument of income redistribution rather than resource allocation 
and output stimulation.
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8.0 SUBSIDY MENTALITY OF FARMERS
The concept of subsidy mentality in the context of Malaysian 
agriculture has been elaborated in Chapter 5. Basically,it is an 
attitude of absolute and persistent reliance of fanners upon the 
government and the continued patronage of the government to sustain 
the farmers* livelihood has been a necessary condition for the 
farmers as a group to pursue a course of action. According to the 
view held by the government, this attitude is hypothesised to be 
negative and detrimental to the long term development of the fanners 
because it tend to perpetuate a situation of dependency so often 
condemned by many quarters. This attitude, it is claimed, tends to 
stifle initiative and innovation. It is in this context that we want 
to find out how fanners in Krian perceived themselves in relation to 
subsidies and to analyse whether there is such a thing called a 
" subsidy mentality ". This concept is very elusive and very often 
assumed to be a given by many economists. In this part we shall not 
attempt to measure it but instead try to clarify it further and 
understand it more through an analysis of the survey data. This 
section follows basically the same pattern as Chapter 7 where we 
analysed the ” subsidy mentality " of rubber smallholders.
TABLE 9.53: Whether Fanners Can Succeed Without Subsidies
Response_________No.________ %









TABLE 9.55: Reasons Self-Reliance Not Affected If Got Subsidies
_____________ Reason____________________________No.__________ %
Incentives For Farmers To Work Harder 57 86.4
Would Reduce Fanners* Burden 7 10.6
Others 2 3.0
Total___________________________________________66________ 100.0
Tables 9.53 to 9.55 tried to find out the general response of 
farmers with regard to subsidies. Table 9.53 shows that more than 
90 % of farmers in Krian believed that their effort in planting 
padi would not be successful if the government did not support them 
and intervene on their behalf by granting various subsidies. Here we 
need to distinguish between willingness to plant padi without 
subsidies and being succeesful in the venture. However, relying upon 
subsidy apparently did not affect the self-reliance spirit of 
farmers as Tables 9.54 and 9.55 show. It has always been contended 
that the spirit of self-reliance is not conducive in an environment 
where subsidies is prevailing. However, the reverse situation seems 
to be case here if the responses of the farmers are to be believed.
In this connection, a moot point is that if fanners* work effort is 
greatly enhanced through the incentive effect of subsidies, then
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subsidy policies would be highly justified. Although the evidence 
adduced from the survey is too superficial to make any conclusions 
on farmers* attitude to subsidies, in the case of Krian, there is a 
need for the government to undertake a detailed attitude survey 
before it can make any statement with respect to farmers* work 
attitudes. As things stand at present, it would be grossly mistaken 
to label farmers in Krian as having a ** subsidy mentality ** unless 
empirical validation is given. Our survey has cast some doubts as to 
the validity of the government’s negative labelling for farmers 
as a whole. ( Table 9.55 ) For example, as Table 9.54 shows, only 
12 % of farmers claimed that their spirit of self-reliance would be 
affected if subsidies were present while the overwhelming majority 
believed otherwise.
TABLE 9.56: Govt. Expectation of Farmers* Behaviour Towards Subsidy
Expectation No. %
That More Farmers Would Be Self-Reliant 54 72.0
Govt. Warning To Phase Out Subsidy 7 9.3
That Farmers Use Subsidies Effectively 4 5.3
Others 10 13.3
As to why the government was using the term ” subsidy 
mentality ** to describe the farmers, Table 9.56 tries to show what 
fanners perceived the government expected to achieve from doing so. 
About 72 % of farmers believed that the government wanted them to 
rely less on government subsidy probably because the government was 
having a financial crisis. About 9 % thought that it was used as a
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as a signal and warning that subsidies was to be phased out. As to 
the applicability of the concept to individual farmers, more than 90 
% agreed that the nurturing of such mentality was undesirable 
because it was degrading upon the dignity of an individual to depend 
upon others.
TABLE 9.57: Farmers* View On Subsidy Mentality^ in % terms 1
Views Agree Disagree Total
SM Exists Due To Poverty 88.0 12.0 100
Farmers In Hardship If No Subsidy 74.7 25.3 100,
SM Exist Due To Govt. Patronage 86.7 13.3 100
Subsidy To Be Used To Help Poor 98.7 1.3 100
Subsidy No Guarantee To Better Life 94.7 5.3 100
Table 9.57 seeks to solicit farmers* views on subsidies by 
asking their response on five related statements. From the Table it 
is apparent that farmers believed that the great degree of reliance 
of farmers upon the government was not due to any inherent attitude 
of the farmers but to economic realities of poverty and deprivation. 
This is in fact a true reflection of the situation as statistics on 
poverty levels of farmers in general and in Krian in particular 
show. As to the statement that farmers would be facing difficulties 
if there were no subsidies, more than 70 % agreed that it is true. 
The response to the third statement is interesting because more than 
86 % of farmers believed that the government was at fault for 
nurturing the subsidy mentality among farmers by instituting hand­
out programmes in the first place. The farmers claimed that they
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would never " demand what was not rightfully theirs. ” However, 
about 99 % believed that the government should make use of 
subsidies liberally to help the needy farmers to stand on their own 
feet. Despite this, fanners still believed that it was not subsidies 
per se that will guarantee a better livelihood for them but their 
positive and right attitude to work.
Summary
In this section, we have tried to analyse rather superficially 
the concept of " subsidy mentality " of Krian farmers by analysing 
their responses to a number of questions which we thought to have a 
bearing on this phenomenon. We found that farmers do tend to rely 
upon government subsidy not because of their inherent qualities but 
rather because they were very poor and have none to rely upon except 
the government. However, an important finding is that although 
fanners do rely a great deal upon subsidies to boost their income 
levels, they sincerely believe that even if they did not receive 
such assistance in the future, they are able to rely on their own 
resources and can survive. Hence, we now have two opposing 
propositions. On the one hand the government believes that farmers 
are chronically dependent upon it for subsidies and hence the label 
" subsidy mentality ". On the other hand, farmers themselves believe 
that they could indeed make do or survive without the level of 
subsidisation as it exist today. Therefore, as far as policy 
implications are concerned, it is up to the government to decide 
what level of assistance farmers really need and whether the present 
” liberal ” subsidy policies of the government should continue. It
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should also be remembered that economic considerations are by no 
means the only consideration when government formulate policies 
relating to farmers. This is obvious from our discussuion of the 
allocative and distributive effects of subsidies. Hence, although 
subsidies may not be the most efficient and optimum fiscal 
instrument at the disposal of the government, we believe that the 
government would be willing to tolerate a certain level of leakages 
or spillovers of subsidy policies in order for it to balance its 
objective of allocation of resources, distributive justice and 
political convenience. As a caveat, it has to be remembered that 
this is by no means a definite conclusion on fanners attitude on 
subsidies. We have only establish a preliminary statement on a few 
matters of great concern to both policy makers and planners and 
farmers. Since this part of the discussion is only an adjunct to the 
thesis proper, it has to be taken up in another study in the future.
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11.0 FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
From the above analysis we can make the following 
conclusion:-
a) Fertiliser subsidy enabled farmers to save on their 
fertiliser expenditures while enabling them to increase 
expenditure on other important inputs like pesticides, weedicid.es 
etc.
b) Despite the existence of fertiliser subsidies, the returns 
from padi cultivation was still low. However, fertiliser 
subsidies contributed to a great reduction in input costs of 
farmers.
c) Productivity tests conducted suggest that returns to padi 
cultivation were more favourable compared to pre-subsidy periods.
d) Farmers' response and attitude to both types of subsidies 
were generally favourable and positive.
e) Although farmers did consider both types of subsidy as 
useful and assisted them in enhancing their income, farmers feel 
that they benefit more from price subsidy rather than from 
fertiliser subsidy.
f) Although farmers tend to display a dependent attitude upon 
the government for subsidies, they claimed that subsidies were not 
indispensable and that they could manage on their own if 





In this thesis, we have analysed at length the system of
agricultural subsidies in the rubber and padi sector of Malaysia. 
We have attempted to assess the impact of subsidies on resource 
allocation, income distribution and on farmers' perceptions and 
attitudes towards subsidies. As stated in the introductory 
chapter, the purpose of the study has been to establish the 
following
i) whether subsidies have contributed positively or negatively 
towards increasing the productivity and income levels of 
smallholders and farmers,
ii) whether smallholders and farmers exhibit the "subsidy
mentality" as alleged by the government and hence are less
productive, and
iii) whether there is a case for a continuation of existing
subsidy policies in the rubber and padi sector in Malaysia.
The specific findings of the study with regard to crop 
type have been spelled out in the individual chapters on rubber 
and padi. In this chapter we shall try to integrate and 
synthesize all the findings comprehensively and to propose certain 
policy measures that the Malaysian government could consider for 
adoption.
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2.0 ALLOCATIVE AND REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES
It is clear from the study that there is no standard 
response of subsidies. Different kinds of subsidies, for example, 
input, output and a subsidy on a process tend to have different 
effects. in addition, subsidies also tend to exhibit different 
results as regards to different levels of analysis, for example 
between national and farm level for the same crop. Therefore, the 
implication is that we cannot make a generalisation as to the 
effect of subsidies. Each case has to be considered on an 
individual basis. Table 10.1 summarises the effect of
subsidies in our study.
Table 10.1: Allocative & Redistributive Effect of Subsidies 
CROP LEVEL OF ANALYSIS EFFECT OF SUBSIDY ON
HECTARE YIELD PROD
RUBBER NATIONAL (+) (S) (-) (S) (+) (S)
RUBBER FARM (-)(s) (-) (NS) (-) (S)
RICE 1 NATIONAL NA ( + ) (NS) (+)(NS)
RICE 2 NATIONAL NA (+) (S) (+) (S)
Note: 1 = Fertiliser Subsidy: 2 = Padi Price Subsidy: 
HECTARE = Hectares Replanted: YIELD = Yield; PROD = Total 
Production
(S) = Significant ; (NS) = Not Significant
(+) = Positive Correlation; (-) = Negative Correlation
NA = Not Applicable
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Table 10.1 summarises the allocative and redistributive 
effect of subsidies in the rubber and padi sector. It is clear 
from the table that the results are not uniform between crops and 
among crops and at different levels of analysis. We can summarise 
the findings as follows
i) For rubber, the regression analysis at the national level 
shows that the subsidy variable was significant statistically in 
all the models but its correlation with the dependent variable was 
positive only in the replanting and total production function. For 
the yield equation, the correlation was negative.
ii) For rubber, the regression analysis at the farm level shows 
that the subsidy variable was significant in two cases but all the 
correlations were negative.
Hence, there does not seem to be any systematic trend of the 
effect of subsidy between the national and farm level in rubber.
Hence, different results have different implications as far as
policy formulation is concerned. Why are the results different 
and which result is more reliable? Is it a problem of data 
specification or if not are the results empirically valid? To
answer this question, there are a possible number of explanations, 
for example there is a possibility of error in the data collected 
at the farm level either because respondents were not telling the 
truth or ! the model is not correctly specified or that there 
was a sampling error. On the other hand, the results could be 
correct for both implying that the effect of subsidy is different 
among different localities and among different groups of
smallholders and therefore no generalisation could be made. In
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this matter, we shall assume the latter because there is no way 
for us to verify which result is more reliable because empirically 
both are correct. The only way to confirm the results, however, 
would be to compare the findings of this study with that of other 
similar studies. Since there is a dearth of studies at the farm 
level on rubber crop on the allocative and redistributive effect 
of subsidies, there is a need to initiate such studies. However, 
as we have mentioned in Chapter 7, smallholders in Perak tend to 
respond differently to replanting subsidies because of the 
peculiar situation in Perak and the socio-economic environment in 
which they live and work. Hence, we believe that RISDA need to 
review their implementation policies in order to ensure that 
smallholders in Perak could benefit fully and positively from the 
replanting subsidies and to enable them to achieve positive 
results in their replanting efforts and hence on productivity, 
income and yield.
As for the implications of the finding at the national 
level, the results suggest that replanting subsidies did indeed 
achieve its objective in stimulating the amount of replanting and 
led to an increase in total production. Only the yield variable 
was negatively correlated. This means that replanting grants is 
generally a positive and an appropriate policy and hence should be 
continued. However, RISDA needs to ensure that its follow-up and 
extension programme is made more efficient in order to optimise 
the effect of this subsidy. In addition, as has been mentioned 
previously, the unorganised and individual mode of rubber
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cultivation has outlived its usefulness and for the future, a 
viable rubber holding has to be on a relatively bigger scale 
either through group farming or the acquisition of bigger 
landholdings for the smallholders. If not, despite pouring in 
millions of cash in the form of subsidy, it will not lead to the
achievement of the desired objectives.
Table 10.1 also summarises the results for the rice sector 
as follows
i) For rice at the national level, the regression analysis 
shows that fertiliser subsidy was not significant for the yield 
and production function although its effect was positive in both 
cases. In the yield equation, the positive result probably means 
that fertiliser application was optimal and yields were giving 
positive returns. However, since the coefficient was not 
significant, we cannot make this interpretation. This shows that 
fertiliser subsidy did not have the desired effect on increasing 
yield and hence total production.
ii) There is no regression for rice at the farm level because of 
the limitations of data and difficulty of model specification. 
Hence, we shall have to rely on secondary data sources to analyse
the effect of subsidies and make certain inferences as far as its
effectiveness is concerned.
iii) The analysis at the national level also suggest that 
fertiliser subsidy enabled farmers to use more fertilisers. In 
addition, padi price subsidy was able to increase farmers' 
earnings but was not able to push farmers above poverty levels.
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Also non-beneficiaries benefited more from this subsidy than small 
farmers.
iv) For padi price subsidy, the results show that at the farm 
level, it is positive and significant in both yield and 
production. This confirms that padi price subsidy is more 
allocative in function rather than redistributive. It also shows 
that the objective of the padi price subsidy to stimulate supply 
response have been achieved. However, the study finds that income 
have been distributed to the wrong people and that there is a 
skewed distribution in favour of bigger farmers and middlemen.
Therefore, in order to help small farmers to increase their income 
level, it would be necessary to modify the subsidy scheme. For
example, as agreed by many farmers, price subsidy should be given 
based on actual output of padi rather than on sale to the market. 
This would then ensure that only farmers who worked and toiled the 
land, would benefit from the subsidy.
From the above observation, it is thus clear that subsidies 
may not lead to a positive effect as many studies have suggested. 
Therefore, in the context of subsidies in the rubber and rice 
sector of Malaysia, it is our contention that the policy is not
wrong or bad but rather the implementation is poor and
inefficient. In addition, subsidies have been resorted to not so 
much for allocative purpose but as an income redistribution 
measure. If this is so, then there is a limit to this because the 
policy is bound to be expensive and secondly, the intended target 
group may not benefit from it because there is leakage in the
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system. However, purely from the efficiency point of view, there 
is no justification of having an expensive subsidy policy in the 
rice sector at least because rice could be imported more cheaply 
from abroad. However, political considerations have ensured that 
subsidies were perpetuated. In addition, there is a consideration 
to ensure some measure of food security in the country and that 
there is a social need to assist the majority of poor farmers in 
the country to increase their income level through subsidies.
As for subsidies in the rubber sector, it is not a pure 
subsidy because replanting grants originate as a tax-cum-subsidy 
scheme where smallholders are also direct contributors to the 
subsidy. Hence, they have a greater right to this subsidy than 
farmers in the rice sector. Therefore, when considering whether to 
phase out subsidies this fact must be taken into consideration. 
However, the most important point to consider with regard to the 
usefulness and effectiveness of subsidy policies is that a subsidy 
policy is not a panacea for the problems in the agricultural 
sector. It has to be realised that subsidies are firstly, 
temporary measures meant to solve bottlenecks in the system and 
secondly, that subsidies cannot be a substitute for good and wise 
policy. Hence, to enable subsidies to work effectively, the 
structural and institutional framework in which farmers work must 
be conducive and receptive to a subsidy policy. For example, if 
the majority of farmers are poor, landless, old and not educated 
it is not a conducive environment. Hence, in this situation 
subsidies can only be redistributive in nature but not able to
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function effectively and efficiently as an allocative mechanism. 
Therefore, the utility of a subsidy policy is not fully realised. 
And this is precisely why most subsidy policies in LDCs fail. We 
can mention the following factors to be responsible for the 
effectiveness of a subsidy policy
i) the way it is administered
ii) farmers' attitude and response to it
iii) socio-economic environment facing the farmers
iv) poverty level of farmers
v) the amount of subsidies given
vi) whether there is monitoring of subsidy programmes.
Therefore, the infant-industry argument for subsidies in 
the Malaysian context is not applicable and valid anymore because 
the " infant never seems to grow ". In general, subsidies in 
Malaysian agriculture have outlived their usefulness and is a much 
abused instrument. It is not economically justified as a 
development strategy although it is a popular measure. Among the 
disadvantages of a subsidy policy include the following :-
i) it may not achieve its objective
ii) it is expensive
iii) it may erode the self-reliant spirit of farmers because it 
leads farmers to a state of dependency.
3.0 SUBSIDIES AND SUBSIDY MENTALITY
From the study it is clear that farmers admitted that they 
have the so called " subsidy mentality " in the sense that they
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could not adapt or innovate without the assistance of 
government subsidy. However, it has to be realised that in the 
present situation of farmers in Malaysia, it is almost impossible 
for farmers not to depend upon government subsidies because the 
majority of farmers are poor. Hence, poverty is the main factor 
which led farmers to be dependent upon government subsidy. But it 
would be difficult for the government to claim that farmers have 
the " subsidy mentality 'in the perjorative sense. It hardly needs 
to be mentioned that a self-reliant strategy is self-defeating if 
poverty is the norm, especially if the subsidy policy meant to 
increase farmers' income fails to do so. However, we have only 
established that there exist the phenomenon of "subsidy mentality" 
and the probable reasons for its existence. There is a need to 
develop this concept further so as to enable us to measure 
"subsidy mentality " through the use of analytical measures like 
an Index of Subsidy Mentality which is beyond the scope of this 
study.
4.0 SUBSIDY POLICIES IN THE FUTURE
In our study, we have discussed the effect of three kinds of 
subsidy, namely input subsidy ( fertiliser subsidy ), output 
subsidy ( padi price subsidy ) and a subsidy based on 
technology/process as in the case of the replanting grants. From 
the study, we have reached some mixed conclusions because some 
subsidies have positive allocative effect while others do not. 
Following from this, there are two options available to the
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government, namely either to scrap all subsidies or modify the 
existing ones. We have opted to recommend the latter mode of
action in the case of fertiliser subsidy whereby the
administration of the subsidy should be reviewed. For example, 
instead of subsidising fertiliser, it is more appropriate to
subsidise other inputs like pesticide or weedicide which are 
becoming more indispensable to farmers in the production process.
In addition, there is a possibility of attaching all
subsidies not to output, as in the case of the padi price
subsidy, but to acts of innovation and especially on new inputs.
In theory, this argument is supposed to be good and valid. But in 
practice, as the Malaysian experience shows, tying subsidies to 
inputs does not seem to increase output or yield. Hence, there is 
a problem here. Although we may be able to reconcile the results 
from the Perak case by suggesting that replanting subsidies may 
not have been administered effectively there or smallholders in
Perak may have perverse supply response or some other probable
explanation attesting to the uniqueness of Perak, the fact that 
subsidies give negative results is very disturbing to planners and
policy makers. Hence, there is a need to have more independent
studies and assessment on the effect of replanting subsidies in
other parts of Malaysia or even in other parts of Perak before
we can confirm conclusively that subsidies have a negative effect 
and that it should therefore be scrapped.
A related question to ask is what should the rationale for 
subsidies be in Malaysia and in what form should it be offered ?
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This is an important policy question to address. Based on the 
study, it is shown that subsidies in Malaysia was given mainly 
based on allocative and redistributive considerations as in the 
case for the padi subsidy. However, although present government 
policy is to discourage farmers to rely on subsidies, it is 
envisaged that in the foreseeable future, subsidies in the rice 
sector will continue to be based on redistributive rather 
than allocative grounds. Until and unless the government is 
willing to apply strict economic criteria in the granting of 
subsidies, subsidies will continue to act as a mechanism for 
equalising income distribution in Malaysia. As for replanting 
subsidies there may be a problem to phase out this subsidy if it 
does not give positive results because smallholders contribute 
directly to it through the cess payments. Hence, the only option 
available is to ensure that it is effectively administered.
5.0 CONCLUSION
Although this study cannot be conclusive on the issue of 
agricultural subsidies in Malaysia, it is hoped that it has been 
able to contribute in a small way to the continuing quest for more 
research on agricultural subsidies. It is hoped too that the 
concept of subsidy mentality be explored further and a different 
study be initiated. Until then the concept will still be tentative 
and conceptual in nature.
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; ;•>• & v S \ i s K  f-. t- - J • <W JC>
Suka. saya maklumkan kepada tuan bahawa Encik Ahmad Rusli bin 
Joharie, seorang Pegawai Tadbir dan Diplomatik sedang mengikutl 
kursus Ph.D di.University of Bath, England. Pengajian beliau 
adalah di bawah tajaan Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia.,1 
Beliau masakini berada di Malaysia untuk mencarl maklumat 
serta bahan-bahan untuk penyelidikannya. Dlsamping itu beliau 
bercadang untuk membuat suatu survey di kalangan pesawah-? 
pesavah padi di kawasan Krian, Perak. Kajian yang hendak 
dijalankannya lalah untuk mengetahui kesan rancangan bantuan 
subsidi Kerajaan terhadap produktiviti serta taraf hldup pesawah- 
pesawah padi.
Sehubungan dengan ini,* saya akan merasa amat suka cit a jika 
pihak tuan'dapat memberl kerjasama serta bantuan kepada Encik 
Ahmad Rusli dalam usahanya itu.
Sekian, terima kasih. 
Yang beJhar,









1 : INFORMATION OF SMALLHOLDER
1. How old are you ? ...... years
2. How long did you attend school ?   years
3. Are you a member of the S/H Development Centre ? Yes / No
4. If not please give your- reason.
Don’t anticipate any benefit - 1
Others 2
5. Is rubber tapping your main occupation ? Yes / No
6. If yes, what other jobs do you do ?
None r 1
Other agriculture 2
Petty business ~ 3
Fruit cultivation 4
Others 5
7. If not, what is your main occupation ?
Other agriclture 1
Carpenter 2
Government job - 3
Others 4
8. How long have been a tapper? ..... years
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2 : INFORMATION ON FAMILY MEMBERS
9. How many people are staying with you °........
10. How many of them help you in the fiel'l ? ........
11. How many of your dependents are still schooling ? ...
3: INFORMATION ON LAND HOLDINGS
12. Please give some information of the land y<ou own.
No. Acre Type of Crop Total land
13. Please give details of the rubber land that you tap.
No. Category of land_____________1978____________1986______
A. Own land ......... acre .........
a. Operate yourself ......  ........
b. Rent out ......  ........
c. Left idle ....... ........
B. Rented land
a. Acre you rent................ ........ .........
14. If you rented out your land, how much rent did you charge ?
M$ ........ per month
15. If you rented or leased somebody's land, how much rent did you 
pay ?
M$ .........
16. How much land tax do you pay per year ?   / acre
4 : INFORMATION ON AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
17. Have you replanted all your rubber trees ? Yes / No
18. If not how many acres are still not replanted ?  acres
19. If you have replanted before, please give the following 
information.
Date Replanted Acres________Type of Crop
20. How much did you spend on the following ?
Replanting cost M$ .......  / acre
Replanting grant M$ .......  / acre
21. Please give information on labour usage in undertaking
replanting work.
Type of Work Type of Labour Hours Wage(M$/acre)
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a. Felling.................... ...... ..........b. Holing . . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . . . . .
<:. Planting ......... ...... ..........
d. Poisoning ......... ...... ..........
d. Fertilising ......... ...... ..........
e. Tapping ......... ...... ..........
f. Processing................. ...... ..........
g. Total ......... ...... ..........
Labour code: Family labour 1
Hired labour 2
Others - 3
5: INFORMATION ON PRODUCTION
22. How many days do you tap your trees per month ? ..... days
23. How much production did you get from your trees before and 
after you replanted your trees ?
Before replanting   kg / day / month
After replanting   kg / day / month
24. How many years did it take for your trees to mature ?
25. In what form do you sell your rubber ?
Latex - 1
Scrap = 2
Unsmoked sheet(USS) - 3
Cup lump = 4
26. If you sell in USS form, please state your reason for doing so.
Get better prices - 1
Easy to transport - 2
Others = 3
27. If you sell in latex form, please state your reason for doing 
so.
MARDEC make regular purchases - 1
Easier work & save time = 2
Others - 3





29. If you sell to the middlemen, please state the reason.
Have credit arrangement 1
Convenient - 2
Prices are higher = 3
Others - 1
30. If you sell your rubber to a government agency, please state 
your reason.
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Prices stable & fixed - 1
Transport facilities provided - 2
No other buyers - 3
Others - 4
31. What was the average price of rubber that you got last month ?
M$ ...... / kg
32. What is your total income from rubber tapping ? M$  p.m.
6 : INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
Please give details of your monthly expenditure as follows
i. Food expenditure M$ ....
ii. Schooling expenditure M$ ....
iii. Transportation M$ ....
iv. Utilities M$ ....
v. Others ( specify ) M$ ....
vi. Total Expenditure M$ ....
34. Do you think your income position has improved after you 
replanted your rubber? Yes / No
35. Please state the sources of your income ( if any ) as follows :
Sources _____________ Amount CMS) / month
i. Wage income.................. ........
ii. Other agriculture............ ........
iii. Pension..................... ........
iv. Remittances from children ........
v. Rental income ........
vi. Others ( specify )...................
vii. Total non-rubber income..............
viii. Rubber income........................
ix. Gross income.........................
36. Please indicate when you spent on the following items.
Items < Replant_______> Replant
i. T.V. ....... .......
ii. Radio................. ....... .......
iii. Bicycle ....... .......
iv. Motorcycle............ ....... .......
v. Motorcar ....... .......
vi. Pilgrimage to Mekah ......  .......
vii. Renovate house................ .......
viii. Others................ ....... .......
7 : SAVINGS
37. Do you have uny savings ? Yes / No




i. National Savings Bank ......  .....
ii. Pilgrimage Funds Board ......  .....
iii. Commercial Banks ......  ......
iv. Amanah Saham Nasional ......  ......
v. Others ......  ......
39. If you did not save or invest, state the reason.
No extra income to save - 1
To avoid incurring interest - 2
Didn’t know how to go about = 3
8 : LOANS AND CREDIT
40. Did you make any production loans ? Yes / No
41. If yes, aftervyou replanted did the loan increase ? Yes / No
42. How much loan did you make ? M$ .....
43. Please state from which source did you borrow from ?




9 : ATTITUDE OF SMALLHOLDERS ON REPLANTING SCHEME AND EFFECT OF THE 
SCHEME ON RUBBER PRODUCTION
44. Have you benefited from the rubber replanting scheme ? Yes / No
45. How have you benefited ?
Increase income - 1
Increase yield = 2
46. Do you think that the replanting assistance should continue ?
Yes / No
47. If yes, why do you think so ?
Smallholders need this help 1
Smallholders’ right - 2
Others - 3
48. Do you think that replanting assistance should continue in the 
form of cash and material as at present ? Yes / No
49. If not, how should it be given ?
Cash only - 1
Material only - 2
Others - 3
50. Do you feel that the materials provided by RISDA under the
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replanting asss it autre are of good quality ?
i. Seedlings Yes / No
ii. Fertiliser Yes / No
iii. Poison Yes / No
iv. Others Yes / No
51. Do you agree if the government were to reduce the amonut of 
replanting assistance ? Yes / No
52. If not why not ?
53. If the amount of replanting grants were to be reduced, would 
you continue to cultivate rubber ? Yes / No
54. If not what would you do ?
Find other job - 1
Plant other crop - 2
Sell land = 3
Rent out land - 4
55. Do you think that the amount of replanting grant which you
received reasonable ? Yes / No
56. If not, what rate would you recommend ? M $ ...... / acre
57. Are you happy with the way RISDA is administering the 
replanting programme ? Yes / No
58. If not state the reasons.
59. What problems did you face when you replanted your trees ?
Wild animals - 1
Lack finance - 2
No labour - 3
Others - 4
60. Do you know from where the replanting grant comes from ? Yes/No
61. Please mention what made you decide to replant your trees.
Amount of replanting grant offered - I
Size of holdings = 2
No labour constraint - 3
Others = 4
9: ATTITUDE OF SMALLHOLDERS TOWARDS SUBSIDIES
62. Did you receive the following assistance
i. SEPENTAS Yes / No
ii. Cover crop credit Yes / No
iii. Others Yes / No
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63. Did you get any benefit from these assistance programme? Yes/ No
64. Have you heard abuses in the administration of the replanting 
programme? Yes / No
65. If yes, what were they ?
66. Do you think you can be self-reliant with minimal government 
assistance? Yes / No
67. Do you think that your self-reliant spirit is affected by the
presence of subsidies ? Yes / No
68. Why do you say that your spirit of self-reliance is not 
affected by the presence of subsidies ?
Subsidies is an incentive to work hard - 1
Subsidies help to reduce fanners’ burden - 2
Others ( specify ) = 3
69. Why do you think the government says that fanners have a ” 
subsidy mentality " ?
So that more farmers would become self-reliant - 1
A government warning that subsidies will be phased out = 2
So that farmers should use subsidies more effectively - 3
70. Please state whether or not you agree with the following 
statements on the concept of ” subsidy mentality M.(SM)
Views_____________________________ Agree______Disagree
i. SM exists due to poverty....................... ......
ii. Farmers face difficulty if no subsidy ..... ......
iii. SM exists due to government patronage..... ..... ......
iv. Subsidies should be used to help poor ..... ......
v. Subsidies are no guarantee to better life ....  ......
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APPENDIX 4





1 : INFORMATION OF FARMERS
1. How old are you ?   years
2. How long did you attend school ?   years
3. Are you a member of the Fanner’s Association ? Yes / No
4. If nol please give your reason.
Don’t anticipate any benefit - 1
Others - 2
5. Is padi fanning your main occupation ? Yes / No
6. If yes, what other jobs do you do ?
None - 1
Other agriculture - 2
Petty business - 3
Fruit cultivation - 4
Others 5
7. If not, what is your main occupation ?
Other agriclture 1
Carpenter 2
Government job - 3
Others = 4
8. How long have been a fanner ?   years
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2 : INFORMATION ON FAMILY MEMBERS
9. How many people stay with you ? .....
10. How many of them help you in the Field ? ........
11. How many of your dependents are still schooling ? ...
3: INFORMATION ON LAND HOLDINGS
12. Please give some information on the land you own.
No. Acre Type of Crop Total land
13. Please give details of the farm land you work in main seasons.
No.______ Category of land____________ 1978____________1986
a. Own land   a c r e .....
i. Operate yourself............. ....... ....
ii. Rent out............................. ....
iii. Left idle..................... ....... ....
b. Rented land
i. Acre you rent................. ........ .....
14. If you rented out your land, how much rent did you charge per 
season ?
M$ ........
15. If you rented or leased somebody’s land, how much rent did you 
pay ?
M$ .........
16. How much land tax did you pay in 1978 and 1986 per acre per 
year ?
1978 ......  M$........
1986 ....... M$........
4 : INFORMATION ON AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
17. Select the main type of padi you planted.
Type______________________1978IMS) 1986IMS)
Seribu Gantang 1 1
Anak Dara 2 2
MR1 ( Setanjung ) 3 3
MR7 ( Sekincan ) 4 4
MR77 5 5
Other MR type 6 6
Mat Candu 7 7
Bahagia 8 8
Others ( to specify ) 9 9
18. Where did you got padi seedling? °
Own stock 1
Others - 2
19. How much seedlings did you use per acre ?
1978 Main-season ......  gantang / acre
1986 Main-season ......  gantang / acre
20. How much was the cost of seedlings per gantang ?
1978 Main-season M$ .....
1986 Main-season M$ .....
21. Did you use any fertiliser ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
22. If yes, how did you get the fertiliser ?
1978 1986
Free from fertiliser subsidy scheme - 1 1
Bought from shop 2 2
Others ( to specify ) - 3 3
23. If you bought fertiliser yourself, please give the following 
details.
Main-season No. of bags Price/bag Total expenditure(M$)
1978 ..........................................
1986 ..........................................
24. Did you use any pesticide ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
5. How much did you spend on pesticide expenditure per acre ?
1978 Main-season M$  / acre
1986 Main-season M$  / acre
26. Did you use any weedicide ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
27. How much did you spend on weedicide expenditure per acre ?
1978 Main-season M$ .....
1986 Main-season M$ .....
28. Please give details on the various activities in padi 
cultivation.
Activity Type of Labour Hours Wage(M$) / acre
1978 1986







Type of labour code : Family labour - 1
Hired labour r 2
Cooperative labour “ 2
29. Do you use tractors to prepare your land ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
30. If yes, where did you gel the tractor from ?
1978 1986
Own tractor - 1 1
Rent 2 2
Others 3 3
31. If rent, how much was the rental per acre ?
1978 M$ ......
1986 M$ ......
32. Did you a combine harvester when harvesting your crop ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
33. If yes, how much was the rental per acre ?
1978 Main-season M$ .....
1986 Main-season M$ .....
5 : INFORMATION ON PADI PRODUCTION
34. How much production did you get from your land in following 
seasons ?
1978 Main-season . kg. / acre
1986 Main-season . kg. / acre
35. Did you sell any of your padi ?
1978 Main-season Yes / No
1986 Main-season Yes / No
36. Please state total amount of padi you use for the following 
purpose.
No. Purpose_________1978 Main-season_______1986 Main-sason
i. Sale in market ......  sacks   sacks
ii. Zakat(tithe) ...... sacks   sacks
iii. Home consumption ......  sacks   sacks
iv. Others ...... sacks   sacks
1 sack = ..... kg / pikul
1 acre - ..... sacks







38. If you sell to the middlemen, please state the reason. 
Reason  1978   1986
Have credit arrangement ..... .....
Convenient ..... .....
Prices are higher............... .....
Others ..... .....
39. If you sell your padi to LPN / agents, state your reasons.
Reasons___________________1978_____ 1986
Prices are better............. ....
No choice..................... ....
Others........................ ....
40. What was the price paid to you including the price subsidy ?
1978 Main-season M$   / 100 kg. / pikul
1986 Main-season M $ ..... / 100 kg. / pikul
41. How much cost was involved in marketing your crop ?
Activity________________________ 1978IMS) 1986IMS)
i. Transport within padi field M$ ...  M$.... / sack
ii. Transport outside padi field M$   M$  / sack
iii. Total cost....................... M $ ...  M$ .... / acre
6 : INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
42. Please give details of your monthly expenditure as follows.
i. Food expenditure M$ ....
ii. Schooling expenditure M$ ....
iii. Transportation M$ ....
iv. Utilities M$ ....
v. Others ( specify ) M$ ....
vi. Total Expenditure M$ ....
43. Do you think your income position has improved with the 
introduction of government subsidy programmes ? Yes / No
44. Please state the sources of your income as follows :
Sources_________________ Amount (M$) / month
i. Wage income .......
ii. Other agriculture .......
iii. Pension .......
iv. Remittances from children .......
v. Rental income .......
vi. Others ( specify ) .......
vii. Total non-farm income .......
viil. Farm income.........................
ix. Gross income .......
45. Please indicate when you spent on the following items.
11 ems < 1980______ > 1980
i. T.V. ....... .......
ii. Radio . . . ...  .......








46. Do you have any savings ? Yes / No
47. If yes, please state where you put your savings and amount 
kept.
Place < 1980 > 1980
i. National Savings Bank
ii. Pilgrimage Funds Board
iii. Commercial Banks
iv. Amanah Saharn Nasional
v. Others
48. After the subsidy scheme was launched, did you manage to 
increase your savings ? Yes / No / No change
49. If you did not save or invest, state the reason.
No extra income to save = 1
To avoid incurring interest - 2
Didn't know how to go about - 3
8 : LOANS AND CREDIT
50. Did you make any production loans ?
1978 (MS) Yes / No
1986 (MS) Yes / No




No change - 3
52. How much loan did you make ?
1978 (MS) M$ .....
1986 (MS) M$ .....
53. Please state from which source did you borrow from ?




9 : ATTITUDE OF FARMERS TOWARDS PADI SUBSIDY SCHEME AND 
EFFECT OF SUBSIDY ON PRODUCTION OF PADI
54. Did you receive free fertiliser from the government ? Ye3 / No
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56. If the quality of the free fertiliser was bad, state the 
reason.
Ferti l'iser was soft - 1
Fertiliser from old stock 2
Fertiliser moist - 3
Fertiliser adulterated - 4
Others - 5
57. Did you face any difficulty in getting free supplies of 
fertiliser ?
Yes / No
58. If yes, state the problems faced.
59. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements on the supply of fertilisers.
Statement__________________________________ .____ Agree_____Disagree
a. Distribution point of supply far from field........... .....
b. Inadequate supply of fertiliser ..... .....
c. Delay to get fertiliser at the stipulated time ..... .....
d. Fertiliser received less than amount eligible? ..... .....
60. Do you feel that fertiliser subsidy has benefited you ? Yes/No
61. If yes, how have it benefited you ?
Forgo fertiliser expenditure - 1
Increase padi yield 2
62. Do you think that the fertiliser subsidy scheme should continue?
Yes / No
63. What form do you think the fertiliser subsidy scheme take ?
Iii kind ( as at present ) - 1
Cash - 2
Others - 3
64. If fertiliser subsidy were to be withdrawn by the government, 
what would be your response ?
Continue to plant padi - 1
Stop planting padi - 2




66. If no, why (Jo you say so °
Farmers resold fertiliser tothird parly 1
Fanners applied fertiliser to other crops - 2 
Others - 3
67. How do you propose to te government to stop these abuses ?
LPP show farmers coreect way to use fertiliser - 1
LPP should monitor fertiliser use - 2
Government should prosecute offenders in court = 3
10: ATTIITUDE OF FARMERS TOWARDS PADI PRICE SUBSIDY
68. Have you benefited from the padi price subsidy ? Yes / No
69. How have you benefited ?
Increase income - 1
Others - 2
70. How long did you have to wait before you are able to cash your
coupon ?
1 - 2  days - 1
3 - 5  days 2
6 - 7  days - 3
> 7 days - 4
71. Please give your response to the following statements on the
administration of the padi price subsidy
Statement________________  Satisfied Not satisfied
i. Coupon issued to buyers of padi
ii. Moisture deductions by buyers
iii. Details of purchase in receipt
72. Have you heard any case of abuse in the administration of price 
subsidy?
Yes / No
73. If yes, please state the kind of abuse tfiat you have heard.
Farmers collaboratirig with buyers - 1
Buyers collaborating with millers - 2
Millers collaborating with LPN staff - 3
Others - 4
74 What would you do if price subsidy were to increase by 100 % ? 
Increase padi area = 1
Reduce padi area - 2
No change - 3
Others 4
75. What would you do if price subsidy were to decrease by 50 % ? 
Increase padi area 1
Reduce padi area = 2
No change ~ 3
Others r 4
V+0
76. Would you increase your market surplus if price subsidy were to 
increase ?
Yes / No
77. What would you propose to do if price subsidy were to be
withdrawn ?
Find alternative job - 1
Continue to plant padi = 2
No change in acreage - 3
Plant padi for own consumption = 4
Others = 5
78. Do you agree if price subsidy is given based on actual output 
rather on amount sold in the market ? Yes / No
79. If yes, why do you say so ?
Fanners able to get more subsidy - 1
Fanners get subsidy even for padi not sold = 2
Govt, able to avoid cheating by middlemen = 3
80. Please state your choice whether you would prefer a price
increase or a subsidy increase for padi.
Increase padi price = 1
Increase price subsidy - 2
Indifferent = 3
81. What is the rate of price subsidy that you would consider
reasonable ?
M$20.00 / 100 kg ■= 1
M$25.00 / 100 kg = 2
M$55.00 / 100 kg - 3
11 : GENERAL ATTITUDES OF FARMERS TO SUBSIDIES
82. Do you think that you can plant padi successfully without 
subsidies ?
Possible - 1
Not possible = 2
83. Do you think you can be self-reliant with minimal government 
assistance?
Yes / No
84. Do you think that your self-reliant spirit is affected by the 
presence of subsidies ? Yes / No
85. Why do you say that your spirit of self-reliance is not
affected by the presence of subsidies ?
Subsidies is an incentive to work hard = 1
Subsidies help to reduce farmers’ burden - 2
Others ( specify ) - 3
uk l
86. Why do you think the government says that farmers have a 
subsidy mentality " ?
So that more farmers would become self-reliant 1
A government warning that subsidies will be phased out
So that farmers should use subsidies more effectively
87. Please state whether or not you agree with the following
statements on the concept of " subsidy mentality ".(SM)
Views____________________________ Agree______Disagree
i. SM exists due to poverty ..... ......
ii. Farmers face difficulty if no subsidy ..... ......
iii. SM exists due to government patronage ..... ......
iv. Subsidies should be used to help poor .....




RATSSM Version 1.12. 12/30/B4
Copyright (C) 1904 by VAR Fconoinetrics 
open data biyazmin 
calender 1968 1 1
allocate 0 1906,1
data 1968,1 1986,1 REPHA PROP SUBSIDY REORANT YPI1 RlinHFHP
print(dates) 1960,1 1986,1 REP1IA PROD SUBSIDY REGRANT YPH RUBBERr
set-REPHA 1960,1 1906,1 log(REPIIA( t))
set PROD 1968,1 1906,1 « log(PROD(t))
set SUBSIDY 1968,1 1986,1 = log(SUBSIDY(t))
set REGRANT 1968,1 1986,1 = log(REGRANT(t))
set YPH 1960,J 1906,1 • log(YPH(t))
set RUBBERP 1968,1 1986,1 = lotf(RUDBERF(t))
OLS RJiPIIA 1969,1 1986,1
# CONSTANT REORANT SUBSIDY -RUBBERP 1 1 
DEPENDENT VARTAnLE 1 REPHA
FROM 1969- 1 UNTIL 1986- 1
OBSERVATIONS 10 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 14
8**2 .50568161 RBAR**2 .39975624
SSR .00305R81 SEE .25126236
DUnBIN-WATSON 1.21110261
0( 9)= 11.8312 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .222996
NO. LABEI VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR T-STATISTTC
♦ ** ******* *** *** ************ ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 4.479167 1.601620 2.663603
2 REGRANT 4 0 .6101526 .4222102 1.415037
3 SUBSIDY 3 0 .3843720 .1649373 2.33041H
4 RUBBERP 6 1 - .6062474 .2971389 -2.309517
END
NORMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0
0 ERRORS 0 WARNINGS
HATN.SM Version 1. 12. 12/30/81
Copyi ighl <C ' 1981 by VAR Eronomcl rirs 
open •]•<I i i  b: yn.'iimi 
cnlfiHlcr 1 !H»H I I 
allocate 0 I WIG,I
data 1960,1 1906,1 REPHA PROD SUBSIDY REGRANT VII! RUBBERP
print(dates) 1960,1 1906,1 REPHA PROD SUDSIDY REORANT YPII RUBBERP
set REPHA 1968,1 1906,1 log(REPHA(l))
sol PROD 1960,1 1906,1 - lotf(PROD(t))
set SUBSIDY 19GR.1 1986,1 = lotj(SUBSIDY(t))
set REGRANT 1968,1 1986,1 = log(REGRANT(t))
set YP1! 1968,1 1906,1 * loe(YPII(t))
, set RUBBERP 1968,1 1906,1 = lou(RUBBERP(I))
OLS YPH 1969,1 19116,1
# CONSTANT REGRANT SUBSIDY -RUBBERP 1 1 REPHA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5 YPH
FROM 1969- I UNTIL 1986- 1
OBSERVATIONS 10 DEGREES OF FREEDOM 11
R**2 .61054229 RBAn**2 .52993992
SSR .17635717 SEE .11647300
DURDIN-WATSON .95712222
Q( 9)- 7.11104 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .625560
NO. L.ABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAK'D. ERROR T-STATISTIC
*** ******* ♦ ** *** ************ ************ ************
1 CONSTANT 0 0 6.255334 .9560615 6.537345
2 REGRANT 4 0 -.4911625 .2098197 •2.342309
3 SUDSIDY 3 0 -.1216391 .9007379E-0) -1.383715
4 RUBBERP 6 1 .5270666 .1610649 3.206213
5
END
REPHA 1 0 -.9701217E-01 .1298893 -.7830553
NORMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0








p s i  1,
IfATSSM V* i •* i 1.12. 12 '20 'H I
Cnpyi ii-lil 1981 !>;. VMl I i-..im*wI i ir>:
*»|»r*n 'lata l»:y.i;:min 
ralendn |Of?H I I 
allocate 0 1906, 1
data 1908,1 1980,1 RFPJIA PROD SUBSIDY REGRANT V'PII lU'BBEHP
print (dates) 1960,1 1906,1 REPHA PROD SUBSIDY REGNANT YFII PUPBFRP
a»-l RLT11A 1900,1 1980,1 log(REPHA(1))
set PROD 1968,1 1900,1 log(PROD(I))
pel SUBSIDY 1900,1 1980,1 - li»u(SIIMSIDY(I! ;
set REGRANT 1960,1 1906,1 = lojj(REGRANT(t'
set YPH 1960,1 1900,1 log(YPIKt))
set RUnBERP 1968,1 19R6.1 » Iotl(RUBBERP(1 )
0I.S PROD 1909,1 1986,1
* CONSTANT REGRANT RUBBERP 1 t YPH REPHA 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 TROD





0( 9)= 17.3901 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .429455E-01
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR 
♦+****♦ ttt *** ♦***♦*♦****♦










CONSTANT 0 0 -2.304392 .9393603
REGRANT 4 0 .2065432 .1465707
RUBBERP 6 1 -.3020310E-01 .1363119
YPH 5 0 1.108842 .1620032







NORMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0 
0 ERRORS 0 WARNINGS
gOcTi:!***♦>
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L S / / I) e p e n d e n t V a r i a b 1 e i s L X 3
Date: 7-• 12-199.0 / T i m e : 16 :1.7
SM PL ran ge : 196 5 1.986
Number of observations: 22
VARIABLE COEPE ICIEN I STD . ERROR T - STAT. 2-TAIL. SIC.
C 0.4337850 0. 6041009 0.7180671 0 .484
L X 6 0.9472793 0. 0 71.4012 13.266992 0 . 000
LX7 0.0096863 0. 0247854 0.3908053 0.70,1
L. X 8 0.0 738151 0. 0386515 1.9097593 0.0 75
LX:1.1 0.9458410 0. 0970402 9.7468999 0.0 00
EX.1.2 0.0678473 0. 0919249 0.7380726 0.4 72
LX.13 0.0198888 0. 0122369 1.6253129 0.125
R- sc|uareel 0.984551 M e a n o f d e p e n d e n t; v a r 7.280013
Adjusted R squared 0 .978372 S . D . o f d e p e n d e n t v a r 0.196208
S . E . o f r e g r e s s i o n 0.028866 S u m o f s q u a r e d r e s i d 0.01.2490
Durbin W a t s o n s t; a t: 2.642978 E • s t a t i s t i c 159.3235
L o g I i k e 1 i h o o d 50.99616
Do you wan t: t:o see t h o C o v a r i a n c e M a t. r i x ? (P , S, ~~J )
C o v a r i a n c e M a t. r i x
C , c 0 . 3 6 4 9 3 8 C ,  LX6 0.028012
(',1X7 0.001744 C,LX8 0.009391
C.LXll. 0.017662 C , L X12 0.038730
C, IX13 0,002090 L X 6 , L X 6 0.005098
L X 6 » L X 7 0.00.1053 1 X 6 ,1 X 8 0.001573
LX6,1X11 0.002680 I...X 6,1... XI2 0.000529
1X6,1 X.1 3 0.000278 L X 7 ,1.. X 7 0.000614
1X7,1. X 8 0.0006.1.4 I..X 7, IX 1.1 0.000109
L X M X  12 0.000889 I..X 7,LX 1.3 0,000114
LX8,LX8 0 . 001494 I.. X 8,1.. X .1.1 0.002470
L X 8 , L X12 5.581) 05 L. X 8 , L X13 4.541) 05
L X1.1 , L X11 0.009 417 1. XI.1 ,LX 12 0.000643
LX11 ,1.X.1.3 0.000103 IX.1.2, EX.12 0.008450
1. XI 2,1X1 3 8.581) 05 LX 1.3,1. XI3 0.000150
Sar S3 tr. Ss ~  :*  :::: a  ™ :::: ~  : - *  a  a  « • *  a  a  a  *  ®  #  a  a  m  a :::: = ::::: :::: :k 88 Sf ™ =5 =  "  "  ™ "" w  = :::: :::: ™ :::: :::: :::: :::: ™
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L 8 / / D e f) e n d e n t. V a r i a b I e
Date: 7 .12 1990 / Timer 16:04 
SMPL range: 1965 .1.986
Number of observati ons: 22
V A R I A B I.
C























.  Ii. R R 0 R
14 53893 
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A cl jus ted R-squared 
8 . E . o f r ci g r e s s i o n 
D u r b i n W a t: s o n s t; a t; 
L o g I i k e 1 i h o o d





H e a r i o f d e p e n d e n t v a r 1, 0 7 2 7 6 7
8.0. o f d e p e n d e n t; v a r 0 .11115 2
8 u m o f s q u a r e d r e s i d 0 . 0 7 3181
I statistic 8.144897
Do you wan t; t; o s e e 1 h e C o v a r i a n c 
C o v a r i
e Matrix ? (P,G,— r) 
a n c e M a t r i x
C,C 1. 31 :l 9 1 7 c ,1 >:/ 0.0 7 507 8
C , L X 8 0.00034 7 C , I..X12 0.258842
C ,1X13 0.004 617 C > l> X1 0.029579
LX 7,1X7 0.002132 IX/,IX8 0.001664
1X7,1. XI.2 0,004754 1 X 7 ,1 X13 0.00021.1
L X 7 , D X .1 0.000694 IX 8 ,1X8 0.003839
1X8,1. XI 2 0.001019 1. X 8 , L X13 0.0004 3 7
L X 8 , D X1 0.0004 86 I X 1.2,1. XI2 0.051982
IX12,1XI3 0.000993 1. X12 , D X1 0.005962
I. X.1.3,1..X13 0.000704 1XI3 ,0X1 0.000190
I) X .1, D X1 0.005514
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rat'v.m v - i m m . i iv. iv-''10/111
I ’ .- I-V I »»:».» • * ’  »•»*• I I . ,  n i t  IN C l , I <  
i i j i im i * li i1  i i  |..Ri::i»\ 
nil noil «• 0 »7
f l u l n ( o r g * v n r )  1 07 VP1I HFPIIA AGETAP TAI’IMY TV-K'M/ (GROSSVI f. 
RIIDDERP HOUSTZE REPYEAR AGESII GROSS IN UN'REMIt "KYI1 I M W Y I  1 
DIW4Y2 DU4NY3 REGRANT TOTIIA DlMfY-1
prlrtt(dutes) 1 07 YMI REPHA AGETAP TArDAY TASKS 17. GIROSSYI. T
RUBBERP 1I0USIZE REPYEAR AGESII GROSS IN UNREPHt WEXP IPUM4Y1 t-
DlffIY2 DIIM4Y3 REGRANT TOTIIA DUMMY4
sel YPH l 07 = log(YPII(t))
scl AGETAP l 87 log(AGETAP(t))
set TAFDAY J 87 = lo«(TAPDAY(t))
set TASKS 17 1 07 lci'(TASKSIZ(t))
set GROSSYL 1 87 - lotf(GROSSYL(t))
set RUBBERP 1 07 log(RURDERP( I))
set HOUSTZE 1 87 - log(HOUSIZE(t))
set RErYEAn 1 07 lug(REPYEAR(t))
set AGESH 1 87 log(AGESH(t))
set GROSSIN I 07 l.og(GROSSIN(I))
set WEXP 1 87 » log(WEXP(t))
act REGRANT 1 07 * log(REGRANT( t))
set TOTIIA 1 87 = log(TOTHA(t))
ols(vcv) REPHA 1 87
# CONSTANT AGESII RUBBERP YPH HOUSTZE REGRANT TOTIIA MMWY4






DEGREES OF FREEDOM 79 
RDAR**2 .714616-14
SEE .3137434-1
Q( 27)= 31.8019 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .239502
NO. LABEL VAR LAG COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR T-STAT
*** ******* *** *** ************ *t*tt***t*** *******
1 CONSTANT 0 0 4.170138 1.920943 2.170081
2 AGESH 10 0 -.7790035E-01 .1005602 .4131325
3 RUBBERP 7 0 -.7943829E-01 .1407327 -.5341010
4 YPH 1 0 -.8043005E-01 .82176458-01 -.9707181
5 IIOUSIZE 8 0 -.6841280E-01 .7039025E-01 -.8727207
6 REGRANT 17 0 -.4134510 .2019525 -2.047272
7 TOTIIA 18 0 .0950490 .6329635E-01 14.14062
8
END
DUtWY-1 19 0 -.6040317 .8592691E 01 -7.960620
NOIIMAL COMPLETION OF JOB 
HALT AT 0 
0 ERRORS
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5




ll i • IIC
1974 1975 1976 1977
1. Replanting Grants
1.1 Rubber:
1.1.1 Rubber replanting &
new planting 84.3 77.9 108.6 81.7 67.2
Research cess 32.3 32.7 31.2 34.5 34.5
1.1.2 RISDA administration 11.1 19.2 25.1 28.9 37.5
1.2 Coconuts 2.7 2.4 3.7 4.2 4.9
1.3 Pineapples 0.6 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.3
2. Input Subsidies
2.1 Urea - 26.8 4.2 - -
2.2 Short term crops:
2.2.1 DOA 3.5 4.6 2.8 4.2 7.5
2.2.2 FOA - 3.9 10.3 9.2 10.9
2.3 Credit: BPM Programmes - - 30.0 - -
2.4 Fishing:
2.4.1 Fisheries Division 1.5 3.6 4.2 1.3 6.1
2.4.2 MAJUIKAN 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.3
2.5 Livestock (smallholders) 
2.5.1 beef and dairy 1.4 1.4 1.4 4.3 4.3
2.5.2 other livestock 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.6 1.6
2.6 Livestock (other): 
2.6.1 development grants
to MAJUTERNAK 4.9 5.5 5.5 1.8 3.2
2.6.2 operating grants
to MAJUTERNAK 0.2 2.0 3.3 4.7 5.2
3.0 Drainage and Irrigation
3.1 Capital 35.1 41.1 45.7 51.5 62.1
3.2 Operating & Maintenance:
3.2.1 irrigation 8.5 7.4 7.8 13.2 16.8
3.2.2 drainage 0.5 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.7
4.0 Price Support
4.1 Padi (LPN):
4.1.1 development 9.5 16.0 4.5 20.8 7.0
4.1.2 trading 23.0 25.0 50.0 39.7 115.8
5.0 Tax Exemptions
5.1 Sugar 2.6 2.1 7.4 7.4 9.4
6.0 Other Subsidies
6.1 Rubber Marketing:
MARDEC capital - 15.5 - - -
6.2 Marketing: FAMA - 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.3
6.3 Land development:
6.3.1 FELDA 16.1 21.2 33.2 31.7 43.9
6.3.2 FELCRA 5.2 6.9 5.1 7.0 9.2
6.3.3 RISDA block planting 3.8 11.2 12.9 15.4 16.6
Total Subsidies 247.2 330.8 402.1 367.6 469.3
Source: Keliin ( 1980 ), pp. 53-55
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TABLE 1: Rubber S/H Inside and Outside Land Development Scheme,1977 
_______Item___________________ No?______ %__________Hu._______ X
Estimated No. of S/H 490,460 100 1,360,769 100
No. of S/H in Land Schemes 22,490 4.6 144,326 10.6
No. of S/H outside Schemes 467.970 95.4 1.216.443 89.4
Note: Land schemes refer to FELDA & FELCRA type
Source: RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 1.2, p. 13
TABLE 2: Rubber Smallholders Between 1961 and 1977. P. Malaysia
Year______ No.________Ha._____Ave. Size(ha)
1961 284,565 819,041 2.9
1973 424,846 1,104,600 2.6
1977 490.460 1.158.451 2.4
Source : RISDA ( 1983 )
TABLE 3: No. of Smallholders by Sex & Race. 1977. P. Malaysia 
Sex Buraiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
No. % No. % No. X No. %______No.______ %
M 251,808 69 81,147 71 4580 72 2981 72 340,516 69.4
F 113,942 31 33,621 29 1226 21 1155 28 149,944 30.6
Tot 365.750 75 114.768 23 5806 1 4136 0.8 490.460 100
Source : RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 2.1, p. 21
TABLE 4: Area of Holdings By Sex and Race. 1977. P. Malaysia______
Sex Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
Ha. X Ha._______ %_____Ha. %____ Haj.____ %_____Hâ _____ %
M 541,992 - 294,262 - 14,110 - 7,172 - 857,536 74
F 188,741 - 106,760 - 3,015 - 2,399 - 300,451 26
Tot 730.733 63 401.022 35 17.124 2 9.571 0.8 1.156.451 100
Source: RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 2.2, p. 23
TABLE 5: No. of S/H by Age Category and Race. 1977. P. Malaysia 
Age Cat. Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
(years) No. % No. % No. X So. X No. X
15-29 21,086 6 9,129 8 437 8 352 9 31,004 6
30-44 122,170 33 41,386 36 2133 37 1311 32 167,000 34
45-59 147,543 40 37,275 33 2158 37 1619 39 188,595 39
> 60 74,951 21 26,978 23 1078 19 854 21 103,861 21
Total 365,750 100 144.768 100 5806 100 4136 100 490.460 100
Source: RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 2.7, p. 31
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TABLE 6: No. of S/H by Tenurial Status & Race. 1977. P. Malaysia 
Status Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
_______No^______% No. % No. % No. % No.______ %
0-0 275,564 75 77,549 69 4416 76 3007 72 360,536 74
NO-O 79,763 22 34,645 31 1309 23 946 23 116,665 24
M-0 10,423 3 2,574 2 81 1 181 4 13,259 3
Total 365.750 100 114.768 100 5806 100 4136 100 490.460 100
Note: 0 - 0 = Owner-Operator
N O - O  - Non-Owning Operator 
M - O = Mixed-Operator 
Source: RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 2.9, p. 34
Frequency Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
No. % No. X No. % No. X No.
0 89,584 33 15,088 17 924 26 1,519 55 107,112
1 161,240 60 66,244 73 2478 70 1,173 42 231,135
2 16,985 6 8,125 9 152 4 84 3 25,346
3 1,463 1 797 1 6 0.2 11 0.4 2,277
Tot. 269,272 100 90,251 100 3560 100 2.787 100 365.870
”0" refers to non-participants in replanting with old trees. This 
exclude FELDA & FELCRA smallholders with immature trees.
Source: RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 4.1, p. 124
Year Bumiputra Chinese Indian Others Total
No. X No. X No. X No. X No. %
< 1960 46,616 24 26,638 31 914 33 261 19 76,429 26.5
'61-’70 82,267 41 38,995 46 1131 40 443 32 122,836 42.6
*71-*77 68,300 34 19,230 23 755 27 670 49 88,955 30.8
Tot. 199.183 100 84.863 100 2800 100 1374 100 288.220 100
Source: RISDA( 1983 ), Table 4.3, p. 128
TABLE 9:
By Size of Holdings and Race, P. Malaysia, 1977.
Holding Size Bumiputra Chinese Others Total
Hectares No. X No. X No. % No. X
0.01-1.99 46,089 51.1 3,276 21.6 1,235 53.4 50,600 47
2.00-3.99 33,864 37.6 7,277 48.0 881 38.1 42,022 39
> 4.00 10,203 11.3 4,616 30.4 195 8.4 15,014 14
Total 90.156 100 15.169 100 2.311 100 107.636 100
Percentage 83.8 14. 1 2.1 100
Source: Adapted from RISDA ( 1983 ), Table 4.11, p. 142
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TABLE 10: Outline of RISDA*s Dev.
Programme_________________
REPLANTING





Source: RISDA ( 1986 ),









Disease control,pest control, 
Tapping technique,use of 
etherel
Cash crops,animal breeding, 
Acquaculture,village industry
Collective Processing Centres 
Smoke houses,community halls, 







holder Development Centre, 
(PPPK)(Smallholder Community 
Worker (PMPK), Smallholder 
Women Group Group,Cooperative 
Development
TABLE 11: RISDA*s Budget - 1981 - 1986 ( in M$ million )
ITEM 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
A.Dev. Exp.
a) Direct Grant 66.5 47.0 38.2 28.3 40.0 29.4
b) Govt. Loan - 42.3 38.8 58.7 61.3 44.4
c) From cess 189.0 236.7 219.4 201.4 198.2 203.8
d) Tot. Dev. Exp. 255.5 326.0 296.3 288.4 299.5 277.6
B. Adm. Exp. 83.7 98.7 76.7 80.2 84.4 84.1
C. Adm. Sc Dev. Exp.339.2 424.7 373.0 368.6 383.9 361.7
Note that administrative expenditure is financed from direct 
government grant.
Source: RISDA ( 1987 ), Personal Communication. 17 April.
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TABLE 12; Annual Expenditure of Rubber Industry (Replanting Board) 
1968-72 and Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority, 
1973-86 (in M$m)
YEAR ADM. RG MED. SHM. SEPENTAS TDE TDAE ECR
1968 7.3 133.1 - - - 133.1 140.4 52.7
1969 7.6 107.4 - - - 107.4 115.0 55.0
1970 7.8 102.8 - - - 102.8 110.6 57.3
1971 8.3 102.6 - - - 102.6 110.9 64.8
1972 9.0 105.4 0.3 - - 105.4 114.4 64.1
1973 11.1 113.8 3.8 - - 113.8 124.9 24.5
1974 19.2 158.5 11.2 - - 158.5 177.7 67.7
1975 41.1 137.5 12.9 3.9 - 154.3 195.4 60.3
1976 34.6 126.5 15.4 4.0 - 145.9 180.5 60.3
1977 33.1 109.9 16.6 10.7 - 137.2 170.3 60.3
1978 64.6 122.6 70.4 6.8 - 199.8 264.4 66.6
1979 51.3 101.4 55.7 2.0 - 159.1 210.4 66.6
1980 58.7 136.5 80.3 4.9 - 221.7 280.4 88.6
1981 83.7 66.5 - - - 66.5 150.2 -
1982 98.7 47.1 7.3 7.3 25.0 241.0 339.7 -
1983 76.7 38.3 3 .8 10.0 25.0 77.1 153.8 -
1984 80.2 28.4 3.8 10.0 45.0 87.2 167.4 -
1985 84.4 40.0 15.3 6.0 40.0 101.3 185.7 -
1986 84.1 29.4 17.2 4.7 20.0 71.3 155.4 -
Source: Computed from RISDA ( 1982 ), Tanam Semula Dalam Konteks 
Pembangunan Pekebun Kecil, Table 3, p. and RISDA ( 1987 ), Personal 
Communication with Deputy Director-General of RISDA.
Note: 1. Adm. - Administrative expenditure; RG = Replanting grants
& input subsidies; MED = Mini-estate development; SHM = Smallholder 
Marketing scheme;
SEPENTAS = Replanting Incentive Scheme; TDE = Total Development 
Expenditure;
TDAE = Total Development 8c Administrative Exp.; ECR = Estate Cess 
Refund
2. Prior to 1981, all RISDA expenditures incurred from cess 
funds. But beginning from 1981, RISDA received direct grant from the 
government to cover its recurrent costs.
3. In the absence of separate figures that constitute 
replanting grants per se, interesting to know how much RISDA 
actually spent on replanting. World Bank ( 1984 ) suggests that the 
following method to estimate amount of replanting subsidies
i) 60 % of administrative expenditure ( item marked ADM.in
Table )
ii) 100 % of subsidies item ( item marked RG in Table ) 
because majority of expenditures incurred in item RG is for 
replanting grants and agricultural input subsidies.
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TABLE 13: Hectarage Devoted To Production of Rubber. P. M.1950 -1986 
Year Area(’000 ha) Planted Area(*000 ha)
New Plant Replant Mature Immature Total S/H (*)
E S E S E S E S E S1950 2.4 1.4 17.8 1.4 706 635 89 7.9 795 642 44.61951 6.0 2.2 23.5 1.5 693 633 102 11.8 795 645 44.71952 2.9 2.8 20.9 1.7 693 632 115 16.3 808 648 44.41953 1.9 2.6 12.1 11.9 699 620 123 30.6 822 650 44.11954 2.9 1.3 15.8 9.1 687 620 129 40.9 817 659 44.71955 4.0 3.3 23.3 10.2 678 617 137 53.9 816 668 45.01956 5.9 5.3 31.7 18.8 660 609 152 78.7 813 682 45.61957 6.5 4.6 30.9 20.2 644 597 169 102.1 814 692 45.91958 5.6 4.4 26.2 24.2 621 595 180 131.1 802 715 47.11959 5.8 8.5 27.6 28.0 591 619 194 168.5 786 744 49.51960 8.8 10.2 30.4 28.1 568 615 214 194.2 783 766 50.21961 7.2 27.3 28.5 23.2 557 608 227 259.9 784 824 51.21962 4.0 33.4 25.5 28.0 552 636 227 339.3 780 900 53.51963 3.5 40.6 23.8 33.8 553 630 224 382.7 777 944 54.81964 2.5 23.3 23.8 32.3 548 631 218 416.2 766 976 56.01965 2.0 16.1 21.5 37.0 544 630 208 464.6 752 1022 57.51966 1.3 10.9 20.2 20.0 543 584 191 456.2 734 1041 58.61967 1.0 7.9 11.3 32.3 605 600 162 452.9 707 1053 57.81968 0.2 4.2 5.3 15.8 546 640 133 415.0 678 1055 60.81969 0.9 6.3 9.7 15.1 552 697 112 370.6 663 1067 61.61970 1.2 11.0 14.1 21.5 545 756 102 321.6 647 1077 62.41971 2.4 12.4 12.1 23.5 534 795 98 291.4 632 1088 63.21972 2.2 9.5 8.0 23.4 522 827 88 264.8 610 1092 64.11973 2.3 12.6 9.7 28.6 508 835 82 269.9 589 1105 65.21974 - 14.1 12.2 23.6 - na - na 579 1392 70.61975 - 18.9 11.2 21.1 549 1108 34 300.0 583 1408 70.71976 - 18.7 8.5 14.3 - na - na 573 1408 71.01977 - 20.1 7.4 12.9 - na - na 559 1422 71.71978 - 34.3 6.7 13.3 - na - na 542 1455 72.81979 - 23.4 - 14.2 - na - na 526 1477 73.71980 - 19.2 - 15.3 - na - na 526 1496 73.91981 - 1.1 - 22.6 - na - na 534 1476 73.41982 - 0.6 - 23.7 - na - na 525 1492 73.91983 - 0.4 - 33.4 - na - na 516 1502 74.41984 - 0.3 - 28.7 - na - na na na na1985 - 0.1 - 30.0 - na - na na na na1986 - 0.06 - na - na - na na na na
Note : E = Estate, S - Smallholding 
Sources:
- C. Barlow (1978), Appendix
- RISDA (1984), p. 16
- C. Findlay, J. Western 8t S. Chamala (eds) (1985),
- P.O. Thomas (1980)
- World Bank (1984), Vol. 3, Annex Table 2,
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Table 14: Production and Yield of Rubber, P. Malayaia 1950-86 
Production( ’000 tons] Yield( kg/ha)





































































































































































































































































- C. Barlow (1978)
- Economic Report, various
- Ani Arope (1982)




STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 7
TABLE I: Age of Smallholders By Age Category
Age Group No. of S/H $
< 34 2 2.2
35 - 39 3 3.4
40 - 44 5 5.7
45 - 49 9 10.3
50 - 54 21 24.1
55 - 59 12 13.8
6 0 - 6 4 20 23.0
> 65 15 17.2
Total 87 100.0
TABLE 2: Educational Status of Smallholders










TABLE 3: Distribution of Household Size of Rubber Smallholders.
Household Size No. of S/H________%
1 - 3  27 31.0
4 - 6  41 47.1
7 - 9  16 18.4
1 0 - 1 2  3 3.4
Total________________87__________100.0
TABLE 4; Distribution, of Occupational Pattern of Smallholders.
Occupation________No. of S/H_________ %_
Solely Rubber 27 31.0
Mainly Rubber 55 63.2
Part Timers 5 5.7
Total__________________87_______ 100.0
TABLE 5; Distribution of Other Economic Activities of Smallholders
Activities__________No. of S/H__________%_
Other Agric. 20 33.9
Petty Business 3 5.1
Orchard 12 20.3




TABLE 6: Working Experience of Smallholders
Years a3 Tappers No. of S/H________%_
<10 4 4.6
11 - 20 25 28.7
21 - 30 28 32.2
31 - 40 14 16.1
> 40 16 18.4
Total_______________ 87_________ 100.0
TABLE 7: Distribution of Membership in S/H Development Centre




TABLE 8: Distribution of Land Ownership Category
Category No. of Cases * Ha. *
Owner-Operator 80 92.0 121.2 86.4
Owner-Tenant 4 4.6 9.4 6.7
Pure-Tenant 3 3.4 9.7 6.9
Total 87 100.0 140.3 100.0
TABLE 9: Total Area Replanted With Rubber
Status Area (ha) %
Tot. Replanted Area 171.6 75.3
- Tot. immature area 37.0 -
- Tot. mature area 134.6 -
Tot. Ha. Not Replanted 57.0 24.9
- Tot. still prod, yield 53.3 -
- Tot. no more yield 3.7 -
Total Ha. in survey area 228.6 100.0
Note: Total land idle = 27 
Average size of land
.1 hectares 
worked - 1.8 hectares
TABLE 10: Distribution of Replanted Rubber Holdings By Size.
Size Cat.(Ha) No. of Cases % Ha. %
< 0.6 17 12.2 8.9 5.1
0.6 - 1.0 44 31.7 37.1 21.2
1.1 - 1.5 37 26.6 46.4 26.5
1.6 - 2.0 26 18.7 42.3 24.1
2.1 - 2.5 5 3.6 12.0 6.8
2.6 - 3.0 5 3.6 14.4 8.2
> 3.1 4 2.9 14.1 8.0
Total 139 100.0 175.2 100.0
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TABLE 11: Labour Utilisation in Rubber Cultivation
in percentage
Activity Family Lab. Hired Lab. Coop. Lab. Others Total
Felling 32.2 57.5 6.9 3.4 100
Holing 5.6 31.0 6.9 3.4 100
Planting 78.2 11.5 6.9 3.4 100
Poisoning 78.2 11.5 6.9 3.4 100
Fertilising 79.3 10.3 6.9 3.4 100
Tapping 93.1 6.9 - - 100
Processing 92.0 8.0 - - 100
TABLE T2-: SMALLHOLDER RUBBER CROP BUDGET
YIELD ( kg/ha ) 946
PRICE ( M$/kg ) 1.43
GROSS RETURN ( M$/kg ) 1,353
PRODUCTION COSTS
- Fertiliser 40
- Plant protection 8






NET RETURNS (Mi/ha) 937
Note: - this is for a ” typical " unorganised smallholder situation in 1984 
- assumes hired tappers undertake 33 % of tapping on share basis of 5 
Source : Robert B. Campbell, et. al. ( 1985 ), Annex 8
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TABLE i?: PROJECTED RE 1JHNb rw/n kupdek ni„.;
Age of Yield  Gross Revenue VT'TZCofJs’



























503 719 774 830
856 1224 1318 1412
1184 1693 1827 1953
1415 2023 2179 2346
1367 1955 2105 2256
1494 2136 2300 2465
1540 2202 2371 2541
1647 2355 2536 2717
1575 2252 2425 2598
1596 2282 2458 2633
1650 2360 2542 2723
1720 2460 2650 2838
1664 2380 2563 2746
1584 2265 2439 2613
1525 2181 2349 2517
1527 2184 2352 ' 2520
1527 2184 2352 2520
1527 2184 2352 2520

















































































from nIbUA ruuucri nmu ...
hired tapping labour receiving 50 % share of output 
s financial; unpaid family labour not c°ste 
price approximately M$1.14 / kg ( Nov. 1984 )
. Campbell, et.al. ( 1985 ), Annex 1
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 8
Padi Fertiliser Distribution Under Government Subsidy Schemes,*51-87
Year States Subsidy Rate Fertiliser Distrib. 
% * (tons)
1951 Kelantan Free to 100 Penghulus -
1952-53 Kelantan/Trengganu 50 % 210
1953-54 Kelantan/Trengganu M$6/100 lb. 710
1954-55 Kelantan/Trengganu M$4/100 lb. 296
1955-56 Kelantan/Trengganu M$7.50/100 lb.(50*) 891
1956-57 Malacca M$15/acre 287
Kelantan M$4.30/100 lb. (34*) 926
Trengganu discontinued 51
Malacca M$10/acre 140
N. Sembilan 50 * 61
1957-58 Kelantan 33.3 * 1398
Trengganu M$7.10/100 lb. (50*) 380
Malacca M$20/acre 125
N. Sembilan 50 * 223
1958-59 Kelantan M$0.90 of M$11.40 cost 1710
Trengganu M$2/100 lb. 472
Malacca M$3.40 of M$13.40 cost 93
N. Sembilan 38 * 263
1959-60 Kelantan discontinued 3049
Trengganu M$l.00/100 lb. 666
Malacca same but credit arranged 150
N. Sembilan 38 * 176
1960-61 Kelantan discontinued 2656
Trengganu discontinued 460
Malacca as before 396




No information by states; First year of uniform 50 % 
Federation subsidy - Kelantan included with no state 
scheme; Penang had own state scheme & did not participate
1964-65
Kelantan No programme 4211
Trengganu 40 * 511
Malacca 40 * 294
N. Sembilan 40 * 388
Kedah 40 * 4969
Perlis 40 * 473
Perak 40 * 202
Kelantan No programme 4891
Trengganu 30 * 1600
Malacca 30 * 169
N. Sembilan 30 * 293
Kedah 30 * 7002
Perlis 30 * 625
Perak 30 * 678
Kelantan No programme 4389
Trengganu 20 * 1387
Malacca 20 * 137
N. Sembilan 20 * 321
Kedah 20 * 7369
Perlis 20 * 717
Perak 20 * 539
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1965-66 Kelantan 10 % 5771
Malacca 10 % 115
N. Sembilan 10 % 301
Kedah 10 % 3273
Perlis 10 % 930
Perak 10 % 207
1966-67 Starting in 1966, the government planned to subsidise the 
price by 30 %. This rate of subsidy would be maintained 
over the next five year period. The gross national usage 
over the 1961-69 period were as follows:-
1961 Federation 50 % 3830
1962 Federation 40 % 8173
1963 Federation 30 % 8889
1964 Federation 20 % 11,469
1965 Federation 10 $ 12,479
1966 Federation 30 % 24,822
1967 Federation 30 $ 25,000
1968 Federation 30 % 25,000
1969 Federation 30 X n. a.
1970 The government stopped fertiliser subsidy programme
1973-74 The government re-introduced fertiliser subsidy because
the world oil crisis increased the price of fertiliser.
Rate of subsidy was M$10 / bag.
1974-75 Federation M$10/bag( 2 bags/acre) 19,458
1975 Federation M$10/bag( 2 bags/acre) 5996
1975-76 Federation M$10/bag(2 bags/acre) 15,133
1976 Federation M$10/bag(2 bags/acre) 3825
1977-79 The government listed fertiliser as a controlled item
under the Control of Supplies Ordinance, 1974.
1979-87 The government introduced a 100 X fertiliser subsidy
___________making fertiliser a free input in padi cultivation.
Source: Oto Doering (1973), Malaysian Rice Policy and the MUDA River 
Irrigation Project. Ph. D. Thesis, Cornell University, 
pp. 258-260 and Ministry of Public Enterprise (1986), 
Personal Communication.
( * ) indicates % of market price
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 9 
TABLE I: Atte of Farmers According to Atfe Category in Krian
Age Group No. of Fanners *
25 - 29 2 2.7
30 - 34 5 6.7
35 - 39 6 8.0
40 - 44 8 10.7
45 - 49 16 21.3
50 - 54 17 22.7
55 - 59 10 13.3
60 - 64 4 5.3
65 + 7 9.3
Total 75 100.0
TABLE 2: Educational Status of Farmers in Krian District










TABLE 3: Distribution of Family Size
H/H Size No. of Fanners %
1 - 3 5 6.8
4 - 6 29 39.7
7 - 9 28 38.4
10 - 12 13 17.3
Total 75 100.0
TABLE 4: Distribution of Occupational Pattern of Fanners
Occupation No. of Fanners O/*9
Solely Padi 20 26.7
Mainly Padi 48 64.0
Padi Part-Time 7 9.3
Total 75 100.0
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TABLE 5: Distribution of Other Economic Activities of Fanners
Activities No. of Farmers
Other Agric. 17 35.4
Petty Business 14 29.2
Carpentry 5 10.4
Govt. Employee 10 20.8
Others 3 6.3
Total 48 100.0
Years No. of Farmers 0/
< 10 7 9.3
11 - 20 14 18.7
21 - 30 19 25.3
31 - 40 26 34.7
> 40 9 12.0
Total 75 100.0
TABLE 7: Distribution of Membership in AFA(PPK)





No. % No. %
Owner-Operator 19 25.7 16 21.3
Owner-Tenant 32 43.2 38 50.7
Pure-Tenant 23 31.1 21 28.0
Total 74 100.0 75 100.0
Note: 1 respondent did not plant padi in 1978
TABLE 9: Dist . and Category of Land Ownership . '78 & *86( % )
Land Sized Owner-Op. Owner-Tenant Pure-Tenant Total
(Ha) 1978 1986 1978 1986 1978 1986 1978 1986
< 1.0 29.4 35.7 - 38.0 42.9 16.0 19.7
1.1 - 1.5 17.6 14.3 6.3 8.3 14.3 9.5 9.9 9.9
1.6 - 2.0 23.5 28.6 56.3 41.7 42.9 38.1 38.3 38.0
2.1 - 2.5 11.8 14.3 12.5 25.0 4.8 - 21.0 15.5
2.6 - 3.0 11.8 7.1 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.9 5.6
3.1 - 3.5 - - 9.4 11.1 - 3.7 5.6
3.6 - 4.0 5.9 0 0 2.8 0 4.8 1.2 2.8
> 4.1 - - 9.4 5.6 - 3.7 2.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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TABLE 10: Distribution of Farm Size Worked. 1978 & 1986
Average Size 1978/79_________1986/87
TABLE 11: Labour Utilisation in Padi Cultivation. 1986/87
Activity Fajnily Labour Hired Labour Family + Wage Total
............. in percentages..............
Prepare Field 53.3 21.3 25.3 100
Rooting 90.7 4.0 5.3 100
Planting 17.3 48.0 30.7 100
Fertilising 90.7 2.7 6.7 100
Poisoning 88.0 2.7 9.3 100
Harvesting________ 8.0__________88.0___________4.0________ 100
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